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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has seen rapid development of Medical Science. In the name of scientific 
progress, human embryos have been used as objects of medical research. These experiments 
are having a serious effect and strikes at the core of the human being. The vulnerable human 
embryos are at stake. On the one hand, scientists voice their opinion, namely, that the life of an 
embryo can be risked considering the benefit to the whole humanity, because they are only a 
lump of cells. On the other hand, voices are raised against them from other quarters, such as 
philosophers and theologians, who consider the embryo as a human, and therefore, cannot be 
endangered for the benefit of the society. In the wake of a heightened appreciation of the dignity 
of the human person, which has become the hallmark of this century, these opinion and voices 
have raised a fierce debate in many countries and in the Catholic Church. Meanwhile, the 
concept of human dignity has deeply pervaded biomedical ethics and has become one of the 
most significant current topic of debate. The debatable questions are, is a human embryo a 
human being, a human person? Does it have a right to life right from the beginning or at a later 
stage? Does human life have an inviolable dignity and an inherent worth from the beginning of 
its existence? 
The use of the last phrase, “beginning of life or beginning of its existence” with regard to an 
embryo, is problematic. The question arises as to whether, the beginning of life is at: (a) 
fertilization, (b) nidation, (c) formation of the primitive streak, (d) beginning of the formation 
of the neocortex, (e) viability, or (f) birth?1 These questions often remain debated without a 
clear-cut answer. Therefore, the phrase, “beginning of life” is preferred, in order to leave the 
question open, i.e., whether human life begins “from the moment of human conception” or at a 
later period.2 
The discussion above therefore revolves around two important questions. First, is a human 
embryo (in order to be very specific, namely, what is handled here is about an embryo arising 
out of the result of human fertilization process and not of other species), human? Second, if so, 
does it have human dignity from the beginning of life, or at a later stage? Therefore, the 
challenge set forth in this research is to construct a foundation of human dignity as a moral 
principle, which is acceptable universally and to determine whether the inviolability of human 
life and thereby its inherent dignity could be assured from the very beginning of its existence. 
The problem is even larger. The issues involved in deciding the fate of an embryo lies not only 
with medicine but also with philosophy, anthropology, law and theology. The concept of human 
dignity “has deep roots in the theology of many religions, moral and political philosophy and 
anthropology” besides legal discourse.3 From a religious perspective, the Catholic Church has 
                                                 
1 Cf. Hans-Martin SASS, “Asian and Western Bioethics: Converging, Conflicting, Competing?”, in: Eubios 
Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 14 (2004) 12-22; 20. 
2 The phrase “beginning of life” is used at least 6 times in various ways in the CONGREGATION FOR THE 
DOCTRINE OF FAITH, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation. Donum 
Vitae. Replies to Certain Questions of the Day (22 February 1987), Pauline Books and Media, Boston, 
Massachusetts 1987. Donum Vitae will hereafter be referred to as DV. 
3 David KRETZMER/Eckart KLEIN, (ed.), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague/London/New York 2002, vi. 
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shown its keen interest and centred herself on the theme of human dignity from the beginning 
of life in its recent Instruction on certain Bioethical Questions, Dignitas Personae4. 
This research seeks to address the question of human dignity from the beginning of life by 
turning to German Moral Theological perspectives, who are forerunners in this issue. This 
research explores moreover, the Indian Moral Theological perspectives, in order to compare 
and contrast the issue of human dignity as conceived by them. Since, as elucidated above, the 
issue is to be seen at a broader level, i.e., to be more universal, Hinduism is chosen, which is a 
representative of the world’s third largest religion after Christianity and Islam and the largest 
religion in India. Since, Catholic Theology and Hindu Theology stem from different 
philosophical backgrounds, a comparison in this situation is out of question. However, a 
dialogue with each other is possible to find common grounds for a universal application of 
human dignity from the beginning of life. 
Outline of Structure of the Research 
In order to facilitate the research, it has been divided it into four parts. Part I deals with the 
General Concepts to lay a basic foundation for the other parts. Part I will deal with deriving a 
working definition of human dignity, the historical and philosophical foundation of human 
dignity, the theological foundation of human dignity, the Bioethical foundations of human 
dignity and finally the question of the ensoulment of an embryo. Part II will engage with the 
Catholic German Moral Theological Perspectives on the issue of human dignity from the 
beginning of life. Here, the bioethical foundations of human dignity in German Moral 
Theology, human dignity in the teachings of the Catholic Church in Germany, the Concept of 
Person from a German Perspective, and finally, human dignity and beginning of life issues will 
be discussed. Part III will look into the Catholic Moral Theological Perspectives from India. 
This Part will also deal with the same topics as in the previous part, but from an Indian 
perspective. The last Part IV addresses the Hindu Perspectives from a dialogue point of view. 
This Part will deliberate on the basic notions of classical Hinduism, bioethical foundations in 
classical Hinduism, the new Hindu theological systems, contemporary Hindu view on human 
dignity and finally the contemporary praxis with regard to beginning of life issues in India 
today. Each Part will begin with an introduction and end with a conclusion. 
Methodology of the Research:  
The method of research will be comparative. Although, the field of research is in a restricted 
area of Bioethics in Moral Theology, ample use of the literature from other sources, like 
philosophy, anthropology and medicine, will be applied in order to substantiate the research. A 
descriptive method will outline at the outset the basic notions on human dignity. Based on these 
findings, the different Catholic Moral Theological perspectives of human dignity in Germany 
and India would be examined critically and analytically, in order to find a common ground for 
a dialogue with Hinduism. A comparative study between Catholic Moral Theology in Germany 
                                                 
4 CDF, Instruction Dignitas Personae on Certain Bioethical Questions (8 September 2008), Carmel 
International Publishing House, Trivandrum, Kerala 2008. Dignitas Personae will be referred hereafter as DP. 
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and India will be carried out in Part III and the outcome will be compared with Hinduism in 
Part IV. As far as possible, a gender inclusive language will be used.5  
One can identify similarities between the moral status of human embryos and the supposedly 
foundational status of adult humans only when the moral status of adult humans has been 
determined. Whether human embryos have the same human dignity that speaks of an 
unconditional right to life as adults, can be judged only if it is clear in what way the ownership 
of this right is found in adult human beings.6 Therefore, the methodology in this research will 
begin first with the human dignity of an adult in a general way and then apply that to human 
dignity from the beginning of life within the field of Bioethics in Catholic Moral Theology and 
Hinduism. This basic pattern will be followed in all Parts of this research. 
Significance of the Study: 
The scope of the term “dignity” and furthermore “human dignity” is quite large. Therefore, it 
is not within the scope of this work to deal with the complete history of the development of the 
concept of these terms. The attempt in this research is to highlight those key events that shaped 
bioethics to adopt human dignity as its fundamental principle.7 The emergence of the respect 
for human life and its protection arose gradually in the phases of the history of Europe and 
America. Therefore, one can validly ask, is the respect, worth and dignity of human life, a 
universal concept, or is it only a “western” concept? In an age of globalization, one needs to 
become aware and clarify the significance of human dignity that can be applied to the human 
race universally. Therefore, it becomes relevant to study the notion as perceived in another part 
of the world, namely, India and especially in Hinduism. 
The Limitations 
Any comparative study has certain limitations. The ideas and concept that exist in one tradition, 
culture or philosophy may not match or be found exactly in another. So also, to look into 
different perspectives of this research and do a comparative study of human dignity between 
Germany and India has certain limitations. As already mentioned, the idea of human dignity as 
it is understood today is claimed to be universal. Therefore, in order to find roots of this concept 
in an Indian tradition certain key concepts and variables are required – like worth, value, 
                                                 
5 This research follows a “gender inclusive language”. However, it is to be noted that several Church documents 
use the term ‘man’ more extensively and it refers to ‘the human person’ rather than the gender. For example, GS 
12 begins with the question: “But what is man?” Wherever direct quotations are involved, the intention of the 
author is repeated, without any offence to anyone. The same problem applies also to works related to Hinduism 
written in English. For a brief discussion on the topic, see Alan GEWIRTH, “Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights”, 
in: Michael J. MEYER/William A. PARENT, The Constitution of Rights. Human Dignity and American Values, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1992, 10-28; 18 at fn. 15. It should also be noted that both the British 
and American spelling will be used when it is a question of direct quotations by an author. Otherwise, the British 
spelling is preferred. As an example: An author may use the term fetus and fetal instead of foetus or foetal. The 
latter is preferred unless they are used in direct quotations. 
6 Cf. Rainer ENSKAT, „Pro Identitätsargument. Auch menschliche Embryonen sind jederzeit Menschen“, in: 
Gregor DAMSCHEN/Dieter SCHÖNECKER (Hg.), Der moralische Status menschlicher Embryonen. Pro und contra 
Spezies-, Kontinuums-, Identitäts- und Potentialitätsargument, de Gruyter, Berlin 2003, 101-127; 101. 
7 Cf. Johannes REITER, „Bioethik“, in: Klaus ARNTZ/Marianne HEIMBACH-STEINS/Johannes REITER/Herbert 
SCHLÖGEL, Orientierung finden. Ethik der Lebensbereiche, Theologische Module, Band 5, Herder, Freiburg im 
Br./Basel/Wien 2008, 7-60; 7-8. 
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respect, sacredness of human life, etc. To a certain extent, this problem has been taken care of 
by laying a basis for the research in Part I of this work. Other parts will clarify the variables in 
their contexts. One can find voluminous literature with regard to human rights and human 
dignity. However, there is no one common author or book to which this research is confined 
and the literature is limited to the concept of human dignity in the field of Bioethics in Catholic 
Moral Theology and Hinduism, especially to issues concerning the beginning of life. 
 
 
 5 
PART I 
Human Dignity from the Beginning of  Life: General Concepts 
The aim of the introductory Part I is to focus and lay the foundation for the research on facts 
that are essential for the parts that follow, namely, Parts II, III and IV. Based on the grounds 
that will established, other parts of the research can be compared. The objective is to highlight 
only those issues that are pertinent to the field of Bioethics when dealing with the question of 
human dignity from the beginning of life. At the outset, it must be remembered that there are 
ample literature available on the topics. However, the research will restrict itself only to those 
that are relevant to the topic of research within the field of Catholic Bioethics. 
The main issues addressed in Part I are: 1) To arrive at a working definition of human dignity, 
2) A brief study on the historical and philosophical foundation of human dignity, 3) A short 
theological understanding of human dignity, 4) Bioethical foundations of human dignity, and 
5) When is a soul infused in an Embryo? 
6  
C H A P T E R  1  
ARRIVING AT A WORKING DEFINITION 
OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Human dignity is not a direct theological concept and does not belong to the biblical language. 
It is more a secular concept.8 Human rights are based upon or derived from human dignity.9 
Although in modern times the concept of human dignity has become a powerful, evocative and 
widely used concept, the precise meaning and requirement is elusive. It is difficult to define the 
term human dignity.10 Therefore, in this Chapter, the concepts and the meaning contained in the 
term “dignity of the human person” will be clarified in order to arrive at a working definition 
of human dignity. The Chapter will further view human dignity in its historical, philosophical, 
theological and bioethical understanding. 
1.2 THE MULTIFACETED MEANING OF THE TERM “HUMAN DIGNITY” 
The word ‘dignity’ derived from the Latin root dingus and dignitas means something similar to 
“worthiness of honour and esteem”.11 It also means ‘intrinsic worth’. Lewis and Short define 
the Latin noun dignitas as literally meaning “being worthy, worth, worthiness, merit, desert”; 
and, used metonymically, “dignity, greatness, grandeur, authority, rank.” The adjective Dignus 
is defined as “worthy, deserving (in a good or ill sense), of things, suitable, fitting, becoming, 
proper”; and the verb dignor as “to deem worthy or deserving”.12 Thus, the Latin noun dignitas, 
the adjective dingus and the verb dignor; all these in general refer to worth. It is from the Latin 
word dignitas that the two International Diplomatic expressions human dignity and dignité 
humaine find their source.13 Although in Ancient Rome there was a strong awareness of 
dignitas, they did not vouchsafe the dignity of all men and women. Dignitas in Rome was first 
                                                 
8 Cf. Manfred BALKENOHL, „Menschenwürde und Lebensrecht“, in: DERS./Roland RÖSLER, (Hg.), Handbuch 
für Lebensschutz und Lebensrecht, Bonifatius, Paderborn 2010, 77-82; 77. See also Herbert SCHLÖGEL, „Zum 
Menschenwürdeargument in der Theologischen Ethik (2002)“, in: DERS., Wie weit trägt Einheit? Ethische Begriffe 
im evangelisch-katholischen Dialog, Ethik im theologischen Diskurs. Ethics in Theological Discourse, Bd. 9, Lit, 
Münster 2004, 84-91, 84. 
9 Cf. GEWIRTH, “Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights…”, 10.  
10 Cf. M. Douglas MEEKS, “Introduction”, in: Jürgen MOLTMANN, On Human Dignity. Political Theology and 
Ethics, tr. by M. Douglas MEEKS, SCM Press Ltd., London 1984, ix-xiv; ix. Cf. John KUSUMALAYAM, Human 
Rights. Individual or/and Group Rights? An Attempt towards a Holistic Understanding of Human Rights Based 
on the Christian Concept of the Human Person as the Imago Trinitas, St. Pauls, Mumbai 2008, 181-182. 
11 Cf. Audrey R. CHAPMAN, “Human Dignity, Bioethics, and Human Rights”, in: Amsterdam Law Forum 3/1 
(2011) 3-12; 5. The English word “dignity” comes from the Middle English word, “dignite”, which is a derivative 
from Old French word, “dignite”. This word and the Anglo-French word “dignité” have their roots in the Latin 
“dignitas”, “dignus”, which basically mean being worthy. See C. ONIONS (ed.), Oxford Dictionary of English 
Etymology, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996, 267-268. In the German language, the word “Würde”, which 
is translated as “dignity” in English, has the basic meaning of being worthy. For other etymological derivations of 
the word “dignity” in Latin and Greek, see Mette LEBECH, On the Problem of Human Dignity. A Hermeneutical 
and Phenomenological Investigation, Königshausen & Neumann, Wurzburg 2009, 30-42. 
12 Charlton T. LEWIS/Charles SHORT, A Latin Dictionary, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1980, 578. 
13 Cf. Heike BARANZKE, „Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte. Vom Anspruch der Freiheit in Recht, Ethik 
und Theologie“, in: DERS./Christof BREITSAMETER/Ulrich FEESER-LICHTERFELD/Martin HEYER/Beate KOWAL-
SKI, Handeln verantworten. Grundlagen-Kriterien-Kompetenzen, Theologische Module. Band 11, Herder, 
Freiburg i. Br./Basel/Wien 2010, 47-93; 63. 
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of all a political concept with the claim of respect of a person belonging to a noble family, or 
as the holder of an office or status given to a dignitary. This form of dignity was the recognition 
of the social status and honour owing to the personal performance of the dignitary. In a moral 
sense, as a moral virtue, the generosity and magnanimity that accompanied dignitas was gained 
by the dignitary through appropriate lifestyle, the manner of conducting oneself, for example, 
using a restrained voice and serious speech, as well as in an expression of aesthetic life-style.14 
Even today in political, social and aesthetic fields these aspects of dignity remain as 
reminiscences. But the dignity of this type is unequally distributed and can be lost with the loss 
of one’s office. While these types of dignities expressed in contingent forms and accidental 
dignities are in plural, it is always in spoken of in singular with regard to the dignitas hominis, 
that is, the dignity of human beings. It is here that dignitas belongs to all human beings in an 
equal manner which cannot be acquired or lost but can only be injured. In contrast to the Ancient 
Roman dignitas, the universal dignity of all people is inherent or intrinsic.15  
Thus the term “human dignity” attributed to the human person, is an expression of a very 
fundamental value or ideal, universally recognized without requiring any independent support.16 
Accordingly, Berma Klein Goldewijk is of the opinion that “Dignity is inherent to each and 
every person simply because of his or her being human. As such, dignity is a category of being, 
not just of having”.17 It follows that human dignity is not something that one achieves or 
appropriates from one’s status, nationality, ethnicity or any other form of power or privilege. 
Basically, it belongs to their being human. Though it can be severely damaged, it cannot be 
taken away.18 
The term “Human Dignity” usually translated into German as “Menschenwürde”19 is not an 
exact English equivalent. It is used widely in German philosophy, political science and ethics. 
In general, the word “Menschenwürde” apart from its correspondence to “Human Dignity”, 
                                                 
14 Cf. Viktor PÖSCHL/Panajotis KONDYLIS, „Würde“, in: Otto BRUNNER/Werner CONZE/Reinhart KOSELLECK 
(Hg.), Geschichtliche Grund-begriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Band 
7, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1992, 637-677; 636. 
15 Cf. BARANZKE, „Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…“, 63-64. The development of human dignity as 
inherent and intrinsic to human beings will be developed later in this chapter. 
16 Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 181. See also Oscar SCHACHTER, “Human Dignity as a Normative 
Concept”, in: American Journal of International Law 77 (1983) 848-854; 848-849. 
17 Berma Klein GOLDEWIJK, “From Seattle to Porto Alegre: Emergence of a New Focus on Human Dignity 
and the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, in: Berma Klein GOLDEWIJK/Adalid 
CONTRERAS BASPINEIRO/P. César CARBONARI (ed.), Dignity and Human Rights. The Implementation of Economic, 
social and Cultural Rights, Intersentia, Antwerp/Oxford/New York 2002, 3-16; 6. Cf. also KUSUMALAYAM, 
Human Rights..., 182. 
18 Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 182. However, Douglas Meeks is of the opinion that “dignity”, which 
denotes the honor of rank or referred to the status of a dignitary and therefore a privilege or prerogative or even 
simply a sense of decorum, is gained by action or status. It is only after the Enlightenment that the word “dignity” 
has gained the meaning of worth of being human. See MEEKS, “Introduction...”, ix. 
19 This translation is found in Oxford-Duden German Dictionary, Oxford University Press, New York 2005, 
491. 
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sometimes refers to “sanctity of life”, or “security of person”, or “personal security”20 denoting 
the inalienable autonomy of human beings.21 In ethical discourse, especially in social and 
political ethics, the term “Human Dignity” is quite generally used. While not really being the 
case, bodies such as: a) politicians, b) International Commission of Jurists, c) numerous 
Constitutions (that have arisen since the end of the Second World War), so also, d) International 
Conventions that have followed the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
1948, e) groups and agencies affiliated to the United Nations, use the term “Human Dignity” 
as though it were an ethical technical term with a distinct meaning. However, the term “Human 
Dignity” conveys only partially and more or less the meaning of “Menschenwürde” in the 
German language.22 
It is important to note here that even though the word “dignity” was analyzed etymologically, 
one should not be pedantic or fall into the error of settling for semantics. When one speaks 
about the dignity of the human person, then one is speaking of the worth or value of the concrete 
existing human being. By the phrase “dignity of the human person”, it is implied that human 
beings have a value or worth qualitatively different from anything else. It also implies that the 
dignity of the human person is inalienable, that is, it can never be lost, and is never permissible 
to merely use or abuse a human being to attain some end or purpose.23 
Having examined the etymology of the word and its multifaceted meaning, the next section will 
pay attention to the ambiguity of language entailed in the concept. 
1.3 THE AMBIGUITY OF LANGUAGE INVOLVED IN THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN 
DIGNITY? 
The term “human dignity” or the “dignity of the human person” speaks of the dignity proper to 
the human person. Immediately, several questions come to the mind. Who is a “human” or who 
is a “human person” about whom the dignity is acknowledged? Does it carry the same meaning 
when referring to a human individual as a human being or a human person?24 One can anticipate 
similar problem when it comes to the German word “Menschenwürde”. The word “Mensch” in 
this compound word when translated in English can mean either “a human”, “a human being”, 
                                                 
20 Legal scholar Roscoe Pound uses the term “personal security” in the Philosophy of Law. See Roscoe POUND, 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, 8th Edition, Yale University Press, Yale 1966, 32. Cf. Martin 
HAILER/Dietrich RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity and the Specific Arguments in Medical 
Ethics”, in: Kurt BAYERTZ (ed.), Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Dordrecht/Boston/London 1996, 91-106; 91. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, in 
its Article 3 recognizes dignity as the “security of person”. 
21 Cf. HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity…”, 91. 
22 Cf. ibid. Cf. also Konrad HILPERT, “Die Idee der Menschenwürde aus der Sicht christlicher Theologie”, in: 
Hans Jörg SANDKÜHLER, (Hg.), Menschenwürde. Philosophische, theologische und juristische Analysen, 
Philosophie und Geschichte der Wissenschaften. Studien und Quellen, Bd. 64, Peterlang, Frankfurt a. M. 2007, 
41-55; 41. 
23 Cf. John C. DWYER, “Person, Dignity of”, in: Judith A. DWYER (ed.), The New Dictionary of Catholic Social 
Thought, The Liturgical Press, Collegeville, Minnesota 1994, 724-737; 724. Cf. Lucas THUMMA, “Human Person, 
Human Dignity and Human Society: Biblical Foundations and Theological Perspectives in the Social Teaching of 
the Church”, in: Indian Theological Studies 39 3/4 (2002) 219-256; 219-220. 
24 Cf. Norman M. FORD, When Did I Begin? Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and 
Science, Cambridge University, New York 1991, 11. Ford is of the opinion that in ordinary discourse they are 
inter-changeable terms but not so on the lips of all philosophers. Cf. ibid. 
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“a man” or “a person”.25 The reason for raising the above mentioned questions is that in 
contemporary bioethical debate, the crux of the argument is based on the fact that one cannot 
be a human person without first being a human individual.26 Interestingly in the day-to-day the 
terms ‘self’, ‘individual’, ‘human being’ and ‘human person’ are very often interchangeably 
used; all meaning more or less the same thing. Are they really the same? 27 The problem at hand 
is that although the above terms are interrelated, yet in Bioethics each of those terms have 
gained a different or distinct meaning.28 
Therefore, in order to clarify these terms, Indian Moral theologian John Kusumalayam begins 
with the definition of an individual to derive the other terms. He quotes Catherine McCall’s 
definition of an individual. She says, “The term individual is used to refer to the single entity 
which is the subject of cognition in various modes. An individual may be perceived as a self-
conscious being, as a person, as a human being, jointly or separately, but it is maintained here 
that there exists one entity, however many different ways there may be of understanding or of 
perceiving such a being.”29 In this definition, McCall uses the terms “person” and “human 
being”. While these two terms themselves need a further clarification, the definition is not so 
useful.30 Therefore, another definition given by Louis M. Guenin, who is an ethicist in the 
Department of Microbiology and Immunobiology at the Harvard Medical School, is preferred,. 
He says, “I define a human individual as an individual of humankind, understood as a natural 
kind identical to or corresponding to the species homo sapiens. Human individuals could exist 
at developmental stages from activated oocyte to adult. This is an ontological observation, not 
a moral claim.”31 Owing to its open-endedness, one can accept this definition of human 
individual in the field of Bioethics, which perhaps may be acceptable to all.  
In order to refer to the individual as a biological entity, the term human being is generally used. 
It means that the human being is a member of a certain species, growing and living according 
to the biological laws, which govern such processes. Thus, if a human individual possesses the 
biological characteristics of a member of the species Homo sapiens, then the individual is 
identified as a human being.32 
                                                 
25 Interestingly the German language has “Mensch” as a word for the generic human being and “Mann” for the 
specific male human being unlike in English, which is “man” for both generic and specific term. Cf. GEWIRTH, 
“Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights…”, 18 at fn. 15. 
26 Cf. Archie GONSALVES, How did I begin? A Pro-Life Approach to Western and an Indian Perspective, 
Dhyanavana Publications, Mysore 2002, xlvi. 
27 Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 35. 
28 Melbourne Ethicist Norman Ford, for example, discusses about the various connotations of these terms that 
are derived in the context of Bioethics and concludes about the fusion of human ovum and human sperm and the 
resultant human life in these words: “This human life could very well be an individual human being, a person – 
but this cannot be taken for granted”. FORD, When Did I Begin?..., 11. 
29 Catherine MCCALL, Concepts of Person. An Analysis of Concepts of Persons, Self and Human Being, Gower 
Pub., Aldershot 1990, 12. Emphasis in the original. Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 35-36. 
30 Another problem can be foreseen with the definition, namely, McCall uses the term “subject of cognition in 
various modes” for an individual. This raises a question with regard to the individuality of an embryo because the 
fertilized ovum cannot be said to be a possessor of cognition in various modes. 
31 Louis M. GUENIN, “The Nonindividuation Argument Against Zygotic Personhood”, in: The Royal Institute 
of Philosophy 82 (2007) 463-503; 463-464. Emphasis in the original. 
32 Cf. MCCALL, Concepts of Person…, 15. Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 36. 
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Any system of moral reflection has to turn finally to some point of reference for defining its 
most fundamental terms.33 Therefore, the next query is: Are all human individuals also human 
persons?  
Ford claims that although there is an agreement that all human persons are human individuals, 
there is no unanimity that all human individuals are also human persons.34 If this is the case, 
one is faced with another problem namely, the question of right to life and human dignity of 
the human individual. Lucose Chamakala, a Moral Theologian from India, enumerates this 
problem. In deliberating over human life and human person he cites the views of the Australian 
philosopher and bioethicist Helga Kuhse. Contrary to the above view, Kuhse, while agreeing 
with Ford, is of the opinion that not all living human beings are human persons but only those 
who have a right to life. A person is neither identical with being a member of the species Homo 
sapiens nor to be identified with a species-based boundary. Persons are beings who are capable 
of understanding that they are continuing selves. This means that human persons are those who 
are self-aware, rational, autonomous, purposeful, moral beings, with hopes, ambitions, 
preferences, life purposes, and ideals. Consequently, if one accepts these facts then according 
to Kuhse human fetuses, human infants and humans with severe retardation or brain damage 
are not persons, and hence do not have a right to life.35 
H. Tristram Engelhardt, a philosopher and bioethicist, too holds a similar view as Kuhse. 
According to Engelhardt, the above described characteristics of a human person is not possessed 
by embryos or those who do not have them any more (the sick in persistent vegetative state 
[PVS]), or those who will never have them (anencephalopathics). According to Engelhardt, 
they are not persons in the strict sense. They are social persons, whose guardianship is 
subordinated to the ‘usefulness’ and interests of the moral subjects. Engelhardt in his book, 
titled The Foundations of Ethics, mentions: 
Not all human beings are persons.  Foetuses, infants, the profoundly mentally retarded and 
the hopelessly comatose provide examples of non-human persons.  Such entities are members 
of the human species… They do not have a status in themselves and for themselves nor a 
standing in the moral community […].  One speaks of persons in order to identify entities 
one can warrant blame and praise […]. For this reason it is nonsensical to speak of respecting 
the autonomy of foetuses, infants, or profoundly retarded adults who have never been 
rational. They are not primary participants in the moral enterprise.  Only human persons have 
this status.36 
                                                 
33 Cf. Joseph SELLING, “The human person”, in: Bernard HOOSE (ed.), Christian Ethics. An Introduction, 
Cassell, London 1998, 95-109; 95. 
34 Cf. FORD, When Did I Begin?..., 11. Cf. also Armin G. WILDFEUER, „‘Person’ und ‘Mensch’“, in: Eberhard 
SCHOCKENHOFF/Alois Johannes BUCH/Matthias VOLKENANDT/Verena WETZSTEIN (Hg.), Medizinische Ethik im 
Wandel. Grundlagen-Konkretionen-Perspektiven, Schwabenverlag, Ostfildern 2005, 86-96; 86. Wildfeuer also 
mentions about similar attitude present in bioethical discussions. 
35 Cf. Helga KUHSE, The Sanctity-of-Life Doctrine in Medicine. A Critique, Oxford University Press, New 
York 1987, 14, 211-212. Cf. Lucose CHAMAKALA, The Sanctity of Life vs. The Quality of Life, Dharmaram 
Publications, Bangalore 2005, 69 &102. The distinction between human individual and human person is important 
here. Later on when the moral status of the embryo will be dealt, the question arises as to whether an embryo is a 
person or not. For example, Donum Vitae raises the question: “how could a human individual not be a human 
person?”(DV I,1 and DP I, 5). 
36 H. Tristram ENGELHARDT, The Foundations of Bioethics, Oxford University Press, Oxford 19962, 107-108. 
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Therefore, according to Engelhardt, PVS patients are not human persons, they are mere entities 
of the human species; they are social persons. They can be subordinated to the “usefulness” and 
interests of the moral subjects. They have no autonomy of their own.37 It is important to mention 
here that theory of Engelhardt on personhood fails to take into account that the human person 
has a capacity and openness to knowledge and love of other persons. This capacity is something 
innate, neither vested upon by others nor on their acceptance.38 
This brings us to the question once again, who then is a human person who has a right to life 
and dignity? It is interesting to note how the English social anthropologist Alfred Reginald 
Radcliffe Brown – who developed the theory of Structural Functionalism – interprets a human 
being. Every human being, according to Radcliffe-Brown, living in society is both an individual 
and a person. As an individual, he or she is a biological organism, consisting of a vast number 
of molecules organized in a complex structure, and during its lifetime, there occur physiological 
and psychological actions and reactions, processes and changes. As a person, the human being 
is a complex of social relationships. He further states: 
If you tell me that an individual and a person are after all really the same thing, I would 
remind you of the Christian creed. God is three persons, but to say that He is three individuals 
is to be guilty of heresy for which men have been put to death. Yet the failure to distinguish 
individual and person is not merely a heresy in religion; it is worse than that; it is a source of 
confusion in science.39 
This brings us to the question: How are ‘individuals’ and ‘persons’ related? According to social 
scientist and educationist Ralph Ruddock, an individual is ontologically a field of experience. 
On the one hand, an individual develops as a person insofar as personhood is imputed to him 
by others, and by himself. On the other hand, an individual continues to exist, if the personhood 
is not socially developed due to non-recognition or functional incapacity, while experiencing 
non-normal, non-egoic states of consciousness. It is possible that even in the normal person; 
non-egoic states constantly interchange with egoic states. However, it is ethically imperative, 
in all cases, that a recognizable human individual should be accorded the status of a person.40 
To state this in another way: An individual acquires a special status when he/she is termed as a 
‘person’. One’s attitude towards a person, according to Ninian Smart, a professor of Religious 
Studies in the University of Lancaster would be: “[…] recognizing an individual as a person 
involves being prepared to act towards him in certain ways.”41 This idea is important for us 
                                                 
37 The concept of “autonomy”, being a philosophical concept needs further explanation and will be taken up in 
the next Chapter (See Chapter 2.3. below) 
38 Cf. Benedict ASHLEY/Kevin D. O’ROURKE, Health Care Ethics. A Theological Analysis, Georgetown 
University Press, Washington D.C. 19974, 9. 
39 Alfred Reginald RADCLIFFE-BROWN, Structure and Function in Primitive Society: Essays and Addresses, 
Cohen and West Ltd., London 1952, 188-204; 194. Cf. Dan GOWLER, “On the Concept of the Person. A Biosocial 
View”, in: Ralph RUDDOCK (ed.), Six Approaches to the Person, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London/Boston 1972, 
37-69; 38.  Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 36. 
40 Cf. Ralph RUDDOCK, “Concluding Commentary”, in: RUDDOCK (ed.), Six Approaches, op. cit., 199-203; 
203. Ruddock also distinguishes between two meanings of the term “person”. One is the complex of rights and 
duties imputed to the human individual, embodied in ethical prescriptions and cultural value systems. This meaning 
is in principle universal. The other is the freely acting participant in a social system, whose capacity for such action 
has developed based on some attribution to personhood. See Ibid. Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 36.  
41 Ninian SMART, “Creation, Persons, and the Meaning of Life”, in: RUDDOCK (ed.), Six Approaches op. cit., 
13-36; 23. Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 36. 
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here. Insofar as one recognizes an individual as a person one can acknowledge human dignity 
due to that person and consequently his/her rights. 
It is interesting to note that Louis Janssens makes a distinction between human person and the 
human being as an individual.42 On the one hand, the human person is the ontological principle 
which penetrates and synthesizes the activity of the whole, constituting in his or her totality, the 
human being. The individual, on the other hand, is that aspect of the human being by its position 
in time and space. Therefore, the person is an ‘extended and intensified’ individuality.43 This 
distinction between human person and individual is important in order to acknowledge human 
dignity in a person. 
Further, in contemporary usage a human being may be referred to as a “person” in three 
different ways. First, the word refers to the distinct, unique and incommunicable selfhood of 
the individual. Second, a person is a subject of rights and duties and consequently an end and 
never a means. Third, a person is, as a consequence of consciousness and moral sense, one who 
is capable of meaningfully experiencing and influencing the environment. These three elements 
are also important for understanding human dignity. In contemporary discussions on human 
rights and of the dignity on which they are based, the concept of “person” is anthropocentric. 
That is, the human being is understood as the independent, autonomous subject whose 
independence must be safeguarded from all violations.44 Moreover, it is to be noted that the 
“rationalism of Enlightenment placed this autonomous subject at the center of a world that had 
been stripped of mystery and in which God was at best a somewhat benign if distant observer 
of the human scene.”45 
The above nuance of the human person who is endowed with human dignity also has problems 
in the field of Bioethics. If one limits the human person with the three different ways in which 
he/she is to be understood as enumerated above, could one then include an embryo too as a 
possessor of these characteristics? Thus, one can go on adding nuances and clarifying problems 
but never come to a consensus about the ambiguities involved in the terms so far enumerated. 
In the last analysis, McCall’s observations are recalled here about human person and human 
being46: 
[…] whilst the concept of person and the concept of human being can be distinguished, in 
that they describe individuals under different sets of properties and characteristics, it would 
seem that an adequate account of the concept of person should make it clear that human 
beings are persons. The ordinary notion of what a person is refers to everyday people who 
are invariable human beings.47 
Further nuances and connotations that the terms human persons and human dignity entails, will 
be taken up in Part II and III specifically from the perspective of German Moral Theologians 
and Indian Moral Theologians respectively. In conclusion to this section, the following 
                                                 
42 Cf. Louis JANSSENS, Personne et Société. Théories actuelles et essai doctrinal, Gembloux, J. Duculot 1939, 
224-227 as cited in Dolores L. CHRISTIE, Adequately Considered. An American Perspective on Louis Janssens’ 
Personalist Morals, Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs, 4, Peeters Press/Grand Rapids/Eerdmans, 
Louvain 1990, 33. Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 38. 
43 Cf. ibid. 
44 Cf. DWYER, “Person, Dignity of…”, 724-725. Cf. THUMMA, “Human Person…”, 219-221. 
45 DWYER, “Person, Dignity of…”, 725. Cf. THUMMA, “Human Person…”, 221. 
46 Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 38. 
47 MCCALL, Concepts of Person…, 102. Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 38. 
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statement as proposed by Archie Gonsalves, an Indian Moral Theologian, can be accepted 
unquestionably. According to him, “every human individual is necessarily a human person”.48 
So also, another Indian Moral theologian Thomas Pazhayampallil acknowledges, “Personhood 
is a quality which belongs inherently to the human being. It is given with human nature. At 
every stage of life, from beginning to end, whatever the condition, an individual human being 
is a person.”49 This means that every human individual has human dignity. 
1.4 THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON – TOWARDS A WORKING DEFINITION: 
The task in this section is to draw out a working definition of human dignity that could form a 
basis for further research. As mentioned in the introduction, it is difficult to define the term 
human dignity. The reason is that it has various shades of meanings. For some it refers to the 
essential and inalienable core of human nature; while for others it is debated over what entails 
exactly the distinguishing feature of human nature. For the human rights theorists human 
dignity refers to the intrinsic worth and respect of all human beings. The flaw however, in this 
approach, is that the content of the requirements of human dignity has not been defined, 
although it is possible to draw them. There are others, who ground themselves on the ethical 
obligations owed to the human person. Then again, there are varying interpretations as to the 
scope of these duties as well as the identification of the duty-bearer(s). Therefore, it is necessary 
under such circumstances to remove the confusion with regard to the term human dignity and 
the multiplicity of meanings it conveys. It should also be acknowledged that although many 
international documents uphold human dignity, none of them clearly or explicitly defines the 
term human dignity. It is left to an intuitive understanding or an assumed shared understanding 
of the reader.50 
Having said that, it must once again be acknowledged that although it is difficult to spell out 
exactly what is meant by human dignity, it is possible to describe some of its salient features. 
Job Kozhamthadam, a Jesuit Indian scientist and philosopher enumerates these salient features. 
They are: 
Human dignity means that humans have a special status, a certain intrinsic value, a certain 
preciousness, and deserve to be treated as such. They enjoy a certain uniqueness based not 
merely on the complexity of their being … but on the simple fact that they are humans. It is 
a matter of being, rather than of having.51 
At the outset, it must be understood that although the term “human dignity” is difficult to define, 
yet it has content.52 The content entails a collection of inalienable and non-forfeitable rights. 
Therefore, to respect human dignity of a human person is to respect at least certain minimal 
                                                 
48 GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., xlvi. 
49 Thomas PAZHAYAMPALLIL, Pastoral Guide. Moral-Canonical-Liturgical. A Text Book. Revised Fourth 
Edition According to the Latin and Oriental Codes of Canon Law. Vol. II. Sacraments and Bioethics, Kristu Jyoti 
Publications, Bangalore, India 2004, 1394. 
50 Cf. MEEKS, “Introduction…”, 3-4. See also KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 181 and SCHACHTER, 
“Human Dignity…”, 849.  
51 Job KOZHAMTHADAM, “Genetic Revolution and Science-Religion Dialogue”, in: Satya Nilayam: Chennai 
Journal of Intercultural Philosophy 7 (2005) 13-28; 21. This view is similar to Goldewijk. See Chapter 1.2 at fn.17 
above. 
52 Cf. SCHACHTER, “Human Dignity…”, 849f. 
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rights.53 What are these rights? The German philosopher and ethicists Dieter Birnbacher 
categorizes these rights into four components which are minimal “basic goods” that no one 
should be deprived. They are: “1. provision of the biologically necessary means of existence, 
2. freedom from strong and continued pain, 3. minimal liberty, 4. minimal self-respect […]. 
Deprivation has to be understood in this context as comprising both action and omission.”54 
Although human dignity is frequently used in a purely negative sense, the principle also works 
both positively and negatively. Birnbacher specifies what he means by the principle of human 
dignity: 
It sets a minimal standard of acceptability both to what is done to people and to what people 
are allowed to suffer. It sets a limit to inhuman treatment (like torture, slavery, capital 
punishment), but also to inhuman omissions (like letting others starve, or allowing them to 
be humiliated or persecuted as members of racial, ethnic or religious minorities).55 
When the rights due to a human person are meted out then human dignity has been 
acknowledged. Although the rights claimed by human dignity are only minimal, yet the efforts 
required to implement their effective protection may be considerable.56 
Thus far, in trying to define the term human dignity, various variable terms such as respect for 
person and life, value of a person and life, inner/intrinsic worth of a person, inviolability of 
human life, sanctity of life etc., are being employed. Although each of these terms has their 
own specific meaning, they do not convey all that the term human dignity could convey. 
Nevertheless, since these terms have been often employed, it would be worthwhile to explore 
the possibility of their contribution to the definition of the term human dignity.  
In what was described above, a common thing that underlies these terms can be found, namely, 
that human life is important. Why is it so? It is because human life is inviolable. Human life 
may not be taken arbitrarily because it is a basic gift and good and the foundation of the 
enjoyment of all other goods. According to Felix Podimattam, an Indian Moral Theologian, by 
the term “human life” is meant life beginning from the time of fertilization of human ovum and 
human sperm.57 
Moral Theologian from Maryland, Germain Grisez, points out four important points concerning 
human life. First, life is intrinsic to the human person. Second, life permeates the whole person 
because it enables the human organism to exist. Third, life transcends the individual person and 
unites human beings with each other and with the natural world. Fourth, human life is a sharing 
in the sanctity, the holiness of the divine.58 How do these four characteristics help in 
understanding human dignity? 
                                                 
53 Cf. Dieter BIRNBACHER, “Ambiguities in the concept of Menschenwürde”, in: BAYERTZ (ed.), Sanctity of 
Life and Human Dignity..., 107-121; 110. Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 182. 
54 BIRNBACHER, “Ambiguities…”, 110. 
55 Ibid., 110. Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 182. 
56 BIRNBACHER, “Ambiguities…”, 110. 
57 Cf. Felix PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4). Abortion and Sex Therapy, Media House, Delhi 2004, 27. 
Podimattam also warns that the term “human life” used in this sense here should not be mixed with “human 
person”. It is because the word “person” muddies moral decision. Cf. ibid. Cf. also Richard A. MCCORMICK, How 
Brave a New World?, Doubleday Company, New York 1981, 357. See also IDEM, Health and Medicine in the 
Catholic Tradition. Tradition in Transition, ed. by M.E. MARTY/K.L. VAUX, The Crossroad Publishing Company, 
New York 1987, 131. Cf. CHAMAKALA, The Sanctity of Life…, 114-115. 
58 Cf. Germain GRISEZ, “The Value of Life. A Sketch”, in: Philosophy in Context 2 (1973) 7-15: 11-13. Cf. 
CHAMAKALA, The Sanctity of Life…, 16-17.  
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According to Grisez, respect for human life is firmly based on the natural law. Respect for 
human life is primarily a moral principle, because each human person by nature desires to 
preserve her or his own life. No one can reasonably expect others to respect her or his life except 
on the basis that there is a universal principle that human life has dignity and consequently the 
demand to be respected.59 
In the above statements one finds that Grisez is speaking of human life having human dignity 
which is something that is assumed as being inherent and therefore worthy of respect. In other 
words, human dignity is inherent because human life is intrinsic to the human person. This is 
just an example of one author among many who often use the term “respect/respect for life” 
and connect it with human dignity. 
1.5 THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
There have also been attempts to identify sanctity of life and human dignity. Perhaps this 
attempt has arisen due to the fact that that the term “sanctity of life” in the contemporary 
discussion is actually used in the sense of “inviolability” or “untouchability” of human life 
(“Unantastbarkeit des Lebens”).60 
In this context, it must be noted that the contemporary discussion about sanctity of life does not 
focus on an ethics pertaining to any religion. The discussion about sanctity of life was triggered 
after the publication of their books by Australian philosophers, namely, Peter Singer’s book 
Practical Ethics and Kuhse’s Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine.61 The sustained public 
interest came from the Singer in the mid-1970s in his book Animal Liberation. There, following 
the view that “it is always wrong to take an innocent human life”; he presented the doctrine of 
“sanctity of life” and explained62: 
People who take this view oppose abortion and euthanasia. They do not usually, however, 
oppose the killing of nonhumans – so perhaps it would be more accurate to describe this view 
as the “sanctity of human life” view. The belief that human life, and only human life, is 
sacrosanct is a form of speciesism.63 
Introducing the sanctity of life as a speciesist term, Singer puts the expression into a polemical 
relationship with animal ethics while particularly criticizing the human-related dimensional 
value of the expression. In doing so, he brings in an equal moral evaluation on both human 
beings and animals, of similar protection and care to both, while undermining the universality 
of human dignity proper only to human beings and devoid of any inviolable human dignity and 
                                                 
59 Cf. GRISEZ, “The Value of Life…”, 11-13. Cf. CHAMAKALA, The Sanctity of Life…, 17. 
60 Cf. Volker von LOEWENICH, “Sanctity of Life and the Neonatologist’s Dilemma”, in: BAYERTZ (ed.), 
Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity..., 229-239; 229. 
61 Peter SINGER, Practical Ethics, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993 and Third 
Edition 2011. KUHSE, The Sanctity-of-Life Doctrine…, op. cit. Helga KUHSE/Peter SINGER, Should the Baby Live? 
The problem of handicapped infants, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1985. Cf. LOEWENICH, “Sanctity of Life 
…”, 229. 
62 Cf. Heike BARANZKE, „Heiligkeit des Lebens. Eine Spurensuche“, in: Konrad HILPERT/Dietmar MIETH 
(Hg.), Kriterien biomedizinischer Ethik. Theologische Beiträge zum gesellschaftlichen Diskurs, Quaestiones 
Disputatae, Bd. 217, Herder, Freiburg i. Br./Basel/Wien 2006, 87-111; 87. 
63 Peter SINGER, Animal Liberation. A New Ethics of our Treatment of Animals, New York Review Book, New 
York 1975, 20. Emphasis in the original. Cf. also KUHSE/SINGER, Should the Baby Live?..., 119. 
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inalienable human rights in a preferential utilitarian ethics, and criticized as morally unjustified 
anthropocentric ideology.64 
Before proceeding further, the above objection needs to be clarified. Though this research is 
not dealing with animals (being outside the scope), yet in order to make the position clear here, 
the position held by Birnbacher is recommended. His position with regard to respect for humans 
and animals is: 
Menschenwürde is an inclusive, not an exlusive [stet] concept. To accept the principle of 
Menschenwürde does not mean to privilege the human species over against other species. On 
the contrary, so far as its contents are applicable to other biological species as well it does 
not foreclose but rather invites (though under another name) the extension of the same 
amount of minimal protection to other species. There is no incoherence in the moral stance 
that postulates that humans should be given a certain minimal protection simply because they 
are humans, i.e., irrespective of their merits and qualities, and that sentient animals should be 
given an analogous protection simply because they are sentient animals, irrespective of any 
value or disvalue they might have for humans.65 
Eberhard Schockenhoff, a German Moral Theologian, clarifies the confusion regarding the use 
of the term sanctity of life. According to him, the Protestant and Anglican commentators were 
the ones who objected that sanctity of life surrenders theological anthropology to suspicions of 
“vitalism in Christian garb” or a “mysticism of nature”. In fact, the formula of the sanctity of 
life is insufficiently protected against such associative overtones, such as shown in their spread 
in fundamentalist circles and in a civil religious language. Lately, the preferable use of this term 
in the language of the Magisterium can lead one to a misunderstanding. To avoid such 
misinterpretations, it is strongly reminded that the expression of the sanctity of life can only be 
properly understood if it neither means a mystifying exaggeration of natural phenomena of life, 
nor the displacement of the signs of death or the nearing of death, which characterizes the 
creaturely life of man. From its original meaning, “sanctity” means belonging to God, from 
which is derived the commission of dignity corresponding to life.66 
In conclusion, about the concept of sanctity of life, one can say that the term does not help in 
clarifying the concept of human dignity, and cannot be included in a working definition of 
human dignity. However, it is in another sense that the concept of sanctity of life (understood 
in the sense of sacredness or inviolability of life) is important (as will be seen later), that is to 
say, in the religious sense. This will be highlighted in Parts II, III and IV. 
The principle of human dignity enumerated so far has evolved through centuries. The Swedish 
Diplomat Jan Mårtenson has rightly expressed this evolution of the concept: 
Human dignity, while the most revolutionary of the concepts, is not the invention or creation 
of any one society, culture, philosophy, or religious approach to life. It is certainly not a 20th 
century invention. Rather, the imperative of respect for the dignity of the human person is 
visible in the traces of civilization going back to the dawn of recorded history. The quest for 
                                                 
64 Cf. BARANZKE, „Heiligkeit des Lebens…“, 87-88. 
65 BIRNBACHER, „Das Dilemma des Personenbegriffs…“, 114.  
66 Cf. Eberhard SCHOCKENHOFF, Ethik des Lebens. Grundlagen und neue Herausforderungen, Herder, Freiburg 
i. Br./Basel/Wien 2013, 258-259. 
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a definition of the essential dignity of the human person and ways of ensuring protection for 
that dignity can be seen throughout the story of humankind.67 
Thus, in order to explicate the ambit of human dignity, one needs to keep in mind that the task 
of defining it must be multidisciplinary, multi-religious and multicultural.68 However, one finds 
that the problem of defining human dignity is multi-fold. First, the present understanding of the 
concept is of a Western Origin. Second, one cannot sum up all that has enriched the concept 
through centuries within the scope of this research. Third, this research deals with human 
dignity from a bioethical perspective and needs to be confined within these limits. Fourth, this 
research also deals with a dialogue between Catholic and Hindu perspectives, which seem to 
be diverse. Given these contexts, one needs to envisage a cosmic understanding that can 
transcend cultural, linguistic, philosophical or religious colouring. In order to overcome these 
difficulties in a dialogue, one can only suggest by learning to negotiate the meanings and values 
that the concept of human dignity has inspired through centuries in order to arrive at a working 
definition that is communicable across those barriers.69 Human dignity is often dependent on 
one’s Weltanschauung, one’s worldview, which is like all worldviews not fully rationally 
analysable.70 
1.6 WORKING DEFINITION OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
Aware of the above limitations and its wide scope that was discussed above (Chapter 1.2 –1.5), 
the following working definition of human dignity is proposed that could be applied in the field 
of Bioethics and perhaps acceptable in an attempt at a dialogue with Hinduism (Part IV):  
Independent of the sex, origin, country, society, class, caste, profession, religion, culture or 
family every human individual, because of being human, has an inviolable intrinsic worth 
recognized throughout one’s human life and respected but not granted; that cannot be lost, taken 
                                                 
67 Jan MÅRTENSON, “The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights 
Programme”, in: Asbjørn EIDE/G. ALFREDSSON/G. MELANDER/L.A. REHOF/A. ROSSAS (ed.), The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. A Commentary, Scandinavian University Press, Oslo, Norway 1992, 17-29; 17-18. 
68 Cf. John WITTE JR., “Rights”, in: Erwin FAHLBUSCH et al. (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Christianity, Vol.4, 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan 2005, 701-709; 708. 
69 Cf. Linda HOGAN/John D’ARCY MAY, “Constructing the Human. Dignity in Interreligious Dialogue”, in: 
Concilium 2/2 (2003) 78-89; 87. 
70 Cf. KOZHAMTHADAM, “Genetic Revolution…”, 22. 
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away, or damaged but can be disrespected and assaulted and is therefore subject to being 
defended and protected by human rights.71 
1.7 CONCLUSION 
Although it is obvious that all of us have human dignity simply because of the fact that we are 
human, it is not acceptable to all. The concept of human dignity is very profound. To capture 
its depth is difficult because one can only describe its salient features. Moreover, it is a concept 
that is difficult to define. Therefore, it was necessary to see the multifaceted meaning of the 
concept and the problem of ambiguity of language involved in its explication. It was also 
necessary to examine who can qualify as an individual, as a human being or as a human person. 
It was also derived that every human individual is necessarily a human person. In addition, 
these terms themselves are notoriously difficult to define in the field of Bioethics. In spite of 
the difficulties involved and the limitations one is faced with, an attempt at a definition was 
done. Having derived a working definition, the next venture is to see how the concept of human 
dignity developed historically and philosophically. This will be carried out in the next chapter. 
 
                                                 
71 Cf. Johannes REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz für die Biotechnik und Biomedizin“, in: IKaZ 
35 (2006) 132-148; 135.  The German Moral Theologian Johannes Reiter explains: „Die Würde des Menschen ist 
mit seiner Existenz gegeben und Gegenstand nicht einer Zuerkenntnis, sondern Anerkenntnis. Die Würde ist der 
Existenz eines Menschen immanent, dem Leben eines Menschen „koextensiv“, sie ist nicht teilbar, in keiner Phase 
seines Lebens ist der Mensch ohne sie. Die zeitliche Folge von Lebensphasen eines Subjekts (Embryo, Fetus, 
Kind, Erwachsener) darf nicht in eine Aufeinanderfolge verschiedener Subjekte umgedeutet werden.“ Ibid. Cf. 
Sanjay, JOSHI, “The Right to Equality, Life and Liberty under the Constitution of India”, in: Abdulrahim P. 
VIJAPUR/Kumar SURESH (ed.), Perspectives on Human Rights, Manak Publications, New Delhi 1999, 82-102; 83, 
Lukman HAREES, The Mirage of Dignity on the Highways of ‘Human Progress’ – the bystanders perspective, 
AuthorHouse, Bloomington, Indiana 2012, 83 and Ludger HONNEFELDER, „Der Streit um die Person in der Ethik“, 
in: Philosophisches Jahrbuch 100 (1993) 246-265, 252. Cf. also Sylvia D. STOLBERG, “Human Dignity and 
Disease, Disability, Suffering. A Philosophical Contribution to the Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide Debate”, in: 
Humane Medicine 11/4 (1995) 144-147. At the present juncture, not all the elements that are contained in the 
above definition are deliberated. However, the Chapters that follow will bring to light the intricacies of the 
definition. 
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C H A P T E R  2  
HISTORICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION 
OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The concept of human dignity had a long history. In this Chapter a brief historical and 
philosophical development of the concept will be explored. Since dignity is to do with a human 
person, it will also be necessary to see the historical and philosophical development of the 
concept of human person in this context in the second part of this Chapter. However, a 
comprehensive historical account is beyond the scope of this work. An episodic account of the 
same will follow. 
2.2 THE HISTORICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
To understand how human dignity is understood today, one needs to go back historically to the 
way that the occidental world understood the concept.72 This is necessary in order that one may 
not degrade the multifaceted concept, to an empty formula. Thus it necessitates to look back 
into its historical complexity and its methodological meaning in ethical argumentation.73 
Already around 442 B.C., human beings were praised for their greatness of their thinking 
faculty as found in the famous text of Sophocles in his Antigone, “There are in the world many 
marvels but none greater than man […]. Speech, thought swift like the wind, aspiration whence 
are born cities; all that he taught to himself as well as he could, while making shelters for 
himself”.74 From this passage, it becomes clear that it is the thought that makes human being’s 
greatness, or in other words, it is the technical and political human thought that raises buildings 
and creates organized republics.  
A similarity can also be found in the Protagoras of Plato (427-347 B.C.) and its famous myth 
of Epimetheus and Prometheus. However, it is in The Republic that Plato manifests the full 
complexity of the human excellence. It is not only an education to political values but a 
comprehension of the ideals that even the state is to be a subject. “The excellence and thus the 
‘dignity’ of men cannot be maintained by a bare political art but only by a political art axed 
upon the absolute Good which is the object of philosophical contemplation [...]. The human 
dignity is thus fed on the divine Excellence.”75 
According to Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) it is the dignity of political excellence which confers on 
a citizen a share in the democratic government of the city that excludes foreigners and slaves.76 
The Latin translators of Aristotle translated both ἀξίωμα (axioma = axiom, that of which one is 
                                                 
72 A helpful and concise summary of the historical development may be found in R. P. HORSTMANN, 
„Menschenwürde“, in: Joachim RITTER/Karlfried GRÜNDER (Hg.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, 
Band 5, Schwabe & Co. AG, Basel/Stuttgart 1980, 1124-1127. 
73 Cf. Jean-Pierre WILS, „Zur Typologie und Verwendung der Kategorie ‚Menschenwürde‘“, in: Manfred P.H. 
WOLFF/Jean-Pierre WILS/Dietmar MIETH (Hg.), Ethik ohne Chance? Erkundungen im technologischen Zeitalter, 
Atttempto-Verlag, Tübingen 1991, 130-157; 130. 
74 As quoted in Richard V. DE SMET, “Materials toward an Indo-Western Understanding of the Dignity of the 
Human Person”, in: JDh 21 (1996) 39-46; 40. 
75 DE SMET, “Materials toward an Indo-Western Understanding…”, 41. 
76 Ibid. 
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thought worth and so, esteem, reputation, rank) and ἀξία (axia = the worth or value of a thing, 
of person, worth, rank) somewhat systematically as dignitas.77 
The Stoics, from the school of philosophy in ancient Greece and Rome antiquity, believed in 
dignity as a genuine possibility for all human beings, regardless of their circumstances, social 
standing, or accomplishments.78 The philosophy of the Stoics was quite different from the basic 
ideals of Plato and Aristotle. For them the concepts of society were distinctly non-egalitarian.79 
Thus, a universal notion of dignity appears with the Stoics, according to whom the estimable 
ἀξίος (axios = the worth or value of a thing; of person) are those who conform to human nature 
and consequently to the great whole which bestows dignity (ἀξία) to a human person.80 The 
Stoics considered human beings to have dignity by the mere fact that they possess reason. One 
who chooses to live in a thoughtful or reflective way has chosen the best life that is in 
accordance with the nature.81 Thus Heike Baranzke, a German moral theologian, concludes 
from this that the Stoics held dignitas as inherent because according to them leading a life of 
reason is in accordance with the natural human life.82 
Thus one finds that in ancient philosophy the word “dignity” was used in two different contexts. 
First, the word “dignity” signified a social position under a particular rank in the society. In this 
sense, a person had dignity insofar as one was vested with dignity. Second, the word signified 
a term which meant an extraordinary distinction of human beings as against other creatures 
which bestowed on persons an inherent dignity.83 
Both these applications are found for the first time in Marcus Tullius Cicero – the Roman 
speaker, politician and author (106-43 B.C.) – in his philosophical writings titled: “On duties” 
(De officiis), which is one of the most influential Roman works of ethical theory. Cicero uses 
the Latin word dignitas to refer to public office or social standing. In De officiis I 105-106, one 
finds the following: 
But it is essential to every inquiry about duty that we keep before our eyes how far superior 
man is by nature to cattle and other beasts: they have no thought except for sensual pleasure 
and this they are impelled by every instinct to seek; but man’s mind is nurtured by study and 
meditation; he is always either investigating or doing, and he is captivated by the pleasure of 
seeing and hearing. Nay, even if a man is more than ordinarily inclined to sensual pleasures, 
provided, of course, that he be not quite on a level with the beasts of the field (for some 
people are men only in name, not in fact) […]. From this we see that sensual pleasure is quite 
unworthy of the dignity of man [dignam hominis] and that we ought to despise it and cast it 
from us; but if someone should be found who sets some value upon sensual gratification, he 
must keep strictly within the limits of moderate indulgence. One’s physical comforts and 
                                                 
77 Cf. ARISTOTLE, “Posterior Analytics”, in: Hugh TREDENNICK/E. S. FORSTER (tr.), The Loeb Classical Library 
391, William Heinemann, London 1960, I, VII (75a38-75b3), I,X (76b13-15) and IDEM, “Nicomachean Ethics”, 
in: H. RACKHAM (tr.), Loeb Classical Library, Vol.73, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1990, IV,3 (1123a34-
25a31). Cf. LEBECH, On the Problem of Human Dignity…, 31. 
78 Cf. BARANZKE, „Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…“, 64-65. 
79 Cf. HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity…”, 95. 
80 Cf. DE SMET, “Materials toward an Indo-Western Understanding…”, 40. 
81 Cf. Charles Davis JAMES, “Human Dignity or Freedom of Research? An Ethical Debate on the Embryonic 
Stem Cell Research”, in: Jnanadeepa Pune Journal of Religious Studies 11/2 (2008) 114-136; 129. 
82 Cf. BARANZKE, „Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…“, 64-65. 
83 Cf. Hartmut KREß, Menschenwürde im modernen Pluralismus. Wertedebatte – Ethik der Medizin –
Nachhaltigkeit, LVH, Hannover 1999, 13. 
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wants, therefore, should be ordered according to the demands of health and strength, not 
according to the calls of pleasure. And if we will only bear in mind the superiority and dignity 
of our nature [natura excellentia et dignitas], we shall realize how wrong it is to abandon 
ourselves to excess and to live in luxury and voluptuousness, and how right it is to live in 
thrift, self-denial, simplicity, and sobriety.84 
One can only conclude from the above passage that Cicero had moved further away from the 
Ancient Roman dignitas which had a political and religious covering to the special status which 
is due to the superior mind of humans in contrast to animals which bestows in turn an inherent 
dignity to the humans. In doing so, Cicero universalizes the Ancient Roman dignitas; in that, it 
applies not only to some people in high social status but to everyone. The universal dignity of 
the human nature is situated within the context of Cosmo-centric framework of antiquity. In 
this context humans have a special place in the cosmos similar to gods insofar as they are 
equipped with a reason, because there is nothing more divine than reason.85 
Although Cicero makes a categorical distinction between humans and animals and attributes to 
humans by reason of their intellect a higher aspect of nature, there is no suggestion that all 
human beings possess or even potentially have dignitas. This is substantiated by the fact where 
Cicero writes: “some people are men only in name, not in fact [sunt enim quidam homines non 
re, sed nomine]”.86 However, why only some achieve this dignitas and not all and also the fact 
why dignitas is not something inherent in all humans are not clear here. Perhaps a further 
deliberation is necessary. 
The Cynics and the Stoics in particular, during the Hellenistic times, continued to hold this 
special position of the human beings in the cosmos by affirming the homogeneity and 
relationship of all people on the basis of their reason. All people are homogeneous citizens in 
the cosmos, and therefore, cosmopolitans. Cicero connected these Greek-Hellenistic ideas with 
the Ancient Roman dignitas. Thus for him the contingent political-social dignitas is somewhat 
lesser than the quintessential universal inherent dignity of the human being, namely, the 
dignitas hominis.87  
It is in this context that the role of virtues becomes important when it came to the question of 
achieving dignity rather than its inherent presence in humans. Based on virtue ethics, Baranzke 
comes to this conclusion that the key question that dignitas hominis served was: How must I 
live in order that I may be happy? It was held that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Virtue, 
which alone produced happiness, is achieved through one’s responsibility for one’s life and the 
                                                 
84 Marcus T. CICERO, “De Officiis“, in: Walter, MILLER (tr.), The Loeb Classical Library, Vol. 21, Harvard 
University Press, London 1913/Reprint 1975, 107 and 109. Addition by author. The Latin text reads: Sed pertinent 
ad omnem officii questionem semper im promptu habere, quantum natura homnis pecudibus reliquisque beluis 
antecedat; illae nihil sentient nisi voluptatem ad eamque feruntur omni impetus, hominis autem mens discendo 
alitur et cogitando, semper aliquid aut anquirit aut agit videndique et audiendi delectatione ducitur. Quin etiam, 
si quis est Paulo ad voluptates propensior, modo ne sit ex pecudum genere (sunt enim quidam homines non re, sed 
nomine) […]. Ex quo intellegitur corporis voluptatem non satis esse dignam hominis praestantia eamque contemni 
et reici oportere, sin sit quispiam, qui aliquid tribuat voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum esse eius fruendae modum. 
Itaque victus cultusque corporis ad valitudinem referatur et ad vires, non ad voluptatem. Atque etiam, si 
considerare volumus, quae sit in natura excellentia et dignitas, intellegemus, quam sit turpe diffluere luxuria et 
delicate ac molliter vivere, quamque honestum parce, continenter, severe, sobrie. Ibid., 106 and 108. 
85 Cf. BARANZKE, „Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…“, 64-65 
86 CICERO, De Officiis, op. cit., 105. 
87 Cf. BARANZKE, „Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…“, 64-65. 
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building of a character. For Cicero – like Socrates, Plato or Aristotle – happiness lies not in 
slavery to pleasure, but in mastery over it. Human dignity, according to Cicero commits the 
human being to lead his/her life in accordance with his/her position in the cosmos, by letting 
reason rule over the emotions and instincts, in contrast to animals who are controlled by 
instincts.88 
Perhaps one can conclude that the role of virtues in human beings make them eligible for human 
dignity and can only be achieved by some who practice disciplined self-control through “study 
and meditation” as seen in Cicero’s passage above (De Officiis I, 105). Achieving dignity is 
different from inherently possessing it. It is to be noted that the emphasis on dignity as 
something inherent in human persons followed later. 
A distinction was made between Natural Law and Laws of the Republic (which was the basic 
law of the Romans) in ancient times. That all people are naturally equal and therefore the 
possessor of human dignity comes from the idea of Natural Law (ius naturale) and not from 
the Laws of the Republic (ius gentium). In other words, insofar as natural law is concerned all 
are equal and therefore they are the inherent possessor of human dignity. However, according 
to public law this is not the case. Therefore, in order to include the concept of human dignity 
and to make it applicable to all people the State has to recognize it. This has been done only in 
the Twentieth Century.89 
It is also to be noted that though Cicero was a Stoic, he was not an egalitarian. In Cicero’s time 
slavery was accepted. It is a contradictory idea to the Stoics to hold for slavery in an egalitarian 
society. A classic example is that of Seneca, who in his famous 47th Letter to Lucilius sees 
slavery as an inherent part both of human experience and of Roman society. Seneca wishes that 
the slaves be treated kindly and on affable terms. However, the abolition of the social institution 
of slavery or a human right to freedom was not demanded in antiquity, not even in the name of 
dignitas hominis.90 
In the Middle Ages, Cicero was considered in high esteem and regarded as a proto-Christian 
writer. Thomas Aquinas incorporated into his definition of personhood from Boethius and with 
that of Cicero’s twin definition of dignity and justice. Thus, for Thomas, a person meant an 
individual substance of rational nature and was identified with self-evident, autonomous 
importance, namely, dignity whether morally or logically considered. Thomas insisted that the 
subject is distinguished by dignity because of its rational or intelligent nature.91 
In the historical development of the concept of human dignity, the next big leap in forwarding 
the concept came from the Christian quarters, namely, both in Antiquity and in the Middle 
Ages, through the concept of human beings created in the image of God (Imago Dei), in their 
                                                 
88 Cf. ibid., 65-66. For a detailed study on the role of virtue that produces happiness through reason in the 
context of dignity, see Hans Michael BAUMGARTNER/Thomas HEINEMANN/Ludger HONNEFELDER/Wolfgang 
WICKLER/Armin G. WILDFEUER, „Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Philosophische Aspekte“, in: Günter 
RAGER (Hg.), Beginn, Personalität und Würde des Menschen, Karl Alber, Freiburg/München. 2009, 333-441; 343-
345. 
89 Cf. BARANZKE, „Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…“, 66. 
90 Cf. ibid., 66-67. 
91 Cf. LEBECH, On the Problem of Human Dignity…, 76.  
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relationship with God and confirmed through the incarnation of Jesus Christ.92 Christians could 
feel an affinity with the Stoics on this account and made use of their philosophy. However, 
Christianity introduced a greater change in the notion of dignity, namely, that every human, 
free or slave, is a creature “in the image and likeness” of God, being assured salvation through 
Jesus Christ and equally worthy of a fundamental worthiness that the world cannot give.93 
The early and Middle Ages confirmation of human dignity stays within the framework of 
Stoics, above all on the Ciceronian ideas that was mentioned above. Along with this, the opinion 
that human beings are endowed with reason and freewill and also that human beings are made 
in God’s image were integrated already during this time.94 A much related term to dignitas 
hominis was the term dignitas conditione humana (that is, the dignity of human condition or 
creation) used in theological circles by Ambrose95 and Bernhard von Clairvaux96 and later by 
Thomas97 as dignitas in the sense of payment of worship and honor to persons in positions of 
dignity in the society.98 
The concept of human dignity was however indissolubly linked with the humanism of Italian 
Renaissance. The humanism of Renaissance too based themselves on the concept of human 
beings made in God’s image and of their exceptional position grounded in the Incarnation. 
Much of the information comes from the philosopher and humanist Giovanni Pico della 
Mirandola (1463-1494) in his famous Oratio de dignitate hominis (1486).99 For Mirandola, men 
and women are hybrid beings who freely choose the blueprint of their existence.100 As 
Mirandola would acclaim: “Thou, constrained by no limits, in accordance with thine own free 
will, in whose hand We have placed thee, shalt ordain for thyself the limits of thy nature.”101 
With regard to human beings made in God’s image, the conclusion arrived by Mirandola in the 
following statement is surprising.102 
                                                 
92 Cf. REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz …“, 133. See also Cf. HORSTMANN, 
„Menschenwürde…“, 1124. 
93 Cf. DE SMET, “Materials toward an Indo-Western Understanding…”, 41. These developments will be taken 
up in the next chapter on the theological foundation of human dignity. 
94 WILS, „Zur Typologie…“, 142. See also BAUMGARTNER et al., „Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. 
Philosophische Aspekte…“, 345. 
95 Cf. AMBROSIUS, Mediolanensis, De dignitate conditionis humanae, PL 17, 1015-1018; PL 40, 1213-1214 
(exc.); PL 100, 565-568. Cf. also “Clavis Patristica Pseudegraphicum Medii Aevii IIB”, in: CCL, Brepols, Turnholt 
1994, 683, No. 3008. Ambrose opens his treatise with these words: “Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et 
similitudinem nostrum (Gen 1,26). Tanta itaque dignitas humanae conditionis esse”. See PL 1015. 
96 Cf. AMBROSIUS, De cognitione humanae conditionis, in: PL 184, 485-508.  
97 Cf. Thomas AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae II-II, 102, 1, in: Thomas de AQUINO, S. Thomae Aquinatis doctoris 
Angelici Summa Theologiae cum textu ex recensione Leonina, cura et studio Pietro,CARAMELLO, Marietti, Romae 
1948. All Latin quotations are from this work. The English tr. is from Thomas AQUINAS, The “Summa Theologica” 
of St. Thomas Aquinas. Part II-II. QQ. CI-CXL, Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 
Second and Revised Edition, Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd, London 1922, 10-12. 
98 Cf. WILS, „Zur Typologie…“, 142. 
99 Cf. ibid., 142-143. 
100 Cf. ibid., 143. 
101 «Tu, nullis angustiis coercitus, pro tuo arbitro, in cuius manu te posui, tibi illam praefinies.» Giovanni Pico 
della MIRANDOLA, De hominis dignitate. Über die Würde des Menschen, übersetzt von Norbert BAUMGARTEN, 
hg. v. August BUCK, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1990, 6. English tr. from Giovanni Pico della MIRANDOLA, 
“Oration on the Dignity of Man”, in: Ernst CASSIRER/Paul Oscar KRISTELLER/John Herman RANDALL JR. (ed.),  
The Renaissance Philosophy of Man: Petrarca, Valla, Ficino, Pico, Pomponazzi, Vives, tr. by Elizabeth Livermore 
FORBES, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1969, 225. 
102 Cf. WILS, „Zur Typologie…“, 144. 
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Whatever seeds each man cultivates will grow to maturity and bear in him their own fruit. If 
they are vegetative, he will be a plant. If sensitive, he will become brutish. If rational, he will 
grow into a heavenly being. If intellectual, he will be an angel and the son of God. And if, 
happy in the lot of no created thing, he withdraws into the center of his own unity, his spirit, 
made one with God, in the solitary darkness of God, who is set above all things, shall surpass 
them all. Who would not admire this our chameleon? 103 
In the above passage, one can find the human possibilities reaching their highest existence from 
vegetative to spiritual. Moreover, one can also find a rising scale of values, i.e., from a rational 
being to being sons of God. However, creation of human as such does not lead to the centre of 
this existence. A self-reflection (reflectio) confronts him or her with the dark depths of existence 
and causes him or her to merge with God as spirit. Thus, Mirandola’s spirit-anthropology – 
which is based on theology – undergoes an inversion while shifting the cornerstone of human 
dignity’s eternal nature being created in God’s image. There is a paradigmatic shift from 
creation-theology into the immanent existential condition of the subject. The self-assertion, that 
is, the inward reflection, is the only sure and certain place for “chameleon-like” existence, 
which cannot be shaken even by God’s intervention.104 
Theological Ethicist Jean-Pierre Wils commenting on the above given text says, “The 
interpretation of human dignity as a consequence of the radical insecurity of human existence 
is a sign of the self-stabilization of man in a world destabilized by the Fall.”105 He further adds 
that Mirandola formulates three moral imperatives which give dignity an expression, although 
abstract, but still programmatic: “mhde.vn a;gan, that is, “Nothing too much”[…] gnw/qi seauto,n, 
that is, “Know thyself” […] and ei=,  that is, “Thou art”.106 
As a consequence of the humanism of Renaissance the concept of dignitas in the pre-modern 
traditions has – if not radically, at least significantly – changed in such a way that the concept 
of ‘dignity’ is now no longer a central category in a logocentric anthropology, in which 
cosmology and theology are integrated. Rather, in the expression of Bruno Schüller107, human 
dignity has become a self-attribution, a “legitimizing name” able to pass judgment, which 
stresses the moral blue-print character of human existence.108 
Hence, Mirandola’s intervention demonstrates the humanist tradition which emphasizes the 
important role that the human dignity plays and the undeniable place that humans occupy in the 
                                                 
103 « […] quae quisque excoluerit illa adolescent, et fructus suos ferent in illo. Si vegetalia, planta fiet. Si 
sensualia, obrutescet. Si rationalia, caeleste evadet animal. Si intellectualia, angelus erit et Dei filius, et si nulla 
creaturarum sorte contentus in unitas centrum suae se receperit, unus cum Deo spiritus factus, in solitaria Patris 
caligine qui est super Omnia constitutes ombnibus antestabit. Quis hunc nostrum chamaeleonta non admiretur?» 
MIRANDOLA, De hominis dignitate; op. cit., 6. English tr. from MIRANDOLA, “Oration on the Dignity of Man”, op. 
cit., 225. 
104 Cf. WILS, „Zur Typologie…“, 144. 
105 „Die Deutung der Menschenwürde als Folge der radikalen Ungesichertheit menschlicher Existenz ist 
Signum der Selbststabilisierung des Menschen in einer durch den Sündenfall destabilisierten Welt.“ WILS, „Zur 
Typologie…“, 144. English tr. from Jean-Pierre WILS, “The End of ‘Human Dignity’ in Ethics?” in Concilium 
203/3 (1989) 39-54, 45. 
106 «mhde.vn a;gan, idest ne quid nimis […] gnw/qi seauto,n, idest cognosce te ipsum […] ei, idest es dicentes.» 
MIRANDOLA, De hominis dignitate; op. cit., 26. English tr. from MIRANDOLA, “Oration on the Dignity of Man”, 
op. cit., 235.. Cf. WILS, „Zur Typologie…“, 145. 
107 Cf. Bruno SCHÜLLER, Der menschliche Mensch. Aufsätze zur Metaethik und zur Sprache der Moral, 
Patmos-Verlag, Düsseldorf 1982, 100-119. 
108 Cf. WILS, „Zur Typologie…“, 145. 
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visible nature through the blue-print character it imposes on human existence. It is to be noted 
here that there is no notion in Mirandola or Renaissance humanism, which corresponds to the 
innate, universal dignity used in contemporary language. This expression took roots later as 
described below. 
Partly due to the dissolution of the humanist movement and partly because of its theological 
bias, the concept of dignitas – which was brought in for the first time in modern application in 
the context of secular natural law – did not attain that status to which it could have been entitled 
from the object.109 
There was also an attempt to ground human dignity in a social milieu by Thomas Hobbes (1588-
1679), the English political philosopher, who defined dignitas not as a legal but a moral entity.110 
He says: 
The public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the commonwealth, is that which 
men commonly call DIGNITY. And this value of him by the commonwealth is understood by 
offices of command, judicature, public employment; or by names and titles introduced for 
distinction of such value.111 
Thus for Hobbes, human dignity is basically governed by the price and value which is 
determined ultimately by the commonwealth. This price is determined by the circumstances 
and not by any inherent dignity. This leads to a valid question. If the value bestowed on human 
persons rests on commonwealth, who becomes the arbitrator when commonwealth itself does 
not respect the dignity of the person? 
In modern philosophy, the concept of reason stood in focal point. This helped in clarifying the 
concept of dignity. One such example is of Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), a French mathematician 
and philosopher. He gave a central position to reason from which stems the concept of human 
dignity when he affirms: “Man is obviously made to think. It is his whole dignity and his whole 
merit”.112 Pascal then reflects on the transient and fragile nature of man. Then he juxtaposes this 
fragility of man with the capacity to think and says: “Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing 
in nature; but he is a thinking reed […]. All our dignity consists, then, in thought.”113 Thus, the 
capacity to think in turn asserts human dignity. Pascal then adds, “A thinking reed. – It is not 
from space that I must seek my dignity, but from the government of my thought.”114 Once again, 
Pascal juxtaposes the situation of man in empty space with the awareness that the capacity to 
                                                 
109 Cf. PÖSCHL/KONDYLIS, „Würde…“, 663. 
110 Cf. ibid. 
111 Thomas HOBBES, Leviathan. With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668, ed. by Edwin CURLEY, 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., Indianapolis/Cambridge 1994, 52. Emphasis in the original. 
112 «L’homme est visiblement fait pour penser; c'est toute sa dignité et tout son mérite.» Blaise PASCAL, Pensées 
et opuscules. Publiés avec une introduction, des notices et des notes, Hachette, Paris 1967, Fragment 146. English 
tr. from IDEM, Pensées, tr. by W. F. TROTTER, Dover Publications Inc., Mineola, New York 2003, 45. 
113 «L’homme n’est qu’un roseau, le plus faible de la nature; mais c’est un Roseau pensant… Toute notre 
dignité consiste donc en la pensée.» PASCAL, Pensées et opuscules, op cit., Fragment 347. English tr. from IDEM, 
Pensées, op. cit., 97. 
114 «Roseau pensant. – Ce n’est point de l’espace que je dois chercher ma dignité, mais c’est du règlement de 
ma pensée.» PASCAL, Pensées et opuscules, op cit., Fragment 348. English tr. from IDEM, Pensées, op. cit., 97. 
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think provides him dignity. Therefore, he says, “Thought. – All the dignity of man consists in 
thought.”115  
Thus, Pascal based human dignity on the fact that human beings do not just exist unconsciously, 
but consciously through their thinking. The idea that human beings are rational thinking beings 
became fundamental to almost the entire spectrum of Modern philosophy.116 
As a further development, it is necessary to mention briefly here about the German natural law 
Philosopher Samuel Freiherr von Pufendorf (1632-1694). Pufendorf took both the elements of 
the Ciceronian philosophy as well as the Renaissance humanism into natural law in establishing 
human dignity.117 Pufendorf in contrast to Hobbes defined the concept of dignitas as price or 
honour in both social and political sense.118 For Pufendorf – whose writings were well known 
among the leading American colonialists in Massachusetts – human dignity was a central 
concept, because the dignity of all people was rooted in the moral liberty to do either good or 
evil.119 Pufendorf explains:  
Now the dignity of man far outshines that of beasts by virtue of the fact that he has been 
endowed with a most exalted soul, which, by its highly developed understanding can examine 
into things and judge between them, and by its remarkable deftness, can embrace or reject 
them.120 
This distinguishing moral faculty of the human beings as rational beings to do good entitled 
them by reasons of natural law both to equality as well as protection of their liberty. 
Consequently, slavery was contrary to the moral nature of the human being, and therefore, not 
justified. At the same time, however, human dignity made the individual human being to esteem 
duty (aestimatio sui) and along with this the respect for all people was also interconnected.121 
Many factors unite to intensify self-esteem, but according to Pufendorf: “[…] its primary source 
is, apparently, human nature. For indeed the word ‘man’ is felt to have a certain dignity […].”122 
Since human nature belongs equally to all, “it follows, as a precept of natural law, that ‘Every 
                                                 
115 «Pensée. – Toute la dignité de l’homme est en la pensée.» PASCAL, Pensées et opuscules, op cit., Fragment 
365. English tr. from IDEM, Pensées, op. cit., 100. Cf. HORSTMANN, „Menschenwürde…“, 1125, WILS, „Zur 
Typologie…“, 145, and Johannes REITER, „Über die Ethik der Menschenwürde“, in: Albert RAFFELT (Hg.), Weg 
und Weite. Festschrift für Karl Lehmann, Herder, Freiburg i. Br. 2001, 443-454; 446. 
116 Cf. Kurt BAYERTZ, “Human Dignity. Philosophical Origin and Scientific Erosion of an Idea”, in: BAYERTZ 
(ed.), Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity..., 73-90, 75. 
117 Cf. WILS, „Zur Typologie…“, 145. Pufendorf argues for the equality of all human beings based on the fact 
that they are endowed with universality of reason and immortality of soul. See Samuel von PUFENDORF, De iure 
naturae et gentium, Knoch, Frankfurt a.M. 1706, II, 1§ 5. See also BAUMGARTNER et al., „Menschenwürde und 
Lebensschutz. Philosophische Aspekte…“, 346 and BARANZKE, „Menschenwürde und Menschen-rechte…“, 53. 
118 Cf. Samuel von PUFENDORF, De jure naturae et gentium Libri Octo, Vol.2, The Translation of the Edition 
of 1688, by C.H. OLDFATHER/W.A. OLDFATHER, Oceana Publications Inc., New York 1964, 8, 4 § 13. Cf. 
PÖSCHL/KONDYLIS, „Würde…“, 663. 
119 Cf. BARANZKE, „Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…“, 53. 
120 «Ex hoc igitur dignitas hominis prae brutis maxime elucet, quod iste nobilissima praeditus est anima, quae 
et insigni lumine circa cognoscendas et diiudicandas res,, et exquisita mobilitate circa easdem adpetendas aut 
reiiciendas pollet.» Latin text from Samuel von PUFENDORF, De jure naturae et gentium Libri Octo, Minerva 
GmbH, Frankfurt 1967, 1, 3 § 1. The English translation is from IDEM, De jure naturae et gentium Libri Octo, 
Vol.2, op. cit., 1, 3 § 1. 
121 Cf. BARANZKE, „Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…“, 53.  
122 «primum tamen eius fundamentum videtur ipsa humana natura. In ipso quippe hominis vocabulo indicatur 
inesse aliqua dignatio.» PUFENDORF, De jure naturae…, 3, 2 § 1. The English translation is from IDEM, De jure 
naturae et gentium Libri Octo, Vol.2, op. cit., 3,2 § 1. 
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man should esteem and treat another man as his equal by nature, or as much as a man as he is 
himself.’”123 In other words, Pufendorf says that from the self-esteem follows the respect for the 
other and the respect for all members of the society. In this regard, Pufendorf says that the more 
one respects oneself, the more faithfully will one follow the laws of socialness (leges 
socialitatis) in respecting the other.124 In its conscious contrast to the thought construction of 
Hobbes, this shows how narrow the bond is (also) to the secular concept of dignitas in a rational 
anthropology.125 
Both Pascal and Pufendorf see dignity in the freedom of human beings, which through reason 
recognizes the choice and does accordingly.126 
Later on, the Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant will expressly handle the connection 
shown by Pufendorf between self-esteem and the respect shown for the human dignity of 
another.127 
It is also interesting to note that probably Pufendorf’s emphasis on the mandatory nature of 
human dignity kept away the American Constitutional Fathers from a reference to the idea of 
human dignity.128 However, Pufendorf’s teaching surely had an influence on the American 
Declaration of Human Rights (1776), which combined the idea of freedom and the role of 
reason along with equality of all people, because all people are entitled to this characteristic.129 
It should also be noted that it is not just rationality and freedom alone that give value to human 
life. However, human dignity itself, as German Philosopher Otfried Höffe would acknowledge, 
is the “highest moral and legal principle, which gives the human being an absolute value against 
other highlighted natures of rationality and freedom”.130 
2.3 THE CONTRIBUTION OF IMMANUEL KANT TO HUMAN DIGNITY 
Taking a step further against this background, an important contribution to the development of 
the concept of human dignity is surely to be attributed to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). The 
German philosopher Immanuel Kant based his arguments on universal human dignity on a 
purely philosophical foundation. Following the Stoics, for Kant, dignity is the intrinsic worth 
that belongs to all human beings. It is because of the rational autonomy that all humans possess 
dignity. In other words, the capacity for free obedience to the moral law of which they 
themselves are author gives humans their dignity. 
                                                 
123 «Humana porro natura, cum omnibus hominibus aeque competat, […] inde consequitur, iure naturali 
praeceptum effe: Ut quisque alterum hominem aestimet atque tractet , tanquam naturaliter sibi aequalem , seu ut 
aeque hominem.» See Ibid. Cf. also PÖSCHL/KONDYLIS, „Würde…“, 664 and BARANZKE, „Menschen-würde und 
Menschenrechte…“, 53. 
124 Cf. PUFENDORF, De jure naturae…, 2, 4 § 1. Cf. PÖSCHL/KONDYLIS, „Würde…“, 664. 
125 Cf. ibid. 
126 REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz …“, 133. 
127 Cf. PÖSCHL/KONDYLIS, „Würde…“, 669 and BARANZKE, „Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…“, 53. 
128 Cf. BARANZKE, „Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…“, 53. Cf. also REITER, „Über die Ethik der 
Menschenwürde…“, 446. 
129 Cf. IDEM, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz …“, 133. 
130 Otfried HÖFFE, Medizin ohne Ethik, Band 2245, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2002, 49. Cf. JAMES, “Human 
Dignity…”, 129. 
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It is in Kant that the concept of dignity became a central concept of ethics, especially in his 
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (GMS = Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of 
Ethics).131 
The definition of human dignity given by Kant in GMS IV, 434 is: 
In the kingdom of ends everything has either value or dignity. Whatever has a value can be 
replaced by something else which is equivalent; whatever, on the other hand, is above all 
value, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity.132 
Thus, Kant makes a distinction in human nature between dignity (Würde, which according to 
him is a human or moral value) and price (Preis, which is a material value). For Kant, man 
understood as a human being, is worthy of dignity and is priceless. In other words, dignity is 
something that is unquantifiable and incalculable, because it flows from the very fact that we 
are human beings. 
According to Kant, only a being which is able to set oneself an end, as the last point of reference, 
is what characterizes humanity. The reason that human nature has dignity, is because of the 
autonomy of man, that is, the ability to be subject to a law of freedom, and therefore to be moral 
(sittlich).133 
This “inherent value” or “intrinsic value” for respect could be violated either by the person 
himself or herself to his or her own humanity or it could be denied by other persons. However, 
in both cases, the dignity that is inherent or intrinsic to being a human person cannot be 
annulled. From this, it follows that the recognition of human dignity is neither bound to nor 
dependent on special qualities or characteristics of the human person. The very fact of 
belonging of a living being to the human species forms the basic condition for the concrete 
acknowledgement of human dignity.134 
But how is it possible to acknowledge human dignity? Three problems arise here.  
                                                 
131 Cf. JAMES, “Human Dignity…”, 134. Cf. HORSTMANN, „Menschenwürde…“, 1125. Cf. also WILS, „Zur 
Typologie…“, 145. 
132 GMS IV,434: „Im Reiche der Zwecke hat alles entweder einen Preis, oder eine Würde. Was einen Preis 
hat, an dessen Stelle kann auch etwas anderes, als Äquivalent, gesetzt werden; was dagegen über allen Preis 
erhaben ist, mithin kein Äquivalent verstattet, das hat eine Würde.“ Citations to Kant are from: Immanuel KANT, 
„Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten“, in: Kants gesammelte Schriften. Band IV, hg. v. der Königlich 
Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Georg Reimer, Berlin 1911, 387-463, 434. Emphasis by the author. 
In the above text, the volume is given in Roman numeral and the page number in Arabic numerals. English tr. 
from Immanuel KANT, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. by Thomas Kingsmill ABBOTT, 
Arc Manor, Rockville, Maryland 2008, 52. In this paragraph, ‘intrinsic value’ translates Würde, which in the 
Kantian literature generally, as well as here, is translated as ‘dignity’. Cf. SCHLÖGEL, „Zum Menschenwürde-
argument...“, 85 and IDEM, „‚Strapazierte Menschenwürde‘. Bedeutung und Problematik eines zentralen Begriffs 
in der biopolitischen Auseinandersetzung (2003)“, in: DERS., Wie Weit trägt Einheit?..., 92-102; 97. 
133 Cf. Immanuel KANT, „Die Metaphysik der Sitten“, in: Kants gesammelte Schriften. Band VI, op. cit., 1914, 
203-491; 462. Cf. REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz …“, 134. Cf. also Kathrin BRAUN, „Die besten 
Gründe für eine kategorische Auffassung der Menschenwürde“, in: Mathias KETTNER (Hg.), Biomedizin und 
Menschenwürde, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 2004, 81-99. Cf. also WILS, „Zur Typologie…“, 146. and Cf. 
HORSTMANN, „Menschenwürde…“, 1125. 
134 Cf. Robert SPAEMANN, „Menschenwürde und menschliche Natur“, in: IKaZ 39 (2010) 134-139. For English 
version, cf. Robert SPAEMANN, “Human Dignity and Human Nature”, in: Robert SPAEMANN (ed.), Love and the 
Dignity of Human Life. On Nature and Natural Law, Wm. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, Michigan 
2012, 27-44. 
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First, one can see that the basic problem of any interpretation lies in the fact that the word 
dignity is a concept which is difficult to define, as was already mentioned.135 
According to Kant’s definition as already stated, man understood as a human being, is worthy 
of dignity and is priceless.136 Nevertheless, Regina Ammicht-Quinn criticizes the above 
definition and says that although the definition is theoretically illuminating, it is difficult to give 
it a basis in the postmodern society.137  
Second, the above definition does not itself clarify how dignity is intrinsic. 
Third, it is to be noted that Kant used the concept of dignity of humans (Würde der 
menschlichen Natur, Würde der Menschheit) only four times in the Metaphysics of Morals and 
only once the term human dignity (Menschenwürde) in the context of the vice of arrogance.138 
So how does Kant come to his conclusion? Five reasons can be given. 
First, for Kant, dignity is that which is incomparable and without equivalent value, incalculably 
valuable thing in human existence, and an end in itself139: 
[…] but that which constitutes the condition under which alone anything can be an end in 
itself, this has not merely a relative worth, i.e., value, but an intrinsic worth, that is, dignity.140 
However, in what exactly dignity as a highest worth consists of remains unclear. It is only under 
the condition of morality that human beings are an end in themselves.141 So Kant says: “Thus, 
morality, and humanity as capable of it, is that which alone has dignity”.142 But what guarantees 
the moral value? 
Second, morality is guaranteed on the presupposition that human beings have the capacity first 
of all, to subject one’s maxims to the general validity of natural laws and second, to free one’s 
purpose of actions from subjective motivations and inclinations. Insofar as one is capable of 
legislating for oneself (autonomy), dignity becomes valid. In other words, according to Kant it 
is the autonomy of a person that makes possible in freedom to set a law for oneself, or the 
capability to be moral (sittlich) is the basis of dignity of the human nature 143  
                                                 
135 See Chapter 1.5 at fn. 67 above. 
136 Cf. Regina AMMICHT-QUINN, “Whose Dignity is Inviolable? Human beings, Machines and the Discourse 
of Dignity”, in: Concilium 2/2 (2003) 35-45; 40. 
137 Cf. ibid. German Ethicist Ammicht-Quinn raises here the problem of the post-modern society to accept 
human dignity which itself is questionable, for example, with regard to the status of the embryo as a person, the 
rationality of the person ill with dementia, the freedom of the dying and so forth. 
138 „Er ist vom Stolz (animus elatus), als Ehrliebe, d.i. Sorgfalt, seiner Menschenwürde in Vergleichung mit 
anderen nichts zu vergeben…“ KANT, „Die Metaphysik der Sitten…“, 465. “It differs from pride proper (animus 
elatus), which is love of honor, that is, a concern to yield nothing of one’s human dignity in comparison with 
others…” English tr. from IDEM, The Metaphysics of Morals, tr. by Mary GREGOR, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge et al. 1991, 257. 
139 WILS, „Zur Typologie…“, 146. Cf. also REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz …“, 134. 
140 GMS IV,435: „Das aber, was die Bedingung ausmacht, unter der allein etwas Zweck an sich selbst sein 
kann, hat nicht bloß einen relativen Wert, d.i. einen Preis, sondern einen inneren Wert, d.i. Würde.“ KANT, 
„Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten…“, 435. English tr. from IDEM, Fundamental Principles of the 
Metaphysics of Morals…, 52. 
141 WILS, „Zur Typologie…“, 146. 
142 GMS IV,435: „Also ist Sittlichkeit und die Menschheit, sofern sie derselben fähig ist, dasjenige, was allein 
Würde hat.“ KANT, „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten…“, 435. English tr. from IDEM, Fundamental 
Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals…, 52-53. 
143 WILS, „Zur Typologie…“, 146. Cf. also REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz …“, 134 and Cf. 
HORSTMANN, „Menschenwürde…“, 1125. 
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Third, in order to understand Kant one needs to see his emphasis on duties which are derived 
from categorical imperatives, which is ultimately Kant’s formulation of the moral law. For Kant 
the derivative of the practical imperative is: “So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own 
person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only”.144 This 
practical imperative restates Kant’s fundamental principle of morality, namely, the categorical 
imperative, emphasizing the respect for persons. 
Fourth, a truly moral action is derived from the respect for moral law. However, in Kant’s 
system these formalistic details are ultimately based on his claim that all rational beings have 
an intrinsic, objective and unconditional dignity based on their capacity for autonomous choice. 
Kant explains these ideas: 
Kant explains the relation between dignity and legislation in these words: 
Now the legislation itself which assigns the worth of everything must for that very reason 
possess dignity, that is an unconditional incomparable worth; and the word respect alone 
supplies a becoming expression for the esteem which a rational being must have for it. 
Autonomy then is the basis of the dignity of human and of every rational nature.145 
Autonomy, for Kant, is self-legislation of reason as an expression of the inner freedom of the 
will to bind itself to a rational action intention and in turn demands for freedom of action as a 
sign of indefensible external freedom. Therefore for Kant, it follows that from the self-reflexive 
knowledge – the subject of responsibility for action even as claimed by its own reason (this 
subject he calls “person”) – flows the moral obligation to recognize the same moral subjectivity 
and thus respect the dignity of others.  
Fifth, the philosophical basis for the principle of dignity that Kant held demands equal respect 
for all persons (MS VI, 434-435).146 It forbids the use of another person merely as a means to 
one’s own ends.147 The prohibition against instrumentalization reads: 
But man regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical reason, is exalted 
above any price; for as a person (homo noumenon) he is not to be valued merely as a means 
to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself, that is, he possesses a 
dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other 
rational beings in the world. He can measure himself with every other being of this kind and 
value himself on a footing of equality with them.148 
                                                 
144 GMS IV,429: „Handle so, dass du die Menschheit, sowohl in deiner Person als auch in der Person eines 
jeden anderen, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchst“. KANT, „Grundlegung zur 
Metaphysik der Sitten…“, 429. English tr. KANT, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals…, 47. 
145 GMS IV,436: „Die Gesetzgebung selbst aber, die allen Wert bestimmt, muss eben darum eine Würde, d.i. 
unbedingten, unvergleichbaren Wert haben, für welchen das Wort Achtung allein den geziemenden Ausdruck der 
Schätzung abgibt, die ein vernünftiges Wesen über sie anzustellen hat. Autonomie ist also der Grund der Würde 
der menschlichen und jeder vernünftigen Natur.“ KANT, „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten…“, 436. 
Emphasis in original. English tr. from IDEM, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals…, 53. 
146 IDEM, „Die Metaphysik der Sitten…“, 434-435. 
147 IDEM, „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten…“, 429. Cf. JAMES, “Human Dignity…”, 129-130. 
148 MS VI,434: „Allein der Mensch, als Person betrachtet, d. i. als Subject einer moralisch-praktischen 
Vernunft, ist über allen Preis erhaben; denn als ein solcher (homo noumenon) ist er nicht blos als Mittel zu anderer 
ihren, ja selbst seinen eigenen Zwecken, sondern als Zweck an sich selbst zu schätzen, d.i. er besitzt eine Würde 
(einen absoluten inneren Werth), wodurch er allen andern vernünftigen Weltwesen Achtung für ihn abnöthigt, sich 
mit jedem Anderen dieser Art messen und auf den Fuß der Gleichheit schätzen kann.“ KANT, „Die Metaphysik 
der Sitten…“, 434. English tr. from IDEM, The Metaphysics of Morals, tr. by Mary GREGOR, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge et al., 1991, 230.  
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The prohibition forbids the use of another person merely as a means to one’s own ends. Here, 
according to Kant, dignity stands in the context of the human being as an end in itself; from 
which it follows the prohibition against total instrumentalization.This definition explains how 
Kant makes a distinction between dignity (Würde) and value (Wert). The former is intrinsic but 
the latter may be added by the society. This definition perhaps gives a better stand for the 
intrinsic dignity of a person. It is once again to be reiterated that Podimattam finds that this 
argument can be extended to include the respect to all individuals without alluding to religious 
convictions.149 
As mentioned above, taking the cue from Pufendorf – who held for the respect for others which 
is connected with self-esteem or self-respect –, Kant now states that the ability to be morally 
responsible as a respect for the dignity forbids the intention to treat self as well as others as 
instruments.150 Hence, according to Kant, the doctrine of human dignity demands equal respect 
for all persons. 
The importance that Kant gave to human autonomy and prohibition of the “instrumentalization” 
of human subjects has had an enormous impact both on modern ethical thought and Bioethics 
in particular. The demands, therefore of the dignity of the human person is such that we never 
treat another as a thing, as a means, even to accomplish greatest good. In other words, another 
person is a subject and neither is he/she an object, nor an “it”. In treating another as an “it”, 
his/her reality as a person is threatened. It only cuts myself off from the rich reality of this other 
person and so impoverishes me.151 
Thus, one can conclude two things from what has been discussed so far. First, Kant makes a 
distinction in human nature between dignity (Würde) as “an intrinsic worth” which according 
to him is a human or moral value and price which is a material value (Wert). The former is 
intrinsic but the latter may be added by the society.152 Second, dignity stands in the context of 
the human being as an end in itself; from which it follows the prohibition against total 
instrumentalization. 
In the last analysis, it is to be admitted that there is a basic problem of interpretation of the 
above facts and one comes back to square one, namely, that the term human dignity is a concept 
which is difficult to define. Nonetheless, taking autonomy and reason – the two concepts that 
are foundations of human dignity as envisaged by Kant – the working definition (See Chapter 
1.6 above) can be modified to read: 
Independent of the sex, origin, country, society, class, caste, profession, religion, culture or 
family every human individual, because of being human, has an inviolable intrinsic worth 
owing to his/her autonomy and endowed with reason recognized throughout one’s human life 
and respected but not granted; that cannot be lost, taken away, or damaged but can be 
disrespected and assaulted and is therefore subject to being defended and protected by human 
rights. 
                                                 
149 Cf. Felix M. PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?, Media House, Delhi 2005, 53-54. 
150 Cf. BARANZKE, „Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…“, 75-76. 
151 Cf. Helen Marie BEHA, Living Community, Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1967, 25-26. Cf. 
JAMES, “Human Dignity…”, 130. 
152 Cf. ibid. 
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2.4 HUMAN DIGNITY IN INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS/DECLARATIONS 
A major leap in history would be to see how the roots, of all that has been said above, which 
shaped human dignity, can be traced to the modern Constitutions/Covenants. These 
Constitutions/Covenants make explicit, for example, the biblical and Natural Law concepts in 
the U.N. Definitions and a combination of biblical and Kantian concepts in the German 
Constitution. Thus, at least thirty-seven national constitutions and instruments ratified since 
1945 make reference to human dignity, such as the opening words of the determination of the 
UN Charter, 1945153, the Preamble to the UDHR 1948154 and including the Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949).155 Although the meaning, content, 
and foundations of human dignity are never explicitly defined in these instruments, yet human 
dignity plays the role of a supreme value on which all human rights and duties are said to 
depend.156 
The determination of the United Nations as stated in the second paragraph of the Preamble of 
the Charter of the United Nations (1945), which was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, 
at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and which 
came into force on 24 October 1945, reads, “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small, [...].”157 
Similarly, the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR 1948) that was 
proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, affirms 
human dignity in these words, “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world […]”.158 Further, the First Article of UDHR makes explicit that: “All human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”159 Article 22 declares, “Everyone, as a 
member of society, has the right to […] of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable 
for his dignity and the free development of his personality.”160 
                                                 
153 “We the peoples of the United Nations determined […] to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person”. See UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION, “Relevant Provisions of the 
United Nations Charter, 1945”, in: Ian BROWNLIE/Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL (ed.), Basic Documents on Human 
Rights, Oxford University Press, New York 20065, 1-13; 3. 
154 UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948”, in: 
BROWNLIE/GOODWIN-GILL (ed.), Basic Documents on Human Rights…, 23-28; 24. Henceforth the abbreviation 
UDHR will be used to refer to this document. 
155 BUNDESMINISTERIUMS DER JUSTIZ, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23. Mai 1949 
(BGBI. S. 1), zuletzt geändert durch das Gesetz vom 11. Juli 2012 (BGBI. I S. 1478). Henceforth, the word 
Grundgesetz will be used to refer to this document. English tr. from GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, 
“German Federal Republic. Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. May 8, 1949, as amended to January 
1, 1966”, in: Amos Jenkins PEASLEE (ed.), Constitutions of Nations. Volume III – Europe, Revised 3rd Edition, 
prepared by Dorothy PEASLEE XYDIS, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherland 1974, 361-398. 
156 Cf. JAMES, “Human Dignity…”; 130. 
157 UN ORGANIZATION, “Relevant Provisions of the United Nations Charter, 1945…”, in: BROWNLIE/GOODWIN 
-GILL (ed.), Basic Documents on Human Rights…, 1. 
158 UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948…”, in: BROWNLIE/GOODWIN-
GILL (ed.), Basic Documents on Human Rights…, 24. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid., 27. 
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Research on these International Constitutions has shown that the concept of human dignity, 
both explicit as well as implicit in the above texts, is based on biblical as well as Natural Law 
concepts, which is ultimately based on ideas from Stoic philosophy.161 
The very fact that humans have human rights comes from the fact that they have inherent 
dignity. The relation between human dignity and human right is stated explicitly in the 
Preambles of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 and 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. Both of them state: “These [human] 
rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.”162 
The German Constitution, which came into effect on 23 May 1949, makes commitment to the 
key function of the concept of human dignity and becomes even more explicit than in the 
UDHR. The opening words in the Grundgesetz affirm the dignity of the human being as the 
greatest value and basic principle of the Constitution. It affirms: “Human Dignity is inviolable. 
To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority” (Art. I, 1).163 The Constitution 
follows a clear logic, namely, that the recognition of human right follows the basic fact of 
human dignity. It is also a positive law which means that human rights can be claimed in court. 
“Here Human Dignity clearly serves as a basic frame reference for Human Rights and for 
anything that follows in the constitution.”164 
In the above instruments, what mattered was to ensure a practical solution than a theoretical 
foundation for the worst atrocities inflicted on large populations during the war, so that they 
may never be repeated. “The inviolability of human dignity was enshrined in at least some of 
these documents chiefly in order to prevent a second Holocaust.”165 This liberal principle of 
“respect for person” did resolve many ethical problems and the rights and freedom of all were 
respected equally, even though the spelling out too clearly of the ground of that assertion was 
not done.166 
The above international laws paved in ways for subsequent promulgation of other Conventions 
and Declarations in the field of Bioethics. In 1993, the International Bioethics Committee (IBC) 
of UNESCO was constituted in order to ensure respect for human dignity and human rights. In 
the same year, the World Conference on Human Rights was held and as an outcome of the 
                                                 
161 Cf. HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity…”, 100. Hailer and Ritschl warn here of the 
difficulties that would affect the later decades because of such grounding. For example, the Communists States 
who preferred an interpretation of human dignity in terms of social rights. Similarly, a number of nations in the 
Southern hemisphere and in East Asia cannot see much value or convincing power in the originally Western 
interpretation of the Greek and biblical interpretations. See ibid. 
162 UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
1966”, in: BROWNLIE/GOODWIN-GILL (ed.), Basic Documents on Human Rights…, 348-357; 348 and UNITED 
NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966”, in: 
BROWNLIE/GOODWIN-GILL (ed.), Basic Documents on Human Rights…, 358-374; 358. Addition by author. Cf. 
GEWIRTH, “Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights…”, 10. 
163 „Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen 
Gewalt.“ Artikel 1, 1, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, op. cit. English tr. from GERMAN 
FEDERAL MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, “German Federal Republic. Basic Law…”, 361. HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General 
Notion of Human Dignity…”, 101. 
164 Ibid. 
165 JAMES, “Human Dignity…”, 130. 
166 Cf. ibid., 130-131. 
34 Part I: General Concepts   
 
 
conference the “Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action” was issued on 25 June 1993.167 
The Declaration recognized and affirmed: 
[…] that all human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person, 
and that the human person is the central subject of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
and consequently should be the principal beneficiary and should participate actively in the 
realization of these rights and freedoms […].168 
Of particular interest on Bioethics is the following assertion in this Declaration in Part I, No. 
11 and paragraph 3: 
Everyone has the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications. The 
World Conference on Human Rights notes that certain advances, notably in the biomedical 
and life sciences as well as in information technology, may have potentially adverse 
consequences for the integrity, dignity and human rights of the individual, and calls for 
international cooperation to ensure that human rights and dignity are fully respected in this 
area of universal concern.169 
The IBC prepared an international instrument on the human genome known as the Universal 
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights and was adopted by the General 
Conference of UNESCO in 1997. It was endorsed by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in 1998. The General Conference in its introduction says: 
Recognizing that research on the human genome and the resulting applications open up vast 
prospects for progress in improving the health of individuals and of humankind as a whole, 
but emphasizing that such research should fully respect human dignity, freedom and human 
rights, as well as the prohibition of all forms of discrimination based on genetic 
characteristics170 
It also proclaimed those Principles on which it is based and adopted in its Article 1 that: “The 
human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human family, as well as 
the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic sense, it is the heritage of 
humanity.”171 In its Article 2, the General Conference makes it even clearer that respect for 
dignity should override any genetic characteristics. It says: 
(a) Everyone has a right to respect for their dignity and for their rights regardless of their 
genetic characteristics.  
(b) That dignity makes it imperative not to reduce individuals to their genetic characteristics 
and to respect their uniqueness and diversity.172 
In the same year the Council of European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine uses the word “dignity” four times in its 
                                                 
167 UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION, “World Conference on Human Rights. Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, 1993”, in: BROWNLIE/GOODWIN-GILL (ed.), Basic Documents on Human Rights…, 138-
163. 
168 Ibid., 138. 
169 Ibid., 142. 
170 UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, “Universal Declaration on 
the Human Genome and Human Rights, 1997”, in: BROWNLIE/GOODWIN-GILL (ed.), Basic Documents on Human 
Rights…, 1178-1184; 1179. Emphasis in the original. 
171 Ibid., 1179-1180. 
172 Ibid., 1180. 
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Introduction and Article 1.173 Of importance, is the introduction, wherein the Convention is 
convinced of the need to respect the dignity of the human being. The statement also uses the 
terms, human being, individual and member of human species (of course, without defining 
them): “Convinced of the need to respect the human being both as an individual and as a 
member of the human species and recognizing the importance of ensuring the dignity of the 
human being.”174 
The latest global instrument drafted by IBC and adopted by UNESCO is the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 2005.175 Here too the Declaration uses 9 times the 
word “dignity” and emphasizes especially the fact that respect to the dignity of the human 
person is fundamental in the question of Bioethics that includes medical ethics while reflecting 
on societal changes and global balances brought about by scientific and technological 
developments. 
All the above references point to the fact that human dignity does play an important role in 
bioethical contexts. 
Having seen the historical and philosophical development of the concept of human dignity, the 
development of the concept of human person will be treated historically and philosophically in 
the next section. 
2.5 HUMAN PERSON 
The concept of human person is very closely related to the concept of human dignity. When 
one speaks of the dignity of a human being, then one uses the term “dignity of the human 
person”. It is about the human person that one acknowledges his/her dignity. 
Thus, it is seen that any system of moral reflection has to turn finally to some point of reference 
for defining its most fundamental terms.176 In a constantly changing scenario of the world, 
realties too are constantly evolving. Not only the human species have become more complex, 
but also other realities surrounding them are involved in the process of a change. Concepts too 
are involved in this change. However, in this constant changing world, is there a possibility of 
discovering fundamental truths that do not change? In other words, what makes one human that 
does not change with time? What is it to be a human person?177 
This section will deal with this question and the historical development of the concept of person, 
its relationship with dignity, the modern view of the concept of person and various new 
definitions of person as well as the modern view according to the German Philosopher Robert 
Spaemann. The last section will deal with the concept of person and its use in Bioethics. 
                                                 
173 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, “European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human 
Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine), 
1997”, in: BROWNLIE/GOODWIN-GILL (ed.), Basic Documents on Human Rights…, 1185-1195; 1185-1186. 
174 Ibid., 1185. Emphasis in original. 
175 UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, “Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights, 2005”, in: BROWNLIE/GOODWIN-GILL (ed.), Basic Documents on Human Rights…, 
1233-1241. 
176 Cf. SELLING, “The human person…”, 95. 
177 Cf. FEDERATION OF ASIAN BISHOP’S CONFERENCE: OFFICE OF THEOLOGICAL CONCERNS, “On Being Human 
in the Changing Realities of Asia 2011”, in: FABC Papers, No.133, FABC Office, Manila 2011, 1-64; 29. 
Hereafter this document will be referred to as FABC Papers, No.133. 
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2.5.1 Historical Development of the Concept of Person 
The term ‘human dignity’ historically, emerged rather slowly. Probably, the concept of ‘person’ 
also in its current usage gained importance quite late for similar reasons as the term ‘human 
dignity’.  
Therefore, at the very outset, it must be said that the concept of “person” in fundamental 
Catholic Moral theology is less discussed as compared to the role that the concept plays in 
bioethical discussions.178 
The origin of the word “person” is of pre-Christian antiquity. It stems from the Greek word 
πρόσωπον (prósopon), which means, “face” or “countenance”. The Hebrew word םיִנ ָּפ - p¹nîm 
can mean both face and person. Originally, the meaning that the word designated is for the mask 
that an actor wore while in a play. The Latin word persona has to do with the societal role with 
which it was associated. Both πρόσωπον and person became designated for an individual in late 
Hellenism.179 However, it is to be noted that the etymology of the word “person” has often been 
disputed. The word may not necessarily mean a human being such as in the case of a legal 
system, trust, an association, a company, a body corporate, an association of persons, a 
partnership firm, a society and the government, etc., where the reference to “persons” is in the 
sense of having rights and duties. “In law a distinction is drawn between natural persons (human 
beings) and artificial persons (corporations, trade unions, colleges and the like).” 180 The natural 
person is referred to here in the discussion. 
Historically seen, the concept of person developed from an early formulation by Boethius. The 
classical definition of a person according to Boethius is, “A person is an individual substance 
of a rational nature.”181 The term “individual” here refers to that which is undivided in itself, 
that which cannot be further subdivided. “Individual” is also to be understood as “of unique 
value” or “with self-identity”. The term “substance” is used to exclude accidents, and is to be 
understood as “insistence” or “subsistence in self” calling for “ek-sistence” or openness to 
others and the world. The term “of a rational nature” – which is the most important part of the 
definition – indicates that person is predicated only of intellectual beings.182  
Ambrose in his De dignitate conditionis humanae uses dignitas and persona interchangeably.183 
Following Boethius who defined person as “naturae rationalis individua substantia”,184 both 
Albert and Thomas also defined a person as hypostasis distincta proprietate distincta ad 
                                                 
178 Cf. Herbert SCHLÖGEL, „Unterschiedliche Zugangsweisen zum Personverständnis. Ein Beitrag zur 
ökumenischen Ethik (1998)“, in: DERS., Wie Weit trägt Einheit?..., 73-83; 79. 
179 Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 47. 
180 Jenny TEICHMAN, Social Ethics: A Student’s Guide, Blackwell, Cambridge/Oxford, 1996, 36. Cf. also 
KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 37. 
181 “Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia”. BOETHIUS, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, 3. 
BOETHIUS. The Theological Tractates. De Consolatione Philosophiae, tr. by H. F. STEWART/E. K. RAND, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge 1968, 85. 
182 Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 47. Cf. L. W. GEDDES/W. A. WALLACE, “Person (in Philosophy)”, in: 
Berard L. MARTHALER (ed.), New Catholic Encyclopedia, XI, The Catholic University of America Press, 
Washington 20033,146-148; 146. Cf. Max MÜLLER/Alois HALDER, “Person”, in: Karl RAHNER et al. (ed.), 
Sacramentum Mundi, Vol. 3, Herder, Freiburg 1969, 1115. See also for a similar view in George V. LOBO, Guide 
to Christian Living. A New Compendium of Moral Theology, Christian Classics, Inc., Westminster, Maryland 
19852, 94. 
183 See AMBROSE, De dignitate conditionis humanae, PL 1016. 
184 BOETHIUS, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, 3..., 85. 
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dignitatem pertinente. Perhaps both Albert and Thomas used Ambrose as an anonymous scholar 
in defining a person as “hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity” – ST I, 29, 3, ad 2).185 The 
predicate dignity here qualifies and identifies the subject, namely, the person. Thomas thus joins 
dignity of humans with their status as persons and understands both the expressions as equal 
formulation. It also means that not only those persons who are recognized by the society as 
befitting dignity, but every individual of rational nature.186 Moreover, a person can be defined 
through three distinguishing characteristics: Distinction (Individuality), self-subsistence 
(Substance) and by having dominion over their own actions (Reason-giftedness).187  
According to the definition above, it is dignity that characterizes the person at the deepest 
possible level.188 In other words, the concept dignitas is contained in the word and concept of 
person and can be predicated of every individual of a rational nature. However, Thomas 
explained the definition of Boethius practically in a new way.189 It was further refined by later 
scholastics. Thomas writes, “And because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, 
therefore every individual of the rational nature is called a person”.190 As individuals of rational 
substances they have above all a dominion over their own actions (dominium sui actus – (ST I, 
29, 1).191 It is also important to note that in ST I, 21, 1, Thomas connected the theme of human 
person with dignity when he spoke about distributive justice: “justice is to give to everyone 
according to dignity”.192 
For Thomas, “individual substance” is that, which is complete, subsists by itself, and is 
separated from others (ST III, 16, 12 ad. 2).193 To this understanding, when the remainder of 
Boethius’ definition is added, one can add five notes that go to make up a person. They are: 1) 
substance (which excludes accidents); 2) complete (either actually or aptitudinally with a nature 
                                                 
185 ALBERTI MAGNI, Summa Theologiae Sive De Mirabili Scientia Dei Libri I Pars I Quaestiones 1-50A, 
Tractatus 10, Monasterii Westfalorum, Aschendorff 1978, Q. 44, 2. Albert says, “Quarta Magistralis est, haec 
scilicet: ‘Persona est hypostasis distincta incommunicabili proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente’”. Thomas uses 
Albert’s phrase, “persona est ‘hypostasis proprietate distincta ad dignitatem pertinente’”. English tr. from 
AQUINAS, The “Summa Theologica”. Part I. QQ. XXVII-XLIX, op. cit., 33. Emphasis in original. 
186 Cf. BAUMGARTNER et al., „Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Philosophische Aspekte…“, 345-346. 
187 Cf. Gilles EMERY, „Einheit und Vielheit in Gott. Trinitätslehre (S.th, I, qq.27-43)“, in: Andreas SPEER (Hg.), 
Thomas von Aquin. Die Summa Theologie. Werkinterpretationen, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin-New York 2005, 77-
99; 92. „Die Person wird also durch drei Kennzeichnen definiert: Unterschiedenheit (Individualität), Existieren 
durch sich selbst (Substanz) und freies Handeln durch sich selbst (Vernunftbegabtheit).“ See ibid. 
188 Cf. LEBECH, On the Problem of Human Dignity…, 76. 
189 ST I, 29, 1. For English rendering, see AQUINAS, The “Summa Theologica”. Part I. QQ. XXVII-XLIX, op. 
cit., 25-28. It should be noted here that Thomas used the notion of “person” in order to comprehend the Trinity. 
190 ST I, 29, 3, ad.2: «Et quia magnae dignitatis est in rationali natura subsistere, ideo omne individuum 
rationalis naturae dicitur persona, ut dictum est.» English tr. AQUINAS, The “Summa Theologica”. Part I. QQ. 
XXVII-XLIX, op. cit., 33. Emphasis in original. 
191 Cf. BAUMGARTNER et al., „Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Philosophische Aspekte…“, 345-346. 
192 ST I, 21, 1: «iustitia […] dat unicuique secundum suam dignitatem.»  Cf. LEBECH, On the Problem of 
Human Dignity…, 77. 
193 ST III, 16, 12 ad. 2: “Ad secundum dicendum quod substantia individua quae ponitur in definitione personae, 
importat substantiam completam per se subsistentem separatim ab aliis. Alioquin, manus hominis posset dici 
persona cum sit substantia quaedam individua, quia tamen est substantia individua sicut in alio existens, non 
potest dici persona.” The English rendering is: “The individual substance, which is included in the deﬁnition of a 
person, implies a complete substance subsisting of itself and separate from all else; otherwise, a man’s hand might 
be called a person, since it is an individual substance; nevertheless, because it is an individual substance existing 
in something else, it cannot be called a person”. English tr. from AQUINAS, The “Summa Theologica”. Part III. 
QQ. I-XXVI, op. cit., 260. Emphasis in original. 
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which is complete and not part of something); 3) subsistent by itself (existing in and for 
himself/herself, the ultimate possessor of his/her nature and all its acts, the ultimate subject of 
predication of all his/her attributes; 4) separate from others (excluding the universal notion of 
second substance, having no existence apart from the individual); and 5) of a rational nature 
(excluding all supposits that lack rationality).194 
Richard de Smet, an Indian Philosopher, gives some instances from Thomas, which designates 
the privileged status of the human person,195 Thomas writes:  
Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in 
the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only 
made to act, like others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. 
Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other 
substances; and this name is person.196 
Moreover, according to Thomas, “Person signifies what is most perfect in all nature - that is, a 
subsistent individual of a rational nature”.197 
Speaking about the excellence of human beings as intellectual creatures, Thomas in his Summa 
Contra Gentiles III, 111-112 further elaborates about the special status they hold. He states:  
For they do stand out above other creatures, both in natural perfection and in the dignity of 
their end. In the order of natural perfection, only the rational creature holds dominion over 
his acts, moving himself freely in order to perform his actions […]. And in the dignity of 
their end, for only the intellectual creature reaches the very ultimate end of the whole of 
things through his own operation, which is the knowing and loving of God [...] the very way 
in which the intellectual creature was made, according as it is master of its acts […] 
intellectual creatures are so controlled by God, as objects of care for their own sakes […] the 
intellectual creature is by nature free.198 
From what has been said above, one may conclude that Thomas, following Augustine, directed 
his attention increasingly to intellectual consciousness and the various acts of the intellect and 
                                                 
194 Cf. ibid. Cf. also PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?.., 47. Cf. GEDDES/WALLACE, “Person (in Philosophy)…”, 
146.The first substance is the concrete substance as existing in the individual and the second substance is the 
substance conceived abstractly as existing in the genus and the species. The generic term that includes all 
individual existing substances is supposit. Supposits can be rational or irrational, living or non-living individuals. 
A person is a particular type of supposit, namely, one with a rational nature.  
195 Cf. DE SMET, “Materials toward an Indo-Western Understanding…”, 44-45. 
196 ST I, 29, 1, resp.: “Sed adhuc quodam specialiori et perfectiori modo invenitur particulare et individuum in 
substantiis rationalibus, quae habent dominium sui actus, et non solum aguntur, sicut alia, sed per se agunt, 
actiones autem in singularibus sunt. Et ideo etiam inter ceteras substantias quoddam speciale nomen habent 
singularia rationalis naturae. Et hoc nomen est persona.” English tr. from AQUINAS, The “Summa Theologica”. 
Part I. QQ. XXVII-XLIX, op. cit., 25-26. Emphasis in original. 
197 ST I, 29, 3, resp. It reads: “persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistens 
in rationali natura.” English tr. from AQUINAS, The “Summa Theologica”. Part I. QQ. XXVII-XLIX, op. cit., 32. 
Emphasis in original. 
198 Thomas AQUINAS, Summa Contra Gentiles III, 111-112. It reads: “Praecellunt enim alias creaturas et in 
perfectione naturae, et in dignitate finis. In perfectione quidem naturae, quia sola creatura rationalis habet 
dominium sui actus… In dignitate autem finis, quia sola creatura intellectualis ad ipsum finem ultimum universi 
sua operatione pertingit, scilicet cognoscendo et amando Deum… ipsa conditio intellectualis naturae, secundum 
quam est domina sui actus […] Disponuntur igitur a Deo intellectuales creaturae quasi propter se procuratae… 
sola intellectualis natura libera est.” Latin-English parallel text from Thomas AQUINAS, Summa Contra Gentiles. 
Book Three: Providence. Part II: Chapters 84-163, tr. by Vernon J. BOURKE, University of Notre Dame Press, 
Notre Dame, London 1975, 114-116. Cf. DE SMET, “Materials toward an Indo-Western Understanding…”, 44-45. 
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will. It is these attributes that give the human person a priviliged status among all other 
creatures.199 
Moving ahead historically, it is also observed that the concept of ‘person’ used in philosophy 
has a confusingly variety of meanings. The spectrum of meanings is wide.200 At one extreme of 
the spectrum there is John Locke’s Political philosophical concept of person, according to 
which a human being is a person only in certain phases of his/her existence (neither an infant 
nor an old man in an advanced state of dementia is a person). Moreover, in his/her lifetime (the 
one who is responsible for his/her actions) he/she is successively represented by different 
persons. It is self-consciousness that forms the basis for the identity of the subject.201 At the 
other end of the spectrum is the concept of person held by some Catholic moral theologians, 
according to whom the concept of person is applied to an already fertilized human ovum: For 
them in order to be a person, it is enough that a living individual possesses the characteristic of 
the human genome.202 
2.5.2 Relation between the terms Person & Dignity 
From a philosophical perspective, Jürgen Habermas, a German Philosopher, identifies three 
stages of development of the relationship between the individual person and human dignity. 
According to him, in antiquity, there was already a close connection established between 
dignitas and persona.203 It was only in the medieval discussions – owing to the fact of human 
being’s created in the image and likeness of God – that the individual person was given 
importance and as it were liberated from a set of social roles that the concept of dignitas at that 
time conveyed. The next stage to set up individualization came from the Spanish scholastics 
who sought to distinguish between subjective rights from the objective system of natural law. 
Finally, the key parameters were set by moralization of the concept of individual liberty in Hugo 
Grotius and Pufendorf. Kant radicalized this understanding into a deontological concept of 
autonomy. By bringing a relationship between rational beings, Kant introduced the 
determination by the reciprocal recognition of the legislating will of each person.204 This is 
exemplified by the Practical Imperative, that was already noted, namely, “So act as to treat 
                                                 
199 Cf. DE SMET, “Materials toward an Indo-Western Understanding…”, 45. 
200 Cf. Dieter BIRNBACHER, „Das Dilemma des Personenbegriffs“, in: Peter STRASSER (Hg.), Personsein aus 
bioethischer Sicht. Tagung der Österreichischen Sektion der IVR in Graz, 29. und 30. November 1996, Steiner, 
Stuttgart 1997, 9-25; 11. Birnbacher informs that the concept of person in typical bioethical discussions has been 
applied as a mixed normative concept, that is, having both descriptive and prescriptive components. 
201 Cf. John LOCKE, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Dover Publication, New York 1959, Book 
II, Chapter 27. Cf. BIRNBACHER, „Das Dilemma des Personenbegriffs…“, 10-11. 
202 Cf. ibid., 11. 
203 Cf. Jürgen HABERMAS, „Das Konzept der Menschenwürde und die realistische Utopie der Menschen-
rechte“, in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58/3 (2010) 343-357; 351. An English translation of the article 
may be found in: IDEM, “The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights”, in: 
Metaphilosophy 41/4 (2010) 464-480; 465. 
204 Cf. HABERMAS, „Das Konzept der Menschenwürde...“, 351-352. Habermas finds it interesting to note that 
it is only after the end of the Second World War that the concept of human dignity, which already existed in the 
ancient world and acquired its present version in Kant, has found its way into the International as well as recent 
National Constitutions. Cf. ibid., 344.  
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humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, 
never as means only”.205 
Thus, one can see that an evolution of the concept of human dignity is ultimately linked to 
human persons as individuals and in relationship with one another, where each one is to treat 
the other as an end and never merely as a means. From a legislative perspective, the concept of 
human rights plays an important role in the treatment of others. Human rights themselves are 
based on the moral claim of human dignity. Therefore, human dignity is to do with human 
person in the first place. This brings us once again to the foundation of human dignity. When 
do human beings become human persons so that from that moment one could claim human 
dignity? In a bioethical context, the question concerned can be rephrased: Can an embryo be 
considered as a person in the first place to be accorded human dignity? This question crops up 
in the context of some philosophers who began to separate the human being from the human 
person rendering the previously mentioned claim of relation between person and dignity to be 
sceptical. Historically seen, it was Locke, who for the first time had separated the being of a 
person from human being. He considered “personality as one particular characteristic of human 
beings, a characteristic that need not always be present”.206 As already mentioned, Singer draws 
on this theory of Locke and claims that embryos are not persons. Owing to the philosophical 
development over the controversy of separating the concept of human being from human 
person, it becomes relevant in this discussion to consider further on the understanding of the 
concept of human person. 
2.5.3 Modern Views of the Concept of Person 
This section will deal with the modern view of the concept of person. It will include modern 
definitions of person and modern view according to Spaemann. 
2.5.3.1 Modern Definitions of the Concept of Person 
One way of defining a human person is to see the human person different from other created 
beings or to find what is unique to the human person. Historically seen, there have been other 
ways that the human person was defined based on certain criteria. However, all these definitions 
have undergone changes. Some of the ways in which the human person has been defined, is as 
follows:207 
Joseph Fletcher (who is well known for his book Situation Ethics208) in his book Humanhood: 
Essays in Biomedical Ethics209 used the cognitive criteria to define the human person.210 He 
based his definition on a tentative list of 20 propositions of a person, of which fifteen are 
                                                 
205 GMS IV,429: „Handle so, dass du die Menschheit, sowohl in deiner Person als auch in der Person eines 
jeden anderen, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchst“. KANT, „Grundlegung zur 
Metaphysik der Sitten…“, 429. English tr. from IDEM, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals…, 
47. Cf. HABERMAS, “Das Konzept der Menschenwürde...“, 351-352. 
206 Robert SPAEMANN, “Is every human being a person?”, in: The Thomist 60 (1996) 463-474; 465. 
207 Cf. FABC Papers, No.133, 29-30. 
208 Joseph FLETCHER, Situation Ethics. The New Morality, Westminster John Knox Press, Louisville, Kentucky 
1966. Cf. FABC Papers, No.133, 30. 
209 Joseph FLETCHER, Humanhood. Essays in Biomedical Ethics, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, New York 1979.  
210 Cf. FABC Papers, No.133, 30. 
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positive and five are negative. It describes, “What it means to be a truly human being”.211 Some 
of the positive propositions included were minimal intelligence, self-awareness, self-control, a 
sense of time, a sense of futurity, a sense of past, the capacity to relate to others, concern for 
others, communication, curiosity, and neocortical function. Later on, he condensed these 
criteria into four, namely, self-consciousness, potential for relationship, happiness and 
neocortical function. The negative points were man is not non- or anti-artificial, man is not 
essentially parental, man is not essentially sexual, man is not a bundle of rights and man is not 
a worshipper.212 His conclusion was, “neocortical function is the key to humanness, the essential 
trait, the human sine qua non”.213 
Other criteria, like the physical criteria were proposed to define the human person. That is to 
say, essential physical features such as fingers, eyes, arms, hands, feet, etc., are needed to define 
a person.214 
There were also attempts to define the human person based on sensory criteria, which is the 
presence of the five senses; taste, smell, hear, see and feel.215 
Further based on the need of a person, the need criteria were also proposed. Five essential needs 
that define the human person are biological needs, psychological needs, spiritual needs, social 
needs, transcendental need.216 
Then there are those who define the human person based on relationships (relational criteria). 
The definition is based in terms of the relationship of the person within the community and is 
sometimes extended further to include nature and environment.217 
Various attempts to define the human person still leaves one wondering about the ultimate 
question based on the above criteria, namely, “Are we human because of unique traits and 
attributes not shared with either animal or machine?”218 
The modern Personalistic Philosophy of Martin Buber in Western Europe is another strand of 
thought that has contributed to the existentialist colouring of the understanding of the human 
person. This is typified in the stance: 
The Thou meets me through grace—it is not found by seeking. But my speaking of the 
primary word to it is an act of my being, is indeed the act of my being […]. The primary 
word l-Thou can be spoken only with the whole being. Concentration and fusion into the 
                                                 
211 Joseph FLETCHER, “Indicators of Humanhood. A Tentative Profile of Man”, in: The Hastings Center Report 
2/5 (1972) 1-4. Cf. FABC Papers, No.133, 30. 
212 FLETCHER, Humanhood…, 12-18. 
213 Joseph FLETCHER, “Four Indicators of Humanhood - The Enquiry Matures”, in: The Hastings Center Report 
4/6 (1974) 4-7; 6. Emphasis in original. Cf. FABC Papers, No.133, 30. 
214 Cf. ibid. 
215 Cf. ibid., 30-31. 
216 Cf. ibid., 31. 
217 Cf. ibid. 
218 Ibid. 
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whole being can never take place through any agency, nor can it ever take place without me. 
I become through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou.219 
Fundamentally, this would mean that the responsibility and freedom of being a human person 
is itself a response. In other words, we are actual persons even before we are confronted with 
the possibilities of personal existence. “One of the basic thrusts of such an approach is that the 
human person and therefore, human life can and should never be instrumentalized.”220 
From the foregoing discussions, one can conclude that trying to define the concept of human 
person is not as simple as it seems. 
2.5.3.2 Robert Spaemann: Modern View of the Concept of Person 
Spaemann clarifies the terms “human” and “person” in his book, Personen: Versuche über den 
Unterschied zwischen ‚etwas‘ und ‚jemand‘221 and in two articles that he published, one titled, 
“Is every human being a person?”,222 and the other, „Wann beginnt der Mensch Person zu 
sein?“.223  
Spaemann is of the opinion that a separation between human beings and human persons makes 
no sense on rational grounds and much less on religious ones.224 For Spaemann the concept of 
person is fundamental and he demonstrates in his previously mentioned book that every human 
being is a person.  
Spaemann clarifies the various nuances of the term “Person”. He says: 
Person is not a sortal term, not the term for any species, sort, or group that would subsume 
individuals of a certain class of objects and thus identify them as examples of this sort [...]. 
Neither does person refer to a genus, like mammal, under which we could subsume a variety 
of species. As Thomas Aquinas puts it, person is rather a nomen dignitatis. To call someone 
                                                 
219“Das du begegnet mir von Gnaden – durch Suchen wird es nicht gefunden. Aber dass ich zu ihm das 
Grundwort spreche, ist Tat meines Wesens, meine Wesenstat […]. Das Grundwort Ich-Du kann nur mit dem 
ganzen Wesen gesprochen werden. Die Einsammlung und Verschmelzung zum ganzen Wesen kann nie durch 
mich, kann nie ohne mich geschehen. Ich werde am Du: Ich werdend spreche ich Du.“ Martin BUBER, Ich und du, 
Verlag Lambert Schneider, Heidelberg 1974, 18. English tr. from IDEM, I and Thou, tr. by Ronald Gregor SMITH, 
T&T Clark, Edinburgh 1950, 11. Cf. FEDERATION OF ASIAN BISHOP’S CONFERENCE: OFFICE OF THEOLOGICAL 
CONCERNS, “Respect for Life in the Context of Asia”, in: FABC Papers, No.120, FABC Office, Manila 2007, 1-
51; 42. Hereafter this document from the FABC will be referred to as FABC Papers, No.120. 
220 Ibid., 42. 
221 Robert SPAEMANN, Personen. Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen ‚etwas‘ und ‚jemand‘, Klett-Cotta, 
Stuttgart 1996. For an English translation see: Robert SPAEMANN, Persons. The Difference between “Someone” 
and “Something”, tr. by Oliver O’DONOVAN, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006 (1996). 
222 SPAEMANN, “Is every human being a person?...”, 463-474. 
223 Robert SPAEMANN,, „Wann beginnt der Mensch Person zu sein?“, in: Manfred SPIEKER (Hg.), Biopolitik. 
Probleme des Lebensschutzes in der Demokratie, Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn (u.a.) 2009, 39-50. The original 
English article appeared in Robert SPAEMANN, “When does the human being to be a person?”, in: Elio 
SGRECCIA/Jean LAFFITTE (Hg.), Human Embryo before implantation. Scientific Aspects and Bioethical 
Considerations. Proceedings of the 12 Assembly of the Pontifical Academy for Life. Vatican City 27 February-1 
March 2006, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican 2007, 298-307. 
224 Cf. SPAEMANN, “Is every human being a person?...”, 463-474; 465. 
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a person means to acknowledge for this someone a certain status, indeed the status of being 
one’s own goal.225 
He also gives arguments on the nuances of the term person that have changed over time. 
Spaemann, drawing on authors like the German philosopher Max Scheler226 as well as others, 
mentions of inwardness in human beings as a characteristic mark of personality such as, “self-
consciousness, memory, a relation to one’s life as a whole, an interest in one’s life […] persons 
as the subjects of a variety of intentional acts”.227 On the other hand, there have also been 
attempts to understand the social character of personal existence. Spaemann articulates: “There 
are only persons, in the plural. Persons are not persons merely on the basis of some specific 
difference that marks them out. Mutual recognition is determinative. The status of personal 
existence depends on a communicative event.”228 However, in recent years there is a shift in 
paradigm: From theoretical and academic character, from nomen dignitas (since Boethius); 
from a fundamental concept owing to Kant in the foundation of human rights; to a function that 
has been reversed. This has led to a theory that only human beings can have human rights and 
this is possible only if they are persons. Spaemann draws out their part of the argument: 
The argument then runs: but not all human beings are persons; and those that are, are not 
persons in every stage of life or in every state of consciousness. They are not persons if from 
the first moment of their lives they are refused admission to the community of recognition, 
for that is what makes human beings persons […]. Small children are not persons, for 
example; neither are the severely handicapped and the senile. In the view of Derek Parfit, by 
far the most unflinching adherent of this line of thought, one ceases to be a person when 
asleep or temporarily unconscious. There is no reason to ascribe such a thing as ‘right to life’ 
to human beings in such conditions; that would even be immoral, a kind of unjust partisanship 
                                                 
225 „‘Person‘ ist nicht ein sortaler Ausdruck, durch den Individuen einer bestimmten natürlichen Klasse von 
Gegenständen subsumiert und als Exemplare eben dieser Art identifiziert werden können […]. ‚Person‘ ist aber 
auch kein Gattungsbegriff, wie z. B. der des Säugetiers, unter den eine Vielzahl von Artbegriffen subsumiert wird. 
‚Person‘ ist vielmehr, wie Thomas von Aquin schreibt, ein nomen dignitas. Jemanden eine Person nennen, heißt, 
ihm einen bestimmten Status zuerkennen, und zwar den Status eines Selbstzwecks.“ SPAEMANN, „Wann beginnt 
der Mensch Person zu sein?...“, 39. English tr. from IDEM, “When does the human being to be a person?...”, 298. 
Emphasis in original. The word “sortaler” in German is translated in the English version as “classificatory”. By 
the term “sortal” (classificatory), Spaemann means the terms such as “human being” or “man” (which is the name 
of a species of living beings) employed by philosophers of language that mark off a kind of entity, such as the 
terms “elephants” or “oak tree” or “spider” do. These terms pick out or “sort out” one of the many species of things 
in the world including human beings or men. Cf. SPAEMANN, Personen..., 14-19; 25. English tr. from IDEM, 
Persons…, 6-10; 16. Cf. also Robert SOKOLOWSKI, “The Christian Difference in Personal Relationships”, in: Craig 
Steven TITUS (ed.), On Wings of Faith and Reason. The Christian Difference in Culture and Science, The Catholic 
University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2008, 68-84; 69. 
226 Max SCHELER, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Value, tr. by Manfred S. FRINGS/Roger L. 
FUNK, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, III 1973, 382-383. For the original German version, see Max 
SCHELER, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines 
ethisches Personalismus, Gesammelte Werke Bd. 2, 6. Auflage, Francke Verlag, Bern 1971, 382f. Cf. SPAEMANN, 
Personen..., 9. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 1-2. 
227 „Selbstbewusstsein, Erinnerung, ein Verhältnis zum eigenen Leben als Ganzem, ein Interesse an diesem 
Leben [...]. Personen als Subjekte verschiedener Arten intentionaler Akte […]“ SCHELER, Formalism in Ethics…, 
382-383. Cf. SPAEMANN, Personen..., 9. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 2. Emphasis in English tr. 
228 „Personen gibt es nur im Plural. Das gegenseitige Anerkennungsverhältnis ist für Personen konstitutiv. 
Personen sind nicht aufgrund bloßer Artmerkmale Personen, Personsein ist ein Status, der sich einem 
Kommunikationsgeschehen verdankt.“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 9. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 2. Emphasis in 
English tr. 
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for one’s own species which has become known, in the disparaging term coined by Australian 
animal-rights Philosopher Peter Singer, as ‘speciesism’.229 
After framing the above background, Spaemann goes to answer the question, “Are all human 
beings person?”230 What follows below are his arguments. 
Human beings are not just members of a species, just as “something” belongs to a particular 
species. Human beings are persons who do not immediately instantiate a species.231 Although 
we name individuals of a certain species as “persons” based on a number of certain properties, 
yet “the concept of person is not a predicate by which we name an individual as one instance 
of a concept and thus subsume it under a certain class.”232 One needs to know in advance what 
class an individual belongs before classifying it, as for example, whether it is a human being, 
or an angel or a rational being of an unknown species. The question that is to be raised is: “If 
there are certain specific characteristics by which we describe certain beings as persons, then 
are those individuals of this species still persons, even if they do not possess these 
characteristics?”233 
Considering the above question, Spaemann says that perhaps the recognition of human beings 
as persons should depend upon the actual presence of those characteristics that define 
personality. Such claims have been made in the recent decades. The demand has been so 
articulated that the concept of human dignity be replaced with that of the personal dignity in 
the constitutions of European countries and in the documents of United Nations. Perhaps, one 
could find support in the European tradition even though opposed by the great revolutionary 
Kant. Perhaps, it can claim support in the view of Thomas, who held that apart from Jesus 
Christ, all human beings have in their first cycle of their embryonic existence an animal soul 
before it is replaced by a direct divine creation of a human and thus a personal soul. However, 
this last view has no longer many defenders because of scientific reasons.234 
Moreover, Spaemann argues: “The actual presence of the typical traits of persons is not in fact 
the condition of personhood.”235 He further says that normality is the condition for human beings 
to develop properties characteristic to them. This normality is developed primarily in a 
relationship between the mother and child. The mother treats the child as a small person. This 
                                                 
229 „Nicht alle Menschen aber und nicht Menschen in jedem Stadium ihres Lebens und in jeder Verfassung 
ihres Bewusstseins sind, so wird uns gesagt, Personen. Sie sind es zum Beispiel nicht, wenn ihnen von Anfang an 
die Aufnahme in die Anerkennungsgemeinschaft verweigert wurde, durch die Menschen erst zu Personen werden 
[…]. Kleine Kinder zum Beispiel, schwer Debile, auch Altersdebile, sind keine Personen, und nach David Parfit, 
dem bei weitem gründlichsten Denker dieser Richtung, sind es auch Schlafende und vorübergehend Bewusstlose 
nicht. Es gibt keinen Grund, diesen Menschen einen Rechtsanspruch etwa auf Leben zuzugestehen; dies wäre sogar 
eine unmoralische Parteilichkeit zugunsten der eigenen Spezies, „Speziesismus“, wie der diskriminierende 
Ausdruck des australischen Tierschutz-philosophen und Ethikers P. Singer lautet.“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 10. 
Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 2-3. Emphasis in English tr. Cf. Derek PARFIT, Reasons and Persons, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1984 and SINGER, Practical Ethics…, especially 48-70. 
230 „Sind alle Menschen Personen?“. SPAEMANN, Personen..., 11. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 3. 
231 Cf. SPAEMANN, Personen..., 16. 
232 Cf. IDEM, “Is every human being a person?...”, 465. 
233 Ibid., 466. 
234 Cf. IDEM, „Wann beginnt der Mensch Person zu sein?...“, 40-41. 
235 „Dass das tatsächliche Vorliegen der typischen Merkmale von Personen nicht die Bedingung von 
Personalität ist […]“ SPAEMANN, „Wann beginnt der Mensch Person zu sein?...“, 42. English tr. from IDEM, “When 
does the human being to be a person?...”, 302. 
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is essential for the child to become that which he or she was and considered from the beginning 
to be so. Then Spaemann emphatically adds: 
Whoever severs the personhood of human beings from their being alive severs as well the 
bonds of interpersonality, within which person can first become what they are. Persons are 
found only in the plural. Even the use of the word person of God makes full sense only in the 
context of the doctrine of the Trinity.236  
One may raise a question as to what characterizes human beings as persons. In response, 
Spaemann argues there is something in human beings that characterizes them as “persons”, 
because of an “inner difference” (self-differentiation).237 Spaemann approaches this “inner 
difference” from three different angles: 
First, when one considers the word “human”, it becomes apparent that this word is used both 
as a normative and descriptive term. In one sense, “human” are things that human do, especially 
those peculiar atrocities that they do, which are unthinkable in animals. However, we do not 
use the word in that sense. We usually use it as a normative term, for those definite actions that 
we approve in contrast to those that we disapprove. Sometimes, however, we reverse the use of 
the language in a strange way. We call some actions “human” though we might gently 
disapprove of them and make excuse for them by saying: “to err is human”. However, this 
conduct is a breach of the norm and we attribute it to our weakness.238 
Second, Spaemann analyses the way one refers to oneself with the personal pronoun ‘I’. When 
one utters ‘I’, he/she actually is, he/she actually exists. This utterance is what Descartes 
mentions as: cogito ergo sum. When one uses ‘I’, one does not mean either to identify the 
qualitative characteristics or to situate it as a member of a kind by the use of a sortal 
(classificatory) term. “I” merely refers to the speaker irrespective of what the speaker may be.239 
He clarifies this by referring to the common use of personal pronouns, I and you. For example, 
we say, “I was born in such and such a year and place” and “I was conceived in the city such 
and such”. However, the being that was conceived and born could not yet say I.240 Spaemann 
specifies the use of I in these words: 
The personal pronoun, I, does not refer to the Ego. The Ego in this sense is the invention of 
philosophers. The personal pronoun, I, refers rather to a living being that only sometime later 
began to say I. The identity of this living being is independent of that about which it has 
actual memory.241 
                                                 
236 „Wer das Personsein des Menschen von seinem Lebendigsein trennt, schneidet das Band der 
Interpersonalität durch, innerhalb dessen Personen erst werden können, was sie sind.“ SPAEMANN, „Wann beginnt 
der Mensch Person zu sein?...“, 43. English tr. from IDEM, “When does the human being to be a person?...”, 302. 
237 Cf. SPAEMANN, Personen..., 16. Cf. IDEM, Persons…, 8. 
238 Cf. IDEM, Personen..., 16. Cf. IDEM, Persons…, 8. 
239 Cf. SPAEMANN, Personen..., 17-19. Cf. IDEM, “Is every human being a person?...”, 466. Cf. IDEM, „Wann 
beginnt der Mensch Person zu sein?...“, 40. 
240 Cf. IDEM, „Wann beginnt der Mensch Person zu sein?...“, 42. Cf. IDEM, “When does the human being to be 
a person?...”, 302. 
241 „Das Personalpronomen ‚ich‘ bezieht sich nicht auf ‚ein ich‘ – ‚das Ich‘ ist eine Erfindung von Philosophen 
– sondern auf ein Lebewesen, das später irgendwann einmal ‚ich‘ zu sagen begann. Und die Identität dieses 
Lebewesens ist unabhängig von dem, woran es sich faktisch erinnert.“ SPAEMANN, „Wann beginnt der Mensch 
Person zu sein?...”, 43. Tr. from IDEM, “When does the human being to be a person?...”, 302. Emphasis in original. 
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Spaemann’s conclusion is that it is counter-intuitive and incompatible with the common use of 
the language used by normal human beings when one attempts to isolate personhood from 
vitality and existence of the human organism.242 
From a theoretical point of view, “I” distinguishes a person and his/her qualitative appearance 
and manifestation. For instance, fairy tales such as Ovid’s Metamorphosis and our own dream 
experience provide illustrations of this usage.243 One can dream to be transformed into other 
beings such as a frog, a tree or a jaguar. In these instances, it is interesting to note that only a 
human being are capable of undergoing metamorphosis into an animal or something else and 
still keep their identities intact. They may later change back or be ‘set free’ from the 
metamorphosis. It points to the fact that we can assume between person and properties or 
characteristics and yet remain the same identical person.244 From this Spaemann analyses: 
The point is simply that though the abstraction is possible only because human beings have 
qualitative attributes, qualitative attributes do not define personal identity. Who we are is not 
simply interchangeable with what we are. 245 
As a third important angle, Spaemann points out to the inner difference between what a living 
creature (Lebewesen) properly is, and what it actually is. This is the difference that Aristotle 
makes between zēn and eu zēn, between living and living well.246 Apparently, it is unique to 
human beings of being conscious of this difference. Consequently, human beings are not just 
mere instantiations of their species, even though they obviously belong to some natural species. 
Spaemann clarifies, “Persons do in fact invariably belong to some natural species, but they do 
not belong to it in the same way that other individual organisms belong to their species”.247 
Moreover, the nature of human beings is such that they, “exist by distinguishing their being 
from their specific way of being, their specific ‘nature’. Their nature is not what they are, pure 
and simple; their nature is something that they have. And this ‘having’ is their being. To be a 
person is the form in which ‘rational natures’ exist.”248 
                                                 
242 Cf. ibid. 
243 Spaemann is here making use of the discussion introduced by Harry Frankfurt regarding “secondary 
volitions”. Persons can have secondary volitions such as, e.g., make promises. Here they determine their future 
volition by granting others a claim upon it. Cf. Harry G. FRANKFURT, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of 
Person”, in: The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971) 5-21. For the German tr., see Harry G. FRANKFURT, 
“Willensfreiheit und der Begriff der Person“, in: Peter BIERI (Hg.), Analytische Philosophie des Geistes, 
Athenäum, Frankfurt a.M. 1981, 287-302; Harry G. FRANKFURT, “Identification and Externality”, in: A. 
OSKENBERG RORTY (ed.), The Identity of Persons, University of California Press, Berkeley 1976, 239-252. Cf. 
SPAEMANN, Personen..., 17-19. Cf. IDEM, “Is every human being a person?...”, 466. Cf. IDEM, „Wann beginnt der 
Mensch Person zu sein?...“, 40. 
244 Cf. IDEM, Personen..., 17-19. Cf. IDEM, “Is every human being a person?...”, 466. 
245 „Worauf es ankommt, ist, dass wir personale Identität nicht durch qualitative Merkmale definieren, 
wenngleich es qualitative Merkmale der Spezies Mensch sind, die uns diese Abstraktion möglich machen. Wer 
wir sind, ist offenbar nicht einfachhin identisch mit dem, was wir sind.“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 19. Emphasis in 
original. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 11. 
246 ARISTOTLE, De anima, 434b, 21. Cf. SPAEMANN, Personen..., 21. IDEM, Persons…, 12. 
247 „Personen gehören immer irgendeiner natürlichen Art an, aber sie gehören ihr anders an, als andere 
Individuen ihrer Art angehören.“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 25. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 16. 
248 „Menschen hingegen existieren, indem sie Sein unterscheiden von ihrer bestimmten Weise zu sein, also 
von einer bestimmten ‚Natur‘. Sie sind nicht einfach ihre Natur, ihre Natur ist etwas, das sie haben. Und dieses 
Haben ist ihr Sein. Personsein ist das Existieren von ‚rationalen Naturen‘.“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 40. Emphasis 
in original. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 31. 
 Chapter 2: Historical-Philosophical Foundation of Human Dignity  47 
 
 
Moreover, the word ‘person’ unlike ‘human being’, “is not a generic term, but a ‘generalizable 
proper noun’”.249 ‘Person’ presupposes the identification of a given being as a human being.250 
It is not because of certain qualitative attributes that persons are persons. Qualitative attributes 
do not make a person a person because “to conceive of personal identity as constituted wholly 
by self-consciousness and memory” is one of the mistakes for which Locke is responsible.251  
Viewed from this philosophical perspective, the concept of person as understood by the 
sciences, which only objectify a person, is thus ultimately challenged by eliciting a different 
but fundamental epistemology. In this way, Spaemann prepares his response to those who deny 
personhood based on certain definite properties by traversing through several series of 
reflections ranging from intentionality, transcendence, time, fiction, religion, souls, conscience 
recognition and freedom among others. He does this in order to illuminate the difference 
between ‘someone’ and ‘something’. Thus, he makes it clear that a person need not be defined 
in terms of certain criteria. One can define oneself only in relation to other persons. He calls 
this reference as “an act of free recognition”.252  
Spaemann returns once again to the rhetorical question, “Are all human beings persons?”, in 
his last Chapter.253 Alongside this question, it also becomes necessary to question whether the 
rights of persons are the same as human rights. This questioning becomes necessary in the wake 
of what has recently been suggested, namely that we exclude a portion of the human race from 
the sphere of persons and in doing so abandon the term ‘human rights’ altogether.254 
Nevertheless, when one does so, it is a paradox. Because, on the one hand, in this argument, 
one assumes a nominalist view that, “recognizes universal predicates such as ‘self-
consciousness’ and ‘rationality’, and so ascribes a generic meaning to the concept of person.”255 
On the other hand, however, there is a denial of universal human nature without any content 
other than a genealogical connection among individuals. However, the genealogical connection 
too is considered self-evidently irrelevant to what they are as individuals. There is also no basis 
provided as a basis for the community of persons.256 Therefore, Spaemann argues: “One does 
not enter that community by being begotten or born, only by becoming self-aware and being 
co-opted by other members.”257  
                                                 
249 „‚Person‘ ist daher nicht ein Klassenbegriff, sondern ein ‚allgemeiner Eigenname‘“. SPAEMANN, 
Personen..., 41. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 32. 
250 Cf. ibid. 
251 „Es gehört zu den Irrtümern, die auf Locke zurückgehen, dass die Identität der Person sich ausschließlich 
über das eigene Bewusstsein und über die eigene Erinnerung konstituiert.“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 44. Tr. from 
IDEM, Persons…., 35. 
252 „Sein Personsein aber ist wesentlich das nie Gegebene, sondern in freier Anerkennung Wahrgenommene.“ 
SPAEMANN, Personen..., 193-194.  “[…] the personal existence of the other is not construed like that, but ‘noticed’ 
by an act of free recognition.” IDEM, Persons…, 183. 
253 „‚Sind alle Menschen Personen?‘“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 253. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 238. Emphasis 
in original. 
254 Cf. IDEM, Persons…, 238. Cf. IDEM, Personen..., 253-254. 
255 „Dieser Einwand ist mit Bezug auf natürliche Arten nominalistisch. Zwar erkennt er Prädikate wie 
‚selbstbewusst‘ und ‚rational‘ als Universalien an und beansprucht ebenso für den Begriff der Person eine 
allgemeine Bedeutung.“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 254. Emphasis in original. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 238. 
256 Cf. IDEM, Personen..., 254. Cf. IDEM, Persons…, 238. 
257 „In diese Gemeinschaft soll man nicht durch Zeugung oder Geburt eintreten, sondern eher durch 
Selbstbewusstsein und Kooptation durch die anderen Mitglieder dieser Gemeinschaft“. SPAEMANN, Personen..., 
254. English tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 238. 
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As a climax to the above reflections, Spaemann offers six reasons, which verify that every 
human being is a person without considering any factually possessed characteristics. These six 
reasons are closely knit together and when taken as a whole strongly suggests, “[T]hat all human 
beings are persons”258 and that, “The rights of persons are human rights”.259 
The first reason is the ethical fact of the genealogical relation of each human being to a 
community of human beings that is constitutive of a community of persons.260 Spaemann 
explains: 
‘Humanity’, unlike ‘animality’, is more than an abstract concept that identifies a category; it 
is the name of a concrete community of persons to which one belongs not on the basis of 
certain precise properties objectively verified, but by a genealogical connection with the 
‘'human family’[…]. Belonging to the human family cannot depend on empirically 
demonstated [stet] properties.261 
Perhaps, the above argument can be used not only for adult and mature persons, but also to 
embryos, foetuses, and those who are in a comatose stage. This argument is of utmost 
importance here. The basis for the status of the person, according to Spaemann, goes beyond 
recognition, to that of the biological descent.262 
Second, the recognition as a person does not make a person. When we take the example of the 
relationship between a mother and her child, we find that the mother has oriented herself 
towards the child as “someone”, as a person in encounter. However, the mother does not intend 
to “make” a person. Nevertheless, in turning her attention towards someone, towards a person, 
she gives this person the possibility of developing gradually those characteristics, which she/he 
manifest as persons.263 Spaemann then says, “We never consciously ‘make’ persons. Personal 
existence is in the highest sense existing ‘out of one’s origin’, something unsusceptible to 
external inducement.”264 Since we treat others as ‘somebody’ because of the belongingness to a 
community of persons, there is no gradual transition from ‘something’ to ‘someone’. It is only 
with human beings that we always and from the start treat human beings as ‘someone’ and not 
as ‘something’. In so treating them, they actually develop the properties that justify the way 
they are as ‘someone’.265 
The third reason Spaemann gives is one of the characteristics of personality, namely, 
intentionality. Intentionality is different from mere propositional attitudes or merely doing 
something without intentions, which can also be ascribed to animals. When we engage in 
                                                 
258 „[…], dass alle Menschen Personen sind.“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 254. Emphasis in original. Tr. from 
IDEM, Persons…, 238. 
259 „Personenrechte sind Menschenrechte.“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 264. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 248. 
260 Cf. IDEM, Personen..., 254-256. Cf. IDEM, Persons…, 238-240. 
261 „,Menschheit‘ ist nicht, wie ‚Tierheit‘, nur ein abstrakter Begriff zur Bezeichnung einer Gattung, sondern 
ist zugleich der Name einer konkreten Personengemeinschaft, der jemand nicht angehört aufgrund bestimmter 
faktisch feststellbarer Eigenschaften, sondern aufgrund des genealogischen Zusammenhangs mit der 
,Menschheitsfamilie‘… Bei der Zugehörigkeit zur Menschheitsfamilie kommt es auf empirische Eigenschaften 
gar nicht an.“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 256. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 240. 
262 Cf. IDEM, Personen..., 255-256. 
263 Cf. Ibid., 256-258. Cf. IDEM, “Is every human being a person?...”, 467. 
264 „Wir haben nie das Bewusstsein, Personen zu machen. Personsein ist vielmehr im eminenten Sinn 
Existieren-aus-eigenem-Ursprung, das allem Herstellen von außen entzogen ist.“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 257. 
Emphasis in original. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 241. 
265 Cf. IDEM, Personen..., 258, Cf. IDEM, Persons…, 242. 
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immediate personal communication, we are certain that intentional acts are present. However, 
we cannot have the same degree of assurance in deciding about the absence of such acts. The 
intentionality of the treatment is recognizable even through the partial rationality of the other 
and sometimes without the observer recognizing it.266 
The fourth reason is the fundamental difference between ‘someone’ and ‘something’.267 Singer 
may respond in argument that the partisanship for one’s own species is merely a kind of racism, 
or “species-ism” for the human race and species. Although, for example, the seriously impaired 
lack certain characteristics or unable to coordinate their movements or even infants who have 
not yet learned so, yet we view and treat them as someone, irrespective of the absence of these 
characteristics. They are perceived as patients or as infirm. They stand in a relationship as 
someone who is in need of help. Yet we do not consider them merely as “something”. “The 
severely disabled are not, as animals are, at one with their nature, their mode of existence. They 
‘have’ a nature; but because their nature is defective, so is their way of having it.”268 Insofar as 
we live with human beings who lack certain characteristics, we acknowledge them in the human 
community. It is really an acknowledgement of their selves. It means the recognition of the 
Selbstsein (selves) of persons.269 
The fifth reason is the inappropriateness of the term “potential persons”.270 Nominalism argues 
that small children are only potential persons and in order to become persons they need to be 
first co-opted into the community through mutual recognition and acknowledgement. However, 
according to Spaemann, the recognition is not a question of co-optation by other members. 
Spaemann brings in this argument especially in the context of those who bind personhood with 
the actual presence of certain properties. By doing so, one not only transforms the act of 
acknowledgment into an act of co-opting but would also subject those who arrive later to the 
arbitrary demands - especially the properties - of those who already mutually acknowledge one 
another. This attitude is reflected among some scientists and philosophers who would want to 
let the protection of life begin from the third month of pregnancy, at birth or even later, that is, 
six weeks after birth. Singer would deny that children under two years have a right to life. When 
other members of the species Homo sapiens abandon some others, which is the sole criterion 
of belonging to the species, then it is a question of displaying power as to which human beings 
are granted personal rights and which ones are not.271 Spaemann argues: “It belongs, however, 
to the very dignity of the person that she assume her rightful place within the community of 
                                                 
266 Cf. IDEM, Personen..., 258, Cf. IDEM, Persons…, 242. Cf. IDEM, “Is every human being a person?...”, 468. 
267 Cf. IDEM, Personen..., 259-261, Cf. IDEM, Persons…, 242-244. Cf. IDEM, “Is every human being a 
person?...”, 468, Cf. IDEM, „Wann beginnt der Mensch Person zu sein?...“ 42. 
268 „Schwer Debile sind nicht, wie Tiere, eins mit ihrer Natur, mit ihrem Sosein. Auch sie haben eine Natur. 
Aber weil ihre Natur defekt ist, ist auch das Haben der Natur defekt.“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 259. Emphasis in 
original. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 243. 
269 Cf. IDEM, Personen..., 259-261, Cf. IDEM, Persons…, 244. Cf. IDEM, “Is every human being a person?...”, 
468-470. 
270 Cf. IDEM, Personen..., 261-262, Cf. IDEM, Persons…, 245-246.Cf. IDEM, “Is every human being a 
person?...”, 470. 
271 Cf. IDEM, „Wann beginnt der Mensch Person zu sein?...“, 44. English tr. from IDEM, “When does the human 
being to be a person?...”, 302-303. 
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persons not as a co-opted or voted in by others but as a native member.”272 Personhood does not 
depend on certain criteria or characteristics.  
There are no potential persons. On the other hand, persons possess potentialities and persons 
can develop themselves. “But nothing develops into a person. You don’t become some-one 
from being something.”273 The person is not the outcome of a change - as Aristotle’s 
substances - but is a generation. “The person is substance, because the person is the mode in 
which the human being exists. The person does not begin its existence after the human being, 
nor does it end its existence before the human being.”274 Spaemann further specifies, “Persons 
are or they are not. If they are, they are actual, semper in actu”.275 
The sixth reason is the absurdity of trying to assign conditions to what are unconditional. To 
acknowledge personhood is to acknowledge or recognize an unconditional claim. It would be 
an illusion if the unconditional claim were made dependent upon fulfilling empirical 
preconditions that remain hypothetical. If that were the case, the word “unconditional” would 
be degraded to a mere rhetorical flourish.276 
Further, Spaemann specifies that the concept of person is not the concept of species but rather 
a way by which individuals of the species “human” are. Spaemann clarifies: 
‘Person’ is not a generic term; it is the way in which individuals of human genus exist. Each 
of these individuals occupies an irreplaceable position in the community of persons that we 
call ‘mankind’. As the occupant of this position they can be taken seriously as persons by 
another occupant. If we make the ascription of this position depend on certain prior 
qualitative conditions, we have done away with the unconditional demand. No one occupies 
the position by co-optation, only by being born to membership of the human race.277 
Spaemann then emphatically concludes: “There can, and must, be one criterion for personality, 
and only one; that is biological membership of the human race.”278 In support of this claim, he 
approves of the British moral philosopher and metaphysician David Wiggins’s definition of 
                                                 
272 „Es gehört zur Würde der Person, dass sie nicht als kooptiertes, sondern als geborenes Mitglied ihren Platz 
innerhalf der universalen Personengemeinschaft einnimmt.“ SPAEMANN, „Wann beginnt der Mensch Person zu 
sein?...“, 44. English tr. from IDEM, “When does the human being to be a person?...”, 303. 
273 „Aber es kann sich nicht etwas zur Person entwickeln. Aus etwas wird nicht jemand.“ SPAEMANN, 
Personen..., 261. Emphasis in original. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 245. Emphasis in original. 
274 „Sie ist Substanz, weil sie die Weise ist, wie ein Mensch ist. Sie beginnt nicht später als der Mensch zu 
existieren und hört nicht früher auf.“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 261. Emphasis in original. Tr. from IDEM, 
Persons…, 245. See also IDEM, “Is every human being a person?...”, 470 and IDEM, „Wann beginnt der Mensch 
Person zu sein?...“ 42. 
275 „Personen sind, oder sie sind nicht. Aber wenn sie sind, sind sie immer aktuell, semper in actu.“ SPAEMANN, 
Personen..., 262. Emphasis in original. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 246. See also IDEM, “Is every human being a 
person?...”, 471. 
276 Cf. IDEM, Personen..., 262. Cf. IDEM, Persons..., 246. See also IDEM, “Is every human being a person?...”, 
471-472. 
277 „Person ist kein Artbegriff, sondern die Weise, wie Individuen der Art „Mensch“ sind. Sie sind so, dass 
jeder von ihnen in der Personengemeinschaft, die wir „Menschheit“ nennen, einen unverwechselbaren Platz 
einnimmt, und nur als Inhaber dieses Platzes werden sie als Personen von jemanden, der selbst einen solchen Platz 
einnimmt, wahrgenommen. Wenn wir die Zuerkennung eines solchen Platzes von der vorherigen Erfüllung 
bestimmter qualitativer Bedingungen abhängig machen, haben wir die Unbedingtheit des Anspruchs schon 
zerstört. Wer diesen Platz einnimmt, nimmt ihn ein als geborenes, nicht als kooptiertes Mitglied der Menschheit.“ 
SPAEMANN, Personen..., 263. Tr. from IDEM, Persons..., 247. See also IDEM, “Is every human being a person?...”, 
473. 
278 „Es kann und darf nur ein einziges Kriterium für Personalität geben: die biologische Zugehörigkeit zum 
Menschengeschlecht.“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 264. Tr. from SPAEMANN, Persons…, 247. 
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‘person’, a definition that sets the criterion for personality, namely, the biological belongingness 
to the human species: 
A person is any animal the physical make-up of whose species constitutes the species’ typical 
members thinking intelligent being, with reason and reflection, and typically enables them to 
consider themselves the same thinking things, in different times and places.279 
Thus, personal existence is given through biological descent. “The question of the person’s 
beginning and end is decided on the same terms as that of the biological beginning and end of 
human life.”280 Spaemann can thus categorically say:  
An embryo is the child of his or her parents from the first moment of existence. As a member 
of the human community he or she is a member of the community of persons, and as a 
member of the community of persons he or she is person, quite independently of any 
properties.281 
Thus, Spaemann argues through the above six reasons, both individually and collectively, that 
it is an intuitively held belief that all human beings are persons. Therefore, the rights of persons 
are human rights because of the fact of being born into the community of persons, freely 
recognized and accepted.282 
2.5.4 Concept of Person in Bioethics 
The above discussions, especially from Spaemann, raises several questions that were already 
raised in the last chapter (see Chapter 1.3 above) about the moral status of an embryo283: When 
exactly does human life begin? What is the quality of life of this embryo? Or, is an embryo a 
human? Is an embryo a “person” both in the moral and legal sense of the word? Does an embryo 
develop as a human being or as a person? Most importantly, is the embryo at an early stage of 
life worthy enough to receive protection and be treated with human dignity? 
It is the last referred question above, concerning the human dignity of the human embryo, that 
needs reflection: When is a human being a person? Although the concept falls under the 
jurisdiction of ethics within the normative disciplines such as anthropology or metaphysics, the 
concept of person is debated whether it is a prescriptive concept, i.e. as a right and duty 
                                                 
279 David WIGGINS, Sameness and Substance, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1980, 188. See SPAEMANN, Personen..., 
264, at fn.6, 274-275. See also IDEM, „Wann beginnt der Mensch Person zu sein?...“, 42. Here referring to the 
phrase “thinking things”, Spaemann clarifies that none among us would call a thinking being a thing. Cf. ibid. 
280 „Zuständig für die Frage nach Anfang und Ende der Person sind deshalb diejenigen, die zuständig sind für 
die Frage nach dem biologischen Anfang und Ende des menschlichen Lebens.“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 264. Tr. 
from IDEM, Persons..., 248. Spaemann is actually arguing here “by defending the thesis that personhood is not a 
property but rather the being of the person”. This means, “the person does not begin later than the existence of a 
new human life no longer identical with parental organism.” IDEM, „Wann beginnt der Mensch Person zu sein?...“, 
42. Tr. from IDEM, “When does the human being to be a person?...”, 301. The context to this affirmation comes 
from the background of brain death, which claimed, “that the death of the person precedes the death of the human 
being”. Ibid. See also IDEM, „Wann beginnt der Mensch Person zu sein?...“, 42. 
281 „Ein Embryo ist Kind seiner Eltern vom ersten Augenblick seiner Existenz an. Als Mitglied einer 
menschlichen Familie aber ist er Mitglied einer Personengemeinschaft, als Mitglied einer Personengemeinschaft 
aber ist er Person, ganz unabhängig von irgendwelchen Eigenschaften.“ SPAEMANN, „Wann beginnt der Mensch 
Person zu sein?...“, 44. English tr. from IDEM, “When does the human being to be a person?...”, 303. At a later 
stage when the status of the embryo will be dealt, the arguments of Spaemann in that regard will be taken up. 
282 Cf. SPAEMANN, Personen..., 264, IDEM, Persons…, 248. 
283 The topic on moral status of the embryo will be dealt with separately later. Here the topic is introduced in 
order to deliberate the questions on the personhood of the embryo. 
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description, similar to the concept of human dignity.284 For some authors the concepts “human 
being” and “persons” are synonymous. According to them, all human beings are persons and 
all persons are human beings. Since all human beings have the moral status of person, only they 
have moral claims and rights. Birnbacher calls this school of thought as “”Equivalence 
Doctrine”. He explains:  
It is advocated in Europe especially by theologians and philosophers who are influenced by 
Christianity. For many of these authors, the statement, “Man is a person”, qualifies so 
axiomatically that they use the concepts of “human dignity” and “personal dignity” 
interchangeably.285 
In contemporary philosophy, the concept of person as a genuinely practical attributive term is 
used to earmark the moral status of a human being: One is attributed personhood insofar as 
he/she has the capacity as a moral agent, a being whose nature in principle and independent of 
actual execution, has the ability and the competence to determine freely through reason to act, 
to enter in a conscious relationship with himself/herself (self-relation, self-consciousness), with 
others and the environment, to take responsibility and obligations in order to pursue the 
purposes and interests as well direct his/her life in the consciousness of the past and the future 
to a unique unmistakable distinctive future.286  
However, if one were to accept all the above characteristics, then the question remains: Is an 
embryo – devoid of these characteristics at least explicitly – a person worthy of respect and 
protection of life and therefore worthy of human dignity? This is a question that stays at the 
background of this research. Further deliberations in this Part I as well as in Part II, III and IV 
will clarify the question in depth. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
The concepts of human dignity and human person have had their own history. The aim in this 
Chapter was to show how the concept of human dignity gained its popularity today. It began 
with the importance given to human beings from Sophocles onwards and the understanding of 
dignity by Cicero as the origin of rights and duties.  
Historically seen, the concept of person has been variously answered using different criteria, 
such as cognitive, physical, sensory, need and relational. Martin Buber, through his I-Thou 
relationship, saw the possibility of actual persons even before being confronted with the 
possibilities of personal existence.  
Since it is difficult to define the concept of human person, the traditional definition by Boethius 
and Thomas was explored. Thomas, who followed Augustine, gave importance to intellectual 
consciousness and the various acts of the intellect and will and therefore, the privileged status 
of the human person in his writings. 
                                                 
284 BIRNBACHER, „Das Dilemma des Personenbegriffs…“, 10. 
285 „Sie wird in Europa vor allem von Theologen und christlich geprägten Philosophen vertreten. Vielen dieser 
Autoren gilt die Aussage „Der Mensch ist Person“ so axiomatisch, dass sie etwa die Begriffe „Menschenwürde“ 
und „Personwürde“ austauschbar verwenden.“ BIRNBACHER, „Das Dilemma des Personenbegriffs…“, 11. Tr. by 
author. The German Judge and legal philosopher Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenforde for example uses both these terms 
interchangeably. See e.g. Ernst-Wolfgang BÖCKENFORDE „Menschenwürde und Lebensrecht am Anfang und Ende 
des Lebens“, in: StZ 226 (2008) 245-258; 248. 
286 See Konrad HILPERT, „Person, Personalität“, in: LThK3 (Sonderausgabe) 8 (2009) 42-52; 42. In this article 
Hilpert discusses the concept of person from a historical, philosophical and theological background. 
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The philosophical contribution of Kant, adds further nuances to the concept of person. He 
acknowledged the nobility and inherent dignity, which finds its contemporary usage in legal 
and constitutional instruments of different States of the world and United Nations. One common 
thread that runs through history and philosophical development of the concept of human dignity 
is that human beings are endowed with reason and so it is reason that plays an important role 
in the development of the concept. “Human dignity”, in the last analysis, belongs to the quality 
of being human. According to Kant, it belongs to the quality of being the “determining 
subjects”.287 Autonomy and reason were given due importance by him in order to substantiate 
dignity. Based on these facts, the working definition of human dignity was modified. The 
difficulty of defining the concept still remains. It becomes troublesome especially when one 
attributes the characteristics that contemporary philosophy claims, such as the capacity as a 
moral agent to determine freely, engaging in a conscious relationship, responsibly pursuing the 
purposes and interests to a unique unmistakable distinctive future. Further, the contemporary 
understanding of philosophy does pose a problem when dealing with the question of dignity of 
the human person from the beginning of life. Can one ascribe all the characteristics to an 
embryo? Does an embryo have a right to life only when such characteristics become manifest? 
As an answer, according to Spaemann’s claim, every human being is a person. Neither the 
qualitative attributes and qualities or characteristics define persons, nor the actual presence of 
the typical traits of persons as the condition of personhood. One can define oneself only in 
relation to other persons as “an act of free recognition”. Although personal existence reveals 
itself gradually, yet it is present from the beginning and is unsusceptible to external inducement. 
There is also an unqualified certainty of the presence of intentionality in persons, which 
sometimes go unrecognized. It was also acknowledged that the single criterion for personality 
is the biological membership of the human race. 
At this critical juncture, one could only acknowledge that these characteristics are potentially 
present in an embryo and it is only a matter of time before they will be manifested. The next 
chapter will highlight the development of the concept of human dignity from a theological 
perspective.
                                                 
287 Cf. Jürgen MOLTMANN, “Human Rights, the Rights of Humanity and the Rights of Nature”, in: Concilium 
/2 (1990/2) 120-135, 122. German tr.: IDEM, “Menschenrechte, Rechte der Menschheit und Rechte der Natur“, in: 
Conc(D) 26 (1990) 165-174; 166. Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 182. 
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C H A P T E R  3  
THEOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
It was already mentioned that the term human dignity is a secular concept. It is neither primarily 
a theological concept; nor does it belong to the biblical terminology. However, theological 
foundations can be identified in the concept.288 It is not a constitutive question whether human 
dignity is founded on secular or religious grounds. A secular reason which is based on Kant 
does not disagree with the religious foundation or puts religious truths in question.289  
However, the religious explanation is deeper and more forceful; in that it connects the 
privileged status of people with their background and their transcendent future.290 With this 
background in mind, the theological development of the concept of human dignity will be dealt 
with in this Chapter. The scriptural basis, a short historical-theological development, and the 
Church documents that support the concept of human dignity will be analyzed. 
3.2 THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON IN THE OT 
It was mentioned in the last Chapter that the historical-philosophical development of the 
concept of human dignity had a great influence from the Christian quarters through the concept 
of human beings created in the image of God (Imago Dei). The Biblical teaching about creation 
of human beings in the “image of God” provides the kernel of the catholic view of human 
person and consequently the dignity of the human person and the intrinsic value of human life.291 
The basic statements of belief about the human dignity stays on the front pages of the Bible: 
Human person is created by God in His own image and likeness (Gen 1, 26-27).292 Considering 
the impact that this passage has, in the light of the effective history behind the priestly account, 
one can call the statements made there as a central anthropological statement.293 The fact that 
                                                 
288 Cf. BALKENOHL, „Menschenwürde und Lebensrecht…“, 77. See also SCHLÖGEL, „Zum Menschenwürde-
argument...“, 91. 
289 Cf. REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz …“, 136. 
290 Cf. ibid. Here, Reiter uses a quotation referring to Benedict XVI’s address to the Participants at the 12th 
General Assembly of The Pontifical Academy For Life And Congress on “The Human Embryo in the Pre-
Implantation Phase” delivered on 27 February 2006. It makes the above point clear: “Indeed, the human person 
has been endowed with a very exalted dignity, which is rooted in the intimate bond that unites him with his Creator: 
a reflection of God’s own reality shines out in the human person, in every person, whatever the stage or condition 
of his life.” BENEDICT XVI, “Discourse to the Participants of its 12th General Assembly of the Pontifical Academy 
for Life. Clementine Hall 27 February 2006”, in: Elio SGRECCIA/Jean LAFFITTE (ed.), Proceedings of the Twelfth 
Assembly of the Pontifical Academy for Life, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican 2007, 6-8; 7. Original in Italian 
version reads: “All’uomo, infatti, è donata un’altissima dignità`, che ha le sue radici nell’intimo legame che lo 
unisce al suo Creatore: nell’uomo, in ogni uomo, in qualunque stadio o condizione della sua vita, risplende un 
riflesso della stessa realtà di Dio.” BENEDICTI PP. XVI, “Allocutiones. Ad Generalem Coetum Pontificiae 
Academiae pro vita tuenda 27 Februarii 2006”, in: AAS 98 (2006) 263-266; 264. 
291 Cf. Thomas SRAMPICKAL, “The Catholic View of Human Life and Abortion”, in: Joseph 
ALENCHERRY/Scaria KANNIYAKONIL (ed.), Bioethical Issues and the Family, Cana Publications, Thurthy, Kerala 
2005, 81-99; 82. See also IDEM, “Abortion and its Evil”, in: Baiju JULIAN/Hormis MYNATTY (ed.), Catholic 
Contributions to Bioethics. Reflections on Evangelium Vitae, Asian Trading Corporation, Bangalore 2007, 218-
245, 218-219. Cf. also THUMMA, “Human Person…”, 236. 
292 Cf. REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz …“, 136.  
293 Cf. Christoph DOHMEN, „Zwischen Gott und Welt. Biblische Grundlagen der Anthropologie“, in: Erwin 
DIRSCHERL/Christoph DOHMEN/Rudolf ENGLERT/Bernhard LAUX, In Beziehung leben. Theologische Anthro-
pologie, Theologische Module, Bd. 6, Herder, Freiburg i. Br. 2008, 7-45; 25. 
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human beings are created in the image of God is what makes them distinct in the plan of 
creation. It is one of the key concepts that undergirds and symbolizes the understanding of the 
uniqueness of the human being in the OT. For the OT this concept of “image of God” is not 
merely a religious overlay on natural humanity, but something fundamental to authentic 
humanity.294 Human being created in the “image of God” is directly referred to only in three 
passages in the OT: Gen 1,26-27; 5,1-3; and, 9,5-6; all belonging to the Priestly Tradition. These 
passages reiterate the truth that the human being, in his/her relationship with God, has been 
imbued with a unique dignity as a responsible spiritual being.295 As is evident in the 
interpretation of Gen 5,1-3 and Gen 9,6, the image of God found in humanity is not something 
in the abstract, or only shared by the first man, but by every single human being. This has 
consequences for the relationship between human beings. By the very fact that everyone is a 
representative of God, each one shares in the “grand” dignity. The dignity of every human being 
is concretized in the relationship between people as a relation of equality. They are in this 
biblical perspective compelled to acknowledge as equals.296 
The author of Genesis with majestic simplicity proclaims: 
Then God said, “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness; and let 
them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, 
and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the 
earth.” So God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he created them; male 
and female he created them (Gen1,26-27).297 
It is interesting to note here that everything God created before the creation of human beings, 
He used the command “let there be”. However, when it came to creating man and woman this 
routine was broken by God and He expressed an intention and resolve of doing something 
special and then created man and woman in His image and likeness.298 Connecting the concept 
of the image of God with the concept of human person, Ray S. Anderson (Professor of theology 
and ministry at Fuller Theological Seminary, California) attests to the fact that: 
[The concept of imago Dei] is the foundational concept for understanding the biblical 
teaching concerning the nature and value of the human personhood. In taking up the question 
of what the imago Dei means for the human personhood, we address an issue that touches 
virtually every other tenet of Christian belief […]. It is not too much to say that the core of 
the theological curriculum itself is contained in the doctrine of the imago Dei. 299 
The Hebrew words for “image and likeness” (Gen 1,26-27) are: םֶלֶצ – ƒ®l®m and תוּמ ְּד – d®mût. 
Modern scholarship agrees that both these words can be used interchangeably without any 
                                                 
294 Cf. FABC Papers, No.120, 33. 
295 Cf. ibid., 34. 
296 Cf. Bernhard LAUX, „Von der Anthropologie zur Sozialethik – und wieder zurück“, in: DIRSCHERL u.a., In 
Beziehung leben…, 90-130; 101. 
297 Quotation from The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version. Catholic Edition, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, New York 1999. 
298 Cf. SRAMPICKAL, “The Catholic View of Human Life …”, 83. Thomas Srampickal, an Indian Moral 
theologian, mentions in his footnote to this passage that the picturesque manner in which the psalmist describes 
the creation of human beings in Ps 139,13-17 is very touching . See ibid., 99, at fn. 2. 
299 Ray S. ANDERSON, On Being Human. Essays in Theological Anthropology, Grand Rapids, Michigan 1982, 
70. Emphasis in the original. Addition by author. Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 189. For a detailed study 
of the concept of the human person made in the “image of God” from a substantialist, functional and relational 
understanding See ibid., 189-200. 
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substantial difference in their meanings.300 The word “image” refers more to an exterior 
representation, a visible figure or physical reproduction. “Likeness” refers more to similarity, 
resemblance or imitation, having a more subtle or broader meaning. These words therefore, can 
render the meanings of image, likeness, statue, sculpture, representation, reflection, 
correspondence, etc. However, neither could the author of Genesis have meant it as physical 
image or representation of God going against the transcendental idea of God in the OT, nor 
would he been satisfied with the idea of a generalized resemblance either. Perhaps, because of 
this he conjoins “likeness” to “image” in order to mitigate the idea of “physical image” and 
ward off any misunderstanding that man or woman is God’s physical image, however, at the 
same time affirming the human being’s special relationship with God.301 In the phrase “in our 
image and likeness”, the synonymous use of the preposition describes the manner and end of 
the particular creation. Adam is “modelled” on םיִהלֱֹא – ’§lœhîm and consequently a model of 
’§lœhîm. “The intention is to describe a resemblance of adam to God which distinguishes adam 
from all other creatures – and has consequence for adam’s relationship to them.”302 Thus, the 
value of human life is understood in its full depth when the human person is seen as the image 
and child of God.303 
The awareness of this human dignity concept contained in the image of God likeness in human 
persons breaks ground in the OT when the superior position of human person is emphatically 
described in Psalm 8304:  
What are human beings that you are mindful of them, mortals that you care for them? Yet 
you have made them a little lower than God, and crowned them with glory and honor. You 
have given them dominion over the works of your hands; you have put all things under their 
feet. (Ps 8,4-6)305 
Although there is no direct reference to the “image of God”, still the psalmist in Psalm 8 alludes 
to a beautiful meditation on the dignity of man and woman created “in his own image and 
likeness” (cf. Gen 1,26). The portrayal of the glory and wonder with which God has crowned 
man and woman in this Psalm is thought provoking.306 
Here appears the final reason for the dignity of human person made in the image of God, which 
is in the immediacy of him/her to God, a partnership with God, ultimately expressed in friendly 
union with God. It is in their creation as human persons by God that they are justified for the 
ultimate ground of their personal dignity.307 
                                                 
300 Cf. Maurice P. HOGAN, The Biblical Vision of the Human Person. Implications for a Philosophical 
Anthropology, European University Studies, Frankfurt a. M. 1994, 95. Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 190. 
301 Cf. John L. MCKENZIE, Dictionary of the Bible, Geoffrey Chapman, London 1968, 385, George 
KARAKUNNEL, The Christian Vision of Man. A Study of the Theological Anthropology in Gaudium et Spes of 
Vatican II, Asian Trading Corporation, Bangalore 1984, 80-81 and ANDERSON,  On Being Human..., 216-217. See 
also SRAMPICKAL, “The Catholic View of Human Life …”, 83. 
302 Phyllis A. BIRD, “‘Male and Female He Created Them’. Gen 1,27b in the Context of the Priestly Account 
of Creation”, in: HThR 74/2 (1981) 129-159; 138 at fn. 20. Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights...,190. 
303 Cf. LOBO, Guide to Christian Living..., 67. 
304 Cf. REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz …“, 136-137. 
305 Quotation from The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version. There is a slight difference in quotation 
number when compared to the German Einheit Edition. In the German Edition the verses correspond to Ps 8,5-7. 
306 Cf. SRAMPICKAL, “The Catholic View of Human Life …”, 99 at fn. 2. 
307 Cf. REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz …“, 137. See also HILPERT, „Die Idee der 
Menschenwürde…; 44. 
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The Wisdom Books too continue to portray the image of God in human beings. For example, the 
Book of Sirach makes reference to the human being created in the image of God: “He endowed 
them with strength like his own, and made them in his own image” (Sir 17,3).308 The Book of Sirach 
also conveys to an integral understanding of the image of God, namely, that the human person has 
been endowed with spiritual faculties that are distinctively human, such as reason and will. “He 
filled them with knowledge and understanding, and showed them good and evil” (Sir 17,7).309 Yet 
another reference is found in the Book of Wisdom. Here the author of the Book affirms that being 
created in the image of God, the human being is much more than mere existence in time, and 
involves a call towards fullness of life that transcends the limits of time. “for God created us for 
incorruption, and made us in the image of his own eternity” (Wis 2,23).310 
Together with the above idea is the idea of relationality of the human being with one another 
which is expressed as, “God placed the first human beings in relation to one another, each with 
a partner of the other sex. The Bible affirms that man exists in relation with other persons, with 
God, with the world, and with himself. According to this conception, man is not an isolated 
individual but a person – an essentially relational being.”311 In addition, a biblical understanding 
of the concept human person gains further nuance in the OT when God reveals himself to 
Abraham, Moses and Isaiah in a way which is totally different from a Platonic idea of a reality 
of being that can be approachable only by Gnostic elite. His revelation is manifested in ways 
that are personal, namely, as one who speaks, loves, and is able to enter into covenant with 
other persons.312 
This image of human persons created in the image of God applies to all persons; meaning that 
there is no difference in the quality of human beings, considered from their cultural, ethnical or 
societal background from which they originate.313 The biblical exegete Claus Westermann 
attests to the universal line of vision of Gen 1,26 that all human beings – no matter which 
religion they belong to and in every area of life, or even where the religions are no longer 
recognized – are created in the image of God.314 
                                                 
308 Quotation from The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version. 
309 Ibid. 
310 Ibid. Cf. FABC Papers, No.120, 35. 
311 INTERNATIONAL THEOLOGICAL COMMISSION, “Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons created in 
the Image of God (July 23rd 2004)”, in: La Civiltà Cattolica 4 (2004) 254-286; No.10. The German translation 
can be found in: INTERNATIONALE THEOLOGISCHE KOMMISSION, „Gemeinschaft und Dienstleistung. Die 
menschliche Person – geschaffen nach dem Bilde Gottes (2004)“, Arbeitshilfen 223, hg. v. Sekretariat der 
Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, Bonn 2008, Nr. 10. Cf. FABC Papers, No.120, 36. The FABC Papers No.120 
referred here uses the expression for relational being as “cosmotheandric” being. This expression was used by 
Raimundo Panikkar. “The cosmotheandric vision of Panikkar is shaped by a fusion between the theandric vision 
of Christianity and the theocosmic vision of the Hindu religion.” See Cheriyan MENACHERRY, Christ. The Mystery 
in History. A Critical Study on the Christology of Raymond Panikkar, Peter Lang, Frankfurt a. M./New York 1996, 
119. 
312 Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 46. 
313 Cf. HILPERT, „Die Idee der Menschenwürde…“, 44. See also Eberhard SCHOCKENHOFF, „Lebensbeginn 
und Menschenwürde. Eine Begründung für die lehramtliche Position der katholischen Kirche“, in: HILPERT/MIETH 
(Hg.), Kriterien biomedizinischer Ethik…, 198-232; 202. 
314 Cf. Claus WESTERMANN, Genesis, I-11, Neukirchener Verl., Neukirchen-Vluyn 1974, 218. Cf. 
SCHOCKENHOFF, „Lebensbeginn und Menschenwürde…“, 203. 
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That every human person has value or worth must be taken into consideration by the health care 
system. Theologically speaking this is precisely expressed by the fact that every person is 
created in the image of God.315 
However according to Schockenhoff, although these theological ideas had developed 
independently of one another in comparison to a secular understanding of human dignity, one 
cannot perhaps harmonize or prematurely bridge a link between the historically interpreted 
image of God in human beings with its inner theological interpretations and a secular 
philosophical-ethical concept of human dignity.316 
It is also important to note that the whole human being is seen as created in the image of God, 
not just located in one or another aspect of human nature. Thus, the OT presents a holistic vision 
of the human being. According to biblical anthropology, there is no dichotomy between body 
and soul. The whole man or woman is body, and the whole man or woman is spirit. He/she is a 
totality, a living soul. “Flesh” (ר ָׂ֖ ָּש ָּב – b¹´¹r) in biblical Hebrew meant the concrete man or 
woman as the source of bodily and non-bodily phenomena. The “soul” or “spirit” (שֶׁפֶנ - nepeš) 
is distinctively human mode of bodily existence. The totality applies also to the different parts 
of the body. So too, in the NT “body” (σῶμα), “flesh” (σὰρξ)) “soul” (ψυχή) and “spirit” 
(πνεῦμα) refer to the whole person. There is no implication that there are two parts in a human 
person, soul and body.317 
The Hebrew term which generally translated “life” are several and varied. In the OT, the 
Hebrew word םיִיַח – hayyîm meaning “life” (probably an abstract plural) often connotes the 
span of human existence (Gen 23,1), sometimes it refers to the circumstances of life (Job 10,1). 
Its cognate יַיַח – hayyâ means, “Living thing”. Other Hebrew terms, which was mentioned 
above, include שֶׁפֶנ – nepeš “soul”, life”, that makes a being alive.318 In no way does the Hebrew 
vocabulary point to an anthropological dualism but toward an understanding of the human 
person as a psychosomatic unity. Thus, in Ps 63,1, the psalmist would declare that his nepeš 
“thirsts” for God and his b¹´¹r “faints” for God (see also Ps 84,2).319 
Human life created in the image of God is sacred. The Scriptures holds for the sacredness of 
human life due to the fact that life is created by God (Gen 2,7).320 Moreover, when one stands 
before human life or any type of life for that matter, one stands before a mystery. When human 
life is approached, there is a sense of awe and wonder. The psalmist powerfully portrays this 
sense of wonder in the expression, “For it was you who formed my inward parts; you knit me 
together in my mother’s womb. I praise you, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made. 
                                                 
315 Cf. Bernhard LAUX, „Zwischen Würde und Preis“, in: Thorsten KINGREEN/Bernhard LAUX (Hg.), 
Gesundheit und Medizin im interdisziplinären Diskurs, Springer, Berlin-Heidelberg 2008, 3-23; 10. 
316 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, „Lebensbeginn und Menschenwürde…“, 203-204 and Eberhard SCHOCKENHOFF, 
„Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theologische Perspektiven“, in: RAGER (Hg.), Beginn, Personalität und 
Würde des Menschen, op. cit., 445-533, 460. Schockenhoff quotes Hilpert in favour of his argument. See Konrad 
HILPERT, Die Menschenrechte. Geschichte-Theologie-Aktualität, Patmos-Verl., Düsseldorf 1991, 189. 
317 Cf. LOBO, Guide to Christian Living..., 86. 
318 Cf. David Noel FREEDMAN (ed.), Eerdmans Dictionary of the Bible, William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan/Cambridge, U.K. 2000, 809. 
319 Cf. Allen VERHEY, Reading the Bible in the Strange World of Medicine, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 
Grand Rapids, Michigan 2003, 82. 
320 Cf. Scaria KANNIYAKONIL, Fundamentals of Bioethics. Legal Perspectives and Ethical Approaches, 
Oriental Institute of Religious Studies India, Kottayam, Kerala 2007, 253. 
 Chapter 3: Theological Understanding of Human Dignity  59 
 
 
 
Wonderful are your works” (Ps 139,13-14). One can find the foundation for the value and 
sacredness of human life in these biblical descriptions.321 The main idea of this teaching, as 
mentioned earlier, is contained in the Bible and is based on the fact that the human being is 
created in the image of God (Gen 1,26-27; Ps 139, 13-18).322 
According to Podimattam, the concept of “sacredness” becomes even more important because 
among many principles that guide ethical reflection, one that is rather deep is the principle of 
the sanctity of human life. For Christians, the ground on which the reflection on sanctity of 
human life is based depends on a number of doctrines. For example, “Man as the image of God, 
Man as one Almighty God actually needs, Man as God’s partner in love, Man as one spoken to 
by God in love, Man as co-creator with God, Man as a god, and so on”.323 Being made in the 
image of God, God himself treats human life as sacred and demands a respect for life’s sanctity 
from all men and women. This is reflected in Gen 9,5-7.324  
However, according to Baranzke, the identification of sanctity of life with human dignity – 
which has become a customary debated question in Bioethics – is itself questionable. She gives 
three reasons for this: 1. the biblical foundation of the idea of the sanctity of life is Lev 19.2 
(“You shall be holy, for I the LORD your God am holy”325); and not the image of God in Genesis 
1, 26f; 2. Historically seen, the concept of sanctity of life pertains always to constitutive and 
positive impact on created nature and corporeality, while the image of God concept, especially 
during the Hellenistic period, was portrayed as dignitas in the form of the intellectualized 
immortal spiritual soul; and therefore, 3. The “sanctity of life” in modern Christian tradition 
was much less evoked as human dignity but rather “based on the theme of human rights” as the 
physical concretization of human dignity.326 
Paulachan Kochappilly, a moral theologian in India, is of the opinion from another point of 
view. For him, the OT stresses the value of bodily life. For example, by the very fact that human 
beings are made in the “image and likeness” of God and moreover, because they breathe the 
“life-giving breath” of God (Gen 2,7), their life is holy. Consequently, a long life is regarded as 
a priceless blessing. It is the desire of Israel that all may be well with them, that Yahweh may 
give them life (Dt 6,24; Ps 34,13). Thus in the OT the concept of sanctity of life can be seen as 
                                                 
321 Quotation from The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version. Cf. Agnelo Rufino GRACIAS, “Dignity of 
Human Procreation and Value of Human life. Moral Foundation and Theological Perspectives” in CATHOLIC 
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ed. by Alex VADAKUMTHALA, Media House, New Delhi 2007, 22-35; 23-24. 
322 Cf. ALENCHERRY/KANNIYAKONIL, “General Introduction”, in: IDEM (ed.), Bioethical Issues and the 
Family..., xxv-xxx; xxvi-xxvii. 
323 Cf. Felix M. PODIMATTAM, “Sanctity of Human Life. Basis and Issues”, in: JULIAN/MYNATTY (ed.), 
Catholic Contributions to Bioethics…, 19-45, 19. 
324 Germain GRISEZ, The Way of the Lord Jesus. Vol. 2. Living a Christian Life, Franciscan Press, Illinois 1993, 
461. Cf. CHAMAKALA, The Sanctity of Life…, 57. 
325 Quotation from The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version. 
326 Cf. BARANZKE, „Heiligkeit des Lebens…“, 109. Cf. also Dietmar MIETH, Was wollen wir können? Ethik im 
Zeitalter der Bioethik, Herder, Freiburg/Basel/Wien 2002, 27. Mieth says: „das Leben ist heilig und der Mensch 
ist Gottes Ebenbild. Aber wenn man zeigen will, was die Heiligkeit des Lebens aussagt, muss man vorher geklärt 
haben, was Leben ist.“ “Life is holy and man is made in God’s image. However, if one wants to demonstrate the 
sanctity of life, then one must first define what life is.” Tr. by author. 
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a close bond between God and the human being. The summit, the fullness and the holiness of 
life is due to its linking with the Divine.327 
Besides the above nuances of human life as created in the image of God and its sacredness, the 
OT also teaches that human life begins in the womb (Gen 16,11; 25,21-26; Ex 21,22; Is 7,14; 
44,2.24; 46,3; 49,1-2; 53,6; Jo 3,11-16; 10,8-12; 31,15; Ps 22,9-10; 139,13-16; Ecc 5,15; 11,5). 
It also teaches that human life begins at conception: “remember, I was born guilty, a sinner 
from the moment of conception” (Ps 51,5).328 Human life is the plan of God and even before 
creation He knew them (Jud 13,3-7 – a prophecy to the wife of Manoah about the birth of 
Samson). Similarly, in Jeremiah one finds: “Before I formed you in the womb I knew you; 
before you came to birth I consecrated you” (Jer 1,5).329 
Owing to the value and worth of human life, God himself does not favour death of the living as 
the book of Wisdom 1,13 acclaims: “For God did not make Death, he takes no pleasure in 
destroying the living”.330 Although OT narrates that Cain killed his brother Abel, yet violence 
to human life is against God’s plan. Anger, envy and murder, which proceed from human 
beings, destroy the image of God. Therefore, the Decalogue proclaims a strong divine 
commandment against killing: “You shall not murder” (Ex 20,13). Thus, the Scriptures prohibit 
the killing of the innocent and righteous (Ex 23,7). It is a grave crime to kill the innocent which 
is contrary to the dignity of the human being (Dt 27,25; Jer 7,6; 22,17; Ps 106,37-38; Prov 6,16-
19).331 
Human beings are also presented with the responsibility for life, that is, to be fruitful and to 
multiply (Gen 1,28). The concept of health and sickness is also related to human life. For 
instance, sickness and infertility are considered as curse (Ps 107,17; Ez 26, 14-22; 1Kg 14,1-4; 
Gen 20,17-18). God is the healer and he bestows health (Gen 20,17; Ex 15,16). The prophets 
continue the healing ministry (2 Kg 5,3-14; 20,1-7), especially Nathan (2 Kg 25,12-14) and 
Elijah (2 Kg 1,14).332 The Bible also presents human life as a gift from God (Gen 1,26ff; Job 
2,4; Eccl 7,17; 11,8-9).333 Human life is also a gift of God in a sublime way because of the very 
fact of its creation in God’s own image. Hence, human life is a good because God is good. 
Bruno Maggioni points out this fact, “God is the Living, and life is the most precious gift 
pouring out of His free and faithful love […]. The word life is always connected with verbs 
showing God’s saving action: to give, to redeem, to preserve, to provide and to do”.334 This 
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aspect of the human person as a gift from God becomes even more explicit in the NT. This will 
be described in the next section. 
3.3 THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON IN THE NT 
The affirmation of human beings in the OT to have fundamental value by the fact that they are 
made in the image and likeness of God is further made concrete in the NT through the 
incarnation of the Son of God as man and consequently restored through his death and 
resurrection. “It is because humanity is considered to exist in the image and likeness of God 
that this reflexive likeness can be taken as a criterion for human dignity.”335 The doctrine of 
creation in the Christian Tradition has brought out the personal worth of every human being 
through the fact that each one of us is made in the image of God and of the final destiny in 
reaching fulfilment with that God of Jesus Christ.336 To express it in Indian Moral Theologian 
George V. Lobo’s words: “it is Christianity above all that has brought to light the inherent 
dignity of the human person made in the image of God and called to sonship of God in Christ.”337 
Thus, in the NT, the concept of imago Dei attains Christological significance.338 Although there 
is no explicit reference to the “image of God” in the NT attributed to human persons, the NT 
plumbs the image of the human being created in the image of God in all its theological depth. 
The image of God is mentioned nearly a dozen times and in three main senses: First, to describe 
the unique dignity and sonship of Jesus Christ (2 Cor 4,4; Col 1,15; Heb 1,3). Second, to 
describe the likeness of God into which believers enter through faith in Jesus Christ (Rom 8,29; 
Col 3,10). Third, to describe the humanity of the human being. It is through the sacraments that 
the transformation of the believer into the image of Christ is accomplished. The NT admits that 
every human being has the possibility of becoming a child of God.339 The deepest significance 
of being made in the image of God is the idea of being children of God. This is also the 
fundamental theological definition of a human person.340  
While in the OT the thrust was about “who” the human being is, namely, the image of God, the 
NT adds a new intensity and thrust bringing into focus: “who the human being is called to be”.341 
Thus, one can derive from what is said about human beings in the OT and apply it to Paul’s 
letter to the Ephesians: “Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has 
blessed us in Christ with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places, just as he chose us in 
Christ before the foundation of the world…” (Eph 1,3-4). Even before God created anything 
else in the world, He already has each one of us in his mind. Each one of us is a gift of God – 
                                                 
335 Mette LEBECH, “What is Human Dignity?” in Maynooth Philosophical Papers 2 (2003) 59-69; 66. 
336 Cf. SRAMPICKAL, “The Catholic View of Human Life …”, 99. 
337 George V. LOBO, Moral and Pastoral Questions, Gujarat Sahitya Prakash, Anand, India 19972, 238. 
338 For an elaborate study on the “image of God doctrine” in the Scripture, see John Romus DEVASAHAYAM, 
Human Dignity in Indian Secularism and in Christianity. Christianity in Dialogue with Indian Secularism, 
Claretian Publications, Bangalore 2007, 240-270; 253. 
339 Cf. FABC Papers, No.120, 39. 
340 Cf. Edward SCHILLEBEECKX, God and Man, tr. by Edward FITZGERALD/Peter TOMLINSON, Sheed and Ward, 
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341 Cf. ibid., 39-40. 
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unique, irreplaceable, never-to-be-repeated history – to the world, to the Church and to his 
Kingdom.342 
Again, in Paul one can find the instance where he affirms Christ as new Adam, who is the 
“image of the invisible God” (Col 1,15). Here Paul speaks of Jesus Christ as portrayal of God 
not only in terms of his humanity, but also in terms of his pre-existence: he is the image that 
comes from invisible God himself.343 Jesus Christ restored the likeness of God in human beings 
lost by original sin. Consequently, human nature regains the lost dignity.344 Paul thus 
emphasizes both the universality of Christ’s redeeming work while reflecting the true image of 
God, as well as humankind, which is predestined to be conformed to the image of Christ. Above 
all, in Pauline writings the concept of the image of God attains a Christological, soteriological 
and an eschatological significance.345 
That the image of human persons created in the image of God applies to all persons; without 
meaning any difference in the quality of human beings in their cultural, ethnical or societal 
background from which they originate, is confirmed by Paul in Gal 3,28.346 
Just like OT described about the sacredness and sanctity of life, the NT also endorses it. The 
ultimate basis for the human body’s sacredness is because of the Incarnation of the divine Word 
becoming flesh. Therefore, because of its link to God, every human person should be treated 
with reverence.347 Thus, in the Christian tradition the values and rules that they embody in the 
understanding of humans and their dignity is, in the last analysis, grounded on the person of 
Jesus Christ who took flesh and blood. “That meaning and that dignity reveals human person 
sharing the otherness (holiness) of God by being called to share in sonship or daughtership of 
the Father, in brotherhood or sisterhood of Jesus and of one another.”348 
Human life is treasured, tendered and triumphed in and through the human body, making it holy 
and honourable. The human person is not a pure spirit imprisoned in the body or just united 
with body, but an embodied spirit or animated body. Our bodies are “temples of the Holy Spirit” 
(1Cor 6,19). This understanding of the human life invites us to live life with dignity and 
integrity involving the whole person. Life is much more than mere physiological processes. 
Lobo brings out this idea clearly when he writes: “So human life is not mere vital existence or 
merely physical and biological reality; it is an ethical and religious reality whose health and 
vigour ultimately depend upon integration of the human will with the divine will.”349 
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These three aspects, namely, being made in the image of God, the Word becoming incarnate, 
and our bodies as the temple of the Holy Spirit, reflects in some way the Trinitarian life in us. 
From a Christian perspective, God is a Trinity. It means, human beings who are created in 
God’s image are imago Trinitas. Consequently, one can call the human person as the image of 
the Trinity. As Donald Juvenal Merriell clarifies: “Far from excluding the possibility of the 
image of the Trinity, reason shows that we should expect to find the image of the Trinity 
wherever we find that image of God, if we accept that God is Trinity.”350 This is also in 
concurrence with the Christian concept of the body, which is the temple of God. As Paul would 
say, “For God’s temple is holy, and you are that temple.” (1Cor 3,17).351 
Life, according to the NT, is given to us as a sacred trust. The fullness of life is eternal life. 
Bodily life is extremely precious.352 Both the words and works of Jesus express the concept of 
sanctity of life; as the Gospel of John portrays that the “son of the father was made flesh” (cf. 
Jn 1,14). This points both to the fact that Jesus has “taken human life in its full reality” and to 
the fact of the dignity of human life. Since the basis of life of a human being is rooted in God’s 
free love, the dignity of human life is inalienable and unreserved.353 
Two Greek words are used in NT for life, namely, βίος – bíos and ζωή – zœ¢. βίος – bíos refers 
to the natural order, life as a stronger ethical content and manner of life and ζωή – zœ¢ to God’s 
life, as vital , natural force, entailing also the salvation of eternal life. The equivalent to bíos, 
when used in Latin is Vivere, which denotes the concept of life.354 
Other texts in the Bible that highlight the teachings of the sanctity of life are: Life is eternal (Mt 
25,46; 2 Tim 1,10); human life is the very life of God (Jn 5,26; 6,57; 10,10). Life culminates in 
resurrection (Rom 14,9; 5,17-18; Gal 2,20; 2 Cor 5,15; Gal 5,22). Human life is unique and 
superior to all other types of life.355 
One can thus find that the focus of Christian ethics can be none other than on life, if that is the 
purpose of Jesus’ coming. “Life is the fountain, force, and focus of Christian ethics, which is 
for its protection, preservation, and promotion. Life is the fundamental good and hence 
recognition of life, respect for life, and response to life is inevitable. This demands reverence 
for life in all its forms, spheres, and stages.”356 The statement of Jesus attests the importance 
given to life: “I came that they may have life, and have it abundantly” (Jn 10,10). Moreover, 
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the respect for life of the human person at the time of the conception is attested to in the NT 
(Lk 1,35-36; Mt 1,18-20).”357 
The concept of human person attains even further nuance in the NT. Christ is revealed as a 
person, as the Second Person of the Trinity, as the Son of God. Hence, one can sum up 
Christianity as a person-centred and person-oriented, at the same time Christo-centric. From its 
beginning Christianity was a community of persons having an inner dynamic of love for one 
another. What is innermost in reality and at the root of all meaning and giver of all meaning is 
the person. The person is not for the world, but the world is for the person.358 
God’s life expresses, as the NT states, the concept of communion and dialogue. This is revealed 
in the unity of the Trinity. Human life participates in this communion and dialogue when love 
is shared among one another. As John writes: “We know that we have passed from death to life 
because we love one another” (I Jn 3,14).359 Apart from this, by the very fact that Jesus went 
through his passions, shared temptations, failure, suffering etc., the life of the human persons 
has been assumed by him.360  
Since life is sacred, the NT too, similar to the OT, prohibits taking away life. Thus, in the 
sermon on the mount, Jesus recalls and extends the 5th commandment (Mt 5,21-39,44).361 
Having seen the dignity of the human person and other nuances connected with that theme in 
the Scriptures; next, the historical development of the concept will be discussed. 
3.4 HISTORICAL-THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF 
HUMAN DIGNITY 
Christianity, which arose as a religion of liberation, provided the most secure basis for the 
respect of the human person made to the image of God. During the Patristic and medieval 
periods, this respect for the human person was elaborated into a high idea combining biblical 
inspirations with valid insights from Greek and Roman philosophy and jurisprudence. 
However, in the same breath it is also to be admitted that down the Church’s history the thought 
has not been promoted or defended with sufficient clarity or energy.362 
Of remarkable impression made in the history of the Church is the famous dictum of Irenaeus, 
bishop of Lyons. The dictum emphatically portrays the value of human life that is expressed in 
the inherent dignity of the human person, namely, “For the glory of God is a living man; and 
the life of man consists in beholding God.” (Gloria enim Dei vivens homo, vita autem hominis 
visio Dei).363 Irenaeus was the first among the Fathers of the Church who brought together the 
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doctrine of the image of God and tied it with human dignity. His influence had a lasting impact 
on later thinkers. For Irenaeus the divine image in human beings meant the divine bestowal of 
human nature endowed with reason and freedom.364  
This influenced later Christian thinkers who held that reason, freedom and moral responsibility 
are the essential qualities of being human, rooted in the soul, i.e., rooted in the bestowal of 
image of God in human beings.365 
The emphasis on the dignity of human person as image of God becomes even more explicit in 
Irenaeus’ Christocentric anthropology. Against the Gnostics he writes: 
And then, again, this Word was manifested when the Word of God was made man, 
assimilating Himself to man, and man to Himself, so that by means of his resemblance to the 
Son, man might become precious to the Father. For in times long past, it was said that man 
was created after the image of God, but it was not [actually] shown; for the Word was as yet 
invisible, after whose image man was created, Wherefore also he did easily lose the 
similitude. When, however, the Word of God became flesh, He confirmed both these: for He 
both showed forth the image truly, since He became Himself what was His image; and He 
re-established the similitude after a sure manner, by assimilating man to the invisible Father 
through means of the visible Word.366 
Irenaeus held that as God’s image the whole of human person is precious to God and therefore, 
destined for redemption. “This is one of his valuable and enduring contributions to the value of 
human dignity in Christian thought.”367 The term “image of God” or imago Dei has a variety of 
meanings within Christian theology. For example, for Augustine, the term “image of God” is 
used of human beings due to their rational nature. Therefore, for Augustine the divine image in 
us orients our spirits towards contemplative union with God.368 
Besides the theme of the human being made in the image of God and its connection with the 
concept of human dignity, the concept of human person came to the light of theological thinking 
right from the time of Tertullian. It was he, at the end of the second century and the beginning 
of the third century, who introduced first the term persona in his doctrine of the Trinity as he 
was thinking about God in the context of biblical history. He used the word persona as a label 
for the distinctive identities of the Father, Son and Spirit. In the course of the Trinitarian debate 
the word was refashioned. “[…] just as one cannot think of the ‘person’ of Father or Son or 
Spirit without the others, so one cannot think of the human person without others, as if human 
personhood were prior to and independent of community. Human persons too are persons-in-
relation. And it is in and as bodily beings that we are in relation to others and to God”.369 
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In contrast to all visible creatures, in God’s plan and creation, human beings stand in a special 
relationship with God, and He finds His rest in them. As Ambrose exclaims: “The sixth day is 
finished and the creation of the world ends with the formation of that masterpiece which is man 
[…].”370 Commenting on this passage, Srampickal says: “This unique relationship with God 
‘constituting the vertical dimension of his existence’ is the key aspect of man’s divine image, 
though other aspects of this special relationship and status can be perceived.”371 
Because of the relationship with God and others, Augustine sees human persons in the image 
of the trinity of divine persons. He finds a variety of trinities within soul (De Trinitate Books 
9-15). De Trinitate describes a summary of the trinities in a person. Augustine writes:  
For if we refer ourselves to the inner memory of the mind by which it remembers itself, and 
to the inner understanding by which it understands itself, and to the inner will by which it 
loves itself, where these three always are together, and always have been together since they 
began to be at all, whether they were being thought of or not; the image of this trinity will 
indeed appear to pertain even to the memory alone; but because in this case a word cannot 
be without a thought (for we think all that we say, even if it be said by that inner word which 
belongs to no separate language), this image is rather to be discerned in these three things, 
viz. memory, intelligence, will (De Trinitate 14.7.10).372 
Augustine thus speaks of a triple power in the human person, namely, memory, understanding, 
and will or love; a trinity which pertains to the inner person. Augustine also says, “And hence 
each individual man, who is called the image of God, not according to all things that pertain to 
his nature, but according to his mind alone, is one person, and is an image of the Trinity in his 
mind. But that Trinity of which he is the image is nothing else in its totality than God, is nothing 
else in its totality than the Trinity” (Ibid. 15.7.11).373 Here Augustine is telling that it is in the 
mind that memory, understanding and will reside in one single person in the image of the 
Trinity, because he/she is made in the image of God. 
Moreover, Leo the Great (440-461) exhorts the Christians of their lofty dignity that allows them 
to participate in the divine nature through their dignified behaviour. He says, “Acknowledge, 
                                                 
370 Hexameron VI, 75-76. See AMBROSE, Hexameron, in: C. SCHENKL (ed.), Corpus Scriptorum 
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372 De Trinitate; 14.7.10. AUGUSTINE, “The Trinity”, in: J. E. ROTELLE (ed.), The Works of Saint Augustine. A 
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nachdenken…“, 66. 
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you Christian, your lofty dignity (dignitatem): You have been made to share in the divine 
nature, so do not return old baseness by unworthy behaviour.” 374 
In order to fit into the Aristotelian system, Thomas adopted what Augustine had taught about 
imago Dei making it more explicit in intellectual and psychological terms.375 Thomas using the 
theory of analogy of being held that God is being, and therefore all created beings image him 
in a certain degree, while excluding non-rational beings. The image of God in human consists 
in their intellectual nature.376 Although Thomas used the concept of dignity and person 
interchangeably, it is to be noted here that the term dignity of human (dignitate humana) was 
used by him only once in Summa Theologiae. It reads, “By sinning man departs from the order 
of reason, and consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood […].”377 Here he argues 
that human beings can lose their human dignity if they depart from the order of reason through 
sin.378 
Thomas claimed that the human person has a special dignity because he/she represents the most 
perfect creature in all of nature. The special excellence consists in having dominion over one’s 
own activity.379 The human person is also a single free intelligent creature silently touched by 
God’s grace and more valuable than all the galaxies.380 
It was Mirandola, based on his considerations that human beings are created in the image of 
God, who emphasized that human dignity consists in their freedom to choose between 
possibilities.381 
Aelred of Rievaulx gave another shade of meaning to the imago Dei. According to him, the 
image of God is a constitutive element of the soul’s nature and hence indestructible.382 Aelred 
thus affirms in his De anima: “Each human soul, created in Gods image, is eternal; and because 
body and soul form one person, the human body must be eternal too. So, even though in many 
                                                 
374 LEO THE GREAT, Sermon 21, in: A. CHAVASSE (ed.), CCL 138, Brepols Editores Pontificii, Turnholt 1973, 
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AQUINAS, The “Summa Theologica”. Part I. QQ. XXVII-XLIX, op. cit., 26-27. Emphasis in original. Cf. 
PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 46. 
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XC-CXIV, op. cit., 399. Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 46. 
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382 Cf. Speculum Caritatis,1,4. AELREDI RIEVALLENSIS, Speculum Caritatis, in: A., HOSTE/C. H. TALBOT (ed.), 
CCM, I, Opera Omnia, Typographi Brepols, Turnholt 1971, 2-161; 14. English tr. IDEM, The Mirror of Charity, 
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respects the bodies of animals are better than ours, in the final analysis ours are more holy than 
theirs, for ours (unlike theirs) will rise again.”383 
The wonderful truth, that is, “to have value (dignity) is to be loved by God”384 comes from the 
fact that God infinitely and unconditionally loves every human being and forms the basis of 
human dignity. That human persons are precious to God is the most important discovery of 
his/her intrinsic dignity and worth, irrespective of achievements and accomplishments.385 
Mathew Illathuparampil, an Indian Moral Theologian, sums up that human dignity is a concept 
biblically rooted and theologically nourished right from the time of the fathers of the church 
like Origen, Athanasius, Ambrose and Augustine, besides Irenaeus. Bernard of Clairvaux and 
Thomas added new shades of meaning to this understanding. This was followed by Catechismus 
Romanus introduced by Pius V in 1556 and the Catechism of 1992 that contributed to the rich 
significant development of the concept of human dignity.386 
Having deliberated on the scriptural and general theological development of the understanding 
of the concept of human dignity, the next section will deal with how these ideas are made 
explicit in the documents of the Catholic Church. 
3.5 CATHOLIC TEACHING ON HUMAN DIGNITY 
In this section the aim is not to do an exhaustive study of the texts but only a limited selection 
of what is relevant to the research. First some of the prominent teachings with regard to human 
dignity will be treated and thereafter certain teachings concerning Bioethics. 
3.5.1 General Catholic Teachings on Human Dignity 
In 1961 John XXIII in his encyclical Mater et Magistra (MM)387, which celebrates the seventieth 
anniversary of the publication of Rerum Novarum (RN)388, spoke of the preservation and 
development of human dignity through the power to participate in political processes. There 
John XXIII speaks about the entire modern tradition of Catholic Social Teaching that “is always 
dominated by one basic theme – an unshakable affirmation and vigorous defense of the dignity 
and rights of the human person”.389 Mater et Magistra also affirms of the primacy of the human 
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389 David HOLLENBACH, Claims in Conflict. Retrieving and Renewing the Catholic Human Rights Tradition, 
Paulist Press, New York 1979, 42. Cf. Arokiasamy SOOSAI, Human Dignity and Human Rights in the Catholic 
Social Teaching in Relation to the Church in India, unpublished paper given as a talk during the Symposium 
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 Chapter 3: Theological Understanding of Human Dignity  69 
 
 
 
person over society: “the individual is prior to society and society must be ordered to the good 
of the individual” (MM 109).390  Thus, the centrality of human persons in all economic, political, 
legal and cultural domains was further asserted (cf. MM 219, Cf. RN 7).391 Speaking about the 
role of the Church’s social teaching, Mater et Magistra acknowledges: “On this basic principle, 
which guarantees the sacred dignity of the individual, the Church constructs her social 
teaching.” (MM 220). The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (Com.)392 
paraphrases this sentence as: “The whole of the Church’s social doctrine, in fact, develops from 
the principle that affirms the inviolable dignity of the human person” (Com. No.107 ).393 John 
XXIII was also aware “that both inside the church and outside of it the modern world is deeply 
concerned with affirming and defending the concrete dignity of the human person”.394  
Two years later John XXIII, in the course of the Second Vatican Council, published in 1963 his 
encyclical Pacem in Terris (PT)395, which was addressed to “all men of good will”. The 
fundamental starting point considered in this encyclical is that a human being is a “person”.396 
The Pope also describes the universal rights and duties of people inherent in their nature as 
persons.397 Pacem in Terris says: 
Any well-regulated and productive association of men in society demands the acceptance of 
one fundamental principle: that each individual man is truly a person. His is a nature, that is, 
endowed with intelligence and free will. As such he has rights and duties, which together 
flow as a direct consequence from his nature. These rights and duties are universal and 
inviolable, and therefore altogether inalienable.  
When, furthermore, we consider man’s personal dignity from the standpoint of divine 
revelation, inevitably our estimate of it is incomparably increased. Men have been ransomed 
by the blood of Jesus Christ. Grace has made them sons and friends of God, and heirs to 
eternal glory (PT 9-10).398 
John XXIII in the above passage calls rights as natural rights because of their ontological roots 
in the nature of the person. With regard to human dignity, the encyclical considers it from two 
points. First, there is a strong emphasis on personalist approach to human dignity because of 
the centrality given to the human person. Second, into the scheme of human dignity is 
introduced the Christological principle through the Paschal mystery of Christ. This thereby 
enhances the dignity of the human person because every human person is precious in the sight 
of God.399 
The Pontiff also interprets the image of God doctrine in personalist language. By the fact that 
human beings are created in the image of God (PT 3) they are persons and hence participate in 
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the dignity of God which is the summum bonum (PT 38). The immediate consequence of being 
created in the image of God is that all men and women are born equal in dignity (PT 44 & 89).400 
The encyclical also asserted a need for social and economic rights and not just political and 
legal rights. The encyclical also emphasized the context, namely, life in community where 
human dignity can be protected and expanded.401 
A significant advance in the understanding of human dignity comes from the Second Vatican 
Council402 that met from 1962 to 1965 in two respects. These two aspects are embodied in 
Gaudium et Spes, the 1965 Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World. First, the 
Council affirmed that human dignity could be defended only if one recognizes that human 
institutions and human persons are not static but develop and change in history. Second, it opted 
for an explicitly theological point of view in identifying human dignity of finite beings called 
to absolute transcendence. Thus, human dignity is presented positively as the right to share in 
the decisions that structure political, social, and economic life.403 
The Second Vatican Council holds in Gaudium et Spes an integral understanding of the image of 
God – with the human person endowed with spiritual faculties, distinctively human, such as reason 
and will. It says that human person alone – among all other earthly creatures – who is created in the 
image of God, “is capable of knowing and loving his/her Creator” (cf. GS 12).404 In a like manner, 
Gaudium et Spes also states that the very dignity of the body necessitates that one should glorify 
God in his/her body (cf. GS 14).405 
It is also interesting to note that the Second Vatican Council, after centuries of 
misunderstanding, portrays the fact of the oneness of the body and soul and gives a holistic 
view of the Bible406: 
Though made of body and soul, man is one. Through his bodily composition he gathers to 
himself the elements of the material world. Thus they reach their crown through him, and 
through him raise their voice in free praise of the Creator. For this reason man is not allowed 
to despise his bodily life, rather he is obliged to regard his body as good and honorable since 
God has created it and will raise it up on the last day. Nevertheless, wounded by sin, man 
experiences rebellious stirrings in his body. But the very dignity of man postulates that man 
glorify God in his body and forbid it to serve the evil inclinations of his heart (GS 14). 
Such an understanding of the human person in his/her wholeness has led to a Personalistic and 
Existentialist current of modern thoughts presenting the basic Christian moral message. Thus, 
Gaudium et spes understands the human person as a whole. “…it remains each man’s duty to 
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preserve a view of the whole human person in which the values of intellect, will, conscience 
and fraternity are pre-eminent (GS 61).”407 
Human dignity presupposes that the person acts according to the knowledge and free choice 
from within and without mere external pressure or from a blind impulse (GS 17; Com. 135). 
The exercise of freedom includes knowing, knowing the truth and values and capacity to 
respond to them. That is why freedom and responsibility go hand in hand. In a sin-broken world, 
freedom needs to be liberated. Through the Word, we are called to be children of God. As Paul 
says in his letter to the Galatians: “For freedom Christ has set us free” (5,1). Freedom of the 
children of God is our dignity.408 
Gaudium et spes also gives a basic reason for human dignity which flows from the relationship 
with God, when it affirms: “An outstanding cause of human dignity lies in man’s call to 
communion with God. From the very circumstance of his origin, man is already invited to 
converse with God” (GS 19). This is an affirmation of what Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum had 
already attested about the reverence attributed to the human person: “No one may with impunity 
outrage the dignity of man, which God Himself treats with great reverence” (RN 57).409 
Although the image and likeness of God in human beings was lost by original sin, Christ 
restored back what was lost. Consequently, human nature is bestowed a dignity through the 
incarnation of Christ and reveals the purpose of being created in the image of God (cf. GS 22).410 
Christian Catholic view of the proper understanding of human persons is not confined to 
biological anthropology alone, but also to an ‘integrated vision’ inspired and guided by 
theological anthropology. So the Church affirms that “human person is the only creature on 
earth that God has willed for its own sake” (GS 24).411  
Gaudium et spes thus sums up the various social teachings so far developed and sees the human 
person as the integrating concept about whom his/her dignity is acknowledged. In mentioning 
the human person, the focus turns on to the intrinsic dignity and inherent worth of every human 
person. This is spelt out by Gaudium et spes, “there is a growing awareness of the exalted 
dignity proper to the human person since he, and his rights and duties are universal and 
inviolable” (GS 26).412 
The Second Vatican Council also felt the need for emphasizing the social aspects of morality, 
because the person finds his/her fulfilment in society, although at times they are impeded from 
attaining perfection through adverse social factors. The social aspect is not something added to 
the human person but he/she is essentially social.413 The Church understands this when she 
affirms the centrality of the human person in every aspect of society and life in common.  As 
Gaudium et spes formulates: “Hence the social order and its development must invariably work 
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to the benefit of the human person, since the order of things is to be subordinate to the order of 
persons, and not the other way around” (GS 26. Cf. also GS 63, MM 219 and Com. 132).414  
Gaudium et spes also expresses its reverence for the human person while enumerating those 
activities that are opposed to life itself, those that violate the integrity of the human person, 
those that insult human dignity and those that cause disgraceful working conditions and calls 
all of them as infamies. It says: 
Furthermore, whatever is opposed to life itself, such as any type of murder, genocide, 
abortion, euthanasia or wilful self-destruction, whatever violates the integrity of the human 
person, such as mutilation, torments inflicted on body or mind, attempts to coerce the will 
itself; whatever insults human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary 
imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution, the selling of women and children; as well 
as disgraceful working conditions, where men are treated as mere tools for profit, rather than 
as free and responsible persons; all these things and others of their like are infamies indeed. 
They poison human society, but they do more harm to those who practice them than those 
who suffer from the injury. Moreover, they are supreme dishonor to the Creator (GS 27). 
Gaudium et spes expresses emphatically the foundation of the radical equality of all persons 
and people regardless of their ethnicity, nation, culture or class, etc. (Com. 144): “Since 
something of the glory of God shines on the face of every person, the dignity of every person 
before God is the basis of dignity of man before other men” (GS 29).415 
Gaudium et spes speaks of the help which the Church strives to bring to individuals by affirming 
that the universal promotion of human rights is more effective way of recognizing human 
dignity.416 It reads:  
[...] the Church can anchor the dignity of human nature against all tides of opinion, for 
example those which undervalue the human body or idolize it. By no human law can the 
personal dignity and liberty of man be so aptly safeguarded as by the Gospel of Christ which 
has been entrusted to the Church.  
For this Gospel announces and proclaims the freedom of the sons of God, and repudiates all 
the bondage which ultimately results from sin. (Cf. Rom 8,14-17). The Gospel has a sacred 
reverence for the dignity of conscience and its freedom of choice [...]. 
Therefore, by virtue of the gospel committed to her, the Church proclaims the rights of man 
(GS 41). 
After the Second Vatican Council, the encyclical Populorum Progressio417 of Paul VI in 1967 
marked the next advance in Catholic social thought. What was innovative element in the 
encyclical is the concept of “integral development”. Human dignity is protected only by 
promoting the development of the whole human being in all walks of life – political, social, 
economic, cultural and spiritual. These areas need development not just as merely instrumental 
in attaining human dignity but become an integral part of the process.418 
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John Paul II’s first encyclical was Redemptor Hominis (RH).419 This was the time when John 
Paul II was already aware of crises facing the Church and especially with regard to human rights 
that were systematically violated in different parts of the world. In this context, he had to stress 
the role of human dignity.420  
John Paul II’s argument is that human beings are incomprehensible to themselves or others 
without love. This love is fully made known to human beings through Christ because it is the 
Redeemer who “fully reveals man to himself” (RH 10). John Paul II then argues that the 
redemption of human beings restores the dignity of humanity: “this is the human dimension of 
the mystery of the Redemption. In this dimension man finds again the greatness, dignity and 
value that belong to his humanity” (ibid). Thus, in order to become comprehensible to 
themselves and others, human beings need to be in relationship with the Creator, who is love. 
The link that was broken through the first parents because of sin has been restored through 
Christ. Human dignity comes from God’s love for the human person. It is in and through Christ 
that human beings acquire the full awareness of his/her dignity (cf. RH 11).421 
Based on the Christological perspectives given in Gaudium et spes, John Paul II in his 
Redemptor Hominis further links the human person with theological anthropology and 
ecclesiology in acknowledging human dignity as the content of the Church’s proclamation.422 
The tone is set in Redemptor Hominis when it declares:  
Thus the human person’s dignity itself becomes part of the content of that proclamation, 
being included not necessarily in words but by an attitude towards it. This attitude seems to 
fit the special needs of our times. Since man’s true freedom is not found in everything that 
the various systems and individuals see and propagate as freedom, the Church, because of 
her divine mission, becomes all the more the guardian of this freedom, which is the condition 
and basis for the human person’s true dignity (RH 12; see also 16 and 17).423 
Referring to Gaudium et spes, John Paul II declares in Redemptor Hominis that the Church 
becomes “a sign and safeguard of the transcendence of the human person” (RH 13; cf. GS 76.)424 
Further, John Paul II affirms in Redemptor Hominis, “man is the fundamental way that the 
Church must travel in fulfilling her mission” (RH 14).425 
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The Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Christifideles Laici (CL)426 of John Paul II in 1988 on 
a separate section on the human person speaks of the violation of dignity of the human persons, 
especially “when the individual is not recognized and loved in the person’s dignity as the living 
image of God (cf. Gen 1:26)” (CL 5). The exhortation also urges one to respect human dignity 
that is becoming a growing trend in the world and not to “use” human persons:  
The sense of the dignity of the human person must be pondered and reaffirmed in stronger 
terms. A beneficial trend is advancing and permeating all peoples of the earth, making them 
ever more aware of the dignity of the individual: the person is not at all a “thing” or an 
“object” to be used, but primarily a responsible “subject”, one endowed with conscience and 
freedom, called to live responsibly in society and history, and oriented towards spiritual and 
religious values (CL 5). 
Although it was already mentioned elsewhere about the equality of dignity of all human 
persons, both men and women, created in the image and likeness of God, yet in a world full of 
gender bias and discrimination there is a growing need to affirm the equal dignity of man and 
woman. In a very enlightening manner Christifideles Laici speaks of the equal dignity of “male” 
and “female” based on the anthropological foundation; though there is diversity in them yet 
there is a mutual complementarity.427 Christifideles Laici clarifies: 
The condition that will assure the rightful presence of woman in the Church and in society is 
a more penetrating and accurate consideration of the anthropological foundation for 
masculinity and femininity with the intent of clarifying woman's personal identity in relation 
to man, that is, a diversity yet mutual complementarity, not only as it concerns roles to be 
held and functions to be performed, but also, and more deeply, as it concerns her make-up 
and meaning as a person (CL 50). 
Further, John Paul II also reminds us in this exhortation about promoting human dignity, which 
forms the essential task of the Church: “To rediscover and make others rediscover the inviolable 
dignity of every human person makes up an essential task, in a certain sense, the central and 
unifying task of the service which the Church, and the lay faithful in her, are called to render to 
the human family” (CL 37; emphasis in the original). The same number also speaks of the 
human person as the “centre and summit” of all that exists on the earth. Further, the paragraph 
speaks of the ontological constitution of the dignity of the human person: 
The dignity of the person is the most precious possession of an individual. As a result, the 
value of one person transcends all the material world. The words of Jesus, “For what does it 
profit a man, to gain the whole world and to forfeit his life?” (Mk 8:36) contain an 
enlightening and stirring statement about the individual: value comes not from what a person 
“has” even if the person possessed the whole world! – as much as from what a person “is”: 
the goods of the world do not count as much as the good of the person, the good which is the 
person individually (CL 37). 
John Paul II then argues that as an effect from the acknowledgement of the personal dignity of 
every human being, which was mentioned above, there demands “the respect the defence and 
the promotion of the rights of the human person” (CL 38; emphasis in the original). The 
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consequence of this is that “No one, no individual, no group, no authority, no State, can change 
– let alone eliminate – them because such rights find their source in God himself” (ibid). 
In the context of medical and scientific research John Paul II in his Post-Synodal Apostolic 
Exhortation Christifideles Laici speaks of human dignity as: “the inviolable dignity of the 
personhood of every human being, from the first moment of life’s existence” (CL 38). 
On the one hundredth anniversary of Rerum Novarum, John Paul II in 1991 promulgated the 
encyclical Centesimus Annus.428 While relying on the encyclical Rerum Novarum of his 
predecessor, John Paul II in his encyclical Centesimus Annus draws the correct perspective 
about the human person: 
[…] the main thread and, in a certain sense, the guiding principle of Pope Leo’s Encyclical, 
and of all of the Church’s social doctrine, is a correct view of the human person and of his 
unique value, inasmuch as ‘man [...] is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself’. 
God has imprinted his own image and likeness on man (cf. Gen 1:26), conferring upon him 
an incomparable dignity, as the Encyclical frequently insists. In effect, beyond the rights 
which man acquires by his own work, there exist rights which do not correspond to any work 
he performs, but which flow from his essential dignity as a person (CA 11).429 
The encyclical also identifies violence (CA 17), atheism (CA 13 & 14), new ideologies (CA 17) 
and totalitarianism (CA 44) as those that pose threats to human dignity. John Paul II in this 
encyclical does not miss the opportunity to acknowledge and affirm human dignity.430 He 
acknowledges that the human person is endowed with human dignity precisely because of being 
a person: “[…] there exists something which is due to the person because he is a person, by 
reason of his lofty dignity” (CA 34). The encyclical further affirms the source of human dignity 
as God himself: “The human person receives from God its essential dignity and with it the 
capacity to transcend every social order so as to move towards truth and goodness” (CA 38). 
The human person as a subject of rights, due to his/her transcendent dignity, is seen in the 
encyclical as the “visible image of the invisible God”. Centesimus Annus acknowledges this 
fact. It affirms: “Thus, the root of modern totalitarianism is to be found in the denial of the 
transcendent dignity of the human person who, as the visible image of the invisible God, is 
therefore by his very nature the subject of rights which no one may violate –no individual, 
group, class, nation or Stat” (CA 44).431 Therefore, through these words Centesimus Annus 
asserts “clearly and forcefully that every individual — whatever his or her personal convictions 
— bears the image of God and therefore deserves respect” (CA 22).432 
John Paul II also speaks of the approach that the Church takes in respecting the freedom in 
human persons: “Furthermore, in constantly reaffirming the transcendent dignity of the person, 
the Church’s method is always that of respect for freedom” (CA 46). 
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Thus, one can see that an abundant indication of the concept of human rights and their 
specification has been given by the Magisterium. One such example can be found in John Paul 
II who has listed the rights in Centesimus Annus:  
Among the most important of these rights, mention must be made of the right to life, an 
integral part of which is the right of the child to develop in the mother's womb from the 
moment of conception; the right to live in a united family and in a moral environment 
conducive to the growth of the child’s personality; the right to develop one’s intelligence and 
freedom in seeking and knowing the truth; the right to share in the work which makes wise 
use of the earth’s material resources, and to derive from that work the means to support 
oneself and one’s dependents; and the right freely to establish a family, to have and to rear 
children through the responsible exercise of one’s sexuality (CA 47 see also Com. 155).433 
The third encyclical Caritas in Veritate434 of Benedict XVI, dated 29 June 2009, continues the 
social justice tradition of the earlier Popes. The encyclical was partly a response to the crisis 
that appeared during the fall of the world’s economic system in 2008.435 It was In the light of 
globalization (see especially CV 41 and 42) this encyclical provides an interpretation of social 
developments. The social teaching of this encyclical places the integral development of the 
human person at the centre of all world systems of thought and activity.436  
Benedict XVI recalls the biblical teaching that human persons are made in the image of God 
and acknowledges the truth that God is he who, “also establishes the transcendent dignity of 
men and women” (CV 29). He further states that human being’s creation “in the image of God” 
is also “a datum which gives rise to the inviolable dignity of the human person and the 
transcendent value of natural moral norms” (CV 45). Benedict XVI also expresses his concern 
that if the transcendent dignity of the human person is to be properly understood then social 
sciences alone cannot achieve it but the contribution of metaphysics and theology are also 
needed (CV 53). 
Benedict XVI in the context of transmission of life, while recalling the encyclical Humane 
Vitae437 of Paul VI – which indicated strong links between life ethics and social ethics (CV 15; 
emphasis in the original), restates that “The Church forcefully maintains this link between life 
ethics and social ethics” (ibid). Thus, he emphasizes that social ethics cannot rightly be seen as 
independent of life ethics.438 Benedict XVI mentions here that he is fully aware of the fact what 
John Paul II had already mentioned in Evangelium Vitae. He writes, “a society lacks solid 
foundations when, on the one hand, it asserts values such as the dignity of the person, justice 
and peace, but then, on the other hand, radically acts to the contrary by allowing or tolerating a 
                                                 
433 Cf. SOOSAI, Human Dignity and Human Rights, op. cit., 12. 
434 BENEDICT XVI, Encyclical Letter. Caritas in Veritate, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City 2009. Latin 
text in: BENEDICTI PP. XVI, “Litterae Encyclicae. Caritas in Veritate”, in: AAS 101 (2009) 641-709. Caritas in 
Veritate will hereafter be referred to as CV. 
435 Cf. Robert MOYNIHAN, “Caritas in Veritate”, in: Michael L. COULTER/Richard S. MYERS/Joseph A. 
VARACALLI, Encyclopedia of Catholic Social Thought, Social Science, and Social Policy, Volume 3 (Supplement), 
Scarecrow Press, Lanham, Maryland 2012, 41-45; 41. 
436 Cf. Peter Kodwo TURKSON, “Conclusion. Caritas in Veritate in the Tradition of Catholic Social Thought”, 
in: Daniel K. FINN (ed.), The Moral Dynamics of Economic Life. An Extension and Critique of Caritas in Veritate, 
Oxford University Press, New York 2012, 140-144; 140. 
437 PAULI PP. VI, “Litterae Encyclicae. Humanae Vitae”, in: AAS 60 (1968) 481-503. 
438 Cf. Thomas R. ROURKE, The Social and Political Thought of Benedict XVI, Lexington Books, Maryland 
2010, 130. 
 Chapter 3: Theological Understanding of Human Dignity  77 
 
 
 
variety of ways in which human life is devalued and violated, especially where it is weak or 
marginalized” (EV 101; CV 15). 
The encyclical Caritas in Veritate devotes several paragraphs (cf. CV 74-77) that lists threat to 
human dignity and its denial in the field of bioethics439, such as: “In vitro fertilization, embryo 
research, the possibility of manufacturing clones and human hybrids” besides “[…] the tragic 
and widespread scourge of abortion […] the systematic eugenic programming of births […] 
and a pro-euthanasia mindset” (CV 75). 
3.5.2 Catholic Church’s Stance on an Embryo 
This section will treat the topic of how the Magisterium has made clarifications with regard to 
an embryo as such and it’s right to life in bioethical discussions, especially with regard to direct 
procuration of abortion, biological interventions like IVF, etc. 
The Church right from its inception, based on the commandment “do not kill”, has always 
opposed to voluntary abortion. The opposition was already held at a time in spite of the fact 
that the biological nature of an embryo in its first stage of development was unknown in 
comparison to what is known today. It must be noted that with the advancement of science, the 
Magisterium when giving instructions on bioethical issues which are connected with the 
beginning of life issues of a biological nature makes reference, whenever possible, to the current 
state of medical advancement on the particular topic. In some cases the moral judgment has 
taken into consideration possible scientific advances and clarifications.440 
One such ethical consideration of the last century is that of Pius XII address to St. Luke Union 
of Italian Doctors on Nov. 12, 1944: “As long as a man is not guilty, his life is untouchable, 
and therefore, any act directly tending to destroy it is illicit, whether such destruction is intended 
as an end in itself or only as a means to an end; whether it is a question of life in the embryonic 
stage, in a stage of full development, or already in its final stages”441  
The Second Vatican Council calls abortion an abominable crime. In Gaudium et Spes it affirms: 
“Therefore from the moment of its conception life must be guarded with the greatest care, while 
abortion and infanticide are unspeakable crimes” (GS 51; cf. also QDA 7). 
The Declaration Quaestio de abortu explains that “The first right of the human person is his 
life” (QDA 11). It further adds that “any discrimination based on the various stages of life is no 
more justified than any other discrimination” (QDA 12). It continues the remark saying: “In 
reality, respect for human life is called for from the time that the process of generation begins. 
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From the time that the ovum is fertilized, a life is begun which is neither that of the father nor 
of the mother, it is rather the life of a new human being with his own growth. It would never be 
made human if it were not human already” (ibid). This assertion followed based on the findings 
of genetics (cf. QDA 13). Nevertheless, the Declaration acknowledges the fact that “it is not up 
to biological sciences to make a definitive judgment on questions which are properly 
philosophical and moral such as the moment when a human person is constituted or the 
legitimacy of abortion” (ibid). Thus one can see clearly how the Church’s Magisterium makes 
a distinction in this text between two levels of the problem: “science should shed light on issues 
related to biology without attempting to answer (from its own area of specialization) the 
philosophical question about the personhood of the embryo or the embryo nor the ethical one 
regarding the legalization of abortion”.442 
The Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith (CDF) issued an instruction Donum Vitae (DV) in 
1987 which was signed by the then Prefect Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger. Although John Paul was 
not the author of the document, he officially received and authorized its publication. This was 
an Instruction as a response to requests from various parts of the world in order to clarify 
biomedical techniques current at that time. Unlike RH, which does not mention about natural 
law, the instruction Donum Vitae makes significant use of it. Besides natural law, one can 
observe a clear shift towards the reintegration of the language of duty and priority of the 
common good, which take a central place in the papal position. 
The criteria of moral judgement with regard to the applications of modern scientific methods 
and technology, especially concerning human life and its beginnings are mentioned. It specifies: 
“[…] the respect, defense and promotion of man, his ‘primary and fundamental right’ to life, 
his dignity as a person who is endowed with a spiritual soul and with moral responsibility and 
who is called to beatific communion with God” (DV Intro. 1). 
Concerning the human person Donum Vitae makes it clear that science and technology must be 
at the service of the human person and the former must show an unconditional respect for the 
fundamental criteria of the moral law (DV Intro. 2). The human person must be considered as 
a “unified totality” which is at the same time corporal and spiritual. This is the fundamental 
criteria for making any decision may be taken on a biological level, but which are not strictly 
therapeutic. Donum Vitae while clarifying this point reaffirms the words of John Paul II: 
Each human person, in his absolutely unique singularity, is constituted not only by his spirit, 
but by his body as well. Thus, in the body and through the body, one touches the person 
himself in his concrete reality. To respect the dignity of man consequently amounts to 
safeguarding this identity of the man corpore et anima unus, as the Second Vatican Council 
says (Gaudium et spes, No.14, par. 1). It is on the basis of this anthropological vision that 
one is to find the fundamental criteria for decision-making in the case of procedures which 
are not strictly therapeutic, as for example, those aimed at the improvement of the human 
biological condition (DV Intro. 3).443 
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The central teaching of the Instruction Donum Vitae is that human life is a gift from God. The 
gratuitous gift of life by the Creator is closely connected to the concept of personal dignity.444 
For instance, in its Introduction, it says:  
The inviolability of the innocent human being’s right to life «from the moment of conception 
until death» is a sign and requirement of the very inviolability of the person to whom the 
Creator has given the gift of life” and further adds with regard to technical interventions on 
human life from its existence that “what is technically possible is not for that very reason 
morally admissible (DV Intro. 4).  
The above teaching also forms the fundamental criteria for moral judgment. The ethical 
guideline which Donum Vitae then offers is: “The human being must be respected – as a person 
– from the very first instant of his existence” (DV I,1).445 The express purpose of the instruction 
was to foster greater respect for human dignity, which includes the right to life of each person, 
especially the human embryo.  
The Instruction further explains that no experimental datum can be in itself sufficient to bring 
one to the recognition of a spiritual soul. Nevertheless the role of science and its conclusions 
regarding the human embryo provide a valuable indication for discerning rationally of a 
personal presence at the moment of the first appearance of a human life. The Instruction then 
asks a rhetorical question: “how could a human individual not be a human person?” (DV I,1) 
Thus the Instruction does not make a distinction between an “individual of the “homo sapiens 
species”, “human being” and “person”. Aware of the current philosophical debate over the 
concept of person, the Instruction remarks: “The Magisterium has not expressly committed 
itself to an affirmation of a philosophical nature, but it constantly reaffirms the moral 
condemnation of any kind of procured abortion.” It further adds: “This teaching has not been 
changed and is unchangeable” (DV I,1).446 
William Bueche, a Moral Theologian in Rome, explains the stance of the Magisterium in this 
matter. He says: 
This represents an acknowledgement that recognizing and «attributing» the status of person 
(a moral issue) is primary, while «proving» personhood (a philosophical issue) is secondary, 
precisely because, while rational reflection of an ontological and metaphysical nature can 
lead to a moral conviction that the human embryo should or should not be included in the 
definition of “person”, it can neither «prove» nor «disprove» personhood in a definitive 
manner. It seems to me that recognizing and respecting the limits of empirical knowledge 
and the logic of the intellect is not a weakness, but a manifestation of wisdom – for wisdom 
embraces more than information and logic.447 
In the year 1993, John Paul II promulgated the encyclical Veritatis Splendor (VS) – a papal 
magisterial document that can be called the magna carta of human life in the recent history of 
the Church.448 It is the first magisterial encyclical that deals with the fundamental questions of 
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Church’s Moral Teaching. The doctrine of the image of God, since the Second Vatican Council, 
has been given greater importance in the official teaching of the Church and reaches its climax 
in this encyclical. The encyclical after articulating a Catholic theological anthropology based 
primarily on the understanding of the human person as “image of God”, draws out the 
consequences for the mission of the Church and for each Christian.449 
The encyclical speaking in the context of human persons warns against all dualistic 
understandings of human person and affirms a foundational truth of the human person, namely, 
that dignity of the person belongs to the person in body-soul unity. “It is in the unity of body 
and soul that the person is the subject of his moral acts.”(VS 48; cf. also Com. 127).450 
The dignity of the human person is perfected by the personalist emphasis on morality. This 
statement is verified when one sees the comment on the commandment “You shall love your 
neighbour as yourself” (Mt 19, 19; cf. Mk 12,31). Veritatis Splendor states451: 
In this command we find a precise expression of the singular dignity of the human person, 
“the only creature that God has wanted for its own sake”. The different commandments of 
the Decalogue are really only so many reflections of the one commandment about the good 
of the person, at the level of the many different goods which characterize his identity as a 
spiritual and bodily being in relationship with God, with his neighbor and with the material 
world (VS 13). 
The overlap between the natural law and Personalism is shown clearly in the passage in 
Veritatis Splendor that brings together the various themes of the encyclical in n.90452: 
The relationship between faith and morality shines forth with all its brilliance in the 
unconditional respect due to the insistent demands of the personal dignity of every man, 
demands protected by those moral norms which prohibit without exception actions which are 
intrinsically evil. The universality and the immutability of the moral norm make manifest and 
at the same time serve to protect the personal dignity and inviolability of man, on whose face 
is reflected the splendour of God (cf. Gen 9:5-6; emphasis in the original). 
Stating freedom as basis of dignity, Veritatis Splendor claims that: 
Human freedom belongs to us as creatures; it is a freedom which is given as a gift, one to be 
received like a seed and to be cultivated responsibly. It is an essential part of that creaturely 
image which is the basis of the dignity of the person. Within that freedom there is an echo of 
the primordial vocation whereby the Creator calls man to the true Good, and even more, 
through Christ’s Revelation, to become his friend and to share his own divine life. It is at 
once inalienable self-possession and openness to all that exists, in passing beyond self to 
knowledge and love of the other. Freedom then is rooted in the truth about man, and it is 
ultimately directed towards communion (VS 86). 
John Paul II published in March his eleventh encyclical Evangelium Vitae (EV)453. While 
Veritatis Splendor dealt with methodological foundation of moral issues, Evangelium Vitae 
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deals with major statements on moral issues of life and death.454 The encyclical focuses 
especially on particular, moral issues that concern the sacredness of human life, namely, 
abortion, euthanasia and capital punishment. The Pope urges “all people of good will” besides 
deeper moral reflection on life (cf. VS 27); to assess a growing “culture of death” and to opt for 
a “culture of life” (cf. VS 28).455 
The encyclical begins with an outline of the significance of life (cf. EV 1). Life is a basic good 
on which all other goods rest. Since life is the substratum of all other good, there is an inherent 
inclination in human beings to have life and promote it. This truth is focussed in this encyclical 
as, “Life in time, in fact, is the fundamental condition, the initial stage and an integral part of 
the entire process of human existence (EV 2).456 However, human life is encircled with threats. 
In this context, John Paul II’s says, “To all the members of the Church, the people of life and 
for life, I make this most urgent appeal, that together we may offer this world of ours new signs 
of hope, and work to ensure that justice and solidarity will increase and that a new culture of 
human life will be affirmed.” (EV 6).Therefore, there is the need to “respect, protect, love and 
serve life, every human life” (EV 5).457 Evangelium Vitae also presents the responsibility for 
life, that is, to be fruitful and to multiply (Gen 1,28; cf. EV 10).458  
The fact that human beings are made in the image of God brings out the difference between 
human beings and other creatures which creates “a particular and specific bond with Creator: 
‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness (Gen 1:26). The life which God offers to man 
is a gift by which God shares something of himself with his creature” (EV 34; emphasis in the 
original). 
In explaining why life is good from scriptural evidences, Evangelium Vitae quotes the famous 
definition that was already mentioned by Irenaeus, namely, “Man, living man, is the glory of 
God”. Owing to his/her relation with God, John Paul II then derives the fact both from the 
scriptures and tradition that human persons are given a sublime dignity: “Man has been given 
a sublime dignity, based on the intimate bond which unites him to his Creator: in man there 
shines forth a reflection of God himself” (EV 34). 
Curiously, John Paul II placed an emphasis on the idea of human dignity in Evangelium Vitae 
that it cannot go unnoticed. The word “dignity” in this encyclical is used 57 times. In almost all 
cases they refer to “human dignity”, “dignity of person”, “dignity of the human person”, 
“personal dignity”, “dignity of the human being”, “dignity of life” “dignity of the unborn child” 
etc. 
As already mentioned, Kant’s attribution of dignity to persons is a negative one. Dignity 
prohibits the use of humans as means. However, in the Personalistic philosophy of John Paul II 
                                                 
454 Cf. Christoph GÖTZ, Medizinische Ethik und katholische Kirche. Die Aussagen des päpstlichen Lehramtes 
zu Fragen der medizinischen Ethik seit dem Zweiten Vatikanum, Lit Verlag, Münster/Hamburg/Berlin/London. 
2000, 57. 
455 Leo J. O’DONOVAN, “Foreword”, in: WILDES/MITCHELL (ed.), Choosing Life. A Dialogue on Evangelium 
Vitae, op. cit., ix-x; ix. 
456 Cf. KOCHAPPILLY, “Celebration of Old Age…”, 454. 
457 Cf. IDEM, Life in Christ…, 13.  
458 Cf. KANNIYAKONIL, Fundamentals of Bioethics…, 251. 
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reflected in Evangelium Vitae “a person has value by the simple fact that he is a person”459 This 
is a positive affirmation of the dignity of a person that transcends completely our human 
assessments of that dignity. John Paul II has rightly underscored this concept of dignity which 
was already acknowledged in Redemptor Hominis and further confirmed in Christifideles Laici 
38 and Centesimus Annus 34.460 
Moreover, Evangelium Vitae affirms that God deals with human being as a person, not as a 
thing: 
The Book of Genesis… places man at the summit of God’s creative activity, as its crown, at 
the culmination of a process which leads from indistinct chaos to the most perfect of 
creatures. Everything in creation is ordered to man and everything is made subject to him: 
“Fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over… every living thing” (1:28); this is 
God’s command to the man and the woman (EV 34; emphasis in the original).461 
Jesus, through his temptation, failure, suffering, etc. shares the life of human persons. This fact 
is attested to by John Paul II when he says, “From the Cross, the source of life, the people of 
life are born and increases” (EV 51).462 
While emphasizing the divine commandment against killing: “You shall not murder” (Ex 
20,13), John Paul II says: “Human life is thus given a sacred and inviolable character, which 
reflects the inviolability of the creator himself. Precisely for this reason God will severely judge 
every violation of the commandment you shall not kill” (EV 53).463 
Evangelium Vitae recalls the prohibition to kill and attests to this command when it exhorts that 
in order to enter life, it is indispensable to obey the command “You shall not kill” (Mt 19,16-
19; EV 54). This explicit command “implicitly… encourages a positive attitude of absolute 
respect for life” (ibid.).464 This explicit command not to kill should be read in what follows, 
namely, the practical moral implication of direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human 
being as gravely immoral (cf. EV 57). 
It is interesting to note that Evangelium Vitae gives a substantial exposé on human life. 
However, to deal with the teaching of the Church on this topic would render a separate study, 
which is beyond the scope of this work.465 In order to summarize that human life is based on 
fundamental principles and values, one needs to understand life from different perspectives. 1) 
God is the origin of life (cf. EV 24, 46, 55); 2) Human life is a gift from God (cf. EV 39, 40, 52, 
81, 84, 92); 3) Human life is a sacred reality (cf. MM 194, cf. EV 2). 4) Life is sacred which 
leads to inviolability of life (cf. EV 53). 5) Life is a fundamental right (cf. PT 11; cf. EV 57, 71, 
                                                 
459 JOHN PAUL II, Crossing the Threshold of Hope, ed. by Vittorio MISSORE, Alfred Knopf, New York 1994, 
202. Cf. Edmund D. PELLEGRINO, “Evangelium Vitae: Euthanasia, and Physician-Assisted Suicide. John Paul II’s 
Dialogue with the Culture and Ethics of Contemporary Medicine”, in: WILDES/MITCHELL (ed.), Choosing Life. A 
Dialogue on Evangelium Vitae, op. cit., 236-253; 246. 
460 Cf. ibid. 
461 See also FABC Papers, No.120, 34. 
462 Cf. KANNIYAKONIL, Fundamentals of Bioethics…, 252. 
463 Cf. ibid., 250. 
464 Cf. ibid., 252. 
465 For a concise summary of the Catholic Teaching on human life, see Cf. KANNIYAKONIL, Fundamentals of 
Bioethics…, 254-256. See also Kevin D. O’ROURKE/Philip BOYLE, Medical Ethics. Sources of Catholic 
Teachings, The Catholic Health Association of the United States, St. Louis 1989, for a detailed study on the 
catholic documents on life and related issues. 
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90, 20, 72, 11, 18, 101). 6) Human life is a fundamental value (cf. GS 22; cf. EV 5, 11, 2, 25, 
34, 71, 55, 101).466 
Thus, one can see that Evangelium Vitae further ratified the teachings of Donum Vitae. John 
Paul II writes: 
[…] what is at stake is so important that, from the standpoint of moral obligation, the mere 
probability that a human person is involved would suffice to justify an absolutely clear 
prohibition of any intervention aimed at killing a human embryo. Precisely for this reason, 
over and above all scientific debates and those philosophical affirmations to which the 
Magisterium has not expressly committed itself, the Church has always taught and continues 
to teach that the result of human procreation, from the first moment of its existence, must be 
guaranteed that unconditional respect which is morally due to the human being in his or her 
totality and unity as body and spirit (EV 60). 
Further, Evangelium Vitae speaking in the context of intervention on human embryos asserts 
that they have “dignity as human beings who have a right to the same respect owed to a child 
once born, just as to every person” (EV 63). Thus, one can see that while John Paul II endorses 
medical research, he wants to constrain it by an appeal to human dignity.467 
Thus, the encyclical reiterates what Donum Vitae had already declared: “The human being is to 
be respected and treated as a person from the moment of conception; and therefore from that 
same moment his rights as a person must be recognized, among which in the first place is the 
inviolable right of every innocent human being to life” (EV 60). 
The latest and most important document on moral issues in the field of Bioethics issued by the 
CDF in September 2008, which was approved by Benedict XVI, adopted in the Ordinary 
Session of his Congregation and ordered for its publication is the Instruction Dignitas Personae 
(DP). It is styled as a successor to Donum Vitae. Dignitas Personae draws upon and reaffirms 
the earlier teachings in Donum Vitae and intends to provide instruction on the ethical issues 
raised over the last 20 years by “new biomedical technologies which have been introduced in 
the critical area of human life and the family” (DP 1). While acknowledging the teachings of 
Donum Vitae as “completely valid both with regard to the principles on which it is based and 
the moral evaluations which it expresses” (DP 1), Dignitas Personae intends to give additional 
clarification and bring to date “in particular in the field of research on human embryos, the use 
of stem cells for therapeutic purposes, as well as in other areas of experimental medicine” (DP 
1). Besides Donum Vitae, the Instruction Dignitas Personae also draws upon the teachings of 
Veritatis Splendor and Evangelium Vitae (DP 1).468 
Falling in line with Evangelium Vitae which acknowledged a “great ‘yes’ to human life” (DP 
1; Emphasis in the original), Dignitas Personae (as the title of the Instruction already suggests) 
affirms in its opening words the fundamental principle of decisive importance. This 
fundamental principle, “must be must be at the center of ethical reflection on biomedical 
                                                 
466 Cf. Joseph KOCHUPARAMBIL, Hope for the Future. The Discussion on the Sanctity of life and Quality of life 
Doctrines in Medical Ethics and Roman Catholic Magisterial Teaching, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, KU 
Leuven, Leuven 2000, 202-224. Cf. KANNIYAKONIL, Fundamentals of Bioethics…, 255-256. 
467 Cf. WILDES, “In the Service of Life. Evangelium Vitae…”, 192-193. 
468 Cf. Ann Marie MEALEY, “Dignitas Personae”, in: Gareth D. JONES/John R. ELFORD (ed.), A Glass Darkly. 
Medicine and Theology in Further Dialogue, Peter Lang, AG, International Academic Publishers, Bern, 
Switzerland 2010, 111-130; 111 & 113. 
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research” (DP 1), namely, “The dignity of a person must be recognized in every human being 
from conception to natural death” (DP 1). Therefore, the dignity which must be accorded to 
every human being does not depend on the situation or circumstances in which one is located, 
i.e., without distinction of any kind, sex, race, condition, health or illness.469 
In all, the terms “dignity of a/the person”; “dignity of the human person” “dignity of human 
beings”, “dignity of the human life” “human dignity” or simply “dignity” referring to the human 
person is used in one or the other form at least 33 times. Citing Donum Vitae, Dignitas Personae 
stresses the fact that “The human being is to be respected and treated as a person from the 
moment of conception; and therefore from that same moment his rights as a person must be 
recognized, among which in the first place is the inviolable right of every innocent human being 
to life” (DP 4).470 Luis Ladaria, the Secretary of the CDF, explains the previously mentioned 
statement in these words: 
It is reiterated here that such a statement should be recognized by all as flowing from the 
natural moral law and should be the basis for any positive legal system. Unfortunately, we 
know that is not always the case. However, even if that truth is not recognized by many, the 
Instruction tells us that the Church has the duty to continue to proclaim with absolute clarity 
and without ambiguity in being faithful to its mission.471 
Thus, the Instruction repeats what Donum vitae had already reiterated that human dignity and 
human rights must be recognized from the first moment of existence of the human person (to 
be specific, i.e., “from the moment the zygote is formed”). 
3.5.3 The Inviolability and Sacredness of Human Life: 
As already mentioned in Chapter 1, there have been attempts to identify sanctity of life and 
human dignity. The magisterium in the assessment of bioethical issues firmly establishes the 
concept of the sanctity of human life.472 Interestingly the Church documents, until Dignitas 
Personae for instance, have no mention of the actual term “sanctity of life” in any of their texts. 
Nevertheless, other terms such as “sacredness” of life or “inviolability” of life are often found 
                                                 
469 Cf. Luis F. LADARIA, “Dignitas Personae. Alcuni elementi di antropologia”, in: StMor 47/2 (2009) 339-
353; 339. 
470 Cf. ibid., 340-341. 
471 Ibid., 341. «Si ribadisce che una tale affermazione dovrebbe essere riconosciuta da tutti come appartenente 
alla legge morale naturale e che dovrebbe essere alla base di ogni ordinamento giuridico positivo. Purtroppo 
sappiamo bene che non è sempre così. Anche se questa verità non è riconosciuta da molti, la Chiesa ha il dovere 
di continuare a proclamarla con tutta chiarezza e senza ambiguità per essere fedele alla sua missione». Tr. from 
Italian by author. 
472 GÖTZ, Medizinische Ethik und katholische Kirche…, 279-300; 279. Christoph Götz says, „Die Vorstellung 
von der Heiligkeit des menschlichen Lebens hat in der Beurteilung bioethischer Fragestellungen durch das 
kirchliche Lehramt ihren festen Platz.“ Ibid. A clarification is here essential in understanding the “sanctity of life” 
which can be misunderstood in a religious sense, especially when it is translated literally into German as 
„Heiligkeit des Lebens“ (holiness/sacredness of life). However, the contemporary discussion about sanctity of life 
does not focus on an ethics derived from a particular religion. “Sanctity of life” is used in the sense of 
“inviolability” or “untouchability” of human life („Unantastbarkeit des Lebens“). Cf. V. von, LOEWENICH, 
“Sanctity of Life and the Neonatologist’s Dilemma”, in: BAYERTZ (ed.), Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity..., 
229-239; 239. See also the discussion below in Chapter 6.5 below on this topic. It must be remembered that the 
Catholic Church does not use the term “sanctity of life” in its Documents. Nevertheless, “sacredness” of life and 
“inviolability” of life are often used. 
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in these documents.473 In this section, a few instances of the Church documents where the 
sacredness and inviolability of life are acknowledged will be described. 
Mater et Magistra already asserted that human life is a sacred reality because from its inception 
it reveals the creating hand of God (cf. MM 194; cf. DV Intro. 5) 474 or as the sacred dignity of 
the individual (cf. MM 220). Here too the phrase “sanctity of life” is not used. 
Gaudium et Spes, in the context of abortion and infanticide, speaks of “God, the Lord of life”, 
who is the ground who protects life from such “unspeakable crimes” (cf. GS 51). However, the 
phrase “sanctity of life” is not found in any document from the Second Vatican Council. The 
CDF, which brought out the Declaration on Procured Abortion, Questio de abortu (QDA)475 in 
1974, present arguments from tradition against abortion. It cites a series of statements from 
recent popes. Interestingly, none refers to the “sanctity of life”. They all point in the same 
general direction, that is, the inviolability or intangibility of life, e.g., “So long as a man 
commits no crime, his life is intangible and therefore every action which tends directly towards 
its destruction is illicit […]” (QDA 7 at fn. 15).476 
Commenting on the Declaration Questio de abortu No.12, Lobo stresses the value that “human 
life has in itself, and not merely in so far as it is ‘useful’. It is precisely when life is weak and 
defenceless [stet] that it needs special care and protection”.477 He further goes on to say that, 
conferring respect for the life of the unborn depends primarily on deepening “our conviction 
regarding the basic dignity and equality of every human life being of whatever class or 
situation”.478 
In 1980, in the CDF’s Declaration Jura et bona (JEB)479 one can find the following statement: 
“Most people regard life as something sacred and hold that no one may dispose of it at will, but 
believers see in life something greater, namely, a gift of God's love” (JEB I). In the same 
context, Jura et bona again declares: “Intentionally causing one’s own death, or suicide, is 
therefore equally as wrong as murder; such an action on the part of a person is to be considered 
as a rejection of God’s sovereignty and loving plan” (JEB I, 3). Similarly, the first argument 
against euthanasia in this Declaration says, “For it is a question of the violation of the divine 
law, an offense against the dignity of the human person, a crime against life, and an attack on 
humanity” (JEB II). In the three documents described above, “inviolability” is associated with 
divine protection. However, the specific term “sanctity of life” is not invoked.480 
                                                 
473 Cf. James F. KEENAN, “The Concept of Sanctity of Life and its Use in Contemporary Bioethical 
Discussion”, in: BAYERTZ (ed.), Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity..., 1-18; 4. 
474 JOHN XXIII, “Encyclical Letter Mater et Magistra...”, 33. Cf. KOCHUPARAMBIL, Hope for the Future…, 
202-224. Cf. KANNIYAKONIL, Fundamentals of Bioethics…, 255-256. 
475 CDF, “Declaration on Procured Abortion. Questio de abortu… ”, 441-453. 
476 PIUS XII, “Discourse to the Saint Luke Union of Italian Doctors, 12 November 1944”, in: Human Body: 
Papal Teachings. Selected and Arranged by the Monks of Solesmes, Bénédictines. Congrégation de France 
(Solesmes), St. Pauls Edition, Boston 1960, 51-65; 58. Cf. CDF, “Declaration on Procured Abortion. Questio de 
abortu… ”, 452 at fn.15. 
477 LOBO, Moral and Pastoral Questions..., 251. 
478 Cf. ibid. 
479 SACRA CONGREGATIO PRO DOCTRINA FIDEI, “Declaratio de Euthanasia. Iura et bona”, in: AAS 72 (1980) 
542-552. English tr. in CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH, “Declaration on Euthanasia. Jura et bona, 5 
May, 1980”, in: SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, Vatican Council II: More Post Conciliar, op. cit., 510-
517. Jura et bona will hereafter be referred to as JEB. 
480 Cf. KEENAN, “The Concept of Sanctity of Life…”, 4. 
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Donum Vitae uses the terms “inviolability of life” and “sacredness” but not the actual 
expression “sanctity of life”. For example: “The inviolability of the innocent human being’s 
right to life ‘from the moment of conception until death’ is a sign and requirement of the very 
inviolability of the person to whom the Creator has given the gift of life” (DV Intro 4). Similarly, 
“Human life is sacred because from its beginning it involves ‘the creative action of God’ and it 
remains forever in a special relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end. God alone is the 
Lord of life from its beginning until its end: no one can, in any circumstance, claim for himself 
the right to destroy directly an innocent human being” (DV Intro 5).481 
The Post-Synodal Exhortation Christifideles Laici also recognizes the sacredness of the human 
person. It says, “But the sacredness of the human person cannot be obliterated, no matter how 
often it is devalued and violated because it has its unshakable foundation in God as Creator and 
Father. The sacredness of the person always keeps returning, again and again” (CL 5).  
The sovereignty of God over human life and from which the inviolability of life flows 
consequently giving one inviolable rights is clearly brought out once again in Christifideles 
Laici. The classic text reads:  
The inviolability of the person which is a reflection of the absolute inviolability of God, fínds 
its primary and fundamental expression in the inviolability of human life. Above all, the 
common outcry, which is justly made on behalf of human rights-for example, the right to 
health, to home, to work, to family, to culture- is false and illusory if the right to life, the most 
basic and fundamental right and the condition for all other personal rights, is not defended 
with maximum determination (CL 38; emphasis in original). 
Evangelium Vitae assures that by being sincerely open to truth and goodness one can, “by the 
light of reason and the hidden action of grace, come to recognize in the natural law written in 
the heart (cf. Rom 2:14-15) the sacred value of human life from its very beginning until its end, 
and can affirm the right of every human being to have this primary good respected to the highest 
degree.” (EV 2). The encyclical concludes that consequent to “the recognition of this right, 
every human community and the political community itself are founded” (EV 2). 
Furthermore, acknowledging the fact that life is a gift of God and in His protection, Evangelium 
Vitae connects the sacredness of humans with biblical text of the image of God:  
Man’s life comes from God; it is his gift, his image and imprint, a sharing in his breath of 
life. God therefore is the sole Lord of this life: man cannot do with it as he wills. God himself 
makes this clear to Noah after the Flood: ‘For your own lifeblood, too, I will demand an 
accounting [...] and from man in regard to his fellow man I will demand an accounting for 
human life’ (Gen 9:5). The biblical text is concerned to emphasize how the sacredness of life 
has its foundation in God and in his creative activity: “For God made man in his own image” 
(Gen 9:6) (EV 39). 
It is from this sacredness of life that inviolability of life arises (EV 40). Furthermore, 
Evangelium Vitae while referring to Donum Vitae acknowledges the sacredness and 
inviolability of human life because it involves the “creative action of God” (EV 53) and human 
life “remains forever in a special relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end” (ibid). The 
sacredness and inviolable character of human life is in fact the reflection of the inviolability of 
the Creator himself (cf. EV 53). 
                                                 
481 Cf. ibid., 4-5. 
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In addition, Evangelium Vitae echoes also the fact that the absolute inviolability of human life 
has been constantly held in the Church. It says, “In effect, the absolute inviolability of innocent 
human life is a moral truth clearly taught by Sacred Scripture, constantly upheld in the Church’ 
Tradition and consistently proposed by her Magisterium” (EV 57). 
The encyclical while dealing with the question of deliberate abortion goes even further to 
acknowledge that human life is sacred and inviolable from the first moment of its existence (cf. 
EV 61). The encyclical further makes reference to Mater et Magistra of John XXIII who had 
already spoken that human life is sacred from its very inception because it reveals the creating 
hand of God (cf. MM 194; cf. EV 62). John Paul II also affirms in Evangelium Vitae that human 
life is sacred and inviolable owing to the fact that it is a gift of God (cf. EV 81).  
Furthermore, speaking in terms of charity, John Paul II argues that charity cannot tolerate bias 
and discrimination because as an indivisible good human life is sacred and inviolable at every 
stage of life situation (cf. EV 87). 
In the context of speaking to the health care professionals while remind the doctors of the 
Hippocratic Oath urge them to commit themselves “to absolute respect for human life and its 
sacredness” (EV 89). 
John Paul II also says that the acknowledgement of the sacred and religious value of life is not 
a concern only of believers or a concern of Christians alone. He reiterates, “The value at stake 
is one which every human being can grasp by the light of reason; thus it necessarily concerns 
everyone” (EV 101). 
However, in a sin-broken world, in which John Paul II’s appeal to affirm a new culture of 
human life (cf. EV 6) is far from realization. Modern culture has degraded the human body by 
looking at it as an object of pleasure. “It has lost its sense about the dignity of human person 
and respect for human life.”482 
The Instruction Dignitas Personae, after explaining the Church’s conviction about humanity 
that is received and respected by faith, which is purified, elevated and perfected by being created 
in the image and likeness of God (Gen 1, 26) and through Jesus makes humans possible to 
become “sons of God” (Jn 1, 12), affirms that this new dimension does not conflict with dignity 
of the creature, but elevates it. The respect for the individual human being is further enhanced 
and strengthened through faith. The instruction then makes it clear that there is no contradiction 
between the affirmation of the dignity and the affirmation of the sacredness of human life (DP 
I,7). 
In addition, Dignitas Personae clarifies the issue of in vitro fertilization and the deliberate 
destruction of embryos. Dignitas Personae acknowledges the sacredness and inviolability of 
human life by referring to Benedict XVI’s, Address to the General Assembly of the Pontifical 
Academy for Life and International Congress in 2006. Dignitas Personae says, “Therefore, the 
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Bioethical Issues and the Family..., 1-5; 2. 
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Magisterium of the Church has constantly proclaimed the sacred and inviolable character of 
every human life from its conception until its natural end” (DP II, 16).483 
Dignitas Personae once again reiterates what has already been said in Evangelium Vitae 63, 
which reminded health professionals of the Hippocratic Oath to commit themselves to absolute 
respect for human life and its sacredness (cf. DP III, 35). 
Based on the above documents of the Church one can come to the conclusion which is expressed 
well by Baranzke. She is of the opinion that the paths of the two ideas of sanctity of life and 
human dignity intersect each other in the course of history time and again. However, both these 
value terms are threatened in the present, especially when it comes to the prohibition on killing 
and euthanasia debate. Nevertheless, due to the esteem given to human biological life, the idea 
of the sanctity of life could better preserve the esteem and integrity of physical vitality than the 
idea of the image of God. This also explains why the Catholic magisterium in its statements on 
bioethics prefers to use the term “sacredness of life” in an attempt to capture a “fixed place” 
against the reserve and the suspicion of the theological ethicists.484 
It is interesting to note here that Ladaria gives an argument in favour of the Instruction for 
avoiding a philosophical definition. He says that Dignitas Personae in order to avoid entering 
into a controversial field avoids philosophical definitions and discussions as its predecessor 
Donum Vitae.485 On the one hand, he argues that one speaks of a person as a being who is 
endowed with reason and free will and in this manner invested with responsibility for his/her 
actions. Of course, this refers to the person who is able to exercise all one’s faculties, but it does 
not mean that this exercise is an integral part of the definition itself. On the other hand, there 
could be civil rights (for example, legacy) that recognizes the unborn child according to a 
different legal systems, and consequently as a “person” from this practical point of view. Thus, 
there is a need felt for a definition. Moreover, it is also necessary – when speaking of the human 
                                                 
483 DP II, 16 is referring to: BENEDICT XVI, “Discourse to the Participants of its 12th General Assembly…”, 7. 
The Italian text reads: «Per questo il Magistero della Chiesa ha costantemente proclamato il carattere sacro e 
inviolabile di ogni vita umana, dal suo concepimento sino alla sua fine naturale». BENEDICTI PP. XVI, 
“Allocutiones. Ad Generalem Coetum Pontificiae Academiae pro vita tuenda…”, 264. 
484 Cf. BARANZKE, „Heiligkeit des Lebens…“, 109-110. The German text reads: „Dennoch kreuzen sich die 
Wege der beiden Ideen im Verlauf der Geschichte immer wieder. So droht beiden Wertbegriffen in der Gegenwart 
wie allen Idealbegriffen zur Zeit der Tod durch Naturalisierung und sie begegneten sich bereits früh über das 
Tötungsverbot, was beiden Begriffen ihren Platz bis heute in den Euthanasiedebatten sichert. Allerdings liegt in 
der Hochschätzung leiblicher Lebensführung, die sich in der Idee von der Heiligkeit des Lebens besser als in der 
Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen bewahren konnte, die Brücke zur Integration der Hochschätzung physischer 
Lebendigkeit überhaupt. So erklärt sich auch, dass sich die „Heiligkeit des menschlichen Leben“ in Äußerungen 
des Katholischen Lehramtes zur Bioethik entgegen der Reserve und dem Vitalismusverdacht, den theologische 
Ethiker dem Ausdruck oft entgegenbringen, einen „festen Platz“ erobern konnte.“ Ibid. It should be noted here 
that one is not clear with regard to the phrase, „Heiligkeit des Lebens“, i.e., whether Baranzke means “sanctity of 
life” or “sacredness of life”. It was already mentioned that the phrase “sanctity of life” is not used in the Church 
documents. Instead, in its place “sacredness” or “inviolability” of life is used. On this discussion see Chapter 3.5.3 
at fn. 472 above. Thus, the author has taken the liberty to translate the German phrase as “sacredness of life”. 
485 Cf. LADARIA, “Dignitas Personae...”, 341. Ladaria says: «Per evitare di dover entrare in definizioni 
filosofiche e in discussioni che possono creare difficoltà, sia già nel 1987 nell'Istruzione Donum vitae, come adesso 
nel 2008, si evita di entrare in questo ambito di problemi, che può far sorgere dei malintesi». Ibid. It is interesting 
to note that in the last 20 years although there has been lot of discussions going on about the first moment of 
existence of a human person or when exactly the animation takes places, yet the Instruction does not give us a 
clear picture. The historical discussion with regard to the ontological status of the embryo will be taken up later in 
detail in Chapter 5 below. 
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person and his/her dignity – that all are able to understand the concept in a general sense. 
Therefore the Instruction, rather than to attempt at a definition and insist on the characteristics 
of the human person that has reached full development, speaks of the continuity of the human 
being precisely in the different phases of this development.486 
From what has been said above, Ladaria concludes that there are no “jumps” in this continuous 
development which causes any substantial mutation. This is made clear by Dignitas Personae: 
“The embryonic human body develops progressively according to a well-defined program with 
its proper finality, as is apparent in the birth of every baby” (DP 4). Thus, according to him, the 
Instruction – without going into philosophical definitions which may give rise to endless 
discussions – while emphasizing the continuity in the progressive development of human being, 
sees the decisive reason for saying that these, in all stages of his/her life, always has the same 
dignity, the dignity which corresponds to the “person”, which is proper and exclusive to it.487  
One can appreciate in the text of Dignitas Personae a greater closeness to the concept of 
personhood of an embryo on the ontological level even though it is not explicitly defined.488 
The Instruction using the quote from Donum vitae (I,1) points out that: 
In fact, it presupposes a truth of an ontological character, as Donum vitae demonstrated from 
solid scientific evidence, regarding the continuity in development of a human being.  
If Donum vitae, in order to avoid a statement of an explicitly philosophical nature, did not 
define the embryo as a person, it nonetheless did indicate that there is an intrinsic connection 
between the ontological dimension and the specific value of every human life. Although the 
presence of the spiritual soul cannot be observed experimentally, the conclusions of science 
regarding the human embryo give “a valuable indication for discerning by the use of reason 
a personal presence at the moment of the first appearance of a human life: how could a human 
individual not be a human person?” Indeed, the reality of the human being for the entire span 
of life, both before and after birth, does not allow us to posit either a change in nature or a 
gradation in moral value, since it possesses full anthropological and ethical status. The 
human embryo has, therefore, from the very beginning, the dignity proper to a person (DP 5; 
emphasis in the original). 
Dignitas Personae, however, does not give a clear definition of the first moment of existence 
of the human person.489 All that it says is a repetition of Donum Vitae, namely, that the “human 
being is to be respected and treated as a person from the moment of conception” (DP 4; 
emphasis added). It is observed here that the term “as a person” is being used (a repetition of 
Donum Vitae) where one would have expected instead the phrase, “a person exists” from the 
first moment of his/her existence. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note here that Dignitas Personae refers to an embryo as a 
“person” when it claims: “The human embryo has, therefore, from the very beginning, the 
dignity proper to a person” (DP 5). This is surely an advance made in the understanding of the 
concept of human person when compared to the previous church documents, which were more 
circumspect in this matter. The phrase here, namely, “the dignity proper to a person” said about 
                                                 
486 Cf. ibid., 342. 
487 Cf. ibid. 
488 Cf. MEANA, “On the Status of Human Embryos…”, 110. Cf. also LADARIA, “Dignitas Personae...”, 342. 
489 Cf. ibid., 341. 
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an embryo is a very strong claim which is equivalent to saying that an embryo is a person from 
the very beginning of its existence. 
From all that has been aforesaid the conclusion that the Magisterium makes serves as an ethical 
guide for the respect one owes to every human being independent of any particular 
philosophical conception of personhood. Dignitas Personae, for example, using the data 
offered by modern sciences and applying philosophical enquiry over the ontological status of 
the embryo together with different concept of persons, offers an articulated ethical guideline: 
“The human embryo deserves the protection that is due to a human person.”490 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
Indicated here are some key points as a conclusion to what has been considered so far in this 
chapter for further deliberation. 
God’s creation of human beings in the OT in His own image and likeness (Gen 1,26-27) is a 
central anthropological statement and a foundational concept of understanding the human 
person. In relation to one another and to God, human persons are endowed with human dignity 
because of the sharing of the image and likeness of God. Human persons created in the image 
of God also apply to all persons without any discrimination. The whole human being is seen as 
created in the image of God representing a holistic vision without any dichotomy between body 
and soul. The OT also holds for the sacredness of human life because God creates life. However, 
this sacredness of life is not to be confused with “sanctity of life”, a term that has become 
debatable in Bioethics. 
The NT makes the dignity of the human person even more concrete through the incarnation of 
the Son of God. It is through our sonship or daughtership, faith in Jesus Christ and by the aid 
of the sacraments that the believer is transformed into the image of Christ. The NT speaks of 
the sacredness of human life. The NT also tells that we are temples of the Holy Spirit. The three 
aspects, namely, being made in the image of God, the Word becoming incarnate, and our bodies 
as the temple of the Holy Spirit, reflects in some way the Trinitarian life in us that make us 
sacred. 
In dealing with the concept of human life in the NT, the importance of the statement of Jesus 
was noted, namely, “I came that they may have life, and have it abundantly” (Jn 10,10). Thus, 
the focus of Christian ethics can be none other than on life. “Life is the fountain, force, and 
focus of Christian ethics, which is for its protection, preservation, and promotion. Life is the 
fundamental good and hence recognition of life, respect for life, and response to life is 
inevitable. This demands reverence for life in all its forms, spheres, and stages.”491 
Down through the ages, e.g., Irenaeus, brought together the doctrine of the image of God and 
tied it with human dignity. Tertullian by introducing persona brings out the aspect of persons-
in-relation, horizontally and vertically. Augustine sees human persons in the image of the trinity 
of divine persons. Thomas claimed that human person have a special dignity in comparison to 
brutes. 
                                                 
490 MEANA, “On the Status of Human Embryos…”, 110. 
491 KOCHAPPILLY, Life in Christ…, 13. 
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It was also important to examine, in the light of the documents of the Church, the ontological 
status of an embryo, namely, the ensoulment of an embryo. The deliberation was necessary 
because there are differences of opinion with regard to considering an embryo as a human being 
or human person. 
The Church’s social doctrine since Leo XIII has always centred round the dignity and rights of 
the human person.492 It was noted that the social encyclicals form, as it were, a leitmotif of the 
dignity of the human person and their social nature, which is centred on the theology of the 
human person, created in God’s image. Human persons are thus ontologically endowed with a 
dignity of transcendent values. The social encyclicals also present the social nature of human 
persons as an essential quality of being created in the divine image. Consequently, all persons 
are born equal in dignity and with an inalienable right to defend that dignity.493 
The Church Documents do not invoke the term “sanctity of life” per se.494 The Documents base 
their argument of human dignity as well as the sacredness and inviolability of life on the fact 
that human beings are created in the image of God (Gen 1,26). Perhaps, one can see a 
connection between human dignity and sacredness and inviolability of life, both of which 
depend on being made in the image of God. 
The Magisterial documents are all unanimous in proclaiming that the human embryo deserves 
the protection that is due to a human person right from the beginning of life. A very strong 
claim by Dignitas Personae is that an embryo has to be awarded “the dignity proper to a person” 
(DP 5). It is tantamount to saying that an embryo is a person from the very beginning of its 
existence. 
Relating all that has been deliberated in the present Chapter on the theological understanding 
of human dignity to that of the last chapter, especially on Kant, insofar as human dignity springs 
from human agency and free will, the Catholic Church’s view of human dignity is similar to 
Kant.495 However, the understanding of the Church goes far beyond this philosophical 
understanding, in that, it understands that freewill in turn springs from the creation of human 
beings as the image of God. Thus, in the last analysis, one can arrive at a definition, which 
includes the substantive foundation of human dignity and based on the fact that human beings 
are created in the image of God. Thus, the definition of human dignity, which was arrived in 
Chapter 1.6 above, can be modified to include the above Catholic dimension. The definition 
would then read: 
Independent of the sex, origin, country, society, class, caste, profession, religion, culture or 
family every human individual, because of being human and made in the image of God, has an 
inviolable intrinsic worth owing to his/her autonomy and endowed with reason which is 
recognized throughout one’s human life and respected but not granted; that cannot be lost, taken 
away, or damaged but can be disrespected and assaulted and is therefore subject to being 
defended and protected by human rights.496 
                                                 
492 LOBO, Moral and Pastoral Questions…, 110. 
493 Cf. DEVASAHAYAM, Human Dignity in Indian Secularism…, 314. 
494 Cf. KEENAN, “The Concept of Sanctity of Life…”, 10. 
495 Cf. Mark D. WHITE, “Dignity”, in: Jan PEIL/Irene VAN STAVEREN (ed.), Handbook of Economics and Ethics, 
Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham (U.K.)/Massachusetts (USA) 2009, 85. 
496 See Chapter 1.6 at fn.71 above. 
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The problem with such a definition is that it uses Christian elements, which may not be 
acceptable to everyone. Therefore, further research is necessary to incorporate a wider 
audience. This venture will continue in the Chapters that follow. However, first, a bioethical 
foundation of human dignity is necessary. This will be carried out in the following Chapter.
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C H A P T E R  4  
BIOETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Now it interests here to pose the question: Is it suitable for bioethical discourse to make 
reference to human dignity to issues pertaining to beginning of life?497 Nevertheless, before the 
question is delved into regarding the suitability of making this reference to human dignity, a 
few other basic questions need to be answered. Since human dignity can only be acknowledged 
of a human person, the basic question is whether an embryo qualifies to be a human person. 
The question concerns the status of an embryo. It is in this context that human life be seen from 
a scientific perspective. However, scientific observation alone is insufficient to prove the 
personhood of an embryo. Therefore, one needs to explore human life from a Metaphysical 
point of view and see if one can acknowledge the fact that an embryo is also a person. Finally, 
the question whether human dignity can be invoked of an embryo in the field of Bioethics at an 
ethical level will be addressed. 
4.2 THE STATUS OF AN EMBRYO 
One of the main problems concerning the beginning of life is the ethical problem of considering 
the status of an embryo. By the term “status”, is meant the nature and specific identity of a 
human embryo.498 In other words, is an embryo a person? An answer to this question becomes 
necessary in the wake of acknowledging the inherent dignity of an embryo. The problem can 
be stated thus: Provided one can affirm that an embryo is a human person, only then can one 
acknowledge that it has inherent human dignity. Some decades ago, this question was unheard 
of because there was at that time no possibility of manipulating embryos in the laboratory as is 
possible now. At that time whether an embryo was a person or not remained more on a 
theoretical level and was limited to the discussions on abortion. Although some were willing to 
accept the personhood of an embryo, they tried to justify abortion by invoking a supposed 
conflict of rights. However, the issue has become more relevant now owing to medical 
advancement. In such cases, it would be difficult to deny an embryo the rights of a person, 
especially the right to life, provided it be regarded as a person. Other authors point out that 
many people in the scientific field do not regard an embryo as a person. However, from a purely 
logical point of view, the acceptance or denial of the personhood of an embryo does not give 
the reason for its justification to be manipulated in the laboratories. It must be reiterated here 
that it is not necessary to prove the personhood of an individual in order to demand some rights 
to be accorded to him or her. One clear example is the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.499 
With regard to the status of the human embryo, four different but inter-related levels needs to 
be distinguished, in which the premises, arguments and conclusions arise, which will help in 
classifying the human being. At the biological level, the biological nature of an embryo is 
                                                 
497 Cf. HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity…”, 92-93. 
498 Cf. DV I,1, op. cit., 13. 
499 MEANA, “On the Status of Human Embryos…”, 98. Cf. also BUECHE, “Destroying Human Embryos…”, 
86-91. 
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inquired. At the philosophical (or ontological) level, the metaphysical nature of an embryo is 
considered. How does one treat an embryo is considered at an ethical level.500 How must the 
society regulate the attitude of its members toward an embryo and the legal questions regarding 
the rights and juridical protection of it are answered at the juridical level.501 The answer to the 
question of the status of an embryo is essentially connected to regulation of the attitude towards 
them in matters of abortion, in vitro fertilization, embryo transfer and embryonic experimentation 
like embryonic stem cell research, etc. 
It must be further emphasized that these four levels, namely, biological, philosophical, ethical 
or moral and juridical levels, are inter-related. For example, the ontological status of an embryo 
bases itself on the results obtained at the biological level. However, it would be misleading 
when one concludes the ontological level from the data derived from biological level without 
further analysis. That is to say, one needs to go beyond the biological level in order to arrive at 
a philosophically founded conclusion. Biology, for example, cannot empirically demonstrate 
the principle of psychological integration (the soul) of an embryo or an adult. It is only at a 
philosophical level – without any recourse to religious reasons – that one can postulate about 
the integrating principle of a living human organism. The following sections will consider 
whether this immaterial principle can also be applied to an embryo. So too, the personhood of 
an embryo cannot be based only on genetic data. Nevertheless, what implication the genetic 
potential can have in a philosophical perspective needs to be explored in order to determine the 
personhood of an embryo. 
So the first task is: From which moment or from when on can one call an embryo an individual? 
Can one count an embryo as a human person? Is it an “it” or a “he or “she”? In general, the 
question pertains to an important inquiry: What status is to be rendered to a human embryo? 
Second, to delve over the question of the research topic: Can one speak of an intrinsic dignity 
of an embryo? Since an answer to these questions involve several disciplines such as biology, 
philosophy, ethics and law at different levels, they will be examined in the following sections. 
Nevertheless, the juridical level is out of the scope of this research and the same will not be 
examined. The ethical level will be taken in another separate section to determine whether the 
concept of human dignity can be used in Bioethics. 
                                                 
500 MEANA, “On the Status of Human Embryos…”, 99. Cf. BUECHE, “Destroying Human Embryos…”, 92. Cf. 
also Angel Rodríguez LUÑO, Scelti in Cristo per essere santi. Vol. 3 Morale speciale, Edusc, Roma 2008, 180. 
501 MEANA, “On the Status of Human Embryos…”, 99. Johannes Seidel, a Molecular Biologist and Moral 
Theologian in Germany, is of the opinion that the ontological question of the embryo is interdisciplinary, that is, 
biological-philosophical-theological oriented and not just medical-theological. He treats the ontological question 
from three levels, namely, biology, philosophy and theology. Further he distinguishes between biological and 
medical inquiry. He argues that medicine as such cannot answer the ontological question but biology. It is because 
human medicine has another formal object in comparison to biology. While human medicine is interested in 
medical treatment of human beings, biology as a science of living has an overall objective that acquaints itself 
with an open-minded biological reality. Cf. Johannes SEIDEL, „Embryonale Entwicklung und anthropologische 
Deutung. Neuen ‚Katechismusfragen‘ zum ontologischen Status des Vorgeburtlichen“, in: Konrad HILPERT (Hg.), 
Forschung contra Lebensschutz. Der Streit um die Stammzell-forschung, Quaestiones Disputatae, Bd. 233, Herder, 
Freiburg i. Br./Basel/Wien 2009, 76-98; 95. See also Johannes SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht? Zum 
ontologischen Status humanbiologischer Keime, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2010, 23. 
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4.2.1 The Biological Level: Human Embryo as an Organism 
Biological science sees the growth of a human being from birth to death as a continuum. 
Nevertheless, science distinguishes different stages in the life of a person and in the life of an 
embryo. The basic biological facts will be dealt with here that will help one to understand 
clearly the terms that will be used in this research. The contribution of science will help as a 
reference point to answer questions on a philosophical, ethical and juridical level.  
From a biological point of view, the end and total result of the fertilization of a sperm and an 
ovum in the fallopian tube is often referred to as a “fertilized egg”502 or a “zygote”503 or an 
“embryo”504, which is the first single totipotent cell produced when the nuclei of the two 
gametes have fused.505 The process of fertilization itself is a continuous process.506 It is to be 
noted that as long as a sperm and/or egg continue to persist, there can be no new human life. In 
contrast to personal, political or religious convictions, based on the cell composition and cell 
behaviour (which are the two criteria that are used in all fields of biological science and which 
are the basis for all scientific distinctions between cell types), one can say that: 
[…] it is unambiguously clear that a distinct (new) cell type comes into existence at the point 
of sperm-egg fusion, an event that occurs very rapidly following the initial binding of the 
sperm and egg surface membranes […] at the point of sperm-egg fusion, a single cell is 
generated that contains all the components of both sperm and egg. This new cell, the zygote 
or one-cell embryo, is therefore distinct from either sperm or egg in terms of its molecular 
composition. Thus based on the first criteria (composition), the zygote is a new cell type, 
distinct from either sperm or egg.507 
Further, after the sperm-egg fusion, the zygote immediately enters into a development trajectory 
(the second criteria: cell behaviour) which is distinct from either sperm or egg. The newly 
formed zygote initiates sequences such as blocking additional sperms entering the cell surface 
and also reconfigures it for functions that are unique to the zygote in contrast to the functions 
which are specific to gametes. “Thus based on the second criteria (unique behaviour), the zygote 
is also a new cell type, distinct from either sperm or egg.”508 
Therefore, based on the first criteria of cell type/composition and the second criteria of cell 
behaviour, one can come to the conclusion that a human zygote is a new type of human cell 
distinct from the sperm and the ovum. What happens within the zygote in the hours that follow? 
                                                 
502 Cf. Maureen L. CONDIC, “Preimplantation Stages of Human Development. The Biological and Moral Status 
of Early Embryos”, in: Is this Cell a Human Being?, op. cit., 25-43; 27. 
503 Michael L. STITZEL/Geraldine SEYDOUX, “Regulation of the Oocyte-to-Zygote Transition”, in: Science 316 
(2007) 407-408; 407. Cf. CONDIC, “Preimplantation Stages of Human Development…”, 27. 
504 Günter RAGER, “Die biologische Entwicklung des Menschen”, in: Beginn, Personalität und Würde des 
Menschen, op. cit., 67-122; 68 & 70. 
505 The Instruction Donum Vitae in its Foreword gives a small note at the bottom of the page indicating that 
“the terms ‘zygote’, ‘pre-embryo’, ‘embryo’ and ‘foetus’ can indicate in the vocabulary of biology successive 
stages of the development of a human being. The present Instruction makes free use of these terms, attributing to 
them an identical ethical relevance [...]” See CDF, Donum Vitae, Foreword. On the note on Section I, 1, Donum 
Vitae gives a definition of a zygote: “The zygote is the cell produced when the nuclei of the two gametes have 
fused.”. See ibid, I,1. Cf. also PAZHAYAMPALLIL, Pastoral Guide…, 1377. 
506 RAGER, “Die biologische Entwicklung…”, 70. See also CONDIC, “Preimplantation Stages of Human 
Development…”, 26. 
507 Ibid., 27-28.  
508 Ibid., 28-29. 
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By approximately eight hours following sperm-egg fusion, the two pronuclei (of the egg and 
sperm) have duplicated their genetic information in preparation for cell division. By 
approximately twenty hours the two pronuclei move together and the nuclear membranes break 
down in preparation for cell division. The event is referred to as “fusion” of the two nuclei, or 
“syngamy”.509 The process of syngamy involves two internal processes, namely, plasmogamy 
which is the fusion of the cytoplasm of the two cells and karyogamy which is the fusion of the 
nuclei of the two cells. Karyogamy involves the fusion of two compatible haploid nuclei (in the 
case of humans with 23 chromosomes each) to form one diploid nucleus (with 46 
chromosomes).510 The factual evidence of “fusion” is indicated in a scientifically well-defined 
“moment of conception”.511 At this decisive moment, a new life, distinct from that of the father 
and that of the mother is given, with a unique, never-to-be-repeated genetic code. An embryo 
contains a multitude of inherited characteristics. There is however an exclusion of a virtually 
infinite number of combinations of paternal and maternal traits in favour of unique traits which 
will determine the individuality of the new life and the innate potentialities that will further 
develop. Thus a genotype is determined.512 
Is this new human cell, i.e., the zygote or an embryo, an organism?513 Based on the same criteria 
for distinguishing a cell, namely, the cell composition and cell behaviour one can also 
distinguish one organism from the other based on its distinctive pattern of behaviour and distinct 
molecular composition. More specifically, the behaviour of a human organism is unique and 
clear when compared to any other type of human cell (for example, human embryonic stem 
cells). Maureen Condic, a neurobiologist, explains this uniqueness of an organism in contrast 
to a cell as: 
The major feature that distinguishes an organism from a cell is that all parts of an organism 
act together in a coordinated manner to preserve the life, health and continued development 
of the organism as a whole. While individual cells show complex behaviour designed to 
sustain cellular life, they show no higher level of organization or coordinated function […] 
organisms produce cells in a globally coordinated manner to generate an ordered collection 
of tissues and structures, all of which contribute to the function of the organism as a whole. 
                                                 
509 Ibid., 28.  
510 Cf. Don RITTNER/Timothy L. MCCABE, “karyogamy”, in: Encyclopedia of Biology, Facts on File Inc., New 
York 2004, 185. 
511 CONDIC, “Preimplantation Stages of Human Development…”, 29. The term “moment of conception” has 
been used in Donum Vitae (I,1). Ever since this Instruction was given, one can see that the Church documents that 
followed began using the term “moment of conception”. See DV Intro. 4; CA 47; EV 60 and DP 4 for other 
instances of the use of the term. It is to be noted here that the legislative bodies of different countries have defined 
the “moment” of conception quite differently as one can see in Canada, United States, Germany and the United 
Kingdom. For example, Germany sets the beginning of life at a point that occurs approximately 24 hours after the 
fusion of sperm and egg, defining a human embryo as, “the human egg cell, fertilized and capable of development, 
from the time of fusion of the nuclei”. GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, “Federal Embryo Protection Law” 
(1990) in Bundesgesetzblatt, Part I, 19 Dezember, 1990, 2746-2748. See CONDIC, “Preimplantation Stages of 
Human Development…”, 26. 
512 Bernard HÄRING, Medical Ethics, St. Pauls, UK 1991, 72.  
513 Merriam-Webster defines “organism” as “1: a complex structure of interdependent and subordinate 
elements whose relations and properties are largely determined by their function in the whole and 2: an individual 
constituted to carry on the activities of life by means of organs separate in function but mutually dependent : a 
living being”. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary. Tenth Edition, Merriam-Webster Incorporated, 
Springfield, Massachusetts 1999, 819. Cf. CONDIC, “Preimplantation Stages of Human Development…”, 29. 
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The coordinated production of diverse, yet functionally integrated, structures is the defining 
feature of an organism and the basis for distinguishing an organism from a mere living cell.514 
Thus, as explained above, the zygote too clearly exhibits a high degree of coordinated behaviour 
beginning from the moment of fusion of egg and sperm and therefore, is an organism. Important 
to note here is the behaviour of the zygote. The behaviour of the zygote is not merely directed 
toward itself as a single cell (say for example, a skin cell), but “is directed toward the production 
of distinct cell types that will act in a globally coordinated manner to produce the structures and 
relationships necessary for the ongoing development of an embryo as a whole […] Thus, even 
in the first 24 h [hours] of life, there is a clear evidence that the zygote behaves as an 
organism”.515 
Further, when one considers the human development during the first week of life, it becomes 
even clearer that the zygote is indeed an organism and not merely a human cell. Fertilization 
generally takes place in the fallopian tubes. The embryo then travels towards the uterus in the 
following days. Approximately, five days after the first division of the zygote, the implantation 
into the uterus takes place. During this time an embryo continues to act in a coordinated manner 
to produce the structures and relationships necessary for its own development in the stages that 
are to follow.516 
The zygote further divides into two, four, and eight identical totipotent cells. At this stage the 
ball of cells is named “morula” because it looks like a mulberry (Latin morula).517 By further 
multiplication of the cells, the morula acquires a cavity and at this stage it is called a 
“blastocyst”. At one pole of this blastocyst is located a group of cells called “inner cell mass” 
(ICM). The ICM are the embryo precursor cells or embryogenic cells. In its early stages of 
development, these ICM are totipotent or pluripotent, i.e., capable of developing into a complete 
organism.518 As cell division progresses, the ICM lose their totipotentiality and pluri-
potentiality, i.e., their capacity to contribute to the formation of any part of the human body. 
With the formation of the blastocyst, the stage of the embryonic development is all prepared 
for implantation in the uterus, which is about fourteen days or so after fertilization. At this point 
there is a separation between cells destined to form the placenta and its adjuncts and those which 
will form other organs.519 The cells at this stage called “gastrula”, organize itself into three 
layers (ectoderm, endoderm and mesoderm). At about the 14-15th day, “a convergence of 
epithetic cells occurs in the posterior part of the embryonic disc: this is called the primitive 
                                                 
514 Ibid., 29. 
515 Ibid., 29-30. Emphasis in original. Addition by author. 
516 Ibid., 30-31. 
517 FORD, When Did I Begin?..., 147. Cf. also GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 72.  
518 Cf. PAZHAYAMPALLIL, Pastoral Guide…, 1377. Cf. also PONTIFICAL ACADEMY FOR LIFE, Notes on 
Cloning, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City 1998, 1b. Totipotency is the ability of a single cell to divide and 
produce all the differentiated cells in an organism, including extra-embryonic tissues. Pluripotency in the broad 
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biological compounds. From the Latin pluri=many, potent=power, capacity. A pluripotent cell can create all cell 
types except for extra embryonic tissue, unlike a totipotent cell, (tot=all), which can produce every cell type 
including extra embryonic tissue. Cf. Hans R. SCHÖLER, “The Potential of Stem Cells. An Inventory”, in: Nikolaus 
KNOEPFFLER/Dagmar SCHIPANSKI/Stefan Lorenz SORGNER (ed.), Humanbiotechnology as Social Challenge. An 
Interdisciplinary Introduction to Bioethics, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., Hampshire/Burlington 2007, 27-53; 28. 
519 Cf. PAZHAYAMPALLIL, Pastoral Guide…, 1377.  
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streak”.520 From here on or shortly afterwards, there is no possibility of twinning, but, 
everything being equal, an embryo will become the foetus properly called eight weeks or so 
from fertilization and so on to viability and birth.521 
Until the end of the second month after conception, the developing being is called an “embryo”. 
Thereafter, it is called a “foetus’.522 It is to be noted, however, that “the word “zygote”, or 
“morula” or “blastocyst” or “embryo” or “foetus” is only a technical term for one stage of 
human development, much like the word ‘adolescent’”.523 
Before proceeding to the next section to find a philosophical basis for the establishment of an 
embryo as a person, a scientific explanation would be necessary. According to Seidel, the 
official position held by the Church is that which favours Karyogamy as the beginning of a 
person. Seidel calls this as a zygotist position, that is, the moment of conception is the beginning 
of a person.524 He explains what the zygotist position is while quoting Stephen Schwarz, a 
philosopher, from his book The Moral Question of Abortion (who also favours the Church’s 
position): “The life of a human person is a single continuum”525 and “Conception, the 
culmination of the process of fertilization, marks the beginning of the continuum of human 
life.”526 “Sperm and ovum are each merely preparations for a human being. When they come 
together, they cease to exist.”527 According to Schwarz, “it is a scientific fact that human life 
begins at conception”.528 Even if scientific inquiry “does not establish”529 that the zygote is a 
person, yet “Scientific data provide part of the evidence” […]. “Thus it is science that explains 
the biological continuity between the zygote and the later child and that the zygote comes into 
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by taking the fetus to herself”. See FORD, When Did I Begin?..., 8. “Fertilization in this case is the beginning of 
conception, while conception itself refers to the actually constituted ontological individual.” See GONSALVES, How 
did I begin?..., 93 at fn.150. 
523 Francis P. FELICE, “Human Life”, in: OR, Weekly Edition in English, 11 December 1975, 8 and Robert S. 
SASSONE (ed.), The Tiniest Humans. Jerome Le Jeune and Albert William Liley, Stafford, Virginia 1977, 79. See 
PAZHAYAMPALLIL, Pastoral Guide…, 1377. Since there is a debate over the moral status about the fact whether 
immediately after fertilization the life begun is a “human”, “a product”, “an entity”, etc., the concept “embryo” is 
better preferred. 
524 Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 122.  
525 Stephen D. SCHWARZ, The Moral Question of Abortion, Loyola University Press, Chicago 1990, 67. Cf. 
SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 122. 
526 SCHWARZ, The Moral Question of Abortion …, 70. Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 122. 
527 SCHWARZ, The Moral Question of Abortion …, 68. Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 122. 
528 SCHWARZ, The Moral Question of Abortion …, 80. Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 122-123. 
529 SCHWARZ, The Moral Question of Abortion …, 80. Schwarz makes it clear that “the term person is a 
philosophical category, not a scientific one”. Ibid. Emphasis in original. Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch 
nicht?..., 123. 
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being as sperm and ovum interpenetrates, thereby ceasing to exist.”530 With the coming into 
being of the zygote as a new human person there is a radical break. Before this radical break 
there are two things, namely, the father’s sperm and the mother’s ovum. However, after 
fertilization it is now one.531 With the radical break and fertilization, “The mother’s ovum loses 
its identity as ovum […]. The same is true of the father’s sperm.”532 “Sperm and ovum cease to 
exist.” 533 Based on this radical break, Seidel analyses the approach of the zygotic argument: 
Centrally located in the zygotist argument is the antithesis between “smooth transition” and 
“radical break”, between continuous development and discontinuous break. It is true that the 
“conception [...] is a process that takes a long time”; but the timing of this process in the 
formation of the zygote – namely, when exactly the male and the female nuclei cease to be and 
the diploid nucleus come into existence534 – is “a moment of conception: the culmination of the 
process of fertilization”.535 This process continues into “the development of a human zygote 
into adult humans [...] without any information-leap, because the species remains preserved. 
The zygote carries sufficient information for the evolvement of human life, because an embryo, 
either as a single-celled or multicellular organism, is an individual of the human species”.536 
In a nutshell the Karyogamy thesis (zygotistische These), according to Seidel, is as follows: 
First, as a principle: there is either a “radical break” or “smooth transition”, either (prolonged) 
development process, or (at times abrupt) break; either continuity or discontinuity. Continuity 
implies identity. Identity implies membership in the species Homo sapiens, and thus personality 
(otherwise it would amount to non-membership and non-personality) “from the beginning”.  
Second, as “scientifically” seen, there is the human life cycle which is only a single 
discontinuous event, namely, fertilization. Everything else is proceeding steadily, without 
interruption, without further (developmental related) break.  
Hence, third, it is “scientifically” demonstrated that the person begins at fertilization.537 
Seidel sums up the conclusion of Schwarz: “Sperm and ovum are transformed into a new being. 
This new being has a specific genetic structure and associated cellular structure […]. This is 
                                                 
530 SCHWARZ, The Moral Question of Abortion …, 80. Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 123. 
531 Cf. SCHWARZ, The Moral Question of Abortion…, 68. As Schwarz clarifies: “The transformation of two 
into one is surely a radical break”. Ibid.  
532 SCHWARZ, The Moral Question of Abortion …, 68. Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 123. 
533 SCHWARZ, The Moral Question of Abortion …, 69. Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 123. 
534 Cf. Alexander LOHNER, Personalität und Menschenwürde. eine theologische Auseinandersetzung mit den 
Thesen der „neuen Bioethiker“, Pustet, Regensburg 2000, 45: „Zwischen den Zellkernen von Samen und Ei 
kommt es bei der Befruchtung zu einer dynamischen Beziehung – und dabei hören sie auf zu sein. Man kann daher 
nur im analogen Sinne von einer ‚Vereinigung‘ oder ‚Verschmelzung‘ sprechen.“ “Between the nuclei of a sperm 
and an ovum there occurs at fertilization a dynamic relationship – and at that point the sperm and ovum cease to 
exist. Therefore, one can only speak in an analogous the sense of a ‘union’ or ‘fusion’.” Tr. by author. Cf. SEIDEL, 
Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 125-126. 
535 SCHWARZ, The Moral Question of Abortion …, 76. Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 126. 
536 „[d]ie Entwicklung einer menschlichen Zygote zum erwachsenen Menschen [...] ohne Informationssprünge, 
da die Spezies erhalten bleibt. Die Zygote besitzt ausreichende Information der Entfaltung menschlichen Lebens, 
da der ein- oder mehrzellige Embryo ein Individuum der menschlichen Spezies ist.“ See Clemens BREUER, Person 
von Anfang an? Der Mensch aus der Retorte und die Frage nach dem Beginn des menschlichen Lebens, Schöningh, 
Paderborn 1995, 49. Addition and emphasis in original. Tr. by author. Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch 
nicht?..., 126. 
537 Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 126. 
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the structure that constitutes the individual person, at that stage of his development. It is a 
specifically human structure, unlike the structure of an animal zygote.”538 
Further, using the observation of Clemens Breuer, a German Moral theologian, Seidel then 
states: “based on the genetic-biological identity between the zygote and the adult human, one 
arrives at the conclusion that ‘the rational perception of a personal presence’ must be connected 
‘with the very first occurrence (appearance) of a human life’”.539 Seidel further puts forward 
the conclusion of Breuer: 
Therefore, the zygote is “not simply a mathematical combination of elements [...], which 
retain their specific nature, but there arises a new system of a different kind. The ‘fertilized 
egg’ is not a linear combination of two germ cells, but a new structure, whose characteristics 
are not the aggregate of the respective characteristics of the germ cells.”540 
However, Seidel’s is doubtful regarding the zygotist position, because in truth it is an 
inconsistent stand. The inconsistency arises because of determining the exact “moment” of the 
“radical break” and in the concrete, the meaning and implication of “potentiality”.541 
Further, the problem here is that the concept of person cannot be decided at the biological level 
alone, even though it provides insights into understanding the concept. Further deliberation on 
a philosophical and theological level is also necessary. Therefore, the next section will engage 
itself on finding a solution as to how far an embryo can be acknowledged as a person at a 
philosophical level. 
4.2.2 The Metaphysical Level: Human Embryo as a Person 
Bioethical arguments are based fundamentally on data provided by science.542 From the data of 
biological level that was discussed above one can arrive at the metaphysical level which 
transcends the former. The question regarding human individual, human being and human 
person was already dealt with in general regarding a mature adult. Now, it necessitates to affirm 
the same about an embryo from a bioethical perspective. More accurately phrased, the question 
that needs to be narrowed down is, what is the status of an embryo?543 A clarification about the 
status of an embryo is essential here so that one acknowledge its inherent human dignity. 
                                                 
538 SCHWARZ, The Moral Question of Abortion …, 72. Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 123. 
539 „aufgrund der genetisch-biologischen Identität zwischen der Zygote und dem erwachsenen Menschen [ist] 
zu der Schlussfolgerung zu gelangen, dass, ‚die rationale Wahrnehmung einer personalen Gegenwart schon mit 
dem ersten Auftreten (Erscheinen) eines menschlichen Lebens‘ verbunden werden muss.“ BREUER, Person von 
Anfang an?..., 51. Tr. by author. Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 123. Breuer is quoting Karl 
Lehmann here. See Karl LEHMANN, „Die Würde der Weitergabe menschlichen Lebens wahren“, in: Stephan 
WEHOWSKY (Hg.), Lebensbeginn und menschliche Würde. Stellungnahmen zur Instruktion der Kongregation für 
die Glaubenslehre vom 22.2.1987, Gentechnologie. Chancen und Risiken, Bd. 14, Schweitzer, Frankfurt a. 
M/München 1987, 32-40; 35. 
540 „Demnach ist die Zygote, ‚nicht einfach eine mathematische Verbindung von Elementen [...], die ihre Natur 
behalten, sondern ein neues System einer anderen Art entsteht. Die ‚befruchtete Eizelle‘ ist nicht die lineare 
Verbindung zweier Keimzellen, sondern ein neues System, dessen Eigenschaften nichts mit der Summe der 
jeweiligen Eigenschaften der Keimzellen zu tun haben.‘“ SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 123. Tr. by 
author. Seidel is quoting BREUER, Person von Anfang an?..., 46. 
541 Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 126. 
542 MEANA, “On the Status of Human Embryos…”, 100. 
543 Cf. BUECHE, “Destroying Human Embryos…”, 86. Cf. Tobias HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung des 
Menschen. Eine historisch-systematische Studie, Studien zur Theologischen Ethik, Bd. 131, Academic Press 
Fribourg/Herder, Freiburg Schweiz/Freiburg-Wien 2011, 11. 
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It was already mentioned (Chapter 4.2.1) that an embryo is a form of human life and that it is a 
human organism. However, the question remains whether an embryo is also a human individual, 
a human being and a human person.544 
From a bioethical perspective the question that often arises as a basic issue is, how should one 
treat the human embryo? It is an ethical question. It is within this context that the question of 
“personhood” becomes important. It concerns the status that befits human zygotes, embryos 
and foetuses. In other words, the debatable question playing a central part today is, is everyone 
who is a human being also a person? The obvious reason for the centrality of this question is 
the link between the right to life and the concept of a person. That is to say, the answer to the 
question “Who is a person” determines one’s obligatory moral behaviour.545 
In order to show that the consequences of the moral behaviour that affect the way an embryo is 
treated are not trivial, two contradictory views will be examined. On the one hand, there is the 
theory known as “preformationism”. This theory presupposes a perfectly differentiated 
organism from the very moment of fertilization. In other words, the sperm is a miniature of the 
adult organism. Further development was an extension of the miniature being. It leads the 
philosopher to conclude that the rational soul is infused at the very moment of conception. In 
this case, an embryo would be treated as a person from the beginning. On the other hand, there 
is another theory that considers “a succession of life principles” or “epigenesis” in the 
developing human embryo: The theory holds that: first, it has a vegetative soul, then, it is 
followed by a sensitive soul and lastly, by an intellectual soul. Each successive soul during this 
process carries out the functions ascribed to the previous souls. Following this argument, the 
philosopher would conclude a delayed ensoulment. In this case, an embryo would be treated as 
a person at a later stage.546 
                                                 
544 Condic in her conclusion to the article titled, “Preimplantation Stages of Human Development…”, 41, 
affirms that, “The life of a human being (i.e., a human organism) begins at a scientifically well-defined moment: 
the fusion of sperm and egg”. Ibid. She had already affirmed this a few years back in another article. See IDEM, 
“When Does Human Life Begin? A Scientific Perspective”, in: The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 9 (2009) 
127-208. In this article, she provides a comprehensive presentation of the biological facts relevant for the 
determination of the beginning of human life. In the summary of the article, Condic writes: “Based on universally 
accepted scientific criteria, a new cell, the human zygote, comes into existence at the moment of sperm-egg fusion, 
an event that occurs in less than a second. Upon formation, the zygote immediately initiates a complex sequence 
of events that establish the molecular conditions required for continued embryonic development. The behaviour 
of the zygote is radically unlike that of either sperm or egg separately and is characteristic of a human organism. 
Thus, the scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new 
human being commences at a scientifically well defined ‘moment of conception.’ This conclusion is objective, 
consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of 
human life or of human embryos.” Ibid., 131. Though Condic, in both the citations that has been quoted, affirms 
that the zygote is a “human organism” and also a “human being” from the very first stage of development, it is to 
be mentioned that this assertion goes over to the metaphysical plane since the term “human being”, strictly 
speaking, is not a term that is proper to biology in the same way that “human organism” is, because it rather belongs 
to the field of philosophy. Cf. MEANA, “On the Status of Human Embryos…”, 101. 
545 Ludger HONNEFELDER, „The Concept of a Person in Moral Philosophy“, in: BAYERTZ (ed.), Sanctity of Life 
and Human Dignity..., 139-160; 139. See also WILDFEUER, „‘Person’ und ‘Mensch’…“; 90 and REITER, „Bioethik…“, 18. 
546 Cf. MEANA, “On the Status of Human Embryos…”, 100. Pablo Requena Meana, a Moral Theologian in 
Rome, is using the examples given by Carrasco de PAULA, “Personalità dell’embrione e aborto”, in: Persona, 
verità e morale. Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Teologia Morale (Roma, 7-12 aprile 1986), Città Nuova 
Editrice, Roma 1987, 277-290; 288. Cf. also Sabine DEMEL, Abtreibung zwischen Straffreiheit und 
Exkommunikation. Weltliches und kirchliches Strafrecht auf dem Prüfstand, W. Kohlhammer, 
Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln 1995, 32. See also REITER, „Bioethik…“, 18. 
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Two other modern contradictory views with regard to treating an embryo as a person need also 
to be considered. 
First, is the view of Singer. His stance becomes clear with regard to right to life of a newborn. 
To quote his words: 
If, for the reasons I have given, the fetus does not have the same claim to life as a person, it 
appears that the newborn baby does not either […]. Newborn babies cannot see themselves 
as beings that might or might not have a future, and so they cannot have a desire to continue 
living. For the same reason, if a right to life must be based on the capacity to want to go on 
living, or on the ability to see oneself as a continuing mental subject, a newborn baby cannot 
have a right to life. Finally, a newborn baby is not an autonomous being, capable of making 
choices, and so to kill a newborn baby cannot violate the principle of respect for autonomy.547 
Thus, according to Singer an embryo or a foetus does not have the right to life, let alone a 
newborn baby. 
 Second, on the contrary, according to Parfit - who holds for the right of life - considers the 
zygotes and foetuses as persons. Therefore, according to him every abortion amounts to the 
homicide of a defenseless person.548 
These contradictory views that was elaborated above makes it clear that the problem in these 
cases are not because of the false conclusions arrived at but that they have been reached through 
an insufficient methodology.549 
Further, some authors like Álvarez distinguish between three concepts – “an individual of the 
homo sapiens species,” “human being” and “persons” – affirming that they are not equivalent 
terms.550 As already mentioned in Chapter 1.3 above, according to the opinion of some authors, 
there are persons that are not humans and there are individuals of the Homo sapiens who are 
not humans and cannot be considered either as human beings or human persons because they 
lack some characteristics that are proper to humans. Álvarez would include an embryo in this 
group.551 
So the first enquiry here is what type of being is the human embryo? In other words, is the 
human zygote or an embryo which is a human organism, a human being?552 It is a commonly 
agreed upon affirmation that not all persons belong to the category of human beings, for 
example, God and angels. According to Álvarez, that which makes an individual of the Homo 
                                                 
547 SINGER, Practical Ethics…, 151-152. In his earlier 1993 edition, the first part of the above quoted passage 
has a different rendering. There he writes: “If the fetus does not have the same claim to life as a person, it appears 
that the newborn baby is of less value to it than the life of a pig, a dog, or a chimpanzee is to the nonhuman animal.” 
See SINGER, Practical Ethics, Second Edition, op. cit., 169-171. German version: IDEM, Praktische Ethik, Stuttgart 
1984, 171. Cf. HONNEFELDER, „The Concept of a Person…”, 139-140; Cf. WILDFEUER, „‘Person’ und 
‘Mensch’…“, 90-91. 
548 Cf. PARFIT, Reasons and Persons…, 322. 
549 Cf. MEANA, “On the Status of Human Embryos…”, 100.  
550 Cf. Juan Carlos ÁLVAREZ, “Ser humano-persona: planteamiento del problema”, in: Juan MASIÁ CLAVEL 
(ed.), Ser humano, persona y dignidad, Universidad Pontificia Comillas-Editorial Desclée De Brouwer, Bilbao 
2005, 17-41; 20. See MEANA, “On the Status of Human Embryos…”, 101. 
551 Cf. ibid. 
552 Cf. ibid. Sabine Demel, a German Canon Lawyer, phrases these questions about the embryo, thus: „Ist es 
Mensch im Sinne der biologischen Gattung Mensch, aber noch ohne Individualität und Personcharakter? Oder ist 
es schon menschliches Individuum und menschliche Person?“ Is it human in the sense of the biological human 
species, but without individuality and personal character? Or is it already a human individual and a human person? 
Tr. by author. See DEMEL, Abtreibung zwischen Straffreiheit und Exkommunikation…, 31. 
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sapiens species to be a “human being” is the characteristics of an individual that makes a person. 
But what characterizes an individual as a person? In the course of history various answers have 
been given.  
One view, which is the classical view (see Chapter 2.5.1 above) of Boethius, defines a person 
as: individual substantia rationalis naturae (individual substance of a rational nature). A second 
view is the modern concept of person, represented by Locke, according to whom it is self-
consciousness which makes an individual remember the past and question himself/herself with 
regards to the future, as the basis for the identity of the subject. Here the concept of person is 
defined in a functional term.553 Locke defined a person as: 
[…] a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as 
itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and different places; which it does only by 
that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: 
it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive.554 
Returning to the classical view of person (definition of Boethius) which is based on the 
metaphysical concepts of individual substance of a rational nature, can one affirm the same 
with regard to an embryo?  
First, let us consider the first part of the definition, namely, “individual substance”. The 
application of “individual substance” to an embryo has been objected to on the grounds that 
there is a possibility of twinning. However, this objection does not seem to be well-founded 
because a single individual can be conceived which later has the possibility to divide into two 
or more individual substances due to internal or external factors. The objection is partly based 
on the confusion between individuality and indivisibility. In response to this objection one can 
say that what characterizes an individual is his/her actual individuality and not his/her potential 
indivisibility.555 
Second, when one considers the human embryo using the second category of Boethius, namely, 
“rational nature”, then one can perhaps see that this concept gives room to permit a human 
organism in which all the characteristics proper to humans are not fully present to be considered 
a person. By the very fact of having rational human nature and not another is what enables an 
individual to be included within the group of persons. Considered this way, all human 
organisms are human beings since they all have a rational nature, even though it may not be 
manifested externally, or even when it is impossible that it will ever be manifested.556 
Thus, considering the definition of Boethius one can say that an embryo is an individual 
substance of a rational nature and therefore a person. 
Brian Johnstone, an Australian Moral Theologian, argues that the definition of Boethius 
regarding “person”, which was later accepted by Thomas, is not an appropriate definition in 
this context. The reason is that Thomas used the definition of Boethius to deal with 
metaphysical question within theological inquiries concerning the persons in the Trinity and 
especially the sense in which Christ could be considered to be a person. Johnstone further takes 
                                                 
553 Cf. MEANA, “On the Status of Human Embryos…”, 101-102. 
554 LOCKE, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding…, Book II, Chapter 27, para 9. 
555 Cf. MEANA, “On the Status of Human Embryos…”, 102. 
556 Cf. ibid. This perhaps may be the answer to the objection raised by Engelhardt and others (see Chapter 1.3 
above) who do not include an embryo, an encephalopathy of a foetus or PVS patients as persons. 
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the support of the argument of Ratzinger who had already criticized this definition on the basis 
that this definition was constructed entirely in terms of the Greek idea of “substance” and 
therefore could not provide an adequate explanation either in Christology or Trinitarian 
doctrine. Johnstone himself proposes that the definition is inadequate not only for theological 
purposes for which it was used, but also inappropriate when one considers “person” from a 
moral perspective.557 Johnstone therefore makes a distinction between a “person” understood in 
an ontological sense and “person” understood in a moral sense. It is to be remembered that the 
question of the personhood of an embryo is dealt with here because of its relevance in Bioethics 
and owing to its protection from the beginning of its existence. It is in this context that one can 
see the validity of the argument of Johnstone. For him this distinction (ontological vs. moral) 
is important because the absolute value and absolute protection of an embryo does not depend 
on the embryo’s fulfilling an ontological definition of “person” but understood in the moral 
sense.558 
Following Locke, as mentioned above, there are also other authors in the field of bioethics who 
claim that self-consciousness is necessary in order to qualify as a person. Engelhardt for 
example, proposes a functionalist-actualist basis to be included as a person. He defines the 
person on the basis of characteristics like self-consciousness, autonomy and rationality. Defined 
in this way, an embryo would naturally be excluded from being considered as a person (see also 
Chapter 1.3 above).559 Angel Rodríguez Luño, a Moral Theologian, consultor for the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and an ordinary member of the Pontifical Academy 
for Life in Rome, is of the opinion that the theory of functionalist-actualist proposal of 
Engelhardt reduces substance to function in actu. According to Luño, it is a debatable 
metaphysical posture which when used to determine the moral status of an embryo leaves it in 
a totally unprotected situation. The problem of such moral system lies in the fact that the will 
of the strong is imposed on the weak. Here the stronger establishes the criteria that the weaker 
                                                 
557 See Brian V. JOHNSTONE, “The Human Embryo. A Person to be Loved”, in: StMor 49/2 (2011) 419-438; 
425-426. Cf. Joseph RATZINGER, Dogma und Verkündigung, Erich Wewel Verlag, München 1973, 205-223; 212-
213. Ratzinger writes: „Boethius hat, auf der Ebene des griechischen Geistes verbleibend, Person definiert als 
naturae rationalis individua substantia, als die individuelle Substanz einer vernünftigen Natur. Man sieht, der 
Personbegriff steht gänzlich auf der Substanzebene; das kann weder bei der Trinität noch bei der Christologie 
etwas klären; es ist eine Aussage, die auf der Ebene des substantialistisch denkenden griechischen Geistes 
verharrt.“ Ibid. Ratzinger writes: “Remaining on the level of the Greek mind, Boethius defined “person” as naturae 
rationalis individua substantia, as the individual substance of a rational nature. One sees that the concept of person 
stands entirely on the level of substance. This cannot clarify anything about the Trinity or about Christology; it is 
an affirmation that remains on the level of the Greek mind which thinks in substantialist terms.” IDEM, “Retrieving 
the Tradition. Concerning the notion of person in theology”, in: Communio: International Catholic Review 17/3 
(1990) 439-454; 448. The article is a tr. by Michael Waldstein of the chapter, „Zum Personenverständnis in der 
Theologie“ from RATZINGER, Dogma und Verkündigung… 205-223. 
558 Cf. JOHNSTONE, “The Human Embryo…”, 423. Cf. BUECHE, “Destroying Human Embryos…”, 92. 
559 Cf. MEANA, “On the Status of Human Embryos…”, 102. 
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individuals (here an embryo) of the human species have to fulfill before being considered for 
moral and juridical status of person.560 
The question of the possibility of considering an embryo as a person with qualifications such 
as in a moral sense will be dealt with in the next section. Since the aim is to explore the question 
of human dignity pertaining to the beginning of life issues, the next section will enquire whether 
the concept of human dignity has any relevance in the field of Bioethics as a normative principle 
and how far it can be applied to a human embryo. 
4.3 ETHICAL LEVEL: THE USE OF HUMAN DIGNITY AS A NORMATIVE PRINCIPLE 
IN BIOETHICS 
Appeals to human dignity have been made in the field of bioethics, philosophy and law. Human 
rights are grounded on human dignity. Human dignity has been used as a central criterion for 
the evaluation of controversial technologies like cloning and embryonic stem cells. Given this 
background and taking into consideration that other arguments may be possible, the enquiry 
here is, whether it is possible to defend the right to life – especially when life is at its weakest, 
namely, at the beginning or the end of life – by using the concept of human dignity as a 
normative principle. It must be reiterated here that in these circumstances the debate falls back 
on the basis that human rights are grounded on human dignity. It is because human beings 
possess inherent human dignity that they become the subject of rights, namely, human rights. 
Human dignity precedes human rights. In other words, human rights are a juridical 
concretization of the more general concept of human dignity. In fact, human dignity is used as 
the highest principle in ethical and juridical discussions. 561 
In bioethical debates the concept of human dignity has been the subject of intense controversy 
especially in the debate over the so-called “death with dignity” in the seventies. Ever since that 
time the application of human dignity in Bioethics has been questioned. For example, 
bioethicist Ruth Macklin in an editorial in British Medical Journal strongly denounces the 
widespread use of the concept and its normative function.562 She writes: 
Is dignity a useful concept for an ethical analysis of medical activities? A close inspection of 
leading examples shows that appeals to dignity are either vague restatements of other, more 
precise, notions or mere slogans that add nothing to an understanding of the topic.563 
Macklin also is of the opinion that references to human dignity can be replaced by other 
principles such as respect for persons or their autonomy.564 
                                                 
560 LUÑO states: “Questa teoria riduce la sostanza (in senso metafisico) alla funzione in atto. Implica la 
prevaricazione del forte sul debole, cioè di colui in virtù della sua posizione di vantaggio può stabilire i pre-
suppone […]”. See LUÑO, Scelti in Cristo per essere santi…, 189. “This theory reduces the substance (in the meta-
physical sense) to the function in actu. It involves the abuse of the strong over the weak, which presupposes in 
establishing it namely by virtue of one’s advantageous position.” Tr. by author. Cf. MEANA, “On the Status of 
Human Embryos…”, 102. 
561 Cf. HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity…”, 93. Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human 
Rights..., 180. Cf. CHAPMAN, “Human Dignity…”; 3. See also Gerhard MARSCHÜTZ, theologisch ethisch 
nachdenken. Band 1. Grundlagen, Echter Verlag, Würzburg 2009, 241. 
562 Cf. Manuel TOSCANO, “Human Dignity as High Moral Status”, in: Les ateliers de l’éthique/The Ethics 
Forum 6/2 (2011) 4-25; 8. 
563 Ruth MACKLIN, “Dignity is a Useless Concept”, in: British Medical Journal 327/7429 (2003) 1419-1420; 
1419. 
564 Cf. ibid., 1420. 
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Given the above circumstance, one is faced with two pressing enquiries. First, the enquiry is 
whether one can use the concept of human dignity in Bioethics and whether an embryo can 
qualify as a bearer of human dignity in bioethical discussions. Second, the enquiry regarding 
ethical status of an embryo is brought to the forefront in bioethical issues involving 
experimentation on an embryo, in vitro fertilization, embryonic stem cell research, etc. 
Therefore, one is faced with two problems that need to be addressed here. 
First, the last three Chapters have shown that there is the problem of a common understanding 
of human dignity, be it in general, or from a philosophical or theological point of view. Closely 
associated with the concept of human dignity, there is already the confusion of the terms such 
as person, human person, human life as well as the controversial question on hominization 
(which will be dealt with elaborately in the next Chapter). Besides these, there stands another 
great challenge, namely, whether one can acknowledge that human dignity can be applied as a 
normative principle in bioethical discussions with regard to beginning of life issues.  
Second, the treatment meted out to an embryo in such cases depends on how an embryo is 
understood. In order to tackle the issue, either one could answer by referring back to when 
human life begins, or define the concept of person and see whether an embryo can qualify to be 
included in this definition.565 These two approaches will be dealt with in the next Chapter. 
However, the Warnock Committee566 claimed that it was possible to resolve the above questions 
without addressing them directly regarding when human life begins or the defining of an 
embryo as a person.567 The Committee claimed: 
Although the questions of when life or personhood begin appear to be questions of fact 
susceptible of straightforward answers, we hold that the answers to such questions in fact are 
complex amalgams of factual and moral judgements. Instead of trying to answer these 
questions directly we have therefore gone straight to the question of how it is right to treat 
the human embryo. We have considered what status ought to be accorded to the human 
embryo, and the answer we give must necessarily be in terms of ethical or moral principles 
(Warnock 1984, para 11.9).568 
The Committee also implied that their conclusion had come to a judgement on these matters. 
In the case of an embryo under research in vitro their conclusion was that: “A human embryo 
cannot be thought of as a person, or even as a potential person. It is simply a collection of cells 
which, unless it implants in a human uterine environment, has no potential for development. 
There is no reason therefore to accord these cells any protected status” (Warnock 1984, para 
11.15).569 The Committee further endorsed that the “more generally held position, however, is 
that though the human embryo is entitled to some added measure of respect beyond that 
                                                 
565 Cf. David Albert JONES, The Soul of the Embryo. An enquiry into the status of the human embryo in the 
Christian Tradition, Continuum, London 2004, 219. 
566 The Warnock Committee was established in July 1982 in order “To consider recent and potential 
developments in medicine and science related to human fertilisation and embryology; to consider what policies 
and safeguards should be applied, including consideration of the social, ethical and legal implications of these 
developments; and to make recommendations” (Warnock 1984, para 1.2). See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
SOCIAL SECURITY, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology, Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, London 1984, Reprint 1988, 4. Cf. “The Warnock Committee”, in: British Medical Journal 289 
(1984) 238-239; 238. 
567 Cf. JONES, The Soul of the Embryo…, 219. 
568 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, Report of the Committee…, 60. Emphasis in original. 
569 Ibid., 62. 
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accorded to other animal subjects, that respect cannot be absolute, and may be weighed against 
the benefits arising from research” (ibid).570 Nevertheless, the Warnock Committee 
recommended that experimentation can only be allowed prior to the emergence of the primitive 
streak, which “most authorities put this at about fifteen days after fertilisation. This marks the 
beginning of the individual development of the embryo” (Warnock 1984, para 11.22; emphasis 
added.).571 
In the field of Bioethics human dignity is invoked in such situations in which the worth of 
human beings is at stake, that is, when human beings are used, forced or injured. One could not 
use a human being as a thing or object because human dignity requires that they be treated as 
having intrinsic worth. But how does one acknowledge that human dignity is intrinsic to human 
beings? This is a fundamental question here because bioethical discussions regarding the 
beginning of life issues are centred on the question about the intrinsic worthiness or dignity of 
an embryo. Though the philosophical and theological foundations of Bioethics concur from 
different point of views, they result in a double agreement: They remind human beings of their 
responsibility towards the non-human as well as the special dignity of human life.572 
In reality, the concept of human dignity has been used in bioethical discussions especially with 
regard to issues concerning the beginning and end of life. Restricting ourselves only to 
beginning of life issues, one can see that the concept of human dignity has been used as a central 
criterion for the evaluation of controversial technologies. In Germany, for example, there is a 
frequent reference to the concept of human dignity as a normative principle made both in the 
ethical and legal debate on issues such as germ line gene therapy, surrogate motherhood, or 
embryo research.573 The research of biologists like Condic (see Chapter 4.2.1 above), attest to 
the beginning of human life as the “moment of conception.” Based on the inference by Kant 
that human dignity is intrinsic, one can conclude that human persons are in possession of this 
dignity from the very beginning of her or his life (i.e. from conception or fertilization).574 
Nevertheless, in the same breath one must also acknowledge that in the discussions on Bioethics 
when the arguments of Kant are used he does not totally forbid the use of other people as a 
means. That is to say, one may not exclusively use others “only as a means”. However: 
We must under all circumstances and always, even if we employ and “use” other people, see 
in them an end in themselves and treat them accordingly. The consequences for medical 
ethics are immediately clear. When conducting experiments there must always be – as we 
say today – a “therapeutic indication”, i.e. the patient with whom we conduct experiments 
must also have the therapeutic benefit of it. On the basis of this principle the production of 
human embryos for research would be against Kant’s moral imperative.575 
                                                 
570 Ibid., 62. Cf. JONES, The Soul of the Embryo…, 219. David Jones is of the opinion that based on the 
importance of the judgment of the Committee it would have been better if it tackled and inquired directly regarding 
the question of whether the embryo is an actual human being or when it becomes one. Cf. ibid. 
571 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, Report of the Committee…, 66. Cf. JONES, The Soul of 
the Embryo…, 225. 
572 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, Ethik des Lebens…, 226. 
573 BIRNBACHER, “Ambiguities…”, 107. 
574 Cf. CONDIC, “When Does Human Life Begin?...; 131. 
575 HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity…”, 98. 
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How far these arguments, coupled with a theological slant, play a role in theological arguments 
centred on human dignity will be taken up in their proper contexts in Parts II and III of this 
research respectively. 
For now, the reasons that reject an extensive recourse to the concept of human dignity in 
Bioethics needs to be explored. The opinion of Birnbacher in this regard is described here. He 
is of the opinion that the concept is sometimes used in an inflationary manner. The concept in 
these fields is irritating not only to Anglo-American observers but also in general.576 There are 
a few who claim in bioethical discussions that the term human dignity is an “empty formula” 
(Leerformel) without any clear content and which does not claim any general liability and others 
who deny this claim.577 On the outset, the problem can be attributed partly to the unclarities and 
ambiguities, to its “Leerformel” content and to its application which is merely rhetorical and 
opportunistic or a “conversation stopper”.578 Analyzing further, Birnbacher gives three reasons 
for an inflationary use of the concept of human dignity. 
The first reason is:  
[…] one gets the impression that the inherent emphasis and the inherent pathos of the concept 
is exploited simply in order to eschew the difficulties of giving rational arguments for moral 
and legal injunctions against unwelcomed practices. These difficulties cannot be 
underestimated. The fact that practices like surrogate motherhood and embryo research are 
rejected, more or less emotionally, by a great majority of the population - and, probably, by 
a majority of intellectuals –, is by itself not sufficient either to justify the moral judgment that 
they are inherently immoral or the penal sanctions imposed, e.g., by the German Embryonen-
schutzgesetz of 1990. By functioning as a “knock-down” argument the Menschenwürde 
argument offers an easy way out of this dilemma.579 
Second, there is a tendency of blurring all conceptual distinctions by using the human dignity 
arguments. For example, some authors use the concept of human dignity in a way that is 
coextensive with the principle of sanctity of life. Such use seems as if the protection of life were 
the only central concern of human dignity as in the case of Germ line Gene Therapy.580 
Third, and the most important reason, an extensive use of the concept of human dignity 
necessarily weakens the authority and moral emphasis of the concept. Given its important role 
to play, an extensive use of the concept of human dignity is stripped of its meaning and its 
normative force.581 
                                                 
576 Cf. BIRNBACHER, “Ambiguities…”, 107. 
577 Cf. ibid. Cf. also SCHOCKENHOFF, Ethik des Lebens…, 226. Lehmann is of the opinion that human dignity 
is in no way an empty formula. Cf. Karl LEHMANN, Zuversicht aus dem Glauben. Die Grundsatzreferate des 
Vorsitzenden der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz mit den Predigten der Eröffnungsgottesdienste, Herder, Freiburg 
i.Br. 2006, 388. 
578 BIRNBACHER, “Ambiguities…”, 107. Birnbacher in using the term “conversation stopper” is referring to 
Keenan’s article, Cf. KEENAN, “The Concept of Sanctity of Life…”, 10. See also Chapter 1.3 above regarding the 
Ambiguity of Language involved in the concept of human dignity. 
579 BIRNBACHER, “Ambiguities…”, 108-109. 
580 Birnbacher is giving here an example by Sebastian Poliwoda in his article. See Sebastian POLIWODA, 
“Keimbahntherapie und Ethik”, in: EthMed 4 (1992) 16-26. Birnbacher is of the opinion that the principle of 
sanctity of life and human dignity are confused rather than actually probing into the complex relation between 
human dignity and right to life,. He then gives an example of the case of suicide and euthanasia. According to him, 
although suicide and euthanasia are against the principle of sanctity of life, they are clearly compatible with human 
dignity. Cf. BIRNBACHER, “Ambiguities…”, 109.  
581 Cf. ibid. 
 Chapter 4: Bioethical Foundations of Human Dignity  109 
 
 
 
Birnbacher, therefore, suggests that in order to counteract the above three developments so that 
the concept of human dignity may not be rejected, “one is well advised to reduce the descriptive 
content of this normative concept to a central and undisputed core meaning that leaves less 
room for subjective interpretation and stands above the political disputes of the day”.582 
In agreement with Birnbacher, it is acknowledged that the concept of human dignity indeed has 
a role to play in Bioethics. As already mentioned, the concept also has a content (see Chapter 
1.4 above). The content entails certain minimal rights and one of it is the right to life. 
Further, the problem with the concept of human dignity is that it is not an absolute notion 
independent of the situation-bound interpretation. Although, its value may be called “absolute”, 
yet its interpretation can vary according to the situation. An example would illustrate this 
situation. In 1945, it would not have been against human dignity to put up a large family of 
refugees in a small room. However, today to do so would be against the principle of human 
dignity.583 Legal theoretician, Robert Alexy explains the reason for this change by making a 
distinction. According to him, human dignity is a principle and not an absolute rule.584 The 
principles of this kind, according to him, are “optimizing offers”, which are of universal 
character, having precedence over rules. Yet, they do not enjoy the definitive ambiguity of rules. 
They are vulnerable, can conflict with other principles and in need of concretization by the 
application of certain rules or laws. This problem is verified especially in biomedical cases.585 
Keeping this in mind, and without alluding to a religious sense, the working definition of human 
dignity in the field of Bioethics is stated once again, in order to clarify certain terms especially 
pertaining to the beginning of life. The proposed definition t reads: 
Independent of the sex, origin, country, society, class, caste, profession, religion, culture or 
family, every human individual, because of being human, has an inviolable intrinsic worth 
owing to his/her autonomy and endowed with reason which is recognized throughout one’s 
human life and respected but not granted; that cannot be lost, taken away, or damaged but 
can be disrespected and assaulted and is therefore subject to being defended and protected by 
human rights. 
From the foregoing discussions thus far, at this stage of the research, certain phrases in the 
above definition need clarification. The phrase “every human individual” includes also an 
embryo. Embryos are also included in the next phrase, namely, “his/her autonomy and endowed 
with reason”, because they are not potential persons devoid of autonomy and reason but persons 
with a potency though not manifested but contained in its very meaning as a human person. By 
the phrase, “recognized throughout one’s human life”, is meant independent of the controversy 
over the moment of animation, or a specified date (e.g., fourteen days or fifteen days after 
fertilization or when the primitive streak appears), embryos have inherent dignity and thus 
recognized from the very first moment of its existence. The last phrase which reads, “that cannot 
be lost, taken away, or damaged but can be disrespected and assaulted and is therefore subject 
to being defended and protected”, convey the meaning that embryos need to be respected while 
                                                 
582 Ibid. 
583 Cf. HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity…”, 102. 
584 Robert ALEXY, Theorie der Grundrechte, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1986, 95-97. 
585 Cf. HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity…”, 102. 
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not allowing a wilful destruction by means of experimentation on them. Rather such 
experiments are done in cases of providing a therapeutic treatment if and when necessary. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
Only human persons have human dignity. Hence, the question arises whether an embryo 
qualifies to be a human, a human person and whether it merits human dignity. Therefore, this 
question was treated in this Chapter which revolved around the individuality and personhood 
of an embryo. The questions that were consequently posed were whether an embryo can be 
regarded as a human, as an individual and as a person. To answer this question, the scientific 
perspective of the status of an embryo was first dealt, which would eventually help to discuss 
about its status from a metaphysical point of view. 
From a biological perspective, the conclusion is that an embryo is not any biological human 
cell but a form of human life with different dynamism, biochemical, and metabolic 
characteristics that is proper to a human organism. Based on scientific conclusion, the 
developing embryo is a human organism. However, few experts deny this fact.586 They hold on 
to the fact that an embryo is only a group of cells and not a human organism. However, one 
could perhaps prove that an embryo is a person based on the genetic-biological identity between 
it and the adult human. 
At a metaphysical level, the status of an embryo could be seen from two contradictory 
perspectives, “preformationism” and “epigenesis”. In the modern times, two other contradictory 
views are prevalent, namely, that by Singer, who holds that an embryo or a foetus does not have 
the right to life and Parfit, who considers the zygotes and foetuses are persons and therefore, 
have the right of life. The problem becomes even more complicated by those authors like 
Álvarez, who distinguish between three concepts, namely, “an individual of the homo sapiens 
species,” “human being” and “persons”. In order to answer these problems, the definition of 
person by Boethius was examined. It was concluded that what characterizes an individual is 
his/her actual individuality and not his/her potential indivisibility. So too, an embryo is an 
individual from the moment of conception. The twinning process that may occur at a later date 
is a question of potential indivisibility and the fact does not deny the individuality from the first 
moment of its conception. With regard to the “rational nature” and all the characteristics proper 
to humans in the definition of Boethius, one can say that the very fact that embryos have a 
rational human nature and not another – even though it may not be manifested externally or 
even when it is impossible that it will ever be manifested – are still human beings. Thus, one 
can derive from the definition of Boethius that an embryo is an individual substance of a rational 
nature and therefore a person. It is also important to note that the absolute value and absolute 
protection of an embryo does not depend on the embryo’s fulfilling an ontological definition of 
“person” but understood in the moral sense. According to some other authors, there is a claim 
that in order to be included in the realm of personhood, one has to have characteristics like self-
consciousness, autonomy and rationality, which is a functionalist-actualist proposal. A counter-
argument is that when these characteristics are used to determine the moral status of an embryo, 
it leaves an embryo in a totally unprotected situation. Such moral system imposes the will of 
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the strong on the weak. Thus, from a metaphysical level, it was concluded that one could 
recognize the status of an embryo as a human person. 
Finally, having answered the above questions from a biological and metaphysical level, the next 
question whether one can invoke human dignity as a normative principle in the field of 
Bioethics and thereby acknowledge the inherent dignity of an embryo was taken up. Although, 
there were disagreements from some quarters, it was shown how this principle of human dignity 
can still be acknowledged of an embryo. In order to reduce the inflationary use of the concept 
of human dignity it was suggested that the normative concept should be restored to a central 
and undisputed core meaning while reducing the descriptive content. The discussion ended with 
the clarification of the working definition of human dignity. Although the concept of human 
dignity is based upon an anthropological and a religious creed and is not a legal one, yet it is 
used sometimes as such and forms as it were as a frame work reference in ethics. It is to be 
noted that principles that are employed in ethics are equally valid in Medical Ethics too.587
                                                 
587 Cf. Traugott KOCH, „Menschenwürde als das Menschenrecht - Zur Grundlegung eines theologischen 
Begriffs des Rechts“, in: ZEE 35 (1991) 96-112. Cf. HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity…”, 
102 &105. 
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C H A P T E R  5  
WHEN IS A SOUL INFUSED IN AN EMBRYO? 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the modern world, one can span the scientific advancement ranging from treatment of 
infertility through in vitro fertilization or the possibility of improvement of health, such as using 
embryonic stem cells in treating Parkinson and Diabetes mellitus. In this field of medical 
research and advancement, some scientists were justifying the destruction of human embryos. 
For some of them an embryo is a cell or a group of cells, or just a biomaterial and nothing else. 
As though encouraging the scientists, some philosophers were justifying that an embryo is not 
yet a human being or at least not yet a human person, depending on their stage of development. 
It can be perceived that the motivation behind the recognition of an embryo as a person is not 
something that is disinterested or impartial.588 
Therefore, the questions arises as to how one should treat the human embryo in the wake of 
medical advancement and the possibility of manipulating them in a laboratory? Respect, care, 
protection and right to life (which is based on human dignity and especially at its beginning) of 
an embryo is partially and closely a philosophical question. In this sense, it is connected with 
the theory of ensoulment. Thus, the motivation behind the question is understandable primarily 
from its practical outcome, in the context stated above. 
Therefore, the interest in this Chapter is to answer the question: Is an embryo a human being in 
the sense of possessing a rational soul? And if so, when exactly is the rational soul infused into 
the body? In other words, is an embryo an “it”, or just “a product”, or “an entity”, or a group of 
cells and nothing else or a human? 
5.2 STATING THE PROBLEM: WHEN EXACTLY IS THE RATIONAL SOUL 
INFUSED INTO THE BODY? 
Authors like Ford, who base themselves on Aristotle and medieval scholasticism, claimed that 
an embryo is a “human in potency”.589 For Aristotle, writing in the context of matter and form 
(De anima: “Now there is one class of existent term, firstly, matter [ὕλη] …; secondly, shape 
or form [μορφή]”590) says: “Matter is identical with potentiality, form with actuality”.591 In the 
case of living beings, the body is the matter and soul is the form (De anima: “for the body 
[Σομα] is […] matter […] soul [ψυχή] is the form of a natural body”592). Aristotle also taught 
that: “The soul […] is the actuality of the body”.593 Thus, according to him, “the soul is cause 
and origin of the living body”.594 He also argued that a certain organization was necessary in 
                                                 
588 Cf. BUECHE, “Destroying Human Embryos…”, 87-90. Cf. also MEANA, “On the Status of Human 
Embryos…”, 103. 
589 Cf. FORD, When Did I Begin?..., 19-43. Cf. MEANA, “On the Status of Human Embryos…”, 103. 
590 ARISTOTLE, De anima, Book II, Chap.1, 412a 7-8. English tr. IDEM, De anima, with tr. intro. and notes by 
R. D. HICKS, University Press, Cambridge 1907, 49. Addition by author. 
591 ARISTOTLE, De anima, Book II, Chap.1, 412a 10. English tr. IDEM, De anima…, 49. 
592 IDEM, De anima, Book II, Chap.1, 412a 16-19. English tr. IDEM, De anima…, 49. Addition by author. 
593 IDEM, De anima, Book II, Chap.1, 412a 21. English tr. IDEM, De anima…, 49 & 51. Cf. BAUMGARTNER et 
al., „Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Philosophische Aspekte…“, 369. 
594 ARISTOTLE, De anima, Book II, Chap.4, 415b 8. English tr. IDEM, De anima…, 65. Cf. BAUMGARTNER et 
al., „Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Philosophische Aspekte…“, 369. 
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order that matter would receive the form. In the case of human conception, Aristotle postulated 
for a type of progressive reception of form. The woman provides the material principle and 
could not receive a sensitive or intellective soul right from the beginning, although they were 
in potency to receive the substantial form (soul) contributed by the male semen.595 
Aristotle believed that male foetuses were animated by a soul earlier than when compared to a 
female. Aristotle writes in his History of Animals, Book VII, Chap.3, “If the child is a male, a 
movement is usually felt on the right side of the groin, in about forty days; if a female, the 
movement occurs on the left side, in about ninety days.”596 Following this argument, Aristotle 
held for a difference in animation times for males and females due to the perceived fundamental 
differences between them. On the one hand, he believed that males were more active than 
females and therefore were quicker to develop and obtain a soul on the fortieth day after 
conception. On the other hand, females were perceived as physically and intellectually inferior 
to males. This led him to the conclusion that the process of ensoulment took a longer time to 
complete in females, which is the ninetieth day after conception.597 
Meana commenting on the Aristotelian theory says: 
This epigenetic theory adopted in the theological field by some, among them Thomas 
Aquinas, led them to postulate that the human soul could only be infused by God to the fetus 
after 40 days for males and after 80 or 90 days for females. This doctrine forms the foundation 
for the denial of the personhood of the embryo by some contemporary theologians.598 
Thus, the question: “When does an Embryo become a person?” hangs on a very important 
foundation, namely: When exactly is the rational soul infused into an embryo? There are four 
possibilities as to when a human being may be said to acquire a rational soul, or in other words, 
four possibilities as to when the life of a human may be said to begin or what is known as the 
individuation of an embryo. The human being may acquire a soul: 
                                                 
595 Cf. ARISTOTLE, De generatione animalium, Book II, Chap.3, 736a 35 – 737a 24. For the English tr. see 
IDEM, Generation of Animals, tr. by A.L. PECK, William Heinemann Ltd, London 1963, 166-175. Cf. MEANA, 
“On the Status of Human Embryos…”, 103. See also JOHNSTONE, “The Human Embryo…”, 419-420. Cf. also 
Joseph F. DONCEEL, “Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization”, in: TS 31 (1970) 76-105; 76-77. 
596 ARISTOTLE, History of Animals, tr. by Richard CRESSWELL, George Bell & Sons, London 1883, 183. 
597 Cf. Scott GILBERT/Ann TYLER/Emily ZACKIN, Bioethics and the New Embryology. Springboards for 
Debate, Sinauer Associates & W.H. Freeman and Company, Sunderland, Massachusetts 2005, 34. Cf. Gerald 
BONNER, “Abortion and Early Christian Thought”, in: John H. CHANNER (ed.), Abortion and the Sanctity of Human 
Life, Paternoster Press, Great Britain, Exeter 1985, 93-122; 97-98. 
598 MEANA, “On the Status of Human Embryos…”, 103. Thomas was claiming here to say that the soul was 
created by God and not generated by the parents. See AQUINAS, Commentary on the Sentences, Book III, 
Distinction.3, Q.5, art. 2, solutio. Here Thomas is citing ARISTOTLE, History of Animals, Book VII, Chap.3. See 
fn.596 above. Cf. JOHNSTONE, “The Human Embryo…”, 420 at fn.4. Cf. also Karl LEHMANN, „Vom Anfang des 
Menschseins. Zur Grundfrage in der heutigen bioethischen Diskussion“, in: Bernhard NACKE/Ernst STEPHAN (ed.), 
Das Ungeteiltsein des Menschen. Stammzellforschung und Präimplantationsdiagnostik, Matthias-Grünewald-
Verl., Mainz 2002, 216-221; 219. 
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1. at the moment of conception 
2. some time between conception and birth 
3. at the moment of birth 
4. some time after birth.599 
The first two views have a long history in the Church. Consequently, there are two theories 
corresponding to these two views. The first theory holds for a “mediate or delayed animation”, 
i.e., ensoulment after a period after fertilization, or in other words, the human soul is not infused 
at the moment of conception, but at some later point in the process of development. The second 
theory is that of “immediate animation”, i.e., immediate ensoulment at fertilization, or in other 
words, the human soul is infused at the moment of conception.600 In the following sections, 
these two theories will be analyzed. 
The view that the human being began to exist immediately after birth was associated with Stoics 
and the Platonists. Similarly, the view that the soul entered long after birth prevailed most 
notably as the toleration of infanticide, although they did not understand it in the sense of a 
delayed acquisition of the soul, rather for them children, women, slaves and barbarians did not 
have the legal or ethical status that depended on free citizenship.601 These later views continue 
to exist even in modern times.602 
5.3 THEORY OF MEDIATE OR DELAYED ANIMATION 
In this section, the theory of delayed animation will be dealt with from a historical perspective 
until recent times as well as from a biological perspective. 
5.3.1 Historical Development in the Catholic Church 
With regard to the moment of animation, there is support from tradition as envisaged by some 
theologians. A distinction was made between the unformed and the formed foetus from the 
earliest centuries. This distinction stemmed from the Septuagint translation of Ex 21,22.603 
According to Jerome and Augustine, abortion is not homicide until the scattered elements are 
formed into a body.604 Augustine says, “because the great question about the soul is not to be 
hastily decided by unargued and rash judgment, the law does not provide that the act pertains 
                                                 
599 JONES, The Soul of the Embryo…, 109. Reiter speaks of six different theories about the question of the 
beginning of life. They are: (1) at fertilization, (2) end of Nidation/implantation, (3) after the possibility of twinning 
(4) development of brain (5) sometime during pregnancy or with the birth, or (6) the first year of a baby’s life 
when self-consciousness and possibility of freely choosing is attained. See REITER, „Bioethik…“, 15-17. 
600 Cf. JOHNSTONE, “The Human Embryo…”, 423. 
601 Cf. JONES, The Soul of the Embryo…, 109-110. 
602 Cf. REITER, „Bioethik…“, 17. 
603 Cf. PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 52. See also Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 5. The 
Septuagint translates unformed foetus as μὴ ἐξεικονισμένον and formed foetus as ἐξεικονισμένον.  Although 
there is a dispute regarding the “manipulation of the original text”, yet insofar as taking the life of a formed foetus 
is unequivocally equated in the text, it is important to know the difference. Cf. ibid.  
604 Cf. John Thomas NOONAN, “An Almost Absolute Value in History”, in: John Thomas NOONAN (ed.), The 
Morality of Abortion. Legal and Historical Perspectives, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1970, 1-59; 15. Cf. 
PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 52. 
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to homicide, for there cannot yet be said to be a live soul in a body that lacks sensation when it 
is not formed in flesh and so not yet endowed with sense.”605 
Later, Gratian in his canonical collection (1140) asserted that the soul was not infused until the 
foetus was formed.606  
Thomas claimed that during the first few weeks of pregnancy there was no human being. 
Following Aristotle, Thomas held that at the moment of conception there originated a vegetative 
organism which would slowly evolve into a sentient organism and finally into a rational 
organism, a real human being, a theory that was already mentioned as “epigenesis” (see Chapter 
4.2.2 above). 607 
Thomas mentioned several times about the delayed animation.608 A quotation from Summa 
theologiae states: 
It is in this way that through many generations and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate 
substantial form, both in man and other animals […]. We conclude therefore that the 
intellectual soul is created by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at the same 
time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being corrupted.609 
Thomas was of the opinion that although an embryo was alive, owing to its expression of life 
in terms of growth and nutrition, yet the life of an embryo is not human life and the development 
is not something coming from within an embryo but through the semen. Perhaps, he thought 
that the semen remained present until an embryo was informed by the soul.610 Thomas says: 
This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, 
is, as it were, a certain movement of this soul itself […]. Consequently there is no need for 
this active force to have an actual organ; but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which 
is frothy, as is attested by its whiteness. [...] the active force is in the semen of the male, as 
the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal, ii. 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. 
In this matter the vegetable soul exists from the very beginning […]. This matter therefore is 
transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by 
the sensitive soul […]. And after the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle in 
the semen […]. As to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the 
semen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes.611 
                                                 
605 “quoniam magna de anima quaestio non est praecipitanda indiscussae temeritate sententiae ideo lex noluit 
ad homicidium pertinere, quia nondum dici potest anima uiua in eo corpore quod sensu caret, si talis est in carne 
nondum formata et ideo nondum sensibus praedita.” AUGUSTINE, On Exodus 21.80, CSEL 28(2).148. Cf. 
NOONAN, “An Almost Absolute Value in History…”, 15. 
606 Cf. PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 52. Gratian does not hold someone a murder who aborts 
“before the soul is infused into the body”. See GRATIAN, Decretum Gratiani, c.8, C.XXXII, q.2. Cf. GONSALVES, 
How did I begin?..., 15. 
607 Cf. DONCEEL, “Immediate Animation…”; 78. Cf. PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 52-53. Thomas 
maintained “the doctrine of the three souls”. The virtus formative is contained in the male seed, which by joining 
to the feminine matter, renders it suitable to receive the vegetative soul. After this the vegetative and sensitive soul 
are “substituted”. Finally, when the embryo has arrived at the proper point, the virtus creative of God infuses a 
soul that is at once, vegetative, sensitive and rational. Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 14.  
608 For instance, in his Commentary on Sentences, 2, 18, 2, 3, Questiones disputate de potentia, 3, 9, ad 9, 
Summa contra gentiles, II, 87-89. Cf. DONCEEL, “Immediate Animation…”, 78.  
609 ST I, 118, 2, ad.2. English tr. from AQUINAS, The “Summa Theologica”. Part I. QQ. CIII-CXIX, op. cit., 
193. 
610 Cf. JONES, The Soul of the Embryo…, 122-123. 
611 ST I, 118, 1, ad.3-4. English tr. from AQUINAS, The “Summa Theologica”. Part I. QQ. CIII-CXIX, op. cit., 
189-190. Additions in original. Thomas is citing ARISTOTLE, De generatione animalium, Book II, Chap.3. See 
Chapter 5.2 at fn. 595 above. Cf. JONES, The Soul of the Embryo…, 120. 
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Thomas insisted that the human embryo must have a certain degree of organization before it 
could receive a rational soul. The beginning of a human shape and the essential organs should 
be present to become the seat of a rational soul. God creates and infuses a rational soul when 
there is adequate organization appropriate enough to receive it. One can see that Thomas is 
adhering here to the hylomorphic theory.612 
Following Thomas, the Catholic Church officially adopted the hylomorphic conception of 
human nature while condemning all forms of Platonic or Cartesian dualism. The hylomorphic 
theory was officially accepted at the Council of Vienne in 1312. The Council defined in the 
following way: 
With the approval of the holy Council we reject as erroneous and contrary to the truth of the 
Catholic faith any doctrine or opinion which rashly asserts that the substance of the rational 
and intellectual soul is not truly and of itself (per se) the form of the human body, or which 
calls this into doubt. In order that the truth of the pure faith may be known to all, and the part 
to error barred, we define that from now on whoever presumes to assert, defend, or 
obstinately hold that the rational and intellectual soul is not of itself and essentially the form 
of the human body, is to be censured as heretic.613 
Thereafter, based on this definition the Church forbade the faithful to baptize any premature 
birth that did not show at least some human shape or outline. 
The theologians at the Council of Trent, while making a distinction between the virginal 
conception of Christ and the ordinary natural course, asserted that normally no human embryo 
could be informed by a human soul except after a certain period. Following the Council, the 
Catechism of the Council of Trent (Roman Catechism) in 1566 teaches clearly about the 
delayed animation in the context of the Incarnation while explaining the Third Article of the 
Creed:  
But what surpasses the order of nature and human comprehension is, that as soon as the 
Blessed Virgin assented to the announcement of the Angel in these words, […] the most 
sacred body of Christ was immediately formed, and to it was united a rational soul enjoying 
the use of reason; and thus in the same instant of time He was perfect God and perfect man. 
That this was the astonishing and admirable work of the Holy Ghost cannot be doubted; for 
according to the order of nature the rational soul is united to the body only after a certain 
lapse of time.614 
                                                 
612 Cf. DONCEEL, “Immediate Animation…”, 79. 
613 DH 902. See Heinrich DENZINGER, Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen 
Lehrentscheidungen, hg. v. Peter HÜNERMANN, 43. Aufl., erweiterte Neuausgabe, Herder, Freiburg i. 
Br./Basel/Wien 2010, 364. Quotation in English taken from Josef NEUNER/Jacques DUPIUS, The Christian Faith 
in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church, ed. by Jacques DUPIUS, 7th Revised and Enlarged Edition, 
Theological Publications in India, Bangalore 2004, No. 405, 169-170. Cf. DONCEEL, “Immediate Animation…”, 
85-88; 86. Cf. also Joseph F. DONCEEL, “Liberal Catholic’s View”, in: Robert E. HALL (ed.), Abortion in a 
Changing World, Vol. 1, Columbia University Press, New York and London 1970, 39-45; 40. 
614 The Catechism of the Council of Trent for Parish Priests. Issued by Order of Pope Pius V, tr. into English 
by John A. MCHUGH/Charles J. CALLAN, Joseph F. Wagner Inc., London, 1923, 43. Emphasis added. The Latin 
version reads: “[...] cum servato naturae ordine, nullum corpus, nisi intra praescriptum temporis spatium, hominis 
anima informali queat.” See Catechismus romanus ex decreto Concilii Tridentinae et Pii Quinti jussu primum 
editus, Louvain 1662, 36. Cf. DONCEEL, “Immediate Animation…”, 89; Cf. Thomas A. SHANNON/Allan B. 
WOLTER, “Reflections on the Moral Status of the Pre-Embryo,” in TS 51 (1990) 603-626, 604 at fn. 4. Cf. 
PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 49. 
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Later, the Bull Effraenatam that was published by Pius Sixtus V in 1588 reserved to the Holy 
See the excommunication of all those who had in any way whatsoever brought, “an abortion or 
the expulsion of an immature fetus, whether animated or not animated, whether formed or not 
formed”.615 
The Bull Sedes apostolica of Gregory XIV in 1591 explained that the severe legislation of his 
predecessor had not brought about the desired results and threatened the eternal salvation of 
many who are unable or unwilling to send their petitions for absolution to Rome. Hence, the 
Pope deemed it preferable: “where no homicide or no animated fetus is involved, not to punish 
more strictly than the sacred canons or civil legislation does”.616 
Later, the Roman Ritual issued in 1617 and its successive editions, which remained unchanged 
until 1895, gave the formula: “Nobody enclosed in the mother's womb should be baptized. But 
should the infant thrust out its head and should there be danger of death, let it be baptized on 
the head But if it thrusts out some other limb, which shows some vital movement, let it be 
baptized on this limb, if there is imminent danger.”617 The Ritual prescribed that baptism be 
administered in such critical circumstances only if either the head or some limb of the foetus 
shows, and only if this limb gives a sign of life, only after “quickening”. Unorganized foetuses 
are not to be baptized.618 
In the next development that followed, it is seen that the Holy Office, on April 5, 1713, in reply 
to a question gave the following answer: “In the case under consideration (the baptism of an 
aborted fetus), if there is a reasonable foundation for admitting that the fetus is animated by a 
rational soul, then it may and must be baptized conditionally. If, however, there is no reasonable 
foundation, it may by no means be baptized.”619 
Alphonsus Liguori (1696–1787) warns with regard to baptism that “not every lump of flesh 
should be baptized which lack the adequate arrangement of organs. Since, for him it was a 
universally accepted fact that the soul is not infused into the body before the latter is sufficiently 
formed. In that case it can only be baptized if it shows some kind of vital movement, as 
                                                 
615 As quoted in DONCEEL, “Immediate Animation …”, 89. Emphasis added by author. The original Latin 
version reads: “[...] qui.. .abortus [sic], seu foetus immaturi, tam animati, quam inanimati, formati, vel informis 
ejectionem procuraverint.” See Bullarum privilegiorum ac diplomatum Romanorum pontificum amplissima 
collectio, 5/1, ed. by Charles COCQUELINES, Rome 1751, 26a. Cf. PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 49. 
616 As quoted in DONCEEL, “Immediate Animation …”, 89. Latin version reads: “[...] utilius censentes, ubi nec 
de homicidio, nec de animatu [sic] foetu agitur poenas non imponere durius iis quae per sacros cañones et leges 
prophanas sunt inflictae.” See Bullarum privilegiorum…, 275b. Emphasis added in English tr. Cf. PODIMATTAM, 
Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 50. 
617 As quoted in DONCEEL, “Immediate Animation…”, 89-90. Latin version reads: “Nemo in utero matris 
clausus baptizari debet. Sed si infans caput emiserit, et periculum mortis immineat, baptizetur in capite[...].  At si 
aliud membrum emiserit, quod vitalem indicet motum, in ilio, si periculum impendeat, baptizetur.” See Rituale 
Romanum Pauli V Pontificis Maximi Jussu Editum, Ex Officiana Plantiniana, Antverpiae 1617, 7-8. Cf. 
PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 50. 
618 Rituale romanum Pauli V…, 7-8. Cf. DONCEEL, “Immediate Animation…”, 90. Cf. PODIMATTAM, Medical 
Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 50. 
619 As quoted in DONCEEL, “Immediate Animation …”, 90. Emphasis added. SACRA CONGREGATIO DE 
PROPAGANDA FIDE, Collectanea Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide: seu Decreta, instructiones, 
rescripta pro apostolicis missionibus, Vol.1, No. 282, Rome, 1907, 92. Cf. PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 
4)…, 50. 
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prescribed by the Roman Ritual.”620 Elsewhere Alphonsus writes: “On the other hand, some are 
mistaken who say that the fetus is ensouled from the first moment of its conception, since the 
fetus is certainly not animated before it is formed […].”621 
Several theologians, in the centuries that followed Alphonsus, held or favoured the theory of 
delayed animation.622 Four of the most prominent names among them will be examined. The 
first among them was Désiré-Joseph Mercier (1851-1926), who served as the first president of 
the Superior Institute of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Leuven and who later became 
the Cardinal-Archbishop of Malines. At that time, the immediate ensoulment theory was 
already advanced in the field of Theology. Although there was a high probability of this theory 
to be true, still Mercier was one of the first theologians to incline towards the theory of delayed 
animation. He taught that it is certainly possible that the rational soul is created at the moment 
of conception and is basis of the embryonic life.623  
Nevertheless, it is also possible that God creates the soul during the process of embryonic 
life, sequentially, first as a principle of organic life, then a sensitive soul, which gives 
perfection to the embryo that it is capable of being informed (by the soul). Both opinions can 
be supported, but in our opinion, the latter is the more likely.624 
Thus, Mercier’s main argument was in favour of a delayed animation that results from the 
Aristotelian Hylomorphism. That is to say, that only after the matter is sufficiently predisposed 
can it be informed by the soul. According to Mercier, it is impossible to determine that point in 
time in which an embryo may have reached this stage. Therefore, he still believed that a 
Thomistic answer to this question might be the greatest probability.625 
According to Thomas, the course the foetus takes before its transformation into a human being 
follows first the principle of the lower stages of life, such as a vegetative life and then a sensitive 
life. Mercier then explains the sequences that follow: “When the organism is finally led to the 
dispositions which is necessary so that it (the organism) can be animated by a rational soul; that 
is where God’s workings come into play and places the rational soul in the body (and) so 
                                                 
620 As quoted in DONCEEL, “Immediate Animation…”; 91. Emphasis in the original. Latin version reads: “cum 
ubique receptum sit, non prius infundí animam corpori, quam istud formatum fuerit; et tunc, ut baptizetur, 
requiritur ut indicet aliquem motum vitalem, prout praescribit Rituale Romanum”. Alphonsi de LIGORIS, 
Theologia moralis 6, Bassani, 1779, tract. 2, No. 124, 107: Emphasis in Latin original. Cf. PODIMATTAM, Medical 
Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 53. 
621 As quoted in DONCEEL, “Immediate Animation…”, 91. Emphasis in original. Latin version reads: “E 
converso, male dixerunt aliqui, foetum in primo instanti quo concipitur animari, quia foetus certe non animatur 
antequam sit formatus.” Alphonsi DE LIGORIS, Theologia moralis 3, tract. 4, No. 394, 159: Cf. PODIMATTAM, 
Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 53. 
622 Cf. Hyacinth M. HERING, “De tempore animationis foetus humani”, in: Ang 28 (1951) 18-29; 18. Cf. 
DONCEEL, “Immediate Animation…”, 91. Cf. PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 53. 
623 Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 138-139. 
624 „Aber es ist auch möglich, dass die Seele von Gott erst im Laufe des embryonalen Lebens geschaffen wird, 
nachdem der Reihe nach zuerst ein Prinzip des organischen Lebens, dann eine sensitive Seele dem Embryo die 
Vollkommenheit gegeben haben, die sie fähig waren, ihm mitzuteilen. Beide Meinungen können behauptet 
werden; aber nach unserer Ansicht ist die letztere die wahrscheinlichere.“ Désiré-Joseph MERCIER, „Das 
Verstandes- oder Vernunftleben“, in: Désiré-Joseph MERCIER (Hg.), Psychologie, Bd. 2, Kempten/München 1907, 
340. As quoted in HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 139. Tr. by author. 
625 Cf. ibid. 
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becomes the principle of each of the subject’s activities, that, for the subject, this becomes the 
only source of life”.626 
The human being thus follows a natural course of things to complete their specific development. 
However, they are not immediately attained. Everything occurs within a time scale as to when 
their assets are actuated during which they undergo various intermediate states.627 Mercier 
clarifies: 
The body is designed in stages and in the organism, as the organization progresses, first ‘life’ 
occurs, and then the power of senses comes into being under the influence of the appropriate 
operating principles. Each of these principles will stop when the other takes its place, as the 
latter by its unity contains the effectiveness of the previous principle, which makes the 
continuance of the former useless.628 
Mercier thus observed that the above speculative view of successive replacement of stages is 
confirmed through the knowledge of embryology available at that time, namely, that the 
fertilization processes constitute a simple cell division and only gradually develops into a more 
complex being before even one can perceive any movement.629 
The movement itself is preceded by the manifestation of the sensory activity so that the 
ontogeny morphologically and physiologically represents itself as a process of development 
from the indefinite to the definite, from the organic to sensitive life, as the brilliant thinkers 
in the 13th Century had already anticipated.630 
With this above presentation, in which the Thomistic animation concept of modern embryology 
not only does not preclude, but on the contrary makes it conspicuous and leaves Mercier to 
accept a delayed animation without providing any further arguments.631 
The above stance continued to be held among theologians. The Sacred Congregation of Studies 
in 1914 confirmed their stance when it offered twenty-four theses as guidance for the study of 
philosophy in Catholic seminaries and universities. Among these, thesis XV states that the 
human soul, which is created by God, “may be infused into a subject that is sufficiently 
                                                 
626 „Wenn der Organismus dann endlich bis zu den Dispositionen hingeführt ist, welche erforderlich sind, damit 
er von einer vernünftigen Seele belebt werde, so tritt die Tätigkeit Gottes dazwischen und schafft die vernünftige 
Seele in den Körper hinein das einzige Prinzip jeder Tätigkeit des Subjektes zu sein, dass sie in ihm die einzige 
Quelle des Lebens wird.“ MERCIER, „Das Verstandes- oder Vernunftleben…“, 341. As quoted in HACK, Der Streit 
um die Beseelung…, 139. Tr. by author. 
627 Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 139. 
628 „Der Körper gestaltet sich stufenweise; und in dem Masse, als die Organisation fortschreitet, tritt in ihm 
zunächst das Leben hervor, dann die Sinneskraft unter dem Einfluss entsprechender tätigen Prinzipien. Jedes dieser 
Prinzipien hört dann auf, wenn das andere an seine Stelle tritt, da dieses, indem es in seiner Einheit die Wirksamkeit 
des vorhergehenden Prinzips enthalt, dessen Fortdauer nutzlos macht.“ MERCIER, „Das Verstandes- oder 
Vernunftleben…“, 341. As quoted in HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 139. Tr. by author. 
629 Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 140. 
630 „[D]ie Bewegung selbst geht den Bekundungen der Sinnestätigkeit voraus, so dass morphologisch und 
physiologisch die Ontogenese sich darstellt als ein Vorgang der Entwicklung vom Unbestimmten zum 
Bestimmten, vom organischen zum sensitiven Leben, so wie es die genialen Denker im 13. Jahrhundert vorgeahnt 
hatten.“ MERCIER, „Das Verstandes- oder Vernunftleben…“, 342. As quoted in HACK, Der Streit um die 
Beseelung…, 139. Tr. by author. 
631 Cf. ibid., 140. 
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disposed”.632 The 13th thesis explains the meaning of sufficient disposition of the subject: “In 
living beings [...] the substantial form, which is known as the soul, requires an organic 
disposition, that is, heterogeneous parts”.633 That is to say, that visible characteristics like that 
of heterogeneous parts in the growing embryo were necessary in order that the soul may inform. 
Thus from the official side of the Church, Mercier’s reasoning was explicitly confirmed. 
Implicitly too this strengthened the position of the exponents of delayed animation, although 
they were not expressly supported. 634 
In the years that followed, a Dominican named Dominikus Prümmer (1866-1931) published the 
first edition of the Handbook of Moral Theology.635 Influenced by his studies at the Faculty of 
Philosophy in Leuven it is not surprising that the neo-Thomism decisively influenced his 
attitude in the animation theory insofar as he found the Thomistic doctrine of delayed animation 
preferable. He explained in his Manual about what is required for treating the moral problem 
of abortion. There he makes a distinction between the fetus animatus and fetus inanimatus.636 
He acknowledged that some Fathers of the Church would have represented a mediate animation 
and found wide support in today’s physiology. However, based on Aristotle, the doctrine 
defended by many older theologians and almost all scholastics show far more consistently the 
philosophical standpoint of soul as the substantial form of the body. For them, the infusion of 
the rational soul into an embryo could not be possible before it is sufficiently formed and 
thereby capable of maintaining its substantial form.637 An embryo prior to the 40th or 80th day – 
the dates themselves going back to the book of Leviticus in which it is mentioned about the 
cleansing instructions of a pregnant woman – admittedly possesses an independent life, but this 
life principle that animates before these dates are only vegetative or sensitive nature.638 
Moreover, one finds also the distinction between animated and unanimated foetus in Ex 21, 22. 
Besides, it would be better to accept a delayed animation especially in cases where in the first 
weeks of pregnancy miscarriages occur as a common phenomenon. If an immediate animation 
had occurred then the number of children who were dying without baptism would be at least 
ten times higher.639 As a consolation to the incompatibility of the two animation theories, after 
having pointed out all the facts, Prümmer concludes that the foetus in any case is animated 
                                                 
632 As quoted in DONCEEL, “Immediate Animation…”, 90-91. Emphasis added. Latin version reads: “Per se 
subsistit anima humana, quae, cum subiecto sufficienter disposito potest infundi, a Deo creatur”. SACRA 
STUDIORUM CONGREGATIO, “Theses Quaedam, in Doctrina Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Contentae, et a Philosophiae 
Magistris Propositae, Adprobantur”, in: AAS 6 (1914) 383-386; 385. Cf. SHANNON/WOLTER, “Reflections on the 
Moral Status…”, 604; Cf. PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 50. 
633 As quoted in DONCEEL, “Immediate Animation…”, 91. Emphasis added. Latin version reads: “In viventibus 
[...] forma substantialis, animae nomine designata, requirit organicam dispositionem, seu partes heterogéneas.” 
SACRA STUDIORUM CONGREGATIO, “Theses Quaedam, in Doctrina Sancti Thomae Aquinatis…” 385. Cf. 
PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 50. 
634 Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 140. 
635 Dominikus PRÜMMER, Handbook of Moral Theology, P.J. Kennedy & Sons, New York 1957. The Latin 
original edition: IDEM, Manuale theologiae moralis secundum principia S. Thomae Aquinatis, Bd. 2, Freiburg i. 
Br.2 1923. 
636 Cf. PRÜMMER, Manuale theologiae…, 125. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung des Menschen…, 140-
141. 
637 Cf. PRÜMMER, Manuale theologiae…, 125. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 141. 
638 Cf. PRÜMMER, Manuale theologiae…, 126. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 141. 
639 Cf. PRÜMMER, Manuale theologiae…, 126. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 141. For the 
distinction between animated and unanimated foetus in Ex 21,22 see Chapter 5.3.1 at fn. 603 above. 
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before birth, a fact that had already been confirmed by the Propositions of Innocent XI in 
1679.640 
Tobias Hack, a German Moral Theologian, observes and concludes that in spite of the 
controversy over the animation theory, and although the 1917 Code of Canon Law had 
abolished the distinction between animated and unanimated foetus, Prümmer’s view, even in 
1936 edition of his book (with some additions), had not changed in this regard. This impression 
is further reinforced against the background that although theology and canon law no longer 
distinguishes between the animated fetus and unanimated fetus, Prümmer still held on to his 
theory. Apparently, Prümmer does not admit a function of the Codex, which goes beyond its 
importance as Canon Law, whereas other authors would consider it as an authentic expression 
of church doctrine.641 
Another Dominican who represented the delayed animation from the school of Leuven was 
Benedikt Merkelbach (1871-1942). In his Appendix to the book Quaestiones de Embryologia 
et de Ministratione Baptismatis, which was published in 1927, Merkelbach speaks about the 
question of how the semen before fertilization could be compared to the fertilized egg.642 He 
attests to the semen a higher ethical significance in comparison to the zygote, because it is the 
semen, which would in any case more or less concern itself with the developing human.643 The 
sole reason for not allowing the destruction of an embryo or the fertilized egg is not that it may 
already be disposed to have a rational soul. On the other hand, it is because such an intervention 
would prevent the procreation of a human. This is the reason that the representatives of delayed 
animation too disapproved of such an act even at an early gestational stage. In principle, as 
confirmed and considered by Thomas, this argument seems to apply to the semen as well; as a 
prospective homo in potentia.644 
Merkelbach himself discussed the problem of animation within the context of baptism of the 
immature foetus. He points out that almost all medieval authors who followed Thomas assumed 
a delayed animation. They based themselves on the fact that matter must be adequately 
predisposed for receiving the form.645 One can confirm this by the observation of gradually 
increasing organization of an embryo insofar as initially only nutrition intake and growth is 
concerned, followed by a sensitive function and then finally the intellective phenomena.646 The 
argument of Merkelbach as a plausible judgment here shows how he deliberately avoided 
                                                 
640 Cf. PRÜMMER, Manuale theologiae…, 126. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 141. 
641 „Offenbar gesteht Prümmer dem Codex über seine Funktion als kirchliches Gesetzbuch hinaus nicht jene 
weitreichende Bedeutung zu, die ihm etwa andere Autoren zubilligen wollen, die ihn als authentischen Ausdruck 
kirchlicher Lehre betrachten.“ HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 142. 
642. Cf. ibid., 151. 
643 Cf. Benedikt MERKELBACH, Quaestiones de Embryologia et de ministratione baptismatis, Lüttich 1927, 85. 
Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 151. 
644 Cf. MERKELBACH, Quaestiones de Embryologia…, 85. Since Merkelbach gives a higher ethic value to the 
semen and considers it as homo in potentia, onanism, for example, would be a sin against justice, insofar as it is 
against the bonum commune and even God, when it is used for a reason other than procreation. Cf. ibid., 86. Cf. 
HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 151-152. 
645 Cf. MERKELBACH, Quaestiones de Embryologia…, 65. Merkelbach writes: «Ratio [...] est, quia nulla forma 
recipitur in materia, nisi haec ad formam recipiendam  sufficienter praeparata et proxime sit deposita [...] ». Ibid. 
As quoted in HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 152. 
646 Cf. MERKELBACH, Quaestiones de Embryologia…, 65. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 152. 
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theological reasoning. It owes to the fact that such reasoning could hinder a similar level of 
plausibility that could lack references to philosophical and scientific context.647 
As mentioned earlier, during this time it was almost unanimously taught that animation resulted 
immediately, that is, at the moment of conception. The main argument given was that a 
succession of souls should be rejected. This is because, on the one hand, the sequence of a 
plurality of beings could not be adopted without reason. On the other hand, the rational soul 
could simultaneously achieve functions that were necessary for a vegetative or sensitive soul. 
To prove this fact three observations were made: First, it is established that the foetus begins to 
live at conception and therefore was animated. Second, it developed normally without 
interruption in its development in a way that is natural to a human. That is, it was disposed from 
the beginning in order to produce necessarily just one person. Lastly, the foetus from the 
beginning possesses everything necessary to be a human being, insofar as, it is the same entity 
that is received, developed and finally born. Further, there could not be identified a single 
moment in which the soul was not present.648 
However, none of the above arguments seemed sufficiently evident for Merkelbach. He argued 
that the first proof does not hold because the assumption that the soul is formed at conception 
and consequently is able to create its own body, constituted a unique exception to the scholastic 
principle that the form could not be infused as long as the matter is not sufficiently disposed. 
The second argument proves only so much that in an embryo a necessary principle is present 
which is effective to produce a human being from the beginning, or at least an embryo was 
developing into a human being under such conditions. Thus, it cannot be proved that an embryo 
is therefore already a human being from the beginning.649 
Merkelbach recognized that the real reason for the rejection of the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
doctrine was not in the supposed power of persuasion carried forward against its arguments, 
but rather in a fundamental opposition to the scholastic matter-form theory, which demands 
recognition by its critics. This has resulted in considering the succession of soul by a foetus as 
absurd.650 Apparently, this has resulted in an erroneous experiment, which leads to the opinion 
that an embryo from the very outset, even in its tiniest dimensions, possesses all the essential 
organs.651 
Merkelbach also draws attention to the finding that not only does the male sperm have already 
an autonomous and independent life and therefore certainly is not the male soul, but is animated 
by its own life principle, so also the female egg has a life of its own and that both the elements 
are not always united immediately after intercourse.652 With the fertilization, there occurs no 
such radical change that necessitates an embryo a rational soul. Just as both sperm and egg are 
animated by their own life principle, it seems to confirm that even an embryo after fertilization 
is animated by such similar principle. Thus, perhaps the rational soul is informed most likely 
                                                 
647 Cf. MERKELBACH, Quaestiones de Embryologia…, 66 and fn. 1. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 
152. 
648 Cf. MERKELBACH, Quaestiones de Embryologia…, 66. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 152-153. 
649 Cf. MERKELBACH, Quaestiones de Embryologia…, 67 and fn. 1. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 
153. 
650 Cf. MERKELBACH, Quaestiones de Embryologia…, 67. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 153. 
651 Cf. ibid. 
652 Cf. MERKELBACH, Quaestiones de Embryologia…, 67. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 153. 
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when the foetus undergoes a complete change and manifests an outer appearance of a human, 
which is at the end of the third month. It is then that there exists a basis to speak about the 
animation of a rational soul.653 The possible argument that an embryo after completion of the 
third month shows no exercise of reason cannot be permitted because no one can prove it. 
Incidentally, at this time, it is not just any sensitive life that is present, but a rational life, which 
is directed in an organized manner, while making it substantially different from a simple animal 
life.654 
Merkelbach also admitted that the old applicable terms of animation distinction between male 
and female foetus is no longer reasonable because it is based on a false research.655 
Merkelbach finally concludes that since both the theories of an immediate or a mediate 
animation is only probable; with regard to baptism, it is to be administered to all living foetus 
after the third month with the conditional expressions: “If you are a human” or “If you are 
capable of”.656 Unconditional love obliges one to take care of the salvation of one’s neighbour. 
If it is therefore prohibited to kill only those foetuses that are animated, then it is also unlawful 
to discard them without baptism. Beyond the theoretical discussion of probabilities of different 
theories, it is certainly important to save its soul.657 
Besides Prümmer and Merkelbach, a third Dominican, named Hyacinth Hering, former 
Professor at the Angelicum, also spoke contrary to the view that mediate animation is not to be 
represented because it is meaningless. In 1951, he published an article titled: De tempore 
animationis fetus humani. In it, he concedes that although in 19th and early 20th century the 
theory of immediate animation was widespread, yet it was far less accepted. The question of 
animation can be considered from two different views. The first view is the classical 
Aristotelian-Thomistic expression. According to this view, the human animation is a 
chronological sequence of different souls. The second view proposed by some modern authors 
is that at conception a simultaneous vegetative and sensitive soul is present, which at a later 
point is followed by the rational soul.658 However, the renowned theory of mediate animation 
has a wider significance. In that, it is based on a thorough investigation including important 
representatives. The theory is scrutinized by philosophers and thoroughly checked by moralists 
and canonists. It especially incorporates into its considerations empirical data provided by 
biology. Hering therefore gathered in his essay, numerous authors of the first half of the 20th 
                                                 
653 Cf. MERKELBACH, Quaestiones de Embryologia…, 68. Merkelbach writes: «Anima ergo rationalis 
probabiliter infundetur tantum, quando foetus radicalem omnino mutationem subit, et externam acquirit speciem 
hominis; quod fit versus finem tertii mensis: tunc utique adest ratio cur dicatur animari anima rationali.» Ibid. As 
quoted in HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 154 at fn. 409. 
654 Cf. MERKELBACH, Quaestiones de Embryologia…, 68 and fn.1. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 
154. 
655 Cf. MERKELBACH, Quaestiones de Embryologia…, 68. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 154. 
656 Cf. MERKELBACH, Quaestiones de Embryologia…, 68. Merkelbach writes: «Cum utraque sententia de 
momento quo foetus animatur sit probabilis, sequitur omnes foetus viventes esse baptizandos, absolute post tertium 
mensem, ante hoc tempus sub conditione: si es homo. vel: si es capax.» Ibid. As quoted in HACK, Der Streit um 
die Beseelung…, 154. 
657 Cf. MERKELBACH, Quaestiones de Embryologia…, 69. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 154. 
658 Cf. HERING, “De tempore animationis…”, 18. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 161. 
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Century, whose arguments illustrate the enduring importance of succession or mediate theory.659 
The already known argument, namely, that the infusion of the soul can take place only when 
the body is sufficiently formed, corresponded much better to the Thomistic theory. This is 
confirmed by biology in the case of an epigenetic development.660 
Hering mentions an author A. Lanza, who deserves special attention. Lanza submitted his 
research in 1940 under the title: La questione del momento in cui razionale l’anima è infusa nel 
corpo. Hering briefly summarizes the findings of Lanza who gives several reasons for a mediate 
animation based on the Aristotelian-Thomistic teaching. The substantial form requires 
practically an appropriate and organized matter; this substantial form cannot possibly be the 
efficient cause of the organism, because it would coincide with developing substance; 
moreover, the substantial form is not the beginning but the end of the generation process.661 
Lanza observed that not only the modern theory of epigenesis confirmed these arguments, but 
also by the phenomenon of a possible monozygotic twinning. This is due to a subsequent 
division of one fertilized egg that has a vegetative soul with variety of powers, or also by the 
possibility of a teratological (congenital abnormalities) malformation in which case they do not 
possess a rational soul.662 
With regard to unity and continuity, Lanza maintained that the individual, despite the 
succession of different souls, with regard to the preceding forms, remains incomplete and 
limited in time until the final specific form is ordained.663 
It is an undisputed question that the egg and sperm are alive before their union. So also in the 
fertilized ovum, organic functions are detectable, because they are necessary for the organism. 
The crucial question however is, whether it is already a specific human organism capable of 
receiving a human spiritual soul as claimed by the proponents of the immediate animation 
theory, but not proven. For the proof of polarity and symmetry with respect to the substances 
and energies in the fertilized egg, it is not sufficient to confirm the existence of the rational soul 
because they have the same characteristics already appropriated in the unfertilized condition.664 
According to Thomas, the form follows procreation but does not precede it. Therefore, it must 
be assumed that parents beget the body of the foetus, which would gradually form by virtue of 
a formative principle, in order to receive finally the human soul. Herring points out that the 
development (evolutio) after procreation is called growth (augmentum), whereas the preceding 
development before procreation is called generation (generatio). Because the form is not the 
beginning but the end of the generation process, it means the human soul could not be infused 
before the human body is not sufficiently formed.665 
                                                 
659Hering lists the following names among them: Liberatore, Zigliara, Cornoldi, Lorenzelli, Sanseverino, and 
di Maria. The more recent authors include Cardinal D. Mercier, V. Remer, A. D. Sertillanges, D. Prümmer, A. 
Farges-D. Barbedette, A. Vermeersch, B. Merkelbach, A. Pirotta, C. Carbone, F. X. Maquart, R. Jolivet, A. Lanza, 
E. Messenger, R. Lacroix, and M. Barbado. Cf. HERING, “De tempore animationis…”, 18. Of these names, 
Mercier, Prümmer and Merkelbach were already mentioned. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 161. 
660 Cf. ibid. 
661 Cf. HERING, “De tempore animationis…”, 25. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 162. 
662 Cf. HERING, “De tempore animationis…”, 26. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 162. 
663 Cf. HERING, “De tempore animationis…”, 26. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 162. 
664 Cf. HERING, “De tempore animationis…”, 28. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 162. 
665 Cf. HERING, “De tempore animationis…”, 28. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 162-163. 
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Hering finds it finally clear, based on the results from the above-cited facts, that the doctrine of 
a delayed animation or later ensoulment is much less likely to be abandoned as erroneous, but 
on the contrary, many followers of science support it, because both the facts conform to the 
principles of scholastic philosophy as well as embryology. Hence, although one cannot prove 
conclusively, it seems to retain, however, a serious probability, either because of the authority 
of many of the philosophers and the theologians who defend it, or for the sake of arguments 
sustained and defended by scientific research and metaphysics.666 
The mediate animation theory continues until our times. Karl Rahner, for example, observes 
that matter and spirit cannot be totally and absolutely unrelated if the God who is Spirit created 
matter, and is therefore, “essentially for the sake of spirit and as orientated towards it”.667 In this 
relationship of some sort between matter and spirit, the spiritual soul, as spirit, and as form of 
the body, does not possess two completely different functions. In both its partial functions, it 
has only one, namely, to fulfil its unitary nature as spirit. Subsequently its corporeality is 
necessarily an integrating factor of its constitution as spirit, not something alien to spirit but a 
limited factor in the accomplishment of spirit itself.668 If matter and spirit are not simply 
disparate in nature but matter is in some way a “solidified” spirit, “then an evolutionary 
development of matter towards spirit is not an inconceivable idea”.669 
For Rahner, God as both Creator and Sustainer and the Cause of all his creatures, works through 
them and not just alongside as his agents and instruments. All that produces an effect brings 
about an increase in reality that is irreducible simply to the agent and must be ascribed to God, 
who is ultimately the source of all being. In so doing, God enables the agent from within to “go 
beyond”, or transcend itself in producing what is both its and God’s effect. Therefore, the 
statement that God directly creates the soul of a human being does not imply the denial of the 
parent’s role in procreation of the human being in its unity. It implies that “procreation belongs 
to that kind of created efficient causality in which the agent by virtue of divine causality 
essentially exceeds the limits set by his own essence”.670 
Following Rahner, Podimattam is of the opinion that just like life which originates from 
inorganic matter, so also in the case of each human reproduction, it may not be so much God’s 
“bypassing” his creatures to intervene “immediately” by “pouring in” a human soul,  
[…] but rather new stages and expression of being a ‘welling up’ from within, through the 
genuine activity of created agencies which have already reached a certain threshold of 
existence and are impelled further by the cosmic creative activity of God.671 
                                                 
666 Cf. HERING, “De tempore animationis…”, 29. Hering writes: «Ex citationibus factis liquido apparet 
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667 Karl RAHNER, Hominisation. The Evolutionary Origin of Man as a Theological Problem, Burns and Oates, 
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Further, Rahner himself had asserted that the existence of a human subject is seriously doubtful 
during the first few weeks.672 
So also Joseph Donceel, a Jesuit Psychologist, Philosopher and Theologian, is of certain opinion 
that there is no human person until several weeks after fertilization. One can have philosophical 
certainty that an organism is a human person only from its activities. When activities like 
senses, the nervous system, the brain, and especially the cortex are present then can one at least 
admit the presence of a human soul.673 The claim of Donceel is clear. He writes, “I feel certain 
that there is no human person until several weeks have elapsed.”674 
Authors like the American Moral Theologian Richard McCormick continued to hold this 
theory. He described an embryo during the first two weeks as “nascent human life” but does 
not consider it an “individual human life” until later.675 Another contemporary American Moral 
Theologian Charles Curran in agreement with McCormick states, “…truly individual human 
life should be judged to be present two or three weeks after conception”.676 
From all that was said above, Podimattam concludes: 
[…] the Catholic doctrine does not hold for certain that the fetus is a human being right from 
the moment of conception. It is quite true that many ordinary Catholics and theologians 
defend this position, and that from the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of twentieth 
century, it became the prevailing opinion. But the hierarchical magisterium itself has never 
taken an official stand on the presence of a rational soul in the conceptus from the moment 
of fertilization […]. In fact, the Church is not competent to decide the moment of animation.677 
Another substantial proof, according to Podimattam for delayed hominization, is the modern 
understanding of the nature of human soul as held by Jesuit Moral Theologian John Mahoney. 
The approach of Thomas and the Catholic philosophical thinking that followed him held that 
body and soul are not two separate “things” but two aspects of the same individual human 
person, who is as much an ensouled body as he/she is an embodied soul. The soul is, so to say, 
the inner “shape” of human material composition, as a chord in music is something more than 
the simultaneous sounding of several notes. For a chord to sound well, it is necessary to be able 
first to produce individual notes, rather than simply undifferentiated noise or sound. In a similar 
manner, for a human person to be produced, there is the necessity for a degree of development 
and complexity in his/her physical makeup which will provide not only the necessary pre-
conditions for the soul to be infused but also the material constituent of the human person.678 
In conclusion, Podimattam says that the above reflections and speculations converge in pointing 
towards a process of delayed rather than instantaneous hominization in the individual, which in 
                                                 
672 Cf. Karl RAHNER, “The Problem of Genetic Manipulation”, in: Theological Investigations 9, tr. by Graham 
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principle is comparable with the emergence of humans upon the evolutionary scene. The 
paradigm of the evolution of human species points to the fact that human development is 
gradual and so the process of gradual development before hominization. Likewise, a 
characteristically human soul requires characteristically human material with which to fuse in 
order to constitute a fully human person. However, this is not to be thought as though pure spirit 
is being poured into a biological receptacle at conception, but as described above, it is a welling 
up from within the joint material provided by the parents. Hence, the affinity between the matter 
and spirit assumes that the emergence of a new human person is a process that requires time 
and some measure of pre-personal existence from which a fully animated existence may be 
launched.679 
Lobo notes that in the case of probability of the presence of a human person, it would be wrong 
to destroy the human embryo, which would amount to exposing oneself to homicide. One 
cannot apply the principle of Probabilism here because it is not a question of law, but a question 
of fact.680 Lobo further says with regard to animation that, “This view has never been officially 
sanctioned by the Catholic Church, although in practice it was urged that the product of human 
conception be treated from the beginning as it were actual human life.”681 He then cites two 
examples about the uncertainty of the Church over this matter. First, Pius XII who forbade the 
expulsion of an embryo even in the earliest stage as a practical norm of safety. Second, the 
Declaration on Procured Abortion, which left open the time of hominization (cf. QDA 7).682 
In this matter, Podimattam agrees with Lobo. Podimattam when giving the opinion from the 
point of view of traditional moralists, makes, a distinction between doubt of fact and doubt of 
law. Probabilism may be used in the case of doubt of law, but never in the case of doubt of fact, 
especially if the doubt involves life, justice, or the validity of contracts. Therefore, in the above 
case (that of the determination of the moment of animation); the safer course is to be followed 
which is the theory of immediate animation.683 However, Podimattam’s distinction between 
“fact”, “doubt of fact”, “doubt of law”, and Probabilism, in the last analysis, leads to conclude 
that:  
After decades of often acrimonious controversy, it became, and remained, accepted in 
Catholic moral teaching that in such dilemmas, and provided, inter alia, that no harm comes 
to a third party, it is morally justifiable to act upon a view of affairs which one has good 
reason to consider true, however, strong the alternative view may be.684 
5.3.2 Biological Perspective 
There are also reasons in reproductive biology for saying that the fertilized ovum is not yet a 
human being. There are pointers in modern embryology of certain phenomena that make us 
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aware of the absence of a personal life centre, although there is a biological centre (without 
which cells could not live and develop) in the fertilized ovum.685 
One such phenomenon is that of identical twins (cf. Chapter 4.2.1 above). After fertilization, in 
such cases, the developing ovum splits into two independent ova, which become two distinct 
persons. This casts serious doubts on the contention that every fertilized ovum is a continuum 
of life from fertilization to death. In contrast to the theory of immediate animation, this 
phenomenon poses the problem of explaining how one fertilized ovum can split into two parts, 
which then develop by themselves. The rational soul once infused is not divisible. A human 
person cannot split into two or more human persons. Twinning may occur within fourteen days 
after fertilization – an indication that the individual human life is not definitely established 
before this time. Therefore it is difficult to maintain that the fertilized ovum has sufficient 
individuation for its being person. “If the fecundated ovum can split into two beings which turn 
out to be two persons, it is difficult to admit that at first it was itself a person, hence fully 
human.”686  
There is also a further possibility, according to some experts, for the refusal or recombination 
of the twins into one individual being. The claim of the fertilized ovum as “irreversible 
individuality” thus becomes even more highly suspect.687 
Evidences show that a great number of fecundated ova are expelled from the uterus even before 
reaching this fourteenth day, due to natural miscarriages.688 In this context, Rahner remarks: 
For a few centuries Catholic moral theology has been convinced that individual hominization 
occurs at the moment of the fusion of gametes. Will the moral theologians still have today 
the courage to maintain this presupposition of many of his moral theological statements, 
when he is suddenly told that, from the start, 50 percent of the fecundated female ova never 
reach nidification in the uterus? Will he be able to admit that 50 percent of the “human 
beings” – real human beings with an “immortal” soul and an eternal destiny – do not, from 
the very start, get beyond this first stage of human existence?689 
Further, the expulsion of fecundated ova poses a problem if one holds on to the immediate-
animation theory. The problem is to do with the baptism of these expelled ova. Henry de 
Dorlodot, a Belgian Canonist and Theologian explains the problem in a blunt manner:  
In the same way, we should have to insist that a search should be made in the menstrual flow 
of every woman who has had sufficiently recent matrimonial intercourse to see if there were 
not some germs there, or better still, we ought to pour baptismal water on this blood, taking 
care that the water should penetrate everywhere, and pronounce sub conditione the baptismal 
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words. For it is quite possible, on the immediate-animation theory, that this menstrual blood 
contains a fecundated ovum in process of development.690 
Authors, like Thomas Shannon, would further argue that there is yet another important thing to 
be noted in the advent of the possibility of human cloning. It is impossible to hold that human 
life begins at fertilization because in cloning there is no fertilization and no sperm.691 
Mahoney draws a parallel between the brain death as a moral certainty – which occurs at one 
end of the human life-spectrum – and on the events that occur at the opposite end, its beginning. 
If brain death is death of the human person, then, the onset of brain life must be the beginning 
of life of the human person, although cellular activity may have preceded it. That means, for 
personal human life to be present there is first of all a need for a characteristically human 
biological substratum, namely, the development of cerebral cortex during the period of about 
twenty-five to forty days into pregnancy.692 
Contrary to this opinion, Lobo argues that the parallelism with brain death is not exact. It is not 
the absence of brain functioning, but its irreversibility, which is the decisive factor in 
determining death. However, in the case of the early embryo, it has the capacity for the 
development of brain and its functioning and hence for personal activity. Therefore, the stage 
of brain formation is not decisive for hominization while that of implantation seems to be.693 
5.4 THEORY OF IMMEDIATE ANIMATION 
The next theory, namely, immediate animation will be analyzed in this section. This theory will 
be examined from a historical perspective until recent times and from a biological and relational 
perspective. 
5.4.1 Historical Development in the Catholic Church 
It is interesting to note that this theory of immediate animation had much to do with the question 
of abortion; the only intervention that was known then on the life of an embryo. The theory of 
immediate animation can be dated back to the post-Tridentine time.694 However, the theory 
came to limelight later. It was in 1620 that there appeared a work by a Flemish physician and 
philosopher at Leuven University, Thomas Fienus titled: de formatione foetus liber, in quo 
ostenditur animam rationalem infundi tertia die (a book on the formation of the fetus, in which 
it is shown that the rational soul is infused on the third day). The title summarizes its content. 
Fienus concluded that the soul is infused on the third day.695 A year later another treatise named 
Medico-Legal Questions appeared. It was written by a Roman physician Paolo Zacchia. He 
argued in that treatise that according to a true Thomistic teaching there must be a single human 
soul from the beginning of the existence of a new foetus and the rational soul must be “infused 
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in the first moment of conception”.696 Thus Fienus and Zacchia rejected the Aristotelian theory 
of delayed animation. They made important historical contributions which finally led to the 
Church’s abandoning the speculation that there is such a thing as unanimated foetus. However, 
Fienus and Zacchia’s theories had no immediate impact on the theologians.697 Interestingly it 
was in the year 1950 that two priests from the same University of Leuven – E. C. Messenger 
and Henry de Dorlodot – repudiated the scientific standing of immediate hominization and in 
detail explained historically how this mistaken interpretation of empirical data was initially 
accepted.698 
Thus, towards the end of the Nineteenth Century the theory of immediate animation began to 
spread. From the point of view of Canon law, one can say that until 1869 it made a distinction 
between un-ensouled and ensouled foetus when treating the gravity of abortion and the penalties 
attached.699 However, in 1869, canon law removed this distinction and consequently the 
immediate animation theory gained support.  
According to Carlo Caffarra (former head of the John Paul II Institute for Marriage and Family 
Studies of the Lateran University), if it is acknowledged that the soul is infused sometime after 
fertilization, it would mean a separation and dualism between the “biological” and the 
“specifically human” in man or woman. Man or woman is a substantial unit, spirit incarnate or 
spiritualized flesh. Man or woman does not just have a bios or body, but is also essentially bios, 
a body; the essence of man or woman is the “composite” of spirit and body.700 
When one considers soul and body as separate entities, only then does the question of “infusion” 
arise. The incompatible scholastic theory that the foetus is first a “plant”, then an “animal” and 
finally a “human being” is meaningful only if one accepts the dubious premises of 
anthropological dualism. It is simpler and truer to affirm that a human being from the beginning 
is a unitary being and the question of the so called “infusion” does not arise. An embryo is 
human from the first moment of its conception. From the first moment of its existence, a human 
being constitutes an indivisible unity.701 
Those who hold for delayed animation bring in the issue of monozygotic twins. Their question 
is, if hominization takes place at the moment of fertilization of the ovum, how could two 
identical twins be formed.702 The answer is, probably the animation of the second twin results 
from the immediate creation of his/her human soul just at the moment of division into two 
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identical twins. Joseph Mangan, an  American Jesuit Moral Theologian and an authority on this 
question writes:  
[…] it seems to me that we cannot rule out the possibility that the animation of the second 
twin results from the immediate creation of his human soul just at the moment of division 
into two identical twins. The identical twin difficulty is hardly decisive in determining that 
hominization occurs after conception, except in the case of one of the identical twins.703 
When twinning happens due to the multiplication of human embryos, then God gives a new 
soul appropriately.704 
The fact that in the case of monozygotic twins the fertilized ovum divides into two does not 
establish that the rational soul that informed the fertilized ovum must also split. In the case of 
the ovum that splits into two, the split part is apt for human animation; it is informed by a new 
and distinct rational soul. The parents contribute elements, which in the fertilized ovum unite 
and become apt matter for a new human being and God infuses a rational soul into it. In a 
similar manner, when a part breaks off from the animated zygote, it in turn becomes the apt 
matter for animation to be endowed with a distinct rational soul. Thus, it is not difficult to 
understand the infusion of a distinct rational soul into a split off section of a fertilized ovum 
much similar to the animation of the original embryo. The further growth of an embryo is by 
way of cellular division. Nevertheless, parts that split off may or may not be apt for animation. 
When they are ready, it can be said that at that proper moment, God infuses into them a rational 
soul.705 
Eventually the Church identified herself with this theory, namely, that the rational soul is 
present from the moment of fertilization. It was often assumed that the official dogmatic 
teaching of the Church is that the rational soul is infused at the moment of conception. Moral 
statements of the magisterium reinforced this assumption.706 
The Second Vatican Council through its Pastoral Constitution, Gaudium et Spes makes it clear 
regarding the position of the Catholic Church with regard to the protection that is to be rendered 
to life from the beginning of its existence. It reads, “Therefore from the moment of its 
conception life must be guarded with the greatest care, while abortion and infanticide are 
unspeakable crimes” (GS 51).707 However, the Council clarified neither that the animation 
occurs at the moment of conception, nor the life of which it is speaking is the life of a human 
person, nor that this life has an absolute right and therefore not to be terminated. The Council 
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only assumes that every abortion is an infanticide.708 The Second Vatican Council Commission, 
which formulated the statement on prenatal life, avoided defining abortion, because it 
considered itself and the Church incompetent bodies for deciding the moment after which a full 
human being is present. The intention was to make a moral point “without touching upon the 
moment of animation”.709 
The Declaration on Procured Abortion, Questio de abortu explicitly expressed the philosophical 
uncertainty about the beginning of an individual human life. Therefore, it acknowledges the 
legitimacy of the ontological speculations: “This declaration expressly leaves aside the question 
of the moment when the spiritual soul is infused. There is not a unanimous tradition on this 
point and authors are as yet in disagreement […]. It is a philosophical problem […]” (QDA 13, 
fn.19).710 
Historically seen, the next clarification came through the Charter of the Rights of the Family, 
published in 1983 by the Holy See. In Article 4, it confirmed, “Human life must be respected 
and protected absolutely from the moment of conception.”711  
Following this, we have the Instruction Donum Vitae, which further clarifies712: 
From the time that the ovum is fertilized, a new life is begun which is neither that of the 
father nor of the mother; it is rather the life of a new human being with his own growth. It 
would never be made human if it were not human already. To this perpetual evidence [...] 
modern genetic science brings valuable confirmation. It has demonstrated that, from the first 
instant, the programme is fixed as to what this living being will be: a man, this individual-
man with his characteristic aspects already well determined. Right from fertilization is begun 
the adventure of a human life […] (DV I,1). 
The teaching of the Magisterium with regard to the beginning of the life of an embryo in Donum 
Vitae is clear and can be summarized in 4 stages: 
1. The life of the fertilized ovum is neither that of the father or mother, but a new life. 
2. This new life is human life; it could not be made human if it were not human already. 
3. This new human life is the life of an individual, since identity or individuality is 
established from the beginning. 
4. The new human being who comes into existence with conception must surely be a 
person. 
Donum Vitae then draws out the consequence of the respect due to human life713: 
Thus the fruit of human generation, from the first moment of its existence, that is to say from 
the moment the zygote has formed, demands the unconditional respect that is morally due to 
the human being in his bodily and spiritual totality (DV I,1). 
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Based on the above facts Podimattam observes, “[…] these statements are moral judgments 
rather than metaphysical assertions”.714  
Evangelium Vitae, while quoting Donum Vitae which preceded it, affirms of the presence of 
the human person right from the beginning. It says: 
Even if the presence of a spiritual soul cannot be ascertained by empirical data, the results 
themselves of scientific research on the human embryo provide a valuable indication for 
discerning by the use of reason a personal presence at the moment of the first appearance of 
a human life: how could a human individual not be a human person? (EV 60)715 
Further, Evangelium Vitae concludes from this, while speaking in the context of clear 
prohibition of any intervention aimed at killing a human embryo, and acknowledges that right 
from the moments of its first existence unconditional respect has to be rendered to it. It says:  
Precisely for this reason, over and above all scientific debates and those philosophical 
affirmations to which the Magisterium has not expressly committed itself, the Church has 
always taught and continues to teach that the result of human procreation, from the first 
moment of its existence, must be guaranteed that unconditional respect which is morally due 
to the human being in his or her totality and unity as body and spirit (EV 60). 
Evangelium Vitae also went a step ahead of Questio de abortu (QDA 13, fn.19) and affirmed 
that unconditional respect has to be guaranteed to an embryo from the first moment of its 
existence and adds further the fact that, “the Church has always taught and continues to teach” 
(EV 60; emphasis added) this truth. 
In conclusion, one can only say that the arguments, either in favour of a delayed animation or 
in favour of an immediate animation, have support among theologians. At present, the Catholic 
Church is clear on this stance, which favours immediate animation. 
The question regarding probable opinion in this matter even where there is a case of doubt, 
whether from the first moment of conception, the zygote is human or not, then there is no 
question of following a probable opinion, because of the very fact that it concerns the life of a 
person. One may use the classical example of a hunter who doubts whether the moving figure 
behind the hedge is an animal or a human person. Under such circumstances, one cannot shoot 
at the object. Such an action would amount to being guilty of murder. In a similar way, the 
distinction between the instant of conception and the moment of animation is a matter of 
opinion and one cannot resort to doubt in a situation that would lead to the action of abortion. 
Those who seek to destroy have also the responsibility of giving evidence to support such a 
conclusion, which in this case is next to impossible. Therefore, the presumption must be in 
favour of human life, not its destruction.716 
5.4.2 Biological Perspective 
Three main arguments are stated here. 
First, there is an indication from science that from the moment of fertilization there is a living 
being which is biologically separate from that of the mother and that this new being is 
unrepeatable and unique. The characteristic of this being is that it is alive, that is, the capacities 
to produce its own cells and develop them into a specific pattern of maturity and function. This 
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being is human, that is, distinct from other living organisms, characteristically human, which 
include full human genetic package of 46 chromosomes, can develop only into a fully mature 
human and not any other being. Half of these chromosomes are derived from each of the 
parents. However, the newly conceived life differs genetically from its parents as a unique 
combination of genes.  
This new life, from its earliest forms and stages, possesses internal mechanisms, which in 
favourable circumstances will enable the individual to be a fully developed human being. An 
embryo itself has this inner capacity and is not ordained by the mother. Scientists have exploited 
this fact of the inherent capacity of the developing embryo, in order to develop human life in 
vitro.717 Pazhayampallil elaborates on this issue by quoting Professor Jerome Le Jeune who 
says:  
At around five days after fecundation, this microscopic human being, one millimeter in 
diameter, sends a chemical message which forces the yellow corpus luteum inside the ovary 
to produce certain hormones so that the menses of the mother will be suppressed. It is in fact 
the baby which suppresses the menses of the mother and who takes over, if I can say so, and 
it does to her what it likes, and you know it will do it again later. He is really capable of 
presiding over his own destiny. Now a little later he will bury himself inside the mucosa of 
the uterus and develop a kind of apparatus that I cannot better describe other than a 
cosmonaut’s suit which would make a little bulb which will have a little cord which will go 
to the big machine and the big machine would be able to take nutrients from the wall of the 
uterus through a special respiratory system. And it is the foetus which built this extra thing 
this extra surrounding of him, this capsule, and the mother just provides by her blood all the 
nutrients which can go through the membranes so that the baby can be fed, but the whole 
machinery, I would say the whole space capsule he has, is built by the foetus.718 
New Zealand obstetrician Albert William Liley shares a similar view. He gives a descriptive 
statement of the inherent capacity of a foetus. He writes: 
Far from being an inert passenger in a pregnant mother, the foetus is very much in command 
of the pregnancy […]. It is the foetus who determines the duration of pregnancy […] who 
decides which way he will lie pregnancy and which way he will present in labour […].719 
Moreover, the being in the womb is complete. It means that nothing new will be added from 
the time of fertilization until the death as an old man or woman except the growth and 
development of what is already there in the beginning. The question here is only about the time 
that is necessary to develop and mature in the womb. The being, therefore, in the womb is not 
a potential human being but a human being with potential.720 Nothing external is added to the 
fertilized ovum except nutrition. The only change in birth is the environment and the nature of 
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life-support system. Thus, it is evident that human life is a continuum from the moment of 
fertilization. Moreover, every embryologist, every major textbook of human embryology states 
the fact that fertilization marks the beginning of the life of the new individual human being. 
Science thus supports the Church’s teaching on life being human from the moment of 
conception and that the decisive moment of beginning of human life is fertilization.721 
Second, around the sixth or seventh day after conception the fertilized ovum implants in the 
uterus and a week later the process of conception ends. The process of implantation is an 
important stage for some theologians. Until implantation takes place, individuation is not 
irreversibly defined. It means that there is still a possibility that the developing embryo could 
twin or remain just one, or even after twinning in rare cases, can recombine. According to some 
theologians, one cannot talk of an individual until the time an embryo moves past this period 
of ambiguity and uncertainty about number.722 However, Pazhayampallil refutes this argument 
and says: 
The possibility of changes that may occur in the embryo before its implantation does not 
constitute a valid argument against the dynamic unity of the zygote. If the embryo is not an 
individual before its implantation in its mother’s womb, it does not become one after the 
implantation. It is true that in the beginning the psychic and moral life is not yet effective, 
but it already exists in potency in the cellular formations from which will develop the nervous 
system, its material condition. All the essential characteristics are already determined at the 
moment of conception: sex, intellectual potentials, facets of character and temperament, 
stature, eventual defects etc.723 
Among the scientific community, it is also widely held that there occurs a natural phenomenon 
of a spontaneous expulsion of a large number of zygotes before implantation. However, once 
implantation has taken place then the natural elimination is negligible. Therefore, some writers 
deny the inviolability of the fertilized ovum before implantation. The question posed by them 
is that when nature is itself so wasteful why not we destroy embryos at an early stage. Owing 
to the fact that they are naturally wasted, are they human beings with eternal fate and vocation? 
Therefore, according to them, experimentation on that life in case of necessity would not 
amount to an abuse.724 
Moreover, one cannot be sure about the exact number of individuals that have been conceived 
until their implantation. This does not mean that an embryo is without human life. Benedict 
Ashley, an American Philosopher, Theologian and Ethicist, give a plausible explanation. He 
argues that in contrast to many species of animals that normally produce multiple, genetically 
identical litters, the zygote of the human species normally develop into a multicellular organism 
that retains its singleness. However, twinning (or triplets, etc.) may be produced in the first two 
weeks (and perhaps a little beyond) either at the two-cell stage with two separate placentas, or 
in the blastocyst with one placenta, or very late with the risk of the formation of conjoined 
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twins. This abnormal separation in probably 30 percent of the cases is due to genetic defects. 
This fact of separation of a group of cells and their independent development into a second 
individual in no way refutes the prior existence of an individuated organism, but only confirms 
it. When twinning occurred at the first cleavage, then prior to that, it existed as a single-cell 
zygote. Nevertheless, when twinning occurred at some later point in the development of the 
blastocyst, then the blastocyst preceded it, in which case it had developed normally up to that 
stage, or else its normal development would have been terminated.725 
Campos answering to those who resort to experimentation in the cases mentioned above, 
replies, “nature’s prodigality in eliminating a lot of abnormal beings does not allow us to 
increase that number of lost beings by artificial means”.726 Implantation does not add anything 
external and new to the internal process of development of a human being, which had already 
begun after fertilization.727 
It is to be noted here that, there are some who use the word “pre-embryo” in order to designate 
the being that exists from zygote state to the beginning of the formation of the primitive 
streak.728 Those who do so follow the frog embryologist and scientist, Clifford Grobstein, who 
used the term to describe the early pre-implanted embryo.729 This change in language seems to 
be a way of placing these tiny human beings outside the pale of protection. Grobstein also used 
another term “individuation”. However, any embryologist who deals with human beings does 
not recognize both the terms “pre-embryo” and “individuation”.730 
Third, another fact that is used as an argument for rendering the minimum status of human 
personal life to an embryo is about the appearance of the first indicators of brain life (around 
40 days after conception).731 The argument given is that just as cessation of brain function is 
taken as a criterion for judging someone dead, so also it follows logically that no human being 
is present until the brain structure is present.732 Some Catholic theologians rely on this argument 
while appealing to Thomas’ teaching on delayed hominization. However, according to Ashley 
and O’Rourke: 
The weakness of such arguments is evident when we take into account the fact, not known 
to Aristotle, that a sequence of primordial centers of organization in the embryo goes back 
continuously to the nucleus of the zygote, long before the brain appears as the final center. 
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From the beginning of this developmental sequence the zygote’s nucleus has contained all 
the information and active potentiality necessary eventually to develop the brain and bring it 
to the stage of adult functioning (Ashley, B., 1976). Thus, although it is true that the 
developing fetus first actively exhibits vegetative (physiological) and animal (psychological 
and motor) functions and finally, long after birth, specifically human functions, it possesses 
from conception the active potentiality to develop all these functional abilities. Only the 
minimal structure necessary for this active potentiality of self-development (even on the basis 
of Aristotle’s philosophical principles) is required for an organism to be actually a human 
person, not the brain structures necessary for adult psychological activities (Australian 
Research Commission, 1985).733 
Thus, there are three arguments against delayed animation from a biological perspective, 
namely: 1) A positive argument that specifies the characteristics of the being from the moment 
of fertilization, which are: alive, human, complete and a continuum; 2) The argument against 
the cases of twinning or a natural phenomenon of a spontaneous expulsion; and, 3) the argument 
against brain function to be taken as a criterion. 
There is another objection raised by those who hold for delayed animation. This is the case of 
recombination of the twins into one individual. However, such occurrences are extremely 
rare.734 Thomas W. Hilgers, Obstetrician-Gynaecologist and Member of Pontifical Academy for 
Life, vouches to this: 
The evidence regarding cell fusion and recombination of early zygotic material comes from 
highly specialized experiments done under carefully controlled and totally artificial 
laboratory conditions. There is little question that under these conditions such fusion can be 
accomplished. However, this type of experimental works has essentially no application to the 
normal, natural process which occurs in early human development. If it does occur, it would 
occur only extremely rarely, and then only as the result of abnormal, diseased development. 
Such occurrences should not form the basis of moral decision-making.735 
According to the late Redemptorist Moral Theologian Augustine Regan, the separated cells 
remain toti- or pluri-potential. In case they reunite and become one individual, the ultimate 
explanation can only be that they are informed by the same soul. It could mean that previously 
they were two or more souls, but now there is only one. Any other soul would have ceased to 
animate, just like in the case of bodily death. Which among the souls remain and which have 
departed from their bodily complement is of no account.736 
5.4.3 Relational Perspective 
There are still others, who hold that human life cannot be simply reduced to biology, but is 
about human relationships.737 It is because the zygote is not merely a natural product of a purely 
biological process but the human fruit of a human union. The zygote, as it were, exchanges 
important psychic influences with its mother. The nourishment received from the mother, when 
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the being is born, is capable of entering fully into the network of human relations. During the 
period of stay in the womb of the mother, an embryo reacts to external stimuli, and establishes 
relationship with the mother.738 
Certain French scholars hold that just as a human being cannot exist without a body, so it cannot 
be humanized without relationships with other people. “These relationships consist of being 
accepted by parents, of being acknowledged by society, of being wanted children, and being 
children, of being destined to live and being procreated intentionally.”739 Although this approach 
underlines the social dimension of human existence, it is irrelevant in the context of the status 
of an embryo. Nevertheless, this raises several questions: “Without recognition by others is life 
not fully human? What does recognition or acceptance add to an embryo that it does not possess 
of itself in terms of intrinsic dignity? Why limit to the first stage of unborn life and why not 
extend it and apply it equally after birth?”740 
5.5 AN ANALYSIS OF THE ENSOULMENT THEORIES 
In this section, the ensoulment theories deliberated above will be analyzed. What would be the 
consequence of accepting a delayed animation? Podimattam, for example, following the theory 
of delayed animation, is of the opinion that when the fertilized human ovum is approached in 
this way, “it is clear that it is not a proper object of the respect due to human persons.”741 
Therefore, Podimattam emphatically states that: “it is not unreasonable to conclude that, if one 
is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the human embryo is not yet developed to be an 
ensouled human person, and if one’s purpose in bringing about its destruction is sufficiently 
capable of moral scrutiny, then to do so is not, even objectively, morally blameworthy”.742 
Therefore, for him the question of human dignity of an embryo is far from consideration. 
However, when the animation (delayed) has taken place, which is according to him around 14 
days after fertilization, then:  
Whatever the exact moment at which a fetus becomes a person the question must be asked: 
“How should one behave when one does not know whether dignity is or is not present in the 
fetus? Where human life is at stake – even potential human life – the fetus must be accorded 
the dignity and protection given to the human being.743 
                                                 
738 Cf. PAZHAYAMPALLIL, Pastoral Guide…, 1387. An interesting article by Johnstone proposes a new 
framework that considers the human embryo as a person from conception. He argues that the human embryo is a 
person who is a receiver and giver of gifts, who ought to be loved, protected and not killed. See JOHNSTONE, “The 
Human Embryo…”, 438. 
739 Cf. CAMPOS, “Ethical Issues in Stem-cell Research…”, 94-95. Campos is referring to: COLLECTIF, “Pour 
une réforme de la législation française relative à l’avortement”, in: Études 338/1 (1973) 55-84; 71. 
740 Cf. CAMPOS, “Ethical Issues in Stem-cell Research…”, 95. 
741 PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 58. Cf. also SHANNON/WOLTER, “Reflections on the Moral 
Status…”, 603-626. Shannon and Walter express their doubt saying, “But we are also vitally concerned as to when 
one might reasonably believe such absolute value could be present in a developing organism”, in order to respect 
an embryo in an absolute way. Ibid., 603. 
742 PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 58. It is interesting to note that in another book of his, Podimattam 
states in the same quotation above replacing the words “in bringing about its destruction” with “in experimenting 
on it”. See Felix M. PODIMATTAM, The Genome Revolution, Media House, Delhi 2002, 93-109, 109. 
743 IDEM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 32. 
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Thus, the question of human dignity is shaped according to the theory of animation one holds 
for. Srampickal in response to the delayed hominization, that some moral theologians hold for, 
has the following arguments: 
a) The processes and mechanisms of nature are ultimately inexplicable. Just because a certain 
percentage of embryos are naturally lost at the early stage, one may not therefore wilfully 
destroy embryos. Being a morally responsible person, one has to behave reasonably and 
responsibly. 
b) Whether a being manifests all its capacities or not, still one cannot deny that being its 
essential nature. There is no paradox or contradiction whether a zygote is animated by a rational 
soul. As the organism develops, its operational possibilities will be gradually expressed. 
c) Whether there is twinning or not, it itself is not a necessary condition for individuality. 
Totipotency at the embryonic stage is a characteristic that operates according to its inner 
orientation and dynamism so that at the early fragile stage any cell can replace another. The 
importance of the appearance of primitive streak does not mean there was no individual identity 
before that. 744 
According to Srampickal, both the arguments, namely, the delayed and immediate 
hominization, do not establish convincingly any of them. One cannot also defend 
metaphysically that human individual or person exists only after nidation. Neither does the truth 
lie in the fact that the status of an embryo can be so easily established by empirical data, nor 
can this question of importance be left to biological data alone, even though such information 
and data are useful. According to Peter Vattappara, an Indian Moral Theologian, airing various 
opinions of scientists (namely, “zygote and early embryo is in a transitional stage, it is a 
collection of cells and tissues and therefore not worthy of respect”; “zygote is only the 
progenitor of a human being” and “the cause of the humanity outweighs the respect due to the 
embryo in the early stage”, etc.), says that these exhibit only biological reductionism.745 
There are also examples of those who hold for immediate animation, like Richard Doerflinger, 
who is the Deputy Director of the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities at the U.S. Conference of 
Catholic Bishops. He and others claim to “hold that foetuses and embryos have moral status, as 
individuals, and so must not be treated as instruments and as means to an end. Being innocent 
they are inviolable”.746 
Having discussed the pros and cons of these theories, the summary of Hack and his findings 
would be useful to consider here. Hack gives two conclusions as follows: 
First, the different historical strands of tradition illustrates a basic differentiation which 
ultimately came to be distinguished between those represented by a constant moral 
reprehensibility of abortion on the one hand, and on the other, their canonical sanction. The 
succession theory itself could make no influence over the general position of the Church on the 
                                                 
744 Cf. SRAMPICKAL, “The Catholic View of Human Life …”, 95. 
745 Cf. Peter VATTAPPARA, A Matter of Life. An inquiry into the morality of the generation and destruction of 
human embryos in experimentation, Intercultural Publications, New Delhi 2000, 54, 58, 63-64. Cf. SRAMPICKAL, 
“The Catholic View of Human Life...”, 95-96. 
746 S. John BRITTO, “Stem Cell Research and Applications. An Ethical Perspective”, in: JULIAN/MYNATTY 
(ed.), Catholic Contributions to Bioethics…, 195-217, 210. Cf. Richard M. DOERFLINGER, “The ethics of funding 
embryonic stem cell research: a Catholic viewpoint,” in Kennedy Institute of Ethic Journal 9/2 (1999) 137-150; 
138.  
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theology of abortion that articulated in adhering to a complete protection of an embryo in all 
stages of its development. However, in contrast, the theory did make a deep impression on the 
distinction between the fetus animatus and the fetus inanimatus in the canonical prohibition of 
abortion. What was decisive is perhaps twofold, namely, the enormous influence of the 
Septuagint translation of Ex 21,22f and the corresponding well-established Aristotelian theory. 
The reputation also goes back to their relevant representation by Thomas. From the 17th Century 
onwards there seems to be an increasing acceptance of the simultaneous theory. However, its 
spread - even within the moral theology - left an increasing pressure on these canonical 
provision; such that, a distinction in the status of animation were ignored even in the 1917 Code 
of Canon Law. After some time delay, it led the Magisterium initially to reformulate the 
sanctioning of excommunication in the case of abortion. Since the offence of abortion formed 
a separate legal institution, with this sanctioning, it became problematic, namely, whether the 
act was to be classified as a homicide. Finally, in canon law, the question of the time of 
animation became irrelevant. Had the question of animation played an important role as to 
influence the moral evaluation of abortion outside this canonical sanction (which seems to be 
the case especially in the period of transition that can be determined by a certain ambiguity 
among the moral theologians), things would have been different. What was expected of the 
Supreme Magisterium was to present, in such an important question as to the right to life of an 
embryo, a decisive answer to the animation controversy. However, such a decision was never 
taken. Apparently, at that time, no threat was detected in the conflicting theories of animation 
that would have involved the general obligation to protect an embryo. However, by then, the 
gradual adoption of animation criterion within canon law accompanied by the reception of that 
theory had already prevailed in medicine and in moral theology.747 
The possible outcome of the above discussion is well comprehended by Hack. According to 
him, apart from the canonical provision, the ensoulment theory would become irrelevant for the 
ethical evaluation of abortion. However, the delayed theory of animation would open the 
possibility of a concept that would determine when an embryo would be protected. Moral 
theology at that time would still detect the danger of the tradition of long delayed animation 
theory and appeal to argue without reference to the time of ensoulment in order to justify the 
protection of an embryo. Every moral theological statement around that time testify to the 
intention that even in the case of the delayed animation the fetus may get the same protection 
whether animate or inanimate.748 
Second, one can derive from the historical development of moral theological debate the killing 
even of inanimate fetus which was qualified as murder using the legal concept of homicidium 
anticipatum or the justification that would hinder a homo in potentia. The killing of the 
inanimate fetus was seen not only as preventing the further development of a human being, but 
also from a genuine theological perspective as thwarting God’s creation plan. Moreover, the 
abortion of the still inanimate fetus was also rejected because killing it would deprive its 
baptism and its supernatural life. Lastly, the application of the morality system of Tutiorism 
                                                 
747 Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 434-435. 
748 Cf. ibid., 435. 
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would leave the doubt about the ensouled embryo (in dubio pro embryone),749 because it 
threatens human life, which is a fundamental good.750 Hack concludes: “In each case, with the 
beginning of its life the embryo appropriates a worthiness of protection independent of its 
animation status, which knows no graduation regarding the reprehensibility of its abortion”.751  
For the same reason as above, Schockenhoff himself expresses wonder whether one would still 
take recourse to the Thomistic animation theory derived from the facts based on current human 
biological knowledge and whether theology itself should be accused of taking a break from that 
tradition.752 Schockenhoff argues: 
Theology must respect the applicable guaranteed human biological evidence of the present 
in the same way that was demonstrated by Thomas and the medieval scholastics in their time 
to the natural historical work of Aristotle. If it [theology] found in response to the scientific 
progress of knowledge and the numerous discoveries, which puts our knowledge in 
connections with human reproduction on a new basis, that departs away from the previously 
represented delayed animation theory, then this reveals the same (methodically and 
objectively stipulated) self-restraint, as that which Thomas exercised towards Aristotle.753 
In the field of Moral Theology, the animation theories do not represent a singular event and 
something exceptional. Thus, Klaus Demmer, a German Moral Theologian, when analyzing the 
theological and philosophical tradition regarding the question of the time of animation, 
emphasizes that Moral Theology has remained a child of its time and has always received 
impetus from the outside.754 
Thus, the profile of the subject changed both positively and negatively. What today seems 
worthy of criticism, was seen at the time of its origin a possibility which did not wish to lose 
connection with the prevailing academic culture. One who refers to the tradition should also 
be aware of the ambivalence of the traditional argument. This also applies to the question of 
the ensoulment theory.755 
                                                 
749 Cf. Gregor DAMSCHEN/Dieter SCHÖNECKER, „In dubio pro embryone. Neue Argumente zum moralischen 
Status menschlicher Embryonen“, in: DIES. (Hg.), Der moralische Status menschlicher Embryonen. Pro und 
contra Spezies-, Kontinuums-, Identitäts- und Potentialitätsargument, de Gruyter, Berlin 2003, 187-268; 187. 
750 Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 435-436. 
751 „In jedem Fall eignet dem Embryo unabhängig von seinem Beseelungsstatus mit dem Beginn seines Lebens 
eine Schutzwürdigkeit, die keine Graduierung hinsichtlich der Verwerflichkeit seiner Abtreibung kennt.“ HACK, 
Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 436. Tr. by author. 
752 Cf. ibid., 436-437. 
753 „Die Theologie muss den als gesichert geltenden humanbiologischen Erkenntnissen der Gegenwart den 
gleichen Respekt entgegenbringen, den Thomas und die mittelalterlichen Scholastiker zu ihrer Zeit dem 
naturkundlichen Werk des Aristoteles erwiesen. Wenn sie in Reaktion auf den wissenschaftlichen 
Erkenntnisfortschritt und die zahlreichen Entdeckungen, die unser Wissen um die Zusammenhänge der 
menschlichen Fortpflanzung auf eine neue Basis stellten, von den früher vertretenen Sukzessivbeseelungstheorien 
abrückte, verrät dies dieselbe (methodisch und sachlich geforderte) Selbstbeschränkung, wie sie Thomas 
gegenüber Aristoteles übte.“ SCHOCKENHOFF, „Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theologische 
Perspektiven…“, 521. Tr. and addition by author. Cf. Hack, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 437. 
754 Cf. ibid. 
755 „So hat sich das Profil des Fachs, positiv wie negativ, verändert. Was heute als kritikwürdig erscheint, war 
zu seiner Entstehungszeit womöglich geboten, wollte man den Anschluss an die herrschende Wissenschaftskultur 
nicht verlieren. Wer auf Tradition verweist, sollte sich darum der Ambivalenz des Traditionsarguments bewusst 
bleiben. Das gilt auch in der Frage der Beseelungstheorie.“ Klaus DEMMER, Gott denken - sittlich handeln. Fährten 
ethischer Theologie, Studien zur theologischen Ethik. 120, Academic Press Fribourg/Herder, Freiburg 
Schweiz/Freiburg-Wien 2008, 138. Tr. by author. Cf. HACK, Der Streit um die Beseelung…, 439. 
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The dispute over the ensoulment proves impressively the above judgment. It drew its fundament 
from the different metaphysical interpretations and from the insights of the advanced scientific 
knowledge. Consequently, which animation theory prevailed depended on these facts.756 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
The basic thrust in this Chapter concerns the question, when or at which moment of its 
development is an embryo a human person? In other words, when does human life begin? Two 
diverse answers to these questions were examined. 
One view, namely, mediate or delayed animation, held that the human person begins at a later 
stage and not from its first moment of existence, namely, fertilization.757  
The other view, namely, immediate animation, also equally justified that the human person 
begins at the moment of fertilization.758 Both these views were developed basing themselves on 
scientific data available at their disposal. 
To summarize the four theologians, who held for delayed animation by following Aristotelian-
Thomistic teachings, the following observations are made: 
1. Sufficient predisposition of matter is necessary in order to be informed by the rational soul. 
2. There is a succession of soul, namely, first the vegetative, then the sensitive and finally the 
rational soul. 
3. The successive replacement of former stages until the rational soul is infused is confirmed 
from embryology because scientific observation show a gradually increasing organization of 
an embryo insofar as initially only nutrition intake and growth are seen which is then followed 
by a sensitive life and finally by an intellectual phenomenon. 
4. A distinction was made between fetus animatus and fetus inanimatus. This distinction served 
mostly in decisions with regard to the baptism of foetuses. 
5. This position is more probable by the very fact that majority of theologians and philosophers 
held for a delayed animation. 
                                                 
756 Cf. ibid. 
757 American Moral Theologian, John Gallagher, at the time he published his book, lists the following authors 
who hold for a delayed animation. The conclusion is that a human person begins some time after fertilization: 
DONCEEL, “Immediate animation…”, 76-105; IDEM, “Catholic politicians and abortion”, in: America 151 (1985) 
81-83; Charles CURRAN, “Abortion, law and morality in contemporary Catholic theology”, in: Jurist 33 (1973) 
162-183; James DIAMOND, “Abortion, animation and biological hominization”, in: TS 36 (1975) 305-324; Bernard 
HÄRING, “New dimensions of responsible parenthood” in TS 37 (1976) 120-132; 127-128; Gabriel PASTRANA, 
“Personhood and the beginning of life”, in: Thomist 41 (1977) 247-294; Richard A. MCCORMICK, “Notes on moral 
theology”, in: TS 39 (1978) 127-128, IDEM, “Notes on Moral Theology: 1978…”, 108-109; C. A. TAUER, “The 
Tradition of Probabilism…”, 3-33. See John GALLAGHER, Is the Human Embryo a Person? A Philosophical 
Investigation, Human Life Research Institute Reports -No. 4, Human Life Research Institute, Toronto 1985, at 
fn.2. 
758 Gallagher also lists those authors who hold that the early stage embryo is a human being. They are: Benedict 
ASHLEY, “A critique of the theory of delayed hominization”, in: MCCARTHY/MORACZEWSKI (ed.), An Ethical 
Evaluation of Fetal Experimentation…, 113-133; Robert E. JOYCE, “Personhood and the conception event”, in: 
New Scholasticism 52 (1978) 97-109; Albert S. MORACZEWSKI, “Human personhood. A study in personalized 
biology”, in: William B. BONDESON/H. Tristram Jr. ENGELHARDT/Stuart F. SPICKER/Daniel H. WINSHIP (ed.), 
Abortion and the Status of the Fetus, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Boston, 1983, 301-311 and James J. 
MCCARTNEY, “Some Roman Catholic concepts of person and their implications for the ontological status of the 
unborn”, in: William B. BONDESON et al. (ed.), Abortion and the Status of the Fetus…, 313-323. See Gallagher, 
Is the Human Embryo a Person?..., at fn.5. 
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Based on the above formulations, it is observed that these theologians limit themselves to 
Aristotelian-Thomistic teaching. They find a solution to fit in the theory of delayed animation 
within this philosophical boundary. Moreover, they find that the scientific evidence from 
embryology, available at their respective times, supports their teaching.  
However, at a biological and metaphysical level there are flaws when one accepts their 
viewpoint, as already mentioned in Chapter 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. Moreover, it must be kept in mind 
that bioethical controversial issues, such as in the present day, did not pose a problem to these 
theologians. 
Though these views have been historically shaped and influenced759, beginning at least from the 
twentieth century the Catholic Church after careful consideration has repeatedly stated her 
position – through the Instruction Donum Vitae, the encyclical Evangelium Vitae and the 
Instruction Dignitas Personae – and continues to hold “a personal presence at the moment of 
the first appearance of a human life” (DV I, 1; EV 60 and DP I, 5). 
Although no one theory is acceptable by all Moral Theologians, the question is left open with 
regard to the exact time of ensoulment of an embryo. However, it is reiterated that the time of 
ensoulment does not play an important role when compared to the role of the worthiness, value 
and moral behaviour towards an embryo right from the moment of its inception. In other words, 
from the beginning of life, an embryo is worthy of human dignity, has the right to life and 
therefore worthy of protection. 
Moreover, the time of ensoulment of an embryo, which is also partially and closely a 
philosophical question, needed to be addressed in its historical context. The question, regarding 
which theory prevails today, either immediate animation or delayed animation, is contentious. 
Although these theories played a historical role at different times, recent biological 
advancements is still unclear on this point, owing once again to the fact that it is a philosophical 
question. Whatever stance one may take, the protection of an embryo from the moment of 
fertilization may be given.
                                                 
759 For example, although Thomas presents a coherent and powerful argument for delayed ensoulment yet his 
arguments were premised on a number of assumptions based on the evidences available at his time, especially in 
the area of biology and his interpretation of Aristotle. 
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PART I  
Conclusion 
In this Part I, which is basically a foundational one, the general concepts of human dignity were 
examined so that these ideas may be used in the later parts of this research. The concept of 
human dignity is very profound. The word “dignity” stems from the Greek and Roman 
background and convey the meaning of “worthiness of honour and esteem”. However, today 
the word and its precise meaning and requirement have become elusive. The term “dignity of 
the human person” is often regarded as an ambiguous term and criticized as lacking content. 
Coupled with the confusion of the word “dignity” there is also a criticism about who qualifies 
to be a human person in order to predict about his/her dignity. The roots of the concept of human 
dignity as well as their utilization in United Nations Declaration and Conventions as well as 
other International Instruments were reviewed. However,  they do not define the content of 
human dignity. By the very fact that these terms themselves are notoriously difficult to define 
in the field of Bioethics, the task of defining human dignity becomes even more difficult. Based 
on these facts, a working definition of human dignity was arrived, which speaks of the inherent, 
intrinsic, inviolable worth of every human being despite his/her origin. It was acknowledged 
that every human individual is necessarily a human person. 
Further, the terms human dignity and human person were examined from a historical, 
philosophical and theological point of view. In examining from a philosophical perspective, 
according to Kant, it became clear that reason and autonomy play an important role in the 
development of the concept. Applying these principles, the working definition was reviewed in 
order to include autonomy and reason. 
God’s creation of human beings in His own image and likeness (Gen 1,26-27) is a central 
anthropological statement and a foundational concept of understanding the human person. 
Owing to this fact, the sacredness of human life is acknowledged. However, this “sacredness 
of life” (Heiligkeit des Lebens) is not to be confused with the term “sanctity of life” (Heiligkeit 
des Lebens), a term that has derived a different meaning in Bioethics. 
Through the incarnation of the Son of God along with the image of God-likeness, the dignity 
of the human person becomes even more concrete and attains Christological significance.  
The Magisterial documents from the 19th Century onwards are all unanimous in proclaiming 
that the human embryo deserves the protection that is due to a human person right from the 
beginning of life. 
The Catholic Church’s view of human dignity is similar to the way Kant perceived about human 
dignity, namely that it springs from human agency and free will. However, the understanding 
of the Church goes far beyond the philosophical understanding because of being created in the 
image of God and likeness. 
The fact that human beings are created in the image of God was further incorporated into the 
working definition of human dignity. 
The discourse seen so far in this research has been instructive in several aspects. Therefore, 
finally the findings in the previous chapters (Chapters 1-3) were applied in the bioethical 
discussion regarding the beginning of life (Chapter 4). At the ethical level, the use of human 
dignity in bioethics as a normative principle can equally be applied to an embryo. In Chapter 5, 
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the problem of the individuation of an embryo was handled because it was necessary to see 
whether an embryo is a human being and a person. The problem is one of a philosophical nature 
and the dispute is whether an embryo is animated from the moment of conception, or after a 
later stage following fertilization. 
It was argued that the time of ensoulment does not play an important role when compared to 
the role of right to life and human dignity of an embryo right from the moment of its conception. 
Based on these deliberations a working definition of human dignity was suggested and the inner 
content of the definition was clarified. 
According to Spaemann, a person does not begin his/her existence after the human being, nor 
does he/she end his/her existence before the human being. The one criterion for personality is 
the biological membership of the human race (See Chapter 2.5.3 above). 
Thus, an embryo – being human because of its biological membership of the human race – is 
also inclusive in the above definition. With this definition in the background and having laid 
the foundations in Part I, the other Parts of this research will follow. 
146  
 
PART II 
Human Dignity from the Beginning of  Life: 
Moral Theological Perspectives in Germany 
Part II will deal with the question of human dignity from the beginning of life from a German 
Moral Theological Perspective.  
For a better clarification, this part is divided into four Chapters: 
The concept of Human Dignity in Bioethics is dealt with in Chapter 6. The next Chapter 7 deals 
with human dignity in the Teaching of the Catholic Church in Germany. The concept of person 
from a German Perspective is taken up in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 will deal with human dignity 
and beginning of life issues. 
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C H A P T E R  6  
BIOETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN DIGNITY  
IN GERMAN MORAL THEOLOGY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The demand for respect and protection of life based on human dignity and human rights and 
the recourse to them as already described is not limited only to international law or 
constitutional law of states. It is ubiquitous. In the field of bioethics, frequent reference is made 
to human dignity760, be it in the field of active euthanasia, Pre-implantation diagnosis, 
legitimating death penalty, cloning, embryonic stem cell research or other areas. Everyone in 
politics and law seems to make use of the concept of human dignity without having any doubt 
about its effectiveness and clear meaning.761 In Germany, as mentioned in the last Chapter, the 
debate in bioethics extends itself into all arenas, especially in politics, and is centred sometimes 
on the question of human dignity. However, in the debate on Bioethics, voices are raised against 
this assumption and the universality of human dignity is questioned. The argument of some are 
that human dignity is based either on metaphysical assumptions, e.g. Kant, or on theological 
assertions. Therefore, one can raise a question, how can these assumptions and assertions be 
accepted in either a pluralistic society or an ideologically neutral state? In this Chapter, an 
answer to the question in German Moral Theology will be attempted and the role of human 
dignity in bioethical discussions will be deliberated. 
6.2 PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL-POLITICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF HUMAN 
DIGNITY 
Chapter 4.3 above described how the concept of human dignity as a normative principle is used 
in the field of Bioethics and an example was given as to how some German Moral Theologians 
make use of the concept as an argument in this field. In this section, how and why this approach 
is made will be described from an analytical level. 
At the very outset, it must be acknowledged that the concept of human dignity plays a 
substantial role in Germany. As mentioned earlier, human dignity is ranked as the highest 
distinctive principle in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik, Deutschland).762 From a philosophical point of view, German Moral 
Theologians put forward the argument of Kant as one of the reasons for human dignity. His 
influence on the understanding of human dignity and its place it has received –in not only 
Philosophical Ethics and Catholic Ethics but also its incorporation into constitutional law 
(especially the German Constitutional Law, the Grundgesetz) – can hardly be overestimated.763 
Moreover, from a legal point of view, the argument frequently used by German Moral 
                                                 
760 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, Ethik des Lebens…, 226-227. 
761 Cf. BARANZKE, „Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…“, 47. 
762 Konrad HILPERT, „Begründung und Bedeutung der Menschenwürde“, in: DERS./Ulrich SCHROTH (Hg.), 
Politik – Recht – Ethik. Vergewisserungen aus der Vergangenheit und Perspektiven für die Zukunft, Kohl-hammer, 
Stuttgart 2011, 106-117; 112. Cf. also MARSCHÜTZ, theologisch ethisch nachdenken…, 241. 
763 Cf. HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity…”, 98. Cf. also HABERMAS, “Das Konzept 
der Menschenwürde...“, 343-344. 
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Theologians in Bioethics with regard to human dignity is the Grundgesetz.764 The opening 
words in this Grundgesetz affirm the dignity of the human being as the greatest value and basic 
principle of the Constitution, when it states, “The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and 
protect it shall be the duty of all state authority” (Art. I,1).765 
The importance given to the Grundgesetz is easily understandable in the context of twentieth 
century historical experience, namely the two World wars and the Holocaust that exterminated 
millions of human beings under the fascist dictatorship in Germany that had decried denial of 
human dignity under the Nazi regime. Millions of people either were forced to be subjects of 
experimentation against their will, or were tortured or killed for other reasons. Kurt Bayertz, a 
German Philosopher, in this context very rightly states: “The elevated status of the term human 
dignity in numerous international documents, as well as the specific duty to protect human 
dignity imposed on the State of Germany by its Basic Law, are to be viewed as the consequence 
of a history which is not to repeat itself.”766 Therefore, Habermas remarks that human rights 
developed in response to these violations of human dignity against the historical background of 
Holocaust and became morally charged and possibly even overcharged.767 The overarching 
importance attributed to Human Dignity in the German Constitution is undoubtedly a reaction 
to Nazi ideology, which was summarized in the horrid slogan, ‘You are nothing, your nation is 
all’. Thus the inalienable dignity of the individual had to be stressed…”768 Human dignity as it 
were, provides basic frame reference for human rights and for anything, which follows the 
Grundgesetz in the Constitution of Germany. It is interesting to note that the key function of 
the concept of human dignity in the Grundgesetz is more explicit than in the UDHR 1948. The 
Grundgesetz pursues a clear logical sequence, namely, it is from the basic fact of human dignity 
that the recognition of human rights are derived which are positive law in the sense that they 
can be claimed in court. It was already mentioned that human dignity is a notion that precedes 
Human Rights. In other words, human Rights are a judicial concretization of the more general 
concept of human dignity. Human Dignity as a concept belongs to a pre-political or pre-juridical 
realm; whereas, human rights belong to the positive law.769 
According to Spaemann, one cannot say that it is human right to have one’s dignity respected. 
Therefore, he remarks, “Dignity is rather the transcendental ground for the fact that human 
                                                 
764 See for example the following who often use the Grundgesetz in their bioethical arguments: REITER, 
„Bioethik…“, 8, REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz…“, 134, Johannes REITER, Menschliche Würde 
und christliche Verantwortung. Bedenkliches zu Technik, Ethik, Politik, Verlag Butzon & Bercker, Kevelaer 1989, 
51, SCHLÖGEL, „Zum Menschenwürdeargument...“, 87, IDEM, „‚Strapazierte Menschenwürde‘…“, 99, Cf. 
LEHMANN, „Vom Anfang des Menschseins…“, 219 and Josef RÖMELT, Christliche Ethik in moderner 
Gesellschaft. Band 2. Lebensbereiche, Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau 2009, 136. See also moral theologians who 
use the Grundgesetz in their general arguments in favour of human dignity: REITER, „Über die Ethik der 
Menschenwürde…“, 447, HILPERT, „Die Idee der Menschenwürde…“, 41 and IDEM, „Begründung und Bedeutung 
der Menschenwürde…“, 107 & 112. 
765 Cf. BARANZKE, „Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…“; 47. 
766 BAYERTZ, “Human Dignity. Philosophical Origin…”, 80. See SCHOCKENHOFF, Ethik des Lebens…, 241 
and Patrick VERSPIEREN, „Menschenwürde in der politischen und bioethischen Debatte“, in: Conc(D) 39 (2003) 
143-152; 144. 
767 HABERMAS, “Das Konzept der Menschenwürde...“, 344. 
768 HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity…”, 101. 
769 Cf. ibid., 93 & 101. 
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beings have rights and duties.”770 Moreover, Spaemann undoubtedly acknowledges that the idea 
of human dignity is older than human rights. The term “dignity” is something abstract and 
therefore neither can be defined with precision nor be defined at all because it expresses a basic 
quality of human beings. Only in an intuitive manner can one approach this difficult notion with 
the help of comparisons, analogies and examples.771 
Since human dignity is the basis of all human rights, as a legal-political application of human 
dignity, it aims at threats towards humanity (here it is concerned with bioethical issues 
pertaining to the beginning and end of life), human self-determination and self-unfolding, which 
originate from human action and its social consequences.772 Reiter explains that in the modern 
society the moral consensus of human dignity is enshrined in the first Article of the 
Grundgesetz. It is a cross-culturally accepted principle for ethical and legal assessment of the 
biological sciences as well as by the Enquete-Kommission of the German Parliament “Recht 
und Ethik der modernen Medizin” (2002) [Law and Ethics of Modern Medicine (2002)].773  
Further, referring to the Preamble of UDHR 1948, to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application 
of Biology and Medicine (Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine), 1997774 and the 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2000775, along with the Grundgesetz, Reiter 
concludes that these documents that base themselves on anthropological statements, contain 
clear and unambiguous guidelines, which explicitly affirm that human dignity applies equally 
to all people. Human dignity exists in human beings, and is not granted (Zuerkenntnis) but 
acknowledged (Anerkenntnis). The dignity is immanent from the moment of existence of a 
human being and is “co-extensive” with the life of the human person; it is not divisible in any 
phase of his/her life. The temporal sequence of life phases of a subject (embryo, foetus, child 
and adult) cannot be reinterpreted into a series of different subjects.776 This affirmation is 
necessary in order to apply the concept of human dignity contained in the Grundgesetz in 
bioethical discussions, especially with regard to the beginning or end of life issues. However, 
it must also be noted that the Grundgesetz does not save the parliament from extended and 
highly controversial debates such as Pre-implantation Diagnosis.777 
The socio-political application of the term and its legal institutionalisation as described above 
may be seen as an extension of the philosophical concept of human dignity. Some finer points 
about Kant’s categorical imperative is to be noted.  
                                                 
770 SPAEMANN, „Menschenwürde …“, 134. English tr. from IDEM, “Human Dignity…;27. 
771 IDEM, „Über den Begriff der Menschenwürde“, in: Grenzen. Zur ethischen Dimension des Handelns, Klett-
Cotta, Stuttgart 2001, 107-122; 109. 
772 BAYERTZ, “Human Dignity. Philosophical Origin…”, 80. 
773 Cf. REITER, „Bioethik…“, 8. See also IDEM, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz…“, 134; IDEM, „Über 
die Ethik der Menschenwürde…“, 434. 
774 See EUROPEAN CONVENTION, “European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights…, 1185-1195. 
775 See EUROPEAN UNION, “European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2000”, in: BROWNLIE/GOODWIN-
GILL (ed.), Basic Documents on Human Rights, op. cit., 806-816. 
776 The Working Definition that was arrived at (see Part I: Chapter 2.3 above) has taken into consideration 
these facts. Besides, See Reiter who writes: „Die zeitliche Folge von Lebensphasen eines Subjekts (Embryo, Fetus, 
Kind, Erwachsener) darf nicht in eine Aufeinanderfolge verschiedener Subjekte umgedeutet werden.“ REITER, 
„Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz…“, 135. 
777 Cf. HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity…”, 102. 
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First, in the phrase: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity […]”, the word ‘humanity’ does 
not denote biological species nor is it to be understood in a collective sense of humankind 
(Latin: genus humanum). According to Werner Wolbert, an Austrian Moral Theologian, this is 
the way that it is normally understood by the German word ‘Menschheit’. The English 
equivalent ‘humanity’ may be less misleading in that it denotes something specifically human 
(Latin: humanitas). What distinguishes human beings from other animals is reason, especially 
practical reason. By practical reason, it is meant here reason insofar as it can recognize moral 
law as a categorical imperative. Therefore, the human person as a moral being has to be treated 
as an end in itself. However, ‘moral being’ in this context does not mean a person who realizes 
morality, or lives according to moral rules, but insofar as the person is capable of perceiving a 
moral claim. This is because of the fact that if human dignity depended on the realization of 
moral goodness rather than on mere capability, human beings would be unequal in respect of 
their dignity. The reference to human dignity in an ethical context means that all humans are 
equal in respect. In this sense, dignity cannot depend on their realization of morality but only 
on their capacity to realize morality. When seen this way, that is, human beings not simply as 
a member of the biological species, the approach may not be accused of ‘speciesism’, as 
suggested by some defenders of animal liberation.778 
Wolbert argues, “This accusation would be justified if dignity were granted to the human being 
simply as a member of the biological species. The relevant feature, however, is not membership 
to the species Homo sapiens, but - as stated - the moral capacity of the person”.779 Kant made it 
clear that only two things have dignity: First, the moral attitude (moralische Gesinnung) or 
moral goodness, and second, the human person insofar as he or she is capable of morality (GMS 
IV, 435).780 
In the context of this research, one may ask the question: What kind of “capacity” is necessary 
for an embryo in order to be considered as a moral being with dignity? If one presupposes an 
active faculty, then even a newborn or a child in its early years would not have the dignity of a 
human being. However, an active capacity, as explained earlier, to set oneself certain ends to 
act consciously according to moral criteria is not required. A minimal requirement would be a 
passive potentiality. In order to consider a human being a person it is necessary that one can 
consider her or him at least as an addressee of the moral claim. The epistemological problem 
here is that one cannot fix with certainty the beginning of personhood (see Chapter 5 above). 
One can only presume that all descendants of human beings are to be considered as persons and 
bestowed with dignity. There may be good reasons at least to treat an embryo as a person from 
the moment of conception.781 
                                                 
778 Werner WOLBERT, “The Kantian Formula of Human Dignity and its Implications for Bioethics”, in: Human 
Reproduction and Genetic Ethics. An International Journal 4/1 (1998) 18-23; 18-19. Wolbert is referring to Singer. 
See SINGER, Practical Ethics…, 48-70. 
779 WOLBERT, “The Kantian Formula of Human Dignity…”, 19. 
780 „Also ist Sittlichkeit und die Menschheit, sofern sie derselben fähig ist, dasjenige, was allein Würde hat.“ 
KANT, „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten…“, 435. Cf. WOLBERT, “The Kantian Formula of Human 
Dignity…”, 19. 
781 Cf. ibid., 21. This problem was already introduced and certain remarks were made. A deeper analysis will 
follow in Chapter 8 on the Human Person and in Chapter 9 about the Beginning of Life issues of this research. 
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Second, in German Catholic Ethics along with Kant the imago Dei is also used as a theological 
foundation for human dignity. However, Kant himself had already sharply criticized this 
theological use. He did acknowledge the elevation of human race above nature. However, he 
confirms one of human dignity’s assertions, namely, freedom. It is human freedom, which 
serves as an indicator and guarantor for the prominent and elevated status of the human being 
over against nature.782 For Kant, the finest use of human freedom is materialized in the exercise 
of the second formulation of moral law, namely, “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in any other person, always at the same time as an end, never 
merely as a means” (GMS IV, 429). Human dignity consists precisely in this freedom when 
one acts on a practical imperative that distinguishes them from everything that is non-human. 
In stating this imperative, Kant actually is insisting on the autonomy of ethics and more 
importantly on the autonomy of human beings who are not just coerced by outside authorities. 
In exercising this autonomy, human beings manifest their dignity as human persons. Thus, Kant 
is replacing here the classical theological concept of imago Dei with the idea of the endowment 
of the human being with reason. Reason in human beings give them the power and enables them 
to exercise in freedom and follow the moral imperative.783 
Thus, the question of respecting the human dignity of another is based on a peculiar 
ambivalence in the mind of a subject’s freedom. According to Spaemann, from this 
ambivalence two different ideas of dignity could be violated. For example, in the Grundgesetz 
it is mentioned that human dignity is inviolable (unantastbar). Here dignity is to be understood 
as normative and not descriptive. Inviolability here can either mean that it is impossible to 
violate something, or it can mean, it should not be violated. These two meanings are related to 
that of the human persons as a subject of freedom. As such, they are not to be influenced in any 
way from the outside. On the other hand, however, there are also apparently acts that do infringe 
the dignity. One can understand this situation in which people present themselves not as free 
floating subjects in a vacuum but have a physical and psychic nature in which they can be 
infringed, regardless of their own will.784 
In the context of the concept of human dignity having a distinctive feature in German bioethical 
discussion, one may raise the question: Why is a frequent reference made to human dignity as 
a normative principle?785 Or, why does German Moral Theology even use this term in bioethical 
discussions – which has been borrowed from philosophy and Constitutions of Nations such as 
                                                 
782 Cf. HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity…”, 98. Cf. SPAEMANN, „Menschenwürde 
und menschliche Natur…“, 135. 
783 Cf. HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity…”, 98. 
784 Cf. SPAEMANN, “Menschenwürde und Menschliche Natur…”, 135. Spaemann says that freedom is the 
characteristic of the species homo sapiens. Nevertheless, human nature is not the only one characterized as a 
representation of freedom. Here Spaemann invites the readers to imagine some creatures from other stars and 
planets. The difference between those creatures and human beings would be that the former could not understand 
pain, for example, the pain of sleep deprivation. One can see that almost all the contents of our human will are 
natural content, which is determined by our contingent human nature. Only in its contingent nature is human 
dignity violable. Cf. ibid. 
785 Cf. BIRNBACHER, “Ambiguities…”, 107. See also REITER, „Bioethik…“, 7-8. Reiter is of the opinion that 
it is a debatable question when it comes to the moral basis of Bioethics. A moral consensus in modern societies is 
sparse. It comprises only a limited repertoire of values and norms, which in essence relate to the protection of 
human dignity. 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, the Grundgesetz786 among others, which 
until the 1960s was never a theme in theology – in Lexicons or Ethics?787  
The common arguments in favour of human dignity among moral theologians in Germany in 
the field of bioethics stems from the fact that the concept was already in use in the ancient 
Philosophy such as Cicero, the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods.788  
There are also some specific arguments that the moral theologians in Germany use. They are: 
First, the most important argument comes from Kant who developed the concept of dignity and 
which later became a central concept of ethics, especially in his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik 
der Sitten, more specifically his definition of human dignity (GMS IV, 434; see Chapter 2.3 
above).789  
Second, the argument given is one that is based on the categorical imperative of Kant (GMS 
IV, 429; see Chapter 2.3 above).790 
Third, the doctrine of dignity that Kant held demands equal respect for all persons (MS VI, 434-
435; see Chapter 2.3 above) and which forbids the use of another person merely as a means to 
one’s own ends.791 
Fourth, the argument frequently used from a legal-ethical point of view is the Grundgesetz. 
All the above four arguments point to the fact that the use of the concept of human dignity as a 
normative principle is frequent in German Moral Theology. However, there are also authors 
who would differ from these arguments. It must also be noted here that although the criterion 
of human dignity is used frequently in bioethical discussion in Germany, it is not a favourite 
theme among moral theologians in other countries to use similar arguments based on human 
dignity.792 
As a conclusion to this section, besides other important factors, two of them play a major role 
in bioethical decisions in Germany. The first, as already described, is the influence of the 
Enlightenment philosopher Kant and the second, the historically and philosophically influenced 
Grundgesetz (alongside the theological influence that will be seen below) with regard to the 
                                                 
786 BUNDESMINISTERIUMS DER JUSTIZ, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, op. cit., Artikel 1 Abs. 1. 
787 Cf. REITER, „Über die Ethik der Menschenwürde…“, 434. In his footnote, Reiter mentions the second 
edition of LThK. There is no mention about the term human dignity in this edition. However, in a later edition, 
Konrad Hilpert, a German Moral Theologian, deals with the concept. See for example in Konrad HILPERT, 
„Menschenwürde“, in: LThK3 7 (1998) 132-137. German Medical Professional Helmut Weber dedicates only a 
single paragraph in the new Moral handbooks regarding the concept, especially in his special Moral theology. See 
Helmut WEBER, Spezielle Moraltheologie. Grundfragen des christlichen Lebens, Styria, Graz/Wien/Köln 1999, 
73-83. However, at present the volume of literature on the topic of human dignity is enormous. See for example 
the literature that Hilpert cites in his article: HILPERT, „Die Idee der Menschenwürde…“, 54. 
788 For a helpful text on the historical development of the concept of human dignity see Konrad HILPERT, 
„Menschenwürde“, in: LThK3 (Sonderausgabe) 7 (2009) 132-137 and PÖSCHL/KONDYLIS, „Würde…“, 637-677. 
789 See for example the following moral theologians among others: Cf. Reiter, Menschliche Würde und 
christliche Verantwortung…, 46-47 and 50. See also Reiter, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz…“, 133-
134. Cf. also Idem, „Über die Ethik der Menschenwürde…“, 446, Schlögel, „Zum Menschenwürdeargument...“, 
85, Horstmann, „Menschenwürde…“, 1125 and Wils, „Zur Typologie…“, 145. 
790 See for example: SCHLÖGEL, „Zum Menschenwürdeargument...“, 85-86 and IDEM, „‚Strapazierte 
Menschenwürde‘…, 98. 
791 KANT, „Die Metaphysik der Sitten“, 434-435. Cf. JAMES, “Human Dignity…”, 129-130. 
792 Compared to the English speaking and Italian countries, the concept of human dignity is very frequently 
used in German Moral Theology. Cf. SCHLÖGEL, „Zum Menschenwürdeargument...“, 84. See also BIRNBACHER, 
“Ambiguities…”, 107. Birnbacher says, “Frequent reference to Menschenwürde as a normative principle is a 
distinctive feature of German bioethical discussion.” Ibid. 
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important role that human dignity plays in bioethics from a philosophical and ethical-legal point 
of view.793 
6.3 THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
Reiter suggests three aspects under which the encompassing action of God towards human 
persons can be seen as the theological foundation of human dignity, namely, creation theology, 
Christological-soteriological and an eschatological theology.794 
6.3.1 Human Dignity under the Aspect of Creation theology 
The concept of the image of God is one of the standard arguments for the biblical and 
theological point of view of human dignity.795 
Erwin Dirscherl, a systematic theologian in Regensburg, explains the importance of the image 
of God concept, which forms the core of biblical anthropology in the Book of Genesis. The 
decision was to make man and woman as God’s deputy (Stellvertreter on earth in the sense of 
being His representative, Repräsentant). The importance of the meaning of this representation 
as repraesentatio dei lies in the fact that human beings are bearers of this dynamic decision of 
God. Although the human himself/herself did not constitute it, the meaning of the image of God 
is received in him/her through His decision. Human creation is a decision which is already 
contained in the phrase “let us make man in our own image and likeness”. It is from here that 
                                                 
793 For an exhaustive list of other sources in ethics and law, see REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre 
Relevanz …“, 146-147 at fn.10. 
794 Cf. ibid., 136-138 and IDEM, Menschliche Würde und christliche Verantwortung…,54-57. 
795 See for example HILPERT, „Die Idee der Menschenwürde…“, 43-44, SCHLÖGEL, „Zum Menschenwürde-
argument...“, 88, IDEM, „‚Strapazierte Menschenwürde‘…“, 100-102, SCHOCKENHOFF, „Menschenwürde und 
Lebensschutz. Theologische Perspektiven...“, 458-461 and IDEM, „Lebensbeginn und Menschenwürde…“, 202-
204. 
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he/she receives the decision.796 The human person points back to the Creator himself (who is 
invisible and imageless) in His creation of human beings as God’s deputy (Stellvertreter) and 
His representative (Repräsentant). Here, in a unique way a program of theological 
anthropology, in the best sense of the term, is presented. This is because the theological 
statement is presented in absolute inner anthropological relation. In other words, one can only 
talk about God when one speaks about humans and similarly one can speak about humans only 
when one is talking about God!797 
In order to appeal to the contemporary philosophers and intellectually educated listeners with 
regard to the interpretation of the biblical idea of the image of God, Hilpert gives a precise 
answer to the question about the content of the image and likeness and to whom it is given. As 
for the content of the image of God likeness, he answers that it consists in the mind and reason 
of human nature. This was later implied as “conscience”; which is expressly incorporated in 
Article 1 of the UDHR.798 With regard to the second question, Hilpert answers that it is given 
in a manner proper to dignity of all human persons. With regard to this equal dignity of all, 
                                                 
796 Dirscherl states: „Es ist entschieden, dass der Mensch Stellvertreter bzw. Stellvertreterin Gottes in der Welt 
und in diesem Sinne Repräsentant/in Gottes ist. Die Bedeutung der Abbildlichkeit liegt in der repraesentatio dei 
im Sinne einer dynamischen, in der Zeit auszuübenden Entschiedenheit. Diese Bedeutung der Gottebenbildlichkeit 
hat der Mensch immer schon empfangen, er hat sie nicht selbst konstituiert. Der Mensch ist in diese Bedeutung 
eingesetzt – damit ist schon über ihn entschieden und von dorther erhält der Mensch seine Entschiedenheit.“ See 
Erwin DIRSCHERL, Grundriss Theologischer Anthropologie. Die Entschiedenheit des Menschen angesichts des 
Anderen, Friedrich Pustet, Regensburg 2006, 114-115. Emphasis in original. The word „Stellvertreter“ has been 
translated as deputy and the word „Repräsentant“ as representative when spoken of human beings made in the 
image of God. Perhaps, as deputy one needs to understand as collaborators with God or in the sense that human 
beings are co-creators with God and seen as ambassadors especially when it comes to the question of the 
stewardship over creation. Protestant theologian Philip Hefner had introduced the term “created co-creator”. The 
word “created co-creators” was used in the understanding of the imago Dei as humans who play a significant role 
in bringing creation and history to its completion. See Philip HEFNER, “The Evolution of the Created Co-Creator”, 
in: Ted PETERS (ed.), Cosmos as Creation, Abingdon, Nashville 1989, 211-233; 211. However, Rahner had already 
anticipated something similar about humans in relation to God and creation. See Karl RAHNER, “The Experiment 
with Man. Theological Observations on Man’s Self-Manipulation”, in: Theological Investigations 9, tr. by Graham 
HARRISON, Herder and Herder, New York 1972, 205-224; RAHNER, “The Problem of Genetic Manipulation…”, 
225-249. Cf. also Bart HANSEN/Paul SCHOTSMANS, “Cloning. The Human as Created Co-Creator?”, in: Ethical 
Perspectives 8 (2001) 75-89; 84. With regard to the word „Stellvertreter“, Jürgen Moltmann gives another 
explanation, namely, that “image of God” is an oriental ruler title. According to this interpretation, only the king 
is God’s image on earth and he is His deputy (Stellvertreter) to his people. That gives him absolute authority and 
demands total obedience from his subjects. He is responsible only to the gods, for he belongs to them. He is not 
accountable to anyone else. If ever the gods reject him, it would be his end. Cf. Jürgen MOLTMANN, „Was ist der 
Mensch? Von der anthropozentrischen zur komischen Anthropologie“, in: International Journal of Orthodox 
Theology 2/3 (2011) 21-51; 23. Cf. Thomas A. SHANNON/James J. WALTER, The New Genetic Medicine. 
Theological and Ethical Reflections, Sheed & Ward, Maryland/Oxford 2003, 7-17; 8. 
797 Cf. DOHMEN, „Zwischen Gott und Welt…“, 27-28. 
798 Hilpert writes: „Die Gottebenbildlichkeit besteht in der Geist- und Vernunftnatur des Menschen. Damit war 
mitgemeint, was später – und der Artikel 1 der Menschenrechtserklärung der Vereinten Nationen hat das 
ausdrücklich aufgenommen – als „Gewissen“ bezeichnet wurde. Die Antwort auf die zweite Frage lautete: Diese 
Würde ist allen Menschen als Menschen zu Eigen.“ See HILPERT, „Begründung und Bedeutung der 
Menschenwürde…“, 108-109. Article 1 of UDHR reads, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.” See UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948”, op. cit., 24. 
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there is no qualitative difference between people in their creation, in their cultural or ethnic 
origin, sex, or to which state of affairs they wish to belong.799 
Ratzinger asserts that the image of God in human beings is actually a reflection of the real God 
who is: 
[…] by his very nature entirely being-for (Father), being-from (Son), and being-with (Holy 
Spirit). Man, for his part, is God’s image precisely insofar as the “from,” “with,” and “for” 
constitute the fundamental anthropological pattern.800 
Thus, Ratzinger finds an anthropological pattern in the image of God. Therefore, he warns that 
when one attempts to free oneself from this pattern, then one is not on the way to divinity but 
dehumanization. It leads one to the destruction of being itself through the destruction of the 
truth.801 It is quite understandable here when one can read these statements in connection with 
the problem of abortion (the reference to which is made by Ratzinger earlier on in this article). 
There he speaks of some people who claim that abortion must be left to the freedom of the 
mother’s choice. Ratzinger says that in choosing so the mother infringes on the freedom of the 
growing embryo. He puts a rhetorical question: “The question we must therefore ask is this: 
“exactly what sort of freedom has even the right to annul another’s freedom as soon as it 
begins?”802 The problem here is that the freedom that flows from fundamental figure of human 
existence itself is under attack. It also assails it even before an individual has a chance to live 
and act.803 One can conclude here that destruction of an embryo –  abortion as one solid example 
– would distort the very image of God in the growing person, which is not a way to divinity but 
rather only a way to dehumanization. 
It must also be noted that the biblical books do not conceive of human dignity as something 
inherent within the human, rather God imparts dignity to the human persons. In other words, 
humans receive their dignity from God. This basic assertion is found in modern philosophy 
such as in Spaemann804, in modern philosophy of law and in theological ethics. This assertion 
is applied to all human beings regardless of their status in the society.805 
The image of God concept of the OT is testified in the NT with regard to Jesus Christ who is 
spoken of not only in terms of his humanity, but also in terms of his pre-existence: “He is the 
image of the invisible God himself” (Col 1,15).806 Human dignity is irrevocably given and 
confirmed through the incarnation of the Son of God who enters into history as a true human 
being. In his humanity, the love of God for human beings is manifested.807 This point will be 
elaborated in the next section. 
                                                 
799 HILPERT, „Begründung und Bedeutung der Menschenwürde…“, 109. Cf. also IDEM, Menschenrechte und 
Theologie. Forschungsbeiträge zur ethischen Dimension der Menschenrechte, Universitätsverlag/Herder, 
Freiburg Schweiz/Freiburg i. Br./Wien 2001, 358. 
800 English tr. from Joseph RATZINGER, “Truth and Freedom”, in: Communio: International Catholic Review 
23/1 (1996) 16-35; 28. Original German version: IDEM, „Freiheit und Wahrheit“, in: IKaZ 24 (1995) 527-542; 536. 
801 Cf. IDEM, “Truth and Freedom…”, 28. 
802 Ibid., 27. 
803 Cf. ibid. 27-28. 
804 SPAEMANN, „Über den Begriff der Menschenwürde…“, 107-122. 
805 HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity…”, 96-97. 
806 Cf. DIRSCHERL, „Über spannende Beziehungen…“, 63. 
807 Cf. REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz …“, 137. 
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6.3.2 Christological-Soteriological Aspect of Human Dignity 
The image of God likeness in human persons, as described above, is variously resorted to in the 
NT in order to justify individual ethical demands. In the NT, Jesus Christ is the true and only 
“image of the invisible God” (Col 1,15).808 Those who believe in Jesus Christ through the grace 
of God in baptism are moulded into his own image. In this manner, God places people before 
Jesus Christ in His image and likeness, that they may know the lofty dignity to which they are 
called. The special dignity of human persons is not grounded in his/her own “characteristic” of 
nature, but in a supporting relationship with Jesus, accomplished through God’s creative 
word.809 
Jesus being free from the chain of sins seizes to himself in his dignity those who are affected, 
while at the same time respecting the freedom of others until his death. His life and his work 
were liberating, in that all are redeemed from sin. His involvement was especially with those 
who were persecuted, the sinners and the sick, in other words, those who could not help 
themselves.810 
Thus, one can observe that the German moral theologians have brought out not only the 
relationship between Jesus and human beings in their sharing of the image of God with him, 
but also soteriological aspect that extends to all people, especially those who are insignificant 
and who cannot help themselves. 
6.3.3 Eschatological Aspect of Human Dignity 
The third theological foundation of human dignity is the eschatological aspect. Reiter explains 
this aspect in the following way. The eschatological message speaks of the Parousia and of the 
prominent state of perfection of human persons and the world. It depends on the human persons 
to leave not only the historical form of existence – which includes the immortal soul, love or 
the works that they once did  – but also the concrete existence so that the gift of God will be 
manifested in the future (cf. GS 39). In aiming at this state, in which the “new person” would 
be born, one sees the present state as one’s-own-self-yet-hidden, as the not-yet-mature, but to 
that state in which one is called-to-perfection. The concept of human dignity should take into 
account this aspect of human imperfection. Owing to the sin of the world and the general 
wretchedness, the concrete human person falls short of the ideal. Human nature is not fully 
dominated by his/her personality, and burdened with disease, suffering and death. Because of 
alienation from God, human persons are alienated from the world, from others and from self. 
The dignity and the image of God in human persons are thus overshadowed by many such grey 
shades. However, the dominion over nature, the victory of life over death is still in his/her reach. 
This is realized only in an eschatological order that is true of the world and its history. In an 
outstanding act of salvation, Christ will bring the world to fulfillment. This eschatological 
aspect clearly emphasizes once again that the dignity of the human person comes from the 
transcendence, that he/she will be bestowed at the end. 811 
                                                 
808 Cf. SCHLÖGEL, „Zum Menschenwürdeargument...“, 88. 
809 Cf. ibid. 
810 Cf. REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz …“, 137. 
811 Cf. ibid., 137-138. 
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This means that human dignity is respected insofar as one acknowledges the imperfection of 
human person, with an expectation at the same time that one also overcomes it. What 
distinguishes this theological conception of dignity from any other proposed conceptualization? 
The liberal, pluralist State law states that the person has an inalienable dignity. However, the 
ultimate reason for the inalienable dignity cannot be explained by the State. The question about 
the ultimate cause is answered differently. It is in the Christian faith – which is founded on a 
purely rational interpretation of the absolute claim of human dignity – a deeper meaning is 
achieved.812 
Thus, the core of a theological foundation of human dignity lies in the assertion that the 
foundation and goal of human persons lies in the fact that human dignity is ultimately grounded 
not on demonstrable skills and qualities of humans, but that God has spoken to human persons 
and that He is the one who maintains all human contrary laws. On the one hand, the triple-
compound proximity of humans to God – the Creator God’s image in humans, God made man 
as a brother, God in perfecting a new man – is theologically speaking, the final legitimation of 
human dignity. On the other hand, in such well-founded human dignity, disposability of the 
human being for the sake of another deprives human dignity of any foundation.813 
Hence, in this respect of eschatological aspect of human dignity, one can see that human dignity 
is not based on qualities present in a human person. That is to say, when one speaks from the 
point of view of an embryo, one need not look for the qualities that are already manifested in it 
in order to claim for itself human dignity. 
6.4 A THEOLOGICAL ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN 
DIGNITY 
It was mentioned above that German Moral Theology makes uses of the secular Instruments 
such as the UDHR 1948 and Grundgesetz in theological arguments favouring human dignity. 
This is because of the fact that the Grundgesetz contains traces of elements not only of the 
Kantian roots but also biblical.814 However, Schockenhoff expresses his doubts regarding the 
usefulness of the prominent position of human dignity that is guaranteed by the UDHR 1948 
and the Grundgesetz. The reason is that no common understanding has been arrived based on 
which a moral argument could be agreed. Therefore, a distinction in the concept of human 
dignity is required, in order to make it possible to use it in secular fields too. If the idea of 
human dignity is to have a normative function, in the sense that it is eligible for recognition 
from a rational point of view, it must remain only as a nominal term. In its normative use, it 
outlines the mutually non-disposable realm of life, acknowledging one another, respecting each 
other as free rational beings. The normative core of the concept of human dignity consists in 
making human persons moral through his/her capacity to be able to act freely and in a lifestyle, 
which is autonomous.815 
From this restriction on the moral capacity to act as such, one can derive a second meaning of 
the term “human dignity”. This meaning is often found in Church documents and her preaching, 
                                                 
812 Cf. IDEM, Menschliche Würde und christliche Verantwortung…, 56. 
813 Cf. ibid., 56-57; IDEM, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz …“, 138. 
814 HAILER/RITSCHL, “The General Notion of Human Dignity…”, 99. 
815 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, „Lebensbeginn und Menschenwürde…“, 204-205. 
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namely, in its use of the humanization of the public-political space, or individual life 
phenomena such as in marriage and family, love and sexuality, illness, death and dying. It is 
through this meaning of the term “human dignity” that it expands its claim beyond a normative 
minimum requirement in addition to a summarization of the anthropological linguistic meaning 
of the Christian faith. Both the ideas which overlap in our everyday language when one speaks 
of human dignity can complement each other in view of the moral responsibility of the 
individual or the structure that promotes the individual welfare in a “good” society; although, 
they almost exclude each other at one point. In its normative sense, the idea of human dignity 
designates a categorical boundary that is placed at every attempt in the realization of its second 
expanded role.816 
This primacy of the normative boundary plays a crucial role in democratic societies, because in 
a comprehensive sense they are founded on their own self-understanding and no longer in the 
order of virtue and truth, but the production and conservation of peace and justice for everyone. 
Just because one agrees no longer in our open societies on mandatory contents of a “dignified 
life”, one needs the minimal concept of dignity to give it a binding legal form. It is not 
dependent on a social agreement which is created by cultural attribution, but which must be 
recognized by everyone as required by the law as a foundation to this limiting condition. It is 
within this concept under which lie all the commitment for the welfare of the people and 
improving their living conditions. It reminds one that human persons are an end-in-
himself/herself and of the fundamental moral principle of the prohibition of 
instrumentalization817: “Every person is to be respected for his/her own sake and must never be 
willed exclusively as a means to an end outside its intended purpose.”818 
Schockenhoff’s conclusion that the concept human dignity entails two meanings, namely, the 
categorical normative meaning of respect for oneself and others and the humane purpose, helps 
first to resolve the problem between the Secular State and the individual citizen. In this respect, 
the recognition of human dignity is not only a possible proposal, whose acceptance is left to the 
discretion of the individual, but also a binding interpretive principle, which is the normative 
basis of the entire state system.819 
However, Schockenhoff poses his skepticism about the use of the principle of human dignity. 
For him, from a meta-ethical point of view, the formula of the inalienable human dignity which 
is often held, serves only the affirmation of formal moral insights, but does not contribute to 
the substantive definition of what is morally correct or not. This is true in many bioethical 
conflict decisions in which a careful weighing of goods and effect assessment is required, to 
the extent that the realization of what is morally right or wrong action cannot be derived from 
human dignity alone. As a negative evaluative criterion that forbids one the unrestricted 
instrumentalization of human life, the appeal to human dignity does not give one still any 
exhaustive positive target into which direction one should direct the future biomedical research. 
                                                 
816 Cf. ibid., 205. 
817 Cf. ibid., 205-206. 
818 „Jeder Mensch ist um seiner selbst willen zu achten und darf niemals ausschließlich als Mittel zu einem 
seiner Existenz fremden Zweck gewollt werden.“ SCHOCKENHOFF, „Lebensbeginn und Menschenwürde…“, 206. 
Tr. by author. See also IDEM, Ethik des Lebens…, 237. 
819 Cf. ibid., 237. 
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In other words, the principle of human dignity only formulates a few absolute obligations, but 
not a complete set of obligations to act. It reminds us only of what one cannot do under any 
circumstances; however, it does not tell us all what one must do in order to survive the challenge 
of the growing possibilities of the technological manipulation of life.820 
Schockenhoff then says that the above argument ignores, therefore, that such normative barriers 
just bring with it in ethical conflict situations through the categorical exclusion of certain actions 
a substantive limitation of what is morally correct. The question of the ethical permissibility of 
human experiment might serve as an example of the prohibition of the use of embryo in 
research. Interventions in the early stages of human life can have a consequence on the 
preliminary decision over the personal freedom of others, which tantamount to determination 
of its future heteronomous inescapable fate. Hence, the natural development process must be 
included within the extension of protection of human dignity, which will qualify to be an 
ethically self-determined human being at a later stage of its existence. This conclusion is not 
based on an ad hoc assumption, which would have been especially designed for the earliest 
stages of human life in order to justify the prohibition of using human embryos in research. It 
represents rather the appropriate application of a general principle to a particularly problematic 
area, namely the protection of life and for the conflicts between born and unborn and not unlike 
the conflicts over the already born.821 
6.5 THE SANCTITY OF LIFE ISSUES IN BIOETHICS OF AN EMBRYO 
The concept of sanctity of life was something unfamiliar to German moral theology before the 
1970s. Until the last decade, it was a contentious part of the public debate on bioethical issues.822 
It must be noted that contemporary discussion about sanctity of life does not focus on an ethics 
derived from a particular religion. The problem could lie in the fact that when the term “sanctity 
of life” is translated literally into German as “Heiligkeit des Lebens” (meaning “holiness of 
life/sacredness of life”), it may be misunderstood in a religious sense.823 For example, when 
Quante writes about human dignity, he refers to two traditions. One of the tradition interprets 
“human dignity” within the framework of “sanctity of human life” („Heiligkeit des 
menschlichen Lebens“). In this tradition, the special status of human life is justified by the fact 
“that God has bestowed on human life this special ethical value”.824 According to Quante, the 
theological thrust of this argument is illustrated by the term “sanctity” (“Heiligkeit”). For him 
in a pluralistic and secular society, such a theological justification of moral claim and above all 
as a legal claim is problematic. Therefore, according to him many authors have attempted to 
                                                 
820 Cf. ibid., 238. 
821 Cf. ibid., 238-239. 
822 Cf. BARANZKE, „Heiligkeit des Lebens…“, 87. Cf. Herbert SCHLÖGEL, „Heiligkeit des Lebens – Ehrfurcht 
vor dem Leben. Nützliche Begriffe in der Bioethik“, in: IKaZ 31 (2002) 556-564, 556. 
823 Cf. LOEWENICH, “Sanctity of Life…”, 229. 
824 „dass Gott dem menschlichen Leben diesen besonderen ethischen Wert verliehen hat“. Michael QUANTE, 
Menschenwürde und personale Autonomie. Demokratische Werte im Kontext der Lebenswissenschaften, Felix 
Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 2010, 37. Tr. by author. Cf. Friedo RICKEN, „Menschenwürde und Recht auf Leben“, in: 
ThPh 86 (2011) 574-577; 576. 
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analyse “sanctity” (“Heiligkeit”) in a non-theological concept.825 Given this background of the 
confusion over “human dignity” and “sanctity of life”, there is a need to discuss about the 
concept in German Moral Theology to place it into a right perspective  
The contention over the concept of “sanctity of life” is in fact a great hindrance to bioethical 
progress.826 The problem is that all established fundamental ethical principles, behavioral norms 
and values are bypassed too lightly. In addition, the construct from Singer and his followers 
from a utilitarian argumentative principles based on empirical-scientific view of human beings 
in a supposedly held tradition of Locke will have deep troubling repercussions.827 From a 
utilitarian approach, Singer and Kuhse show that there is no basis for the sanctity of life in a 
rational ethic.828 
Singer and Kuhse argue that the concept of “sanctity of life” is a consequence or even a relic of 
Judeo-Christian tradition. They derive the support for their opinion from the fact that sanctity 
of life is a part of Judeo-Christian morality by giving examples of some exotic peoples whose 
respect for human life, although not abolished, at least is very limited.829 
Mirijam Zimmerman and Ruben Zimmerman, both German Protestant Theologians, while 
critically confronting Kuhse and Singer, attempt to do justice to the phenomenon of the 
“sanctity of life” by interpreting it as a myth. According to Zimmerman and Zimmerman, the 
concept of “sanctity of life” requires the understanding of a given-ness of life (Gegebenseins 
des Lebens). This requires a wider claim than the Judeo-Christian tradition, which is only a 
historical formation of the phenomenon.830 
It is to be noted that from the ethical justification point of view the “sanctity of life” concept is 
not a normative statement. However, the bioethical debate over the concept has shown that one 
cannot bypass without treating the theoretical principles. When one does that, it can manifest 
itself in various forms of utilitarian expressions (like that of Singer, Hoerster). Therefore, 
Zimmermann and Zimmermann stress that the idea of “sanctity of life” be independent of 
religious and cultural backgrounds.831 
The term “sanctity of life” is commonly used neither in the tradition of Catholic moral theology 
nor in the Protestant ethic, although its contents have been. This is because “sanctity of life” 
indeed has a theological background, but in no way is it used only in this context. On the 
contrary, this term was used partially to move away from a creation-theological foundation of 
the dignity of the human person, in order to enshrine the person in a secular framework. 
                                                 
825 Cf. QUANTE, Menschenwürde und personale Autonomie..., 37. The second tradition sees the justification in 
the ability of people to “live their lives autonomously, in the sense that they can decide and judge for themselves 
in the light of self-given moral rules” („ihr Leben autonom zu führen, und zwar in dem Sinn, dass sie im Lichte 
selbst gegebener moralischer Regeln entscheiden und urteilen können“). Ibid.  Tr. by author. The concept of 
autonomy is outside the scope of this research and is not treated here. Cf. also RICKEN, „Menschenwürde und 
Recht auf Leben…“, 576. 
826 Cf. SCHLÖGEL, „Heiligkeit des Lebens…“, 556. Cf. also BARANZKE, „Heiligkeit des Lebens…“, 88-89. 
827 Ibid., 89. 
828 Cf. KUHSE/SINGER, Should the Baby Live?..., 118-139. Cf. SCHLÖGEL, „Heiligkeit des Lebens…“, 557. A 
debate over the theories of Kuhse and Singer can be found in Mirijam ZIMMERMANN/Ruben ZIMMERMANN, „‚Der 
Heiligkeit des Lebens‘ in der Medizin. Eine Entgegnung“, in: ZEE 41 (1997) 217-227. 
829 Cf. LOEWENICH, “Sanctity of Life…”, 229. Cf. also KUHSE/SINGER, Should the Baby Live?..., 125. 
830 ZIMMERMANN/ZIMMERMANN, „‚Der Heiligkeit des Lebens‘…“, 217-227. According to research in more 
recent times, myths do not deal with fairy tales and ancient gods but with the reflection on reality experiences. 
831 Ibid., 223-224. 
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Schockenhoff describes that it has become “a kind of secular alternative formula for the 
sovereign right of God”.832 
As seen above, although different aspects of “sanctity of life” have been highlighted and can 
assimilate together to form its basis, these aspects of it as a myth or a theological argument are 
not acceptable to all. In a utilitarian model of medical ethics, these aspects seem to be viable as 
a reference point as well as a concept that can protect human life, which begins at birth, and to 
trust that rationality prevails at a minimum in all bio-political decisions. Perhaps, in this respect, 
the notion of “sanctity of life” remains a useful and meaningful concept.833 
Besides the above aspects of sanctity of life, the concept “reverence for life” (which is usually 
associated with Albert Schweitzer in the context of environmental ethics) has also been used as 
a basic attitude towards human life. Reverence for life has many facets and one of them, 
according to Habermas, is the following insight. Although in a pluralistic society, it is difficult 
to accept that an embryo could be granted absolute protection of life like that, which individuals 
as bearers of fundamental rights enjoy, yet the fact that an embryo be considered as a second 
person in the becoming, is a remarkable insight. Aspects like, recognition of the fact that the 
foetus is a second person, to know that interventions on it are unilateral and not reciprocal, in 
the long run to maintain its self-determination; are all those that show respect for an embryo 
and meaningful in medical ethics.834 
Thus, one can conclude that the terms such as “sanctity of life” and “reverence for life” does 
not provide direct and immediate help for the debate on normative ethics in bioethical issues. 
However, they are helpful and useful insofar as they name a policy framework within which 
the debate on ethical standards can be extended.835 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
It was mentioned in the last Chapter that human dignity is a fundamental principle in bioethics. 
In Germany, especially as an aftermath of the war, the concept proved to be very helpful to all 
the people in bringing unification within a pluralistic society. Today, it has become the epitome 
of humanity. It serves as a common reference point for people of all races, religions and 
cultures.836 Four results can be seen from its acceptance. 
First, as a fundamental principle the concept of dignity gains its fuller foundation as a normative 
basis in German moral theology. For example, Reiter analyses the more recent and currently 
debatable questions on Cloning, Stem-cell Research, Stem-Cell import, Pre-implantation 
diagnosis, Euthanasia from the normative principle of human dignity.837 It was also noted that 
the normative basis of human dignity alone is insufficient in a secular society. A second 
                                                 
832 „zu einer Art säkularen Ersatzformel für das Hoheitsrecht Gottes geworden.“ Eberhard SCHOCKENHOFF, 
Ethik des Lebens. Ein theologischer Grundriss (Welt der Theologie), Matthias-Grünewald-Verl., Mainz 1998, 186. 
Tr. by author. It is interesting to note that Schockenhoff does not deal anymore with the concept of sanctity of life 
as one can see from his newer editions of “Ethik des Lebens” (2009 and 2013 editions). See. SCHLÖGEL, „Heiligkeit 
des Lebens…“, 559-560. Here, Schlögel mentions about Schockenhoff‘s previous edition of „Ethik des Lebens“ 
(1993 edition) and the use of the term. 
833 Cf. SCHLÖGEL, „Heiligkeit des Lebens…“, 562. 
834 Cf. ibid., 562-563. 
835 Cf. ibid. 563.  
836 Cf. IDEM, „Zum Menschenwürdeargument...“, 91. 
837 See REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz …“, 138-145. 
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meaning of human dignity, namely, a humane one is also essential. Both these meanings 
complement each other in view of the moral responsibility of the individual and the society. 
Second, in Germany, the appeal to the Grundgesetz is very common in their moral theology. 
Besides other reasons, the Grundgesetz has both the biblical and Kantian roots. Therefore, this 
instrument is more widely used in bioethical discussions in Germany. Following Kant, it was 
said that human dignity consists precisely in the freedom of human persons insofar as they have 
the capacity to act on the categorical imperative. Human persons have intrinsic dignity, not 
because they belong to the human species, but because they possess the claim to morality. If 
not an active capacity, at least as a minimal requirement would be a passive potentiality. In this 
respect, provided an embryo can be considered as a person in potency, one could say that it too 
can be considered as an addressee of moral claim. Further, an ethical-legal affirmation of human 
dignity is necessary (such as in the Grundgesetz) in order to serve both its categorical and 
anthropological meaning. 
Third, the secular understanding of human dignity is not contrary to the religious understanding. 
They complement one another. From a theological point of view, three realities of human 
dignity come to the forefront. First, the dignity of the human person is grounded in his or her 
being created in the image and likeness of God. Second, her or his vocation is made known 
through the redemptive-soteriological act of Jesus Christ to become the child of God. Third, 
human beings participate in the eschatological transcendence in the divine vision in heaven. 
The eschatological perspective also reminds us that human dignity is respected in spite of the 
imperfection of human person with a hope of overcoming it in the future. 
Fourth, it is also to be noted that the principle of human dignity only formulates a few absolute 
obligations, but not a complete set of obligations to act. Hence the natural development process, 
say for example a growing embryo, must be included within the extension of protection of 
human dignity, which will qualify to be an ethically self-determined human being at a later 
stage of its existence. 
In the last analysis, one can say that a human embryo is worthy of all the above four points that 
was noted above and hence has inherent dignity. The next Chapter will deal with how the 
teaching of the Catholic Church in Germany deliberates on the concept of human dignity. 
The sanctity of life is a useful and meaningful concept insofar as the protection of life in its 
weakest forms, such as an embryo, is concerned. However, the concept does not provide direct 
and immediate help for the debate on normative ethics in bioethical issues.
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C H A P T E R  7  
HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE TEACHINGS 
OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN GERMANY 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter deals with some of the important interventions of the German Bishop Conference 
with regard to the question of human dignity. At the outset, one can acknowledge that in 
Germany the Bishop Conference have found ways and methods that try to bring in a correlation 
between the State and the Catholic Church. This approach is important in a European multi-
cultural context. This Chapter will deal with five important documents published by the Bishop 
Conference. It is to be noted that these documents examined here are not the only documents 
that deal with the issue of human dignity. Several press releases do appear every now and then 
in this regard. 
7.2 GOD LOVES ALL THAT LIVES: CHALLENGES AND TASKS FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF LIFE 
The Joint Declaration of the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany and the German 
Bishops’ Conference brought out a document in 1989 named, “Gott ist ein Freund des Lebens: 
Herausforderungen und Aufgaben beim Schutz des Lebens” (God loves all that lives: 
Challenges and tasks for the protection of life). The document first describes briefly about the 
development of the concept of person. The document says that the theological concept of person 
gained its importance in the context of Trinitarian and Christological clarifications between the 
second and fifth centuries while linking together with a language of ancient Rome, and served 
originally for clarification on the talk about God. Only secondarily was the concept applied to 
human individuality and has variously become a key concept of the theological (and 
philosophical) anthropology.838 
When the document is examined, one can also see the connection between the concept of person 
and human dignity from a theological perspective. This document in a separate section titled: 
“Der Mensch als Person: Eine Begriffsklärung” (The Human Being as a Person: A clarification 
of Terms) articulates several relationships in a compact manner between person and dignity and 
in their relationship with nature. The document reads: 
[…] the conception ‘person’ is the concentration into one word of what the Christian tradition 
has to say about the being and dignity of mankind, and characterizes what is qualitatively 
                                                 
838 GEMEINSAME ERKLÄRUNG DES RATES DER EVANGELISCHEN KIRCHE IN DEUTSCHLAND UND DER 
DEUTSCHEN BISCHOFSKONFERENZ, Gott ist ein Freund des Lebens. Herausforderungen und Aufgaben beim Schutz 
des Lebens, hg. v. Kirchenamt der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland und v. Sekretariat der Deutschen 
Bischofkonferenz, Neuauflage, Paulinus-Verlag, Trier/Gütersloh 1989, Sonderausgabe 2000, 41-42. The English 
Title of this section follows the translation by the EVANGELICAL CHURCH IN GERMANY, God loves all that lives. 
Challenges and Tasks for the Protection of Life. See http://www.ekd.de/english/1731 html, accessed on 
02.07.2014. Note here that the German word „evangelische Kirche“ when translated into English would mean the 
Protestant Church. The English word “evangelical” in German is „evangelikal“, which has a narrower meaning 
than „evangelisch“. However, what is preferred here and in other occurrences in this work is “Evangelical Church”. 
This is the translation by the Evangelical Church in Germany. See ibid.  Moreover, for ecumenical reason, this 
latter term is preferred. See Introductory remarks to Part IV below. 
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unique in human life in its association with the life of nature as well as in its distinction from 
the rest of nature. 839 
Thus, the concept of person not only signifies the dignity of human beings but also evokes the 
characteristic that is unique to her or him, separating them from the rest of nature and yet 
remaining in a unique relationship with nature. 
Because of the above-described aggregate concept of person, the concept itself entails 
essentially the following three dimensions. “Gott ist ein Freund des Lebens” explains these:840 
a) Person is seen as in a tension between what is given (Vorgegebensein) and what is to 
be done (Aufgegebensein): This means that the human person, who is constituted through her 
or his body, is bound up with life, its conditions, laws and rhythms. To this degree, she or he is 
both a natural and cultural being. However, the human person can behave in various ways 
towards one’s natural and historical conditions. Person is thus a given to oneself (sich selbst 
gegeben) as well as a task (aufgegeben). 
b) Personality between individuality and society: Every person is unique. Nevertheless, 
she or he is naturally as well as personally dependent on other people and at the same time a 
being for others. She or he can satisfy his or her natural needs only in society, and this requires 
the recognition by others. Being-in-oneself (in-sich-sein) and for-oneself (Für-sich-sein) is 
inconceivable without existence with-others (Mit-anderen-sein) and for-others (Für-andere-
sein). Only in solidarity and love can the person realize fully herself or himself. The archetype 
of this relational understanding of personality for Christians is derived from the life of Jesus 
Christ for others. 
c) The unconditional dignity of the human person: That which theologically constitutes 
her or him as a human person is the recognition of the human being by God. Social and fellow 
human behaviour does not create personal dignity of the other but only recognizes it. This 
results in a number of consequences: 
- The value and dignity of human beings are not ultimately determined by their 
functions, achievements, merits, or due to certain characteristics, and least of all 
according to individual or social benefits and interests. 
- The person has a priority over things, including institutions, economic processes, 
human interests, etc. Human persons may therefore never be a means to an end 
for other persons. 
- Human persons may not exercise power either over the life of others, or over 
their own life, which would make them in a way lord over life and death. 
- This does not mean that a person voluntarily surrenders her or his life in the 
service of another human life and in the service of God. Such freely entered life 
                                                 
839 „Der Begriff Person ist dabei die in einem einzigen Wort konzentrierte Zusammenfassung dessen, was die 
christliche Tradition über das Sein und die Würde des Menschen zu sagen hat, und charakterisiert das qualitativ 
Einmalige des menschlichen Lebens in seinem Zusammenhang mit dem Leben der Natur wie in seiner 
Unterschiedenheit von der übrigen Natur.“ GEMEINSAME ERKLÄRUNG DES RATES DER EVANGELISCHEN KIRCHE 
IN DEUTSCHLAND UND DER DEUTSCHEN BISCHOFSKONFERENZ, Gott ist ein Freund des Lebens…, 42. English tr. 
from EVANGELICAL CHURCH IN GERMANY, God loves all that lives, op. cit. Cf. SCHLÖGEL, „Unterschiedliche 
Zugangsweisen zum Personverständnis…“, 80. 
840 Cf. GEMEINSAME ERKLÄRUNG DES RATES DER EVANGELISCHEN KIRCHE IN DEUTSCHLAND UND DER 
DEUTSCHEN BISCHOFSKONFERENZ, Gott ist ein Freund des Lebens…, 42-43. 
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of sacrifice is indeed the highest fulfillment of human vocation to be the 
guardian of life. In existing for others one finds one’s own life (Lk 9,24; Jn 
12,24f). 
The conclusion that the document makes is that, although the concept of person today may be 
variously interpreted theologically, philosophically and juridically, yet the factual statements 
made above has a continuing significance independent of this concept. It is a matter of 
preserving the merits of the statements about human persons and not so much the concept of 
“person”.841 
In a separate section after describing and clarifying the above terms associated with the concept 
of person, the document takes up the issue of human dignity of an embryo, namely, “Die Würde 
des vorgeburtlichen Lebens” (The dignity of prenatal life).842 One can thus see how this 
document proceeds from the concept of person to the concept of human dignity. This section 
will be summarized below for a better understanding of the issue at hand. 
Without doubt, there exist a number of differences between human life before and after birth. 
Therefore, the anthropological and ethical assessment of prenatal life is debatable. Two main 
questions confront us because of this debate: Can one equally apply the statements made about 
God’s image and human dignity to prenatal human life? Ethically, is prenatal life entitled to the 
same protection of life as human life after birth? Six reasons can be enumerated here on behalf 
of these questions: 
a) Embryonic research has led to the clear conclusion that: 
 From the moment of fertilization of the egg and sperm cells there begins to exist 
a living being, which when developed becomes nothing else than a human being, 
 This human being from the beginning of life is an individual and in the case of 
subsequent cell division giving rise to identical twins, there is nothing that 
repeals this fundamental fact, 
 Further developmental process is continuous and has no reasonable recesses in 
which something new is added. 
Thus, the prenatal life does not merely represent purely vegetative life, but individual human 
life, which is always in the process of becoming. One cannot therefore dispute that it already 
enjoys a privileged status. Therefore, one may not turn it into an object of arbitrary 
manipulations. 
b) Although it is a fact that the unborn child is dependent in a special way on its mother, it is 
nevertheless not a part of her. It is another independent human being. If at all the problem of 
abortion arises, it is only because the unborn child is another human individual, and in the future 
after birth will give rise to duties and responsibilities. 
c) It is also true that birth plays an essential role in the independence and self-determination of 
the child. The unborn child is unable to prove its autonomy and reveal its true self. Only after 
birth does the child behave in a perceptible way by which others are capable of recognizing it 
as a being in its own right, a being that is beginning to live its own life and that it is no longer 
                                                 
841 Cf. GEMEINSAME ERKLÄRUNG DES RATES DER EVANGELISCHEN KIRCHE IN DEUTSCHLAND UND DER 
DEUTSCHEN BISCHOFSKONFERENZ, Gott ist ein Freund des Lebens…, 43. 
842 Cf. ibid., 43-46. 
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completely dependent upon its mother. Nevertheless, the distinction between the prenatal 
period and the first phase of life as far as autonomy and self-determination are concerned, is 
only a question of degree. The facility for the full exercise of human existence is included in 
prenatal life from the beginning and develops in a process that is not completed even at birth. 
d) Consequently, there is no reason not to refer to what is said about human being’s made in 
the image of God or the dignity of the human being as referring also to prenatal human life or 
for denying it the claim to the equal protection as is given to life after birth. From the theological 
perspective, it must be further asserted that every human life has its own unique value and 
meaning, in that it is created, called, respected, and loved by God. Human beings have an 
inalienable dignity. It is because of the fact that they have been called by God to be his 
counterpart and because they have been accepted unconditionally in Jesus Christ. Unborn 
children are included in this claim (cf. Job 31, 15; Ps 139, 13-16; Jer 1, 5). God’s acceptance of 
unborn human life confers on it human dignity. Hence, from this springs the commitment to 
accept and protect prenatal human life that is due to the human person. 
e) That which is theoretically recognized as correct and true must also be experienced among 
the people, lived out and practiced. Nevertheless, here lie the main problems: 
 Language expresses a certain interpretation of reality. Birth, for example, in the 
German language is also expressed as a “bringing into the world” («zur Welt 
bringen»). In some way, it is correct that the “world” of an embryo is the womb 
of the mother. It is not until after birth that the child is brought into an obvious 
connection with the wider world, associated with other people, and with the 
external conditions of life. However, the phrase “bringing into the world” can 
give rise to dubious impression that prenatal life is not yet “in the world”. One 
speaks of the child after birth in terms of the first months (Lebensmonaten) or 
years of its life (Lebensjahren) - as if the prenatal phase of life were not really a 
part of it. Therefore, one is caught up in an inadequate interpretation of reality 
at the level of language. This inadequacy is not something that can be changed 
by a single act of the will, but only on a long-term basis.843 
 There is a difference between how the humanity of an embryo is recognized and 
described at the theoretical level and how it is perceived and experienced in the 
living process. This perception depends on the stage of the pregnancy and on the 
attitude of the mother, the father, or the observer. In the first weeks and months, 
an embryo hardly makes itself noticeable as an independent new life. New 
medical procedures such as ultrasound have recently begun to bring about a 
change in this respect. The intensity of the experience and perception depends 
on the attitude to the unborn child. The desire for a child does assist the 
perception. Without allowing these perceptions to become a criterion for the 
                                                 
843 It is interesting to note here how the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany and the German 
Bishops’ Conference make adequate reasoning for what is seen in their culture with respect to expressions in 
language that can have consequences for the society. 
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duty of protection, it can nonetheless be formulated that the unborn human life 
is always becoming more perceptible than what it is. 
 Psychologically, the threshold for the killing of an unborn human life is in 
practice lower than the case of killing an already born or the one that is growing 
up. This is because, in killing an unborn human life it is imagined that human 
life is not being killed, but more so because of the extent of its protection has 
always been controversial in the past, and is still in the present. Abortion was 
and is a social reality, a possibility, and a more or less readily accessible way. 
This does not justify it, but it represents one of the difficulties coming from the 
insight as to what is the correct action with regard to a general actual practice. 
f) The mandate to respect and protect unborn human life is thus a consequence to the above 
considerations. The protection of life is not only an individual duty but also solidarity and a 
public responsibility of the legal system. The goal of all government action must be to improve 
the protection and promotion of human life both before and after birth and enhance the general 
awareness of the intrinsic dignity of other human life as even at the prenatal stage.844 
Thus, the general concept of the person in this document has been effectively applied and 
extended to an embryo, especially its protection. The ethical importance of human life from the 
beginning is aptly described in this document. Under the heading „Aktuelle Herausforderungen 
beim Schutz menschlichen Lebens“ (Current challenges in the protection of human life), the 
documents treats two main topics, namely, „Forschung an Embryonen“ (Research on 
Embryos), and „Das ungeborene Leben im Mutterleib“ (The unborn life in the womb). The 
position of the Catholic and Evangelical churches with regard to embryonic protection is 
unambiguous. The document states: 
[…] the embryo is individual life, which as human life is always in a state of development; 
the potential of unlimited exercise of humanity is present in it from the beginning; unborn 
life has the same claim on protection as life after birth. But in that case - as with other human 
experiments - research on prenatal life can be accepted only to the extent that it serves the 
preservation and advancement of this particular individual life; in these cases one should 
speak of attempted healing. But deliberate operations which allow for its damage or 
destruction as a side effect are not acceptable, however important the aims the research 
desires to achieve.845 
“Gott ist ein Freund des Lebens” thus examines the issue at hand from various perspectives like 
physiological, medical, psychological, linguistic, juristic and theological. The treatment of the 
subject is thus wholesome and it does not remain only at the theoretical level but also very 
                                                 
844 Cf. GEMEINSAME ERKLÄRUNG DES RATES DER EVANGELISCHEN KIRCHE IN DEUTSCHLAND UND DER 
DEUTSCHEN BISCHOFSKONFERENZ, Gott ist ein Freund des Lebens…, 43-46. 
845 „Der Embryo ist individuelles Leben, das als menschliches Leben immer ein sich entwickelndes ist; die 
Anlage zur uneingeschränkten Ausübung des Menschseins ist in ihm von Anfang an enthalten; das ungeborene 
Leben hat ebenso wie das geborene Anspruch auf Schutz. Dann kann aber – wie bei anderen Humanexperimenten 
– Forschung am angeborenen Leben nur insoweit gebilligt werden, wie sie der Erhaltung und der Förderung dieses 
bestimmten individuellen Lebens dient; man sollte in diesen Fällen von Heilversuchen sprechen. Gezielte Eingriffe 
an Embryonen hingegen, die ihre Schädigung oder Vernichtung in Kauf nehmen, sind nicht zu verantworten - und 
seien die Forschungsziele noch so hochrangig.“ GEMEINSAME ERKLÄRUNG DES RATES DER EVANGELISCHEN 
KIRCHE IN DEUTSCHLAND UND DER DEUTSCHEN BISCHOFSKONFERENZ, Gott ist ein Freund des Lebens…, 64. 
English tr. from EVANGELICAL CHURCH IN GERMANY, God loves all that lives, op. cit. Cf. also SCHLÖGEL, 
„Heiligkeit des Lebens…“; 558-559. 
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practical. In explaining the above ethical perspectives, the said document rightly justifies the 
importance of human life and its protection right from the beginning, while ascertaining its 
human dignity. 
7.3 HUMAN DIGNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING 
In June 1995, the German Parliament, on the request of the German Unification Treaty, adopted 
a new legal regulation of pregnancy termination. In answer to this legal regulation, the German 
Bishop Conference issued a document in 1996 titled: “Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte 
von allem Anfang an; zur ethischen Beurteilung der Abtreibung” (Human Dignity and Human 
Rights from the very beginning: On the ethical evaluation of abortion).846 The document 
describes the reasons for issuing the document, the various contexts in which one procures 
abortion and then speaks of the human being from the beginning of its existence. Regarding the 
beginning of the human being, the Bishops clarify that: 
The unborn child already carries within it all possibilities for its future development. It is one 
and the same person who develops from the moment of conception to the unfolding of its 
capacities in a continuous process until - many years after birth – it grows into an 
autonomous, independent existence. Therefore, a human being is to be respected and treated 
as a human from the moment of conception (EV 60).847 
Acknowledging Evangelium Vitae, the Bishops clarify here that a human being exists from the 
moment of conception and asserts that from that moment on she/he needs to be treated as a 
human person. Having stated this, the conclusion drawn is: 
From its origin, human life has its own dignity, rights and independent claim on protection, 
which cannot be outweighed through the rights of others or by special contradictory 
circumstances.848 
The Bishops mean to say here that it is because an embryo is a human person; it also has its 
dignity proper to it; from which flows the human right to life and protection which cannot be 
offset either by the claim of the right of the mother or certain circumstances that may force to 
end its life. 
The document, in the context of prohibition to kill and the protection of everyone, further 
acknowledges the fundamental principle, which comes to us through the thinking of the modern 
human rights and democratic state. They affirm that the life of every person has equal value, 
regardless of their social status, their economic performance, their education, their skin color 
or their looks, their sex, their age or their health condition.849 
                                                 
846 DBK, Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte von allem Anfang an. Gemeinsames Hirtenwort der deutschen 
Bischöfe zur ethischen Beurteilung der Abtreibung, Die deutschen Bischöfe 57, hg. v. Sekretariat der Deutschen 
Bischofskonferenz, Bonn 1996, 3-9. 
847 „Das ungeborene Kind trägt bereits alle Möglichkeiten seiner späteren Entwicklung in sich. Es ist ein und 
derselbe Mensch, der vom Augenblick der Zeugung an in einem kontinuierlichen Prozess seine Anlagen entfaltet, 
bis er – erst lange Jahre nach der Geburt – zu einem eigenverantwortlichen, selbständigen Dasein heranwächst. 
Deshalb ist ein menschliches Geschöpf vom Augenblick seiner Empfängnis an als menschliche Person zu achten 
und zu behandeln (Enzyklika „Evangelium vitae“, 60).“ DBK, Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…, 5. 
Addition in original. Tr. by author.  
848 „Menschliches Leben besitzt von Anfang an eigene Würde, eigenes Recht und eigenständigen 
Schutzanspruch, der durch die Rechte anderer oder besondere ihm entgegenstehende Umstände nicht aufgewogen 
werden kann.“ DBK, Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…, 5. Emphasis in original. Tr. by author. 
849 Cf. DBK, Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…, 5-6. 
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The document further reiterates that the belief in the equal dignity of all human beings must 
apply with equal seriousness and without reservations to the lives of unborn children.850 
7.4 A JUST PEACE 
The teaching of the Catholic Church in Germany and its commitment to greater justice is made 
clear by the German Bishop Conference851 through the document that was issued in 1990 titled, 
“Gerechter Friede” (A Just Peace).852 This document clarifies that the Gospel and Politics are 
not unconnected themes. Political programme entail social models based on concrete actions 
and decisions. In a democracy, these basic political orientations arise from a process of opinion 
formation and decision, and it is in this way that the Church too participates in the process. In 
that process the vision of a just peace is sought: The Bishops affirm: 
We want to introduce the ideal of just peace into this process as a point of encounter between 
the Bible’s message on the Kingdom of God and political reason. The Church must 
promulgate the gospel of peace and project signs of this peace into our world. Politics 
must create conditions that ensure human dignity. Both these tasks are directed at the 
same people and the one world in which they live. If the Church expresses opinions on 
political issues, she does so on the basis of a faith that is obviously not shared by everyone. 
Her arguments, however, are founded in common reason (No. 57).853 
The respect for the dignity of humans can be seen as a point of interface between Church’s 
mission and political task (Cf. No. 58). This is theologically justified from the fact that human 
beings are made in the image of God and from there it is deduced that the human persons in 
turn receives rights and obligations due to their dignity (Cf. ibid.).854 The Bishop Conference 
makes this point clear: 
In the last analysis, the ideal of a just peace is based on a very simple understanding: a 
world that does not provide the majority of people with the basic needs of a humane life 
is not viable. Even when there are no wars, such a world is still full of violence. A 
situation dominated by long-term and severe injustice is inherently violent. It follows that 
justice creates peace (No. 59).855 
                                                 
850 „Diese Überzeugung von der gleichen Würde aller Menschen muss mit gleichem Ernst und ohne Abstriche 
auch für das Leben ungeborener Kinder gelten.“ DBK, Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…, 6. 
851 Cf. SCHLÖGEL, „Zum Menschenwürdeargument...“, 90. 
852 DBK, Gerechter Friede, Die deutschen Bischöfe 66, hg. v. Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, 
Bonn 2000, 3-119. English translation from: THE GERMAN BISHOPS, A Just Peace, The German Bishops 66, 
Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, Bonn 2000, 5-75. 
853 „Es fasst zusammen, worin sich die biblische Botschaft vom Reich Gottes und die politische Vernunft 
treffen. Die Kirche hat den Auftrag, das Evangelium des Friedens zu verkündigen und es in dieser Welt zeichenhaft 
zu vergegenwärtigen. Die Politik hat die Aufgabe, für menschenwürdige Verhältnisse zu sorgen. Beides bezieht 
sich auf die gleichen Menschen und auf die eine Welt, in der alle Menschen leben. Wenn die Kirche sich zu Fragen 
der Politik äußert, tut sie das vom Glauben her, den offenkundig nicht alle Menschen teilen. Ihre Argumente aber 
gründen sich auf die allen Menschen gemeinsame Vernunft.“ DBK, Gerechter Friede…, 34. English tr. in text 
above from: THE GERMAN BISHOPS, A Just Peace…, 23. Cf. SCHLÖGEL, „Zum Menschenwürdeargument...“, 90. 
854 Cf. ibid., 90. 
855 „Das Leitbild des gerechten Friedens beruht auf einer letzten Endes ganz einfachen Einsicht: Eine Welt, in 
der den meisten Menschen vorenthalten wird, was ein menschenwürdiges Leben ausmacht, ist nicht zukunftsfähig. 
Sie steckt auch dann voller Gewalt, wenn es keinen Krieg gibt. Verhältnisse fortdauernder schwerer 
Ungerechtigkeit sind in sich gewaltgeladen und gewaltträchtig. Daraus folgt positiv: ‚Gerechtigkeit schafft 
Frieden.‘“ DBK, Gerechter Friede…, 35-36. English tr. in text above from: THE GERMAN BISHOPS, A Just 
Peace…, 24. Cf. SCHLÖGEL, „Zum Menschenwürdeargument...“, 90. 
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It is in this context that human right is mentioned as the minimum guarantee for human 
dignity.856 The Bishops explain: 
Human rights are an expression of the specific dignity inherent to man that differentiates him 
from his fellow creatures. Notwithstanding all individual differences and cultural 
peculiarities and despite differences of race, nation and sex, all humans are defined by 
their dignity and the treatment they merit on the basis of this dignity. Individuals deserve to 
enjoy certain rights purely on the basis of being human. These rights specify the conditions 
that must be fulfilled for human dignity to be realized. Human rights are therefore rights 
that antecede state laws; it is not the state’s job to guarantee them. The state is obliged to 
respect them (No. 72).857 
Further, a different category of human rights has emerged in the recent history. For example, 
the European enlightenment and the philosophical theory of natural law concentrated on the 
liberal laws of freedom in order to protect the individual from the caprice of either absolutist 
ruler or all-powerful state authorities. In this context, the document Gerechter Friede 
acknowledges the role of Rerum Novarum and Catholic social teaching in promoting human 
dignity. It says:  
In view of the widespread social distress during the 19th and early 20th century there was a 
growing awareness that elemental social standards had to be safeguarded in order to 
guarantee a life of human dignity – standards that can also be understood as human rights. 
These considerations were inspired by the Encyclical of Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (1891) 
and Catholic social teaching (No. 77).858 
7.5 MAN: HIS OWN CREATOR? 
In the context of the Human Genome Project that brought in a new light to the understanding 
of human life in the field of Biomedicine, the German Catholic Bishop Conference brought out 
a position paper in 2001, named: Der Mensch: sein eigener Schöpfer?; Wort der Deutschen 
Bischofskonferenz zu Fragen von Gentechnik und Biomedizin (Man: His own Creator? Word 
of the German Bishop Conference on questions related to Genetic Engineering and 
Biomedicine).859 The position paper describes the biomedical advancement such as Human 
Genome Project, Gene Diagnostics, Gene therapy, Cloning, Pharmaceutical Drugs, Patents and 
Life, etc. The position paper begins with the Biblical understanding of human beings. After 
                                                 
856 Cf. ibid., 91. 
857 „Die Menschenrechte bringen zum Ausdruck, dass den Menschen eine spezifische Würde eigen ist, die sie 
von ihren Mitgeschöpfen unterscheidet. Ungeachtet aller individuellen Besonderheiten und kultureller Eigenarten, 
ungeachtet von Rasse, Nation und Geschlecht gleichen sich die Menschen im Hinblick auf das, was ihre Würde 
ausmacht und was ihnen aufgrund dieser Würde gebührt. Daraus ergeben sich Rechte, die jedem Menschen 
zustehen, weil er Mensch ist. Sie benennen die Bedingungen, die erfüllt sein müssen, damit jemand 
menschenwürdig leben kann. Die Menschenrechte sind deshalb vorstaatliche Rechte; sie werden nicht vom Staat 
gewährt, sondern binden und verpflichten ihn.“ DBK, Gerechter Friede…, 44. English tr. in text above from: THE 
GERMAN BISHOPS, A Just Peace…, 29. Cf. SCHLÖGEL, „Zum Menschenwürdeargument...“, 91. 
858 „Angesichts der weitverbreiteten sozialen Not während des 19. und beginnenden 20. Jahrhunderts wuchs 
jedoch das Bewusstsein, dass es ebenso elementare soziale Standards für ein menschenwürdiges Leben zu sichern 
gelte, die sich in vergleichbarer Weise als Menschenrechte verstehen lassen. Diese Überlegungen wurden 
wesentlich inspiriert durch die Enzyklika Leos XIII. „Rerum Novarum“ (1891) und die katholische Soziallehre.“ 
DBK, Gerechter Friede…, 46-47. English tr. in text above from: THE GERMAN BISHOPS, A Just Peace…, 30-31. 
859 DBK, Der Mensch: sein eigener Schöpfer? Wort der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz zu Fragen von 
Gentechnik und Biomedizin vom 7. März 2001, Die deutschen Bischöfe 69, hg. v. Sekretariat der Deutschen 
Bischofskonferenz, Bonn 2001, 3-13. 
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stating that human beings are made in the image of God, the position paper further affirms the 
dignity of the person. It says: 
Since man is not an accidental product, and because he is not his own creator, he does not 
exist in complete autonomy. As a finite creature, he can guarantee neither for himself nor the 
meaning and value of his life. He lives within specified limits, which he should not exceed. 
His dignity is founded on the image of God. It indicates that he is unconditionally loved and 
affirmed by God prior to all his achievements, all his abilities and inabilities. Human dignity 
is inviolable and therefore should be accorded to all people, regardless of assessment by 
others or their self-assessment, to the born and the unborn, to the healthy and the sick, to the 
disabled and the dying.860 
What is affirmed here is that human dignity is a given, is something intrinsic and therefore 
inviolable. These facts are derived theologically. However, the position paper also alludes to 
non-theological justification and describes the role of secular Constitution in upholding human 
dignity. It affirms: 
The biblical view of man and especially human dignity constitutes the framework for human 
action. Even non-theological foundations recognize that human beings merit human dignity, 
simply because of being human and which precedes any legal regulation. It is in this sense 
that the principle of human dignity is established, in which the inviolability and physical 
existence of man is enshrined, which is at the same time the foundation of our democratic 
constitution.861 
A clearer citation of the Grundgesetz, which acknowledges human dignity, is accredited in the 
following statements of the Der Mensch: sein eigener Schöpfer? It reads, “Human dignity is 
indispensable, it comes before the authority of the State and binds it (Art. 1 GG). The value of 
human life from its beginning until its end is one of those prescribed ideas, which cannot be 
infringed. This is confirmed by our Constitution (Art. 19.2 GG).”862 
                                                 
860 „Weil der Mensch kein Zufallsprodukt ist, und weil er sich auch nicht selbst gemacht hat, existiert er nicht 
in absoluter Autonomie. Als endliches Geschöpf kann er weder sich selbst, noch Sinn und Wert seines Lebens 
garantieren. Er lebt innerhalb vorgegebener Grenzen, die er nicht überschreiten darf. In der Gottebenbildlichkeit 
des Menschen gründet auch seine Würde. Sie besagt, dass er im Voraus zu all seinen Leistungen, zu all seinen 
Fähigkeiten und Unfähigkeiten von Gott bedingungslos geliebt und bejaht ist. Die Menschenwürde ist daher 
unantastbar und kommt allen Menschen, unabhängig von der Einschätzung anderer oder ihrer Selbsteinschätzung 
zu, den Geborenen und Ungeborenen, den Gesunden und Kranken, den Behinderten und Sterbenden.“ DBK, Der 
Mensch: sein eigener Schöpfer?…, 5. Emphasis in original. Tr. by author. 
861 „Das biblische Menschenbild und insbesondere die Menschenwürde bilden den Rahmen für menschliches 
Handeln. Auch nichttheologische Begründungen führen zu der Erkenntnis, dass die Menschenwürde dem 
Menschen allein schon aufgrund seines Menschseins zukommt und jeder rechtlichen Regelung vorgängig ist. In 
diesem Sinne bildet das Prinzip der Menschenwürde, in dem die Unantastbarkeit auch der körperlichen Existenz 
des Menschen verankert ist, zugleich die Grundlage unserer demokratischen Verfassung.“ DBK, Der Mensch: sein 
eigener Schöpfer?…, 6. Emphasis in original. Tr. by author. Cf. REITER, „Bioethik…“, 8. See also BALKENOHL, 
„Menschenwürde und Lebensrecht…“, 79. German Catholic Theologian Manfred Balkenohl affirms here that the 
Constitution guarantees the absolute inner worth of human dignity. 
862 „Menschenwürde ist nicht disponibel; sie liegt der staatlichen Gewalt voraus und bindet sie (Art. 1 GG). 
Der Wert menschlichen Lebens von seinem Anfang bis zu seinem Ende gehört zu jenen Vorgegebenheiten, über 
die nicht abgestimmt werden kann. Dies sagt uns auch unsere Verfassung (Art. 19,2 GG).“ DBK, Der Mensch: 
sein eigener Schöpfer?…, 12. Tr. by author. The Abbreviation GG here refers to the Grundgesetz. Art. 19,2 of the 
Grundgesetz reads: „In keinem Falle darf ein Grundrecht in seinem Wesensgehalt angetastet werden.“ That is, “In 
no case may a basic right be infringed upon its essential content.” GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, 
“German Federal Republic. Basic Law…”, 365. 
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Thus, one can see that not only the German Moral Theologians - as was seen in the last 
Chapter - but also the German Bishop Conference apply the role of Article 1,1 of Grundgesetz, 
in which human dignity is enshrined, as one of its argument in the field of Bioethics. 
7.6 TERRORISM AS AN ETHICAL CHALLENGE: HUMAN DIGNITY AND HUMAN 
RIGHT 
Ten year after the terrorist attack “9/11” in New York and Washington, the German Bishop 
Conference decided to draw a preliminary assessment of policies against terrorism, basing itself 
on the Church’s peace ethic (Friedensethik) which is nothing other than an ethic of justice. The 
emphasis is on the dimension of peace as an ethics of rights, which meets in an intellectual 
debate with the political strategies in order to combat terrorism. The rationale behind this new 
document, „Terrorismus als ethische Herausforderung: Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte“ 
(Terrorism as an Ethical Challenge: Human Dignity and Human Right), is the peace ethic 
(Friedensethik) that has already been laid out in the former document “Just Peace” („Gerechter 
Friede“ [2000]). The document is dated as 5 September 2011.863 
The said terrorist attack has opened the eyes of many and undoubtedly gained great and painful 
insights for the whole of humankind,. One could see that the international political scenario had 
changed. This urged the German Bishop Conference to issue the document, “Just Peace” 
(„Gerechter Friede“ [2000]). It addressed itself on issues pertaining to legal ethics. The need 
was felt to respect the dignity of each person, which must be protected by appropriate legislative 
and legal institutions.  
The Church was involved in this process significantly. Since the early church fathers, the 
Church has introduced the “rationality” of Greek philosophy in the thinking of the West. As an 
important category of social life, the Church encouraged and promoted the “right” of the Roman 
tradition. Not arbitrarily, but the determinant of life that legally binds everyone was firmly 
established in the form of written laws. Jesus’ sacrifice for the love of humanity on the cross at 
Calvary further founded the category of “loving mercy” („liebenden Barmherzigkeit“). It 
captured the rationale, namely, to seek what is best for every person and the right that does not 
downgrade one to “highest injustice” (summum ius - summa iniuria). Law must rather serve 
justice for everyone. This triad, namely, the rationality of the Greeks, the rights of the Romans 
and the loving mercy on Golgotha, were the foundation of the Church in the West. The Church 
sees itself today as being appointed to defend this triad. Especially, in the 20th Century, in order 
to defend the violence permanently, the Church’s Magisterium has emphasized repeatedly on 
the observance of law and respect for human dignity. In this context, one can also see the strong 
tendency of the Popes as well as the present day international organizations urging to guarantee 
the protection of the dignity and rights of every human being.864 
In this context, the Encyclical Pacem in Terris draws one’s particular attention. Since the 
pontificate of Pope John XXIII, human rights have become an integral part of the Church’s 
peace ethics (Friedensethik). Human dignity and the protection of people through human rights 
has become the main target of the doctrine of peace. Although Pope John Paul II has left no 
                                                 
863 DBK, Terrorismus als ethische Herausforderung; Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte, Die deutschen 
Bischöfe 94, hg. v. Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, Bonn 2011, 1.65; 5-6 Foreword. 
864 Cf. ibid., 7-9; Introduction. 
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explicit encyclical on peace ethics (Friedensethik), his pontificate was marked by the struggle 
with problems of peace and international order. The Church of the 21st Century can look back 
on a long tradition of legal-ethical discussion of the problems of violence, both domestically 
and internationally. The Church has repeatedly reminded that all acts of State authority have to 
respect human dignity, which finds its legal expression in human rights. It is from this basic 
idea that the German Bishops are guided in their confrontation with the anti-terror policies of 
the past decade.865 
For the discussion here, Chapter 2 of the said document clarifies the role of human dignity. It 
gives us two reasons why the profession of law and the legal community support human dignity. 
First, there are reasons from experience. Second, it comprises of the fundamental importance 
of human dignity as the implicit premise of all normative as well as legal obligations. Basic 
human rights have a special place here because they are rooted in the “inalienable” human 
dignity and therefore “inviolable”. In this sense, they are not only determined by the Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz), but were already recognized in the preamble of the UDHR 1948, namely, 
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”. Today, in 
individual countries as well as within the international political discourse, the universality of 
human rights and its protection has become significant, paving way for the legitimate defense 
against Terrorism that comes from human dignity and human rights.866 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
Although, the concept of human dignity is not a theological concept, in Germany, especially 
after the World War, it has proved a useful concept in a pluralistic society. Today, it has become 
synonymous with humanity. The five documents that were examined above reflect the German 
Bishop Conference’s attitude towards the society and humanity. The connection between the 
concept of person and human dignity is brought out clearly from a theological perspective. The 
value and dignity of human beings are neither ultimately determined by functions, 
achievements, merits or certain characteristics, nor by individual or social benefits and 
interests.867 The intervention by the Bishop’s Conference – spanning question of justice of the 
right of life of the unborn – points out the peculiar theological nuances of the concept of human 
dignity. The concept itself serves as focal point for people of different races, origin, culture and 
religion. The Christian perspective as sketched in these documents opens up a new arena for 
discussion.868 The acknowledgement and application of the secular Constitution in theological 
                                                 
865 Cf. ibid., 9-10, Introduction. 
866 Cf. ibid., 28, Chapter 2.2. In relating human dignity to terrorist acts, Archbishop Ludwig Schick, who is the 
President of the Commission of World Church of the German Bishop Conference, in a Press Statement said, “the 
recognition of the inalienable and inviolable human dignity of every human being is the most important 
requirement to withdraw legitimacy of any terrorist act”. The German Text reads: „Die Anerkennung der 
unveräußerlichen und unverletzlichen Menschenwürde eines jeden Menschen ist die wichtigste Voraussetzung, 
um jedem terroristischen Akt die Legitimation zu entziehen.“ See PRESSEMITTEILUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN 
BISCHOFSKONFERENZ, Statement bei der Vorstellung des Wortes der deutschen Bischöfe „Terrorismus als ethische 
Herausforderung. Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte“ (Berlin, 5. September 2011), Nr.126a, hg. v. Sekretär 
der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, Bonn 2011, 1-7; 3. Tr. by author. 
867 This idea will become clearer in the next Chapters that follows. 
868 Cf. SCHLÖGEL, „Zum Menschenwürdeargument...“, 91; 
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discussion brings out the paramount importance of a secular Article. Thus, one can observe a 
positive move by the Bishops to bridge the gap between the secular and religious understanding 
of human dignity. Moreover, the document on Terrorism brings out the fundamental importance 
of human dignity as the implicit premise of all normative as well as legal obligations. 
Thus, one can conclude that that the legal-political interpretation of human dignity is also of 
interest and importance for the theological reflection, which is made possible by the feasibility 
and tangibility of human dignity that can be assured through its implementation of 
consummated Law.869  
The next step is to discuss on the human person to whom dignity is attributed.
                                                 
869 Cf. REITER, „Über die Ethik der Menschenwürde…“, 447. 
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C H A P T E R  8  
THE CONCEPT OF PERSON  
FROM A GERMAN PERSPECTIVE 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Given the huge advances in medicine and the increasing industrialization of the handling of 
animals in recent years, the entitlement to respect and protection of the life of a human being 
has come under threat. Similarly, the question regarding the status of a person has had much 
controversy in the past years over who has to be regarded as a person and how far the person 
could be equally placed with the status of possession of certain empirically identifiable 
characteristics. The respective answers to the questions on personhood have a direct impact on 
what is warranted and how one ought to act in conflict situations and borderline cases.870 This 
Chapter will deal with the development of the concept of person from a systematic theological 
and theological ethical perspective in order to answer the above questions. In Part I, the ethical 
limit of using the concept of human dignity in bioethical discussions was summarized. In 
recognition of this limit, the indispensable meaning of the term “person” in the contemporary 
bioethical debate will be discussed in this Chapter.871 
8.2 A SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF 
PERSON 
Historically seen, the term ‘human dignity’, as mentioned earlier in Part I, emerged rather 
slowly. Probably, the concept of person too in its current usage gained importance for similar 
reasons as the term ‘human dignity’. Perhaps, this is the reason why German Moral Theology 
deals with the concept of human dignity before it examines the concept of person. It is also to 
be noted that the concept of person in fundamental Catholic Moral theology is less discussed 
when compared to the role that the concept plays in bioethical discussions.872  
From a systematic theological perspective, the concept of person comes from the centre of faith 
as the result of the effort to grasp conceptually three central convictions and to identify them 
linguistically. They are: a) uniqueness of human being grounded on God’s call; b) the unity of 
Jesus Christ in the duality of the divine and human nature; and c) the reality of the Christian 
Revelation of God, shown more formally as the power of One God in Three Persons. In the 
ancient world the concept of person was thus defined in the reflection of these contents of faith. 
Although the definition was vague and ambiguous as lemmas (pro,swpon, u`po,stasiς, persona), 
yet it entered its way through history.873 Thomas combined the idea of the dignity of man and 
woman to the idea of the status of theirs as person – as a rational being. This status along with 
the idea of the image of God from the very outset gave them a “high dignity” and their position 
at the head of an earthly hierarchy. Thomas represents the human person as the partaker of all 
                                                 
870 Cf. HILPERT, „Person, Personalität…“, 51. 
871 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, „Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theologische Perspektiven...“, 463. 
872 Cf. SCHLÖGEL, „Unterschiedliche Zugangsweisen zum Personverständnis…“, 79. 
873 Cf. HILPERT, „Person, Personalität…“, 46. 
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orders and degrees of being and living. Human person was held in antiquity as a universe in 
miniature, uniting all beings to itself.874 
It is to be noted that the term “dignity of the person” often replaced the concept of human 
dignity in theological and Church Traditions. It is also noteworthy to observe that the concept 
of person is the essential basic definition of the human being in theology.875 According to 
theological teachings, the human being is a person because God is person and calls the human 
being to responsibility.876 Dignity binds one with personhood in a lasting relationship with God 
by which one is withdrawn from the powers of this world in a boundless claim to Him.877 This 
relationship with God will be described further. 
From a theological perspective, according to Schockenhoff, the category of the human person 
represents the fact of being called by God. The calling brings into existence the very constitution 
of the personal being of man and woman. This relational relationship of man and woman to 
God that remains on the interpersonal level is not without consequences. It leads one not only 
to enable the radical dependence on God on the creaturely level, but also secures him/her to be 
independent. The category of person who is called by God appeals to his/her own selfhood, 
which must remain withdrawn through interpersonal instances.878 Therefore, Schockenhoff 
raises a question of distinction between “what” and “who” that is involved between God and 
human in answering the interpersonal relationship. He says, “It does not answer the question: 
“‘What is man’ – which can be answered through the species-specific differences in contrast to 
an animal – but to the question: ‘Who is man’, which only brings to the fore the incalculable 
value of his existence”.879 
In his study on the Imago Dei, Schockenhoff speaks of the relationship of human beings with 
God. What make him/her a human person is this relationship and not any particular 
characteristics like intellect or will. He says: 
Through his creative word, God summons the human being to enter an immediate 
relationship to himself, which gives him the dignity of dialogue partner with God and makes 
him a human person. This means that it is not some particular characteristics (such as the 
intellect or the will bestowed on him rather than on the other creatures) that makes the human 
                                                 
874 Cf. Richard BRUCH, Person und Menschenwürde. Ethik im lehrgeschichtlichen Rückblick, Lit, Münster 
1998, 25. This idea is similar to the one that was already described in Part I, 3.4. See also DIRSCHERL, „Über 
spannende Beziehungen…“, 46-89; 71-72. See also for a theological perspective on personhood IDEM, Grundriss 
theologischer Anthropologie…, 145-150. The status to which human beings are called was stated as nomen 
dignitas. Such usage was mentioned in Chapter 2.5.3.2 above. See SPAEMANN, „Wann beginnt der Mensch Person 
zu sein?...“, 39. English trans: IDEM, “When does the human being to be a person?...”, 298. 
875 Cf. BARANZKE, „Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…“; 59. 
876 Cf. DIRSCHERL, “Über spannende Beziehungen…“, 71.  
877 „Mit dem Personsein des Menschen wird seine Würde rückgebunden an seine ihn tragende Beziehung zu 
Gott, durch die er einem grenzenlosen Verfügungsanspruch durch Mächte dieser Welt entzogen ist.“ BARANZKE, 
„Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte…“, 59. 
878 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, „Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theologische Perspektiven...“, 463-464. 
879 „Sie antwortet nicht auf die Frage ‚Was ist der Mensch‘, die durch die Benennung artspezifischer 
Differenzen im Unterschied zum Tier beantwortet werden kann, sondern auf die Frage: ‚Wer ist der Mensch‘, die 
den unverrechenbaren Wert seiner Existenz erst hervortreten lässt.“ SCHOCKENHOFF, “Menschenwürde und 
Lebensschutz. Theologische Perspektiven...“, 464. Emphasis in original. Tr. by author. Cf. also Romano 
GUARDINI, Welt und Person. Versuche zur christlichen Lehre vom Menschen, Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, Mainz, 
19886, 121-128. 
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person God’s image, but rather the relationship to God which sustains his life and allows him 
to transcend the empirical features of his humanity.880 
Further, Schockenhoff also speaks of the spectrum of the relationship established in following 
four areas in the context of the theological substance of the idea of imago Dei, namely, the 
relationship to God (creatureliness); the relationship to other human beings (shared humanity 
and the fact of two genders); the relationship to oneself (totality) and the relationship to creation 
(responsibility).881 
Schockenhoff further clarifies the issue about “a relational component of being human”. 
Relational justification of personhood through the creative external relationship of human 
beings to God does not aim at relativizing its importance in the development of personal identity 
or in its encounter with the social or interpersonal relations. Rather, it intends to ensure that 
every person can be considered as an unavailable partner to the other who can then enter into a 
relation with her/him in the horizontal structure of relations. Nevertheless, the social fulfilment 
does not depend on the sustaining ground of personhood in her/his interpersonal relational 
dimension. This can only develop where there is a free and mutual recognition, provided the 
justification of human personality is prior to their social acceptance.882 
In the context of relationality, Dirscherl expands the term to include not only the concept of a 
person, but also that of the image of God, creature, soul and body are faced in a similar fashion 
with the phenomenon of relationality.883 In confirming this statement, he quotes Ratzinger, who 
affirms: 
It is inherent in man to be a relational being […]. He is not an autarchic, self-sufficient being 
who develops alone, in isolation, not an island unto himself, but essentially created for 
relationship [...]. And it is precisely this basic structure of his being that reflects God. For this 
                                                 
880 Eberhard SCHOCKENHOFF, Natural Law & Human Dignity. Universal Ethics in a Historical World, tr. by 
Brian MCNEIL, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2003, 230. The German version 
reads: “Gott ruft den Menschen durch sein schöpferisches Wort in ein unmittelbares Verhältnis zu sich, das ihn als 
Gegenüber des göttlichen Du auszeichnet und in seinem menschlichen Personsein konstituiert. Die 
Gottebenbildlichkeit der menschlichen Person besteht deshalb nicht zuerst in einer besonderen Eigenschaft wie 
seiner Geistigkeit oder seinem willentlichen Vermögen, die ihm vor den übrigen Geschöpfen verliehen wäre, 
sondern in der tragenden Relation zu Gott selbst, kraft derer er die empirischen Merkmale seines Menschseins 
transzendiert.“ IDEM, Naturrecht und Menschenwürde. Universale Ethik in einer geschichtlichen Welt, Mathias-
Grünewald-Verlag, Mainz 1996, 239. 
881 Cf. IDEM, Natural Law…, 229-235. In the German language Schockenhoff uses these terms: “Die Relation 
zu Gott (Geschöpflichkeit); Die Relation zum anderen Menschen (Mitmenschlichkeit und Zweigeschlecht-
lichkeit); Die Relation zu sich selbst (Ganzheitlichkeit); und, Die Relation zur Schöpfung (Verantwortlichkeit)“ 
IDEM,  Naturrecht…, 238f. 
882 Cf. IDEM, “Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theologische Perspektiven...“, 465. In the words of 
Schockenhoff: „Die Pointe einer relationalen Begründung des Personseins durch die schöpferische 
Außenbeziehung des Menschen zu Gott zielt nicht darauf, die Entfaltung personaler Identität in der Begegnung 
mit dem mitmenschlichen Du oder dem sozialen Wir in ihrer Bedeutung zu relativieren. Sie will vielmehr 
sicherstellen, dass jeder Mensch als ein den anderen unverfügbarer Beziehungspartner in das horizontale 
Relationsgefüge eintreten kann, so dass zwar die soziale Entfaltung, nicht aber der tragende Grund des Personseins 
von seiner zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungsdimension abhängt. Diese kann sich nur in freier und gegenseitiger 
Anerkennung entwickeln, wenn die Begründung menschlicher Personalität der sozialen Akzeptanz des Menschen 
voraus liegt.“ Ibid. 
883 Cf. DIRSCHERL, „Über spannende Beziehungen…“, 72; Cf. DIRSCHERL, Grundriss theologischer 
Anthropologie…, 150. 
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is a God whose essential being, in just the same way, rests on relationships, as we learn from 
the doctrine of the Trinity.884 
Thus, made in the image of God and grounded on God’s call, having a relational relationship 
with God, oneself, others and the creation, is what constitutes the human being as a human 
person. Within this normative framework of the concept of person, the next section will deal 
with a theological ethical perspective of the notion. 
8.3 THEOLOGICAL ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
From a theological ethical perspective, person means one who has substantial dominion over 
one’s own actions (ST I, 29,1). The actions of this person are ethical and are capable of self-
determination. The person is seen as a self-reliant reasonable being, as a concrete independent 
individual, as one who is genuinely responsible and whose actions are attributable (cf. Kant, 
The Metaphysics of Morals, Part I, 214).885 Thus, a person as a moral being means he/she is also 
responsible for the moral behaviour towards the other. 
While insisting the theological or philosophical anthropology against all attempts to reduce the 
humans to particular aspects of his/her holistic being, according to Schockenhoff, the concept 
of person in moral terms must fulfil a vital function despite its openness to different 
metaphysical connotations. It is just like the old word “soul” that describes one’s irreducible 
being, which is the “focal point of his/her freedom” from which one may say “I” and present 
himself/herself to the world around them.886 The meaning of the terms “person” and “spiritual 
soul” is therefore, every person by virtue of his/her derivativeness from God. He/she builds 
his/her own centre, around which all other things are ordered to his/her special world.887 
Accordingly, the normative understanding of the concept of person and one’s obligatory moral 
behaviour towards another is essential in order to apply it to bioethical questions, especially 
issues related to the beginning of life. Hence, a question can be raised: How is a person related 
to morality?  
Schockenhoff answers the above question in the following way: Although the link with the term 
“person” in the history of theological and philosophical anthropology is derived from different 
metaphysical notions, they are consistent with regard to their practical purpose at the decisive 
                                                 
884 „Zum Menschen gehört, dass er ein relationales Wesen ist… Er ist kein autarkes, in sich allein gerundetes 
Wesen, keine Insel des Seins, sondern seinem Wesen nach Beziehung [...]. Und gerade in dieser Grundstruktur ist 
Gott abgebildet. Denn es ist ein Gott, der in seinem Wesen ebenfalls Beziehung ist, wie uns der 
Dreifaltigkeitsglaube lehrt. Joseph RATZINGER, Gott und die Welt. Glauben und Leben in unserer Zeit. Ein 
Gespräch mit Peter Seewald, Knaur Taschenbuch-Verlag, München 2005, 95. English tr. from IDEM, God and the 
World. A Conversation with Peter Seewald, Ignatius Press, San Francisco 2002, 110-111. Cf. DIRSCHERL, „Über 
spannende Beziehungen…“, 73. 
885 Cf. KANT, „Die Metaphysik der Sitten“, in: Kants gesammelte Schriften; Band VI, op. cit., 1914, 203-491; 
417-418. Cf. IDEM, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., 214. Cf. HILPERT, „Person, Personalität…“, 50. 
886 Bernhard WELTE, „Person und Welt. Überlegungen zur Stellung der Person in der modernen Gesellschaft“, 
in: Bernhard WELTE/Annette SCHAVAN (Hg.), Person und Verantwortung. Zur Bedeutung und Begründung der 
Personalität, Patmos Verlag, Düsseldorf 1989, 12f. Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, “Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. 
Theologische Perspektiven...“, 464. 
887 Cf. ibid. Cf. also GUARDINI, Welt und Person…, 134. 
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point.888 The concept of “person” can be understood in different ways. One can understand 
“person” in the scholastic tradition (Boethius) as the individual subject of a rational nature. One 
can also understand from the modern critique of reason (Kant) that a person is the subject, as 
the moral being. Further, one can also understand with the modern existentialism (Kierkegaard), 
in which human being is seen as the reflected self-relation. In all these ways, the decisive point 
is that the individual human person is always addressed as the incomparable and irreplaceable 
being who is justified both from a moral and legal point with regard to his/her special 
conservation value.889 This explanation clarifies the stance of German Moral Theology on the 
person as a moral being. 
Schockenhoff is of the opinion that the terms image of God, person and human dignity are 
theological and philosophical terms, which are of key importance to the moral self-
understanding of human beings. In their normative essence, they cannot be dealt-with 
exhaustively from socio-psychological approaches such as, “self”, “identity” or “I”.890 These 
basic words designate the normative framework of ideas. Regardless of their different 
backgrounds and accents of the contents on which they are associated with, a rational 
perspective of acceptable protection of human embryos is indispensable. When the question 
arises about answering their moral status with moral arguments, then the required solution 
should not be carried out from a particular point of interest (such as accessing intentions of 
science or the cure for future generations). Similarly, it should not be carried out by the mere 
appeal to the unproblematic self-evident nature (For example, the sheer microscopically 
observable size of the human embryo). Nonetheless, they are rather decided upon only on a 
level of common reason and on a platform of impartial justice between the unborn and the born 
as is revealed through the concepts of the image of God, personhood and human dignity in a 
normative framework of reference.891 
Schockenhoff argues further that one can miss the essential moral function of the concept of 
person in an empiricist understanding of a person under the influential current of Anglo-
American bioethics of personhood. They bind the factual evidence of cognitive and volitive 
skills to actual characteristics or the ability to have self-conscious interests, preferences and 
desires.892 According to Schockenhoff, the moral status of a living being that depends on the 
                                                 
888 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, “Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theologische Perspektiven...“, 463. See also 
IDEM, „Lebensbeginn und Menschenwürde…“, 206. For a theological perspective of the concept of person, see 
IDEM, Ethik des Lebens…, 190-204 and, BREUER, Person von Anfang an?..., 73-96. For a philosophical 
development of the concept of person see BAUMGARTNER (u.a.), „Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz; 
Philosophische Aspekte…“, 342-358. 
889 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, “Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theologische Perspektiven...“, 463. 
890 Cf. ibid., 470. Cf. also Wolfhart PANNENBERG, Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive, Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, Göttingen 1983, 151-235. 
891 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, “Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theologische Perspektiven...“, 470. 
892 Cf. ibid., 468-469. Perhaps, Schockenhoff is referring through the phrase, “by the factual evidence of 
cognitive and volitive skills”, to Singer’s statement on the ‘Indicators of Humanhood’, namely, “self-awareness, 
self- control, a sense of the future, a sense of the past, the capacity to relate to others, concern for others, 
communication, and curiosity” and to Autonomy, which, “here refers to the capacity to choose and to act on one’s 
own decisions”. See SINGER, Practical Ethics…, 73 & 84. For a critical debate over this issue see HONNEFELDER, 
„Der Streit um die Person…“, 246-265, Günther, PÖLTNER, „Die konsequenzialistische Begründung des 
Lebensschutzes“, in: Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 47/2 (1993) 184-203 and Eberhard 
SCHOCKENHOFF, „Pro Speziesargument. Zum moralischen und ontologischen Status des Embryos“, in: 
DAMSCHEN (Hg.), Der moralische Status, op. cit., 11-33; 15. 
180  Part II: Moral Theological Perspectives in Germany   
 
 
preliminary definition which recognizes only the intellectual and expressive skills as morally 
relevant characteristics, while its physical existence is considered only as a purely biological 
factuality, seems an un-reflected anthropological dualism and an abstract idea. Therefore, it is, 
of immense importance to consider the human being as the body-soul unity. Although the 
respect for one’s dignity is the capacity for moral self-determination, it does not follow that 
bodily and natural biological membership would be nothing more than mere factuality that 
should be ignored in moral terms. Since it belongs to human beings due to their corporeality 
and temporality as the inescapable conditions of subjective nature and moral capacity to act; 
one must have respect for the dignity of his/her person even though the full expression of self-
consciousness and rationality, and its explicit expression of the will is not met with. One should 
allow and provide for the intellectual self-realization, not only as demanded by the dignity of 
the person, but also as a respect for the entire time continuum and the physical expression.893 
Perhaps, this argument can be used not only for adult and mature persons, but also to embryos, 
foetuses, and those who are in a comatose stage. This argument is of utmost importance here. 
An answer to the ethical problems associated with the beginning of human life is only possible 
within the framework of the ethical importance of human life, which can ultimately justify the 
ethical protection of human life. For the same reason, one needs to answer as to what extent the 
zygote and an embryo can participate in this protection. The value of the protection of human 
life is to be seen within the context of the general prohibition on killing. Modern ethics, which 
is highly influenced by western ideas, associates the general prohibition on killing with the 
moral status of human being as a person. Although other cultures do not have a notion of the 
person, their ideas as well originate from the prohibition on killing.894 Since the protection and 
prohibition on killing is associated with the moral status of human being as a person, the topic 
will be dealt with elaborately in the Chapter that follows. 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
Seen from a theological perspective, the concept of person developed gradually. In the second 
to the fifth century, the concept was used in the context of Trinitarian and Christological 
clarifications. Theological and philosophical considerations were secondary. From a 
theological perspective, the concept arose from the centre of faith. Thomas tied the status as a 
person to that of her or his dignity because of rationality. This status along with the idea of the 
image of God conferred a “high dignity” to the person. Thus, the concept of dignity is closely 
bound with the concept of person. Functions, achievements, merits, or the presences of certain 
characteristics themselves do not give value and dignity to the human person. Insofar as they 
are created and recognized by God, human persons have dignity. The calling and personal 
relationship with God, and not particular characteristics, make a human person and 
consequently, his or her dignity. Do these statements also apply to an embryo, especially when 
                                                 
893 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, “Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theologische Perspektiven...“, 468-470. 
894 Cf. BAUMGARTNER, (u.a.), „Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Philosophische Aspekte…“, 333. Although 
Baumgartner does not agree here that the idea of person exists in other cultures as conceived by him, this topic 
will be taken up in Part IV for a better understanding of totally another culture such as Hinduism, which does 
acknowledge the concept of person apart from the prohibition on killing. However, it is to be acknowledged that 
the idea of personhood differs according to the philosophy it is based. 
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it comes to the question of their protection of life? In answering this question, what is necessary 
is a normative framework of reference. This brings us to the question of how a person is related 
to morality. The decisive point is that the individual human person is always addressed as the 
incomparable and irreplaceable being who is justified both from a moral and legal point. This 
further leads us to the importance of human life, which would decide the ethical protection of 
human life. Moreover, it brings us to consider whether an unborn has the same claim as created 
in God’s image and endowed with human dignity. Alternatively, ethically spelt, is prenatal life 
entitled to the same protection of life as human life after birth? Prenatal life is not merely and 
purely a vegetative life, but individual human life in the process of becoming. It already enjoys 
a privileged status. Therefore, one may not turn it into an object of arbitrary manipulations. It 
is true that the unborn child is unable to prove its autonomy and reveal its true self. Nevertheless, 
as far as autonomy and self-determination are concerned, it is only a question of degree. Every 
human life has its own unique value and meaning, in that it is created, called, respected, and 
loved by God because of which human beings have an inalienable dignity. The mandate to 
respect and protect unborn human life is not only an individual duty but also solidarity and a 
public responsibility of the legal system. 
Schockenhoff’s argument falls in line with the above argument. Contrary to the influential 
current of Anglo-American bioethics of personhood that binds the factual evidence of cognitive 
and volitive skills to actual characteristics or the ability to have self-conscious interests, 
preferences and desires, Schockenhoff claims these to be an un-reflected anthropological 
dualism and an abstract idea. More important is to consider the human being as a body-soul 
unity. 
Having considered the concept of person from a theological perspective in this Chapter, it is 
necessary to narrow down the research on human dignity issues pertaining to beginning of life. 
A consideration of the moral status of an embryo and whether it qualifies to be a person and 
therefore, worthy of dignity, will be examined in the next Chapter.
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C H A P T E R  9  
HUMAN DIGNITY AND BEGINNING OF LIFE ISSUES 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
It was acknowledged that human dignity is intrinsic from the moment of existence of a human 
being. It is “co-extensive” with the life of the human person. In other words, it is not divisible 
in any phase of his/her life. The temporal sequence of life phases of an embryo cannot be 
reinterpreted into a series of different subjects.895 The criterion for personhood is the biological 
membership of the human race. However, human dignity arises from the moral capacity of the 
person. An embryo has a certain minimal requirement in terms of a passive potentiality for a 
moral capacity. This in turn leads one to have good reasons at least to treat an embryo as a 
person from the moment of conception and therefore, worthy of dignity. 
The above facts that were explained so far in the last three Chapters focus on the need to protect 
an embryo from the very moment of its existence and ensure its right to life. This point will be 
further elaborated in this Chapter. The question of the human dignity of an embryo will then be 
examined. In order to explore it, the question of the ensoulment of an embryo will once again 
be revisited and the status of an embryo examined. 
9.2 PROTECTION-WORTHINESS OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO AND THE RIGHT TO 
LIFE 
This section concerns itself in seeing how German moral theology answers questions pertaining 
to the protection-worthiness (Schutzwürdigkeit) of the human embryo. In other words, is an 
embryo worthy enough to receive protection from the beginning of its existence? (This question 
was already raised in 2.5.4 above).  
In Germany, as mentioned earlier, the Grundgesetz Article 1, 1 guarantees that human dignity 
is inviolable. This is further concretized in the second article, which establishes the right to life 
and physical integrity (Art 2, 2 reads, “Everyone shall have the right to life and to inviolability 
of his person. The freedom of the individual shall be inviolable…”896). Even the unborn human 
being and even an embryo in vitro are not excluded from these fundamental rights per se.897  
This high-level protection of the human embryo has its basis in the assumption that it already 
appropriates human dignity. The Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), that is, the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany, states that wherever there is human life, there is human 
dignity. This statement is found in the Bundesverfassungsgericht Entscheidung (BVerfGE) 
Schwangerschaftsabbruch I, that is, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany Decision 
Termination of Pregnancy I. BVerfGE 39, 1, 41-42, states: 
The duty of the state to protect every human life may therefore be directly deduced from 
Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law […].Where human life exists, human 
                                                 
895 Cf. REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz…“, 135. 
896 „Jeder hat das Recht auf Leben und körperliche Unversehrtheit. Die Freiheit der Person ist unverletzlich…“ 
English tr. from GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, “Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany…”, 
361. 
897 Cf. Sebastian SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material? Eine Analyse der Diskursebenen in der Debatte zum 
Umgang mit menschlichen Embryonen am Beispiel embryonaler Stammzellforschung, Studien der Moraltheologie, 
Bd. 45, Lit Verlag, Berlin, 2012, 46. 
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dignity is present to it; it is not decisive that the bearer of this dignity himself be conscious 
of it and know personally how to preserve it. The potential faculties present in the human 
being from the beginning suffice to establish human dignity [...].Human life represents, 
within the order of the Basic Law, an ultimate value, the particulars of which need not be 
established; it is the living foundation of human dignity and the prerequisite for all other 
fundamental rights.898 
Moreover, the stage of development of an embryo “cannot be a relevant criterion for the 
intensity of constitutional protection”.899 This fact has been clearly laid out by the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany in its decision BVerfGE 88, 203,251-252 – Schwanger-
schaftsabbruch II. It states: 
These proceedings do not require us to decide whether human life begins, as medical 
anthropology would suggest is the case, when an egg and a semen cell unite […]. Wherever 
human life exists, it should be accorded human dignity (cf. 39, 1 [41]).900 
Günter Dürig, a Professor of Constitutional Law, explains in his standard commentary over the 
Grundgesetz that human dignity is violated: “when man as a tangible human being is debased 
to an object, a mere thing, an arguable dimension.”901 It is in this sense that the German bishops, 
as was seen earlier, emphasize often that the human person is afforded dignity and right to life 
from the beginning.902 
Although the above evidences are there to speak on behalf of human dignity of an embryo, there 
are still objections to using human dignity as an argument especially when pertaining to issues 
concerned with the beginning of life. Why is it so? 
In speaking about the protection worthiness and right to life of an embryo, there are three 
different concepts coming into play, namely, the status, the personhood, and the human dignity 
of an embryo. These three concepts are important today especially in the context of biomedical 
                                                 
898 FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF GERMANY DECISION: TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY I, BVERFGE 
39,1,41-42. English translation from: Robert E., JONAS/John D., GORBY (tr.), “West German abortion decision: a 
contrast to Roe v. Wade”, in: The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure, Vol. 9, John Marshall Law 
School, Chicago 1976, 605-684; 641-642. The German version reads, „Die Pflicht des Staates, jedes menschliche 
Leben zu schützen, lässt sich deshalb bereits unmittelbar aus Art. 2 Abs. 2 Satz 1 GG ableiten […]. Wo 
menschliches Leben existiert, kommt ihm Menschenwürde zu; es ist nicht entscheidend, ob der Träger sich dieser 
Würde bewusst ist und sie selbst zu wahren weiß. Die von Anfang an im menschlichen Sein angelegten potentiellen 
Fähigkeiten genügen, um die Menschenwürde zu begründen [...]. Das menschliche Leben stellt, wie nicht näher 
begründet werden muss, innerhalb der grundgesetzlichen Ordnung einen Höchstwert dar; es ist die vitale Basis der 
Menschenwürde und die Voraussetzung aller anderen Grundrechte.“ BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN (BVERFGE) 39,1 Schwangerschafts-abbruch I, 25.02.1975. 
899 Ralf MÜLLER-TERPITZ, “The ‘Uniqueness’ of the Human Being in Constitutional Law”, in: Hans-Rainer 
DUNCKER/Kathrin PRIEß, On the Uniqueness of Humankind, Wissenschaftsethik und Technikfolgenbeurteilung, 
Bd. 25, Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 2005, 107-122; 116. 
900 The Paragraphs reads, „Es bedarf im vorliegenden Verfahren keiner Entscheidung, ob, wie Erkenntnisse 
der medizinischen Anthropologie nahe legen, menschliches Leben bereits mit der Verschmelzung von Ei und 
Samenzelle entsteht [...]. Wo menschliches Leben existiert, kommt ihm Menschenwürde zu (vgl. BVerfGE 39, 1 
[41]).“ BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS ENTSCHEIDUNGEN (BVERFGE) 88, 203 Schwangerschafts-abbruch II, 
28.05.1993. BVERFGE 88, 203, 251-252. For English trans. see: FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF GERMANY 
DECISION: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/fs19930528_2bvf000290en.html, accessed on 02.07.2014. Cf. 
SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 47. Cf. Ralf, MÜLLER-TERPITZ, “The ‘Uniqueness’ of the Human 
Being…”, 117. 
901 „wenn der konkrete Mensch zum Objekt, zu einem bloßen Mittel, zur vertretbaren Größe herabgewürdigt 
wird.“ Günter DÜRIG, „Der Grundrechtssatz von der Menschenwürde“, in: Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 81 
(1956) 117-157; 127. Tr. by author. Cf. SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 47. 
902 Cf. ibid. 
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research and advancement. Simply stated, the bioethical problems are, can one do a research on 
an embryo? Is the concept of human dignity sufficient to stall such research? Has an embryo 
right to life?903 
The very fact that these questions have been raised, point to the fact that there are objections 
with regard to the issues of protection of an embryo, especially when backed up through 
arguments based on human dignity. An example of Michael Quante, a German philosopher, 
will illustrate this fact. He is not comfortable with the rationality potential use of the discourse 
on human dignity in bioethical debates. According to him, in such debates the discourse on 
human dignity actually stops all arguments abruptly. Moreover, Quante complains that the 
rationality potential discourse on Bioethics is declining because of the use of the concept of 
human dignity.904 According to Quante’s approach, the concept of human dignity includes three 
features:  
First, this concept cannot be applied to human life inferior to the level of organism. Second, 
human dignity represents an excellent ethical status that is inalienable and incalculable 
against other values, principles or norms. Third, human dignity in its content comprises of 
the provision that a human being may never be totally instrumentalized as a means.905  
Quante, while using Pre-implantation Diagnosis as an example, shows that those who rely on 
the concept of human dignity assume their argument that “the assessment of human life and its 
selection based on a quality of life - both are undoubtedly essential aspects of Pre-implantation 
Genetic Diagnosis - are incompatible with the human dignity”.906 However, he shows that the 
question of human dignity is still compatible with embryonic research leading to the destruction 
of an embryo. He writes: 
The principle of human dignity, central to German bioethical debates, is shown to be a useful 
principle within a pluralistic ethics. To make this claim plausible two strategies have to be 
distinguished. The extensional strategy denies certain (kinds of) entities (e.g. human embryos 
or human embryonic stem cells) human dignity, while the intensional strategy holds that 
some kinds of action are compatible with the human dignity of these entities. Taking 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis as an example, it is shown that the principle of human 
                                                 
903 Cf. Dietmar MIETH, “Going to the roots of the stem cell debate. The ethical problems of using embryos for 
research”, in: European Molecular Biology Organization (EMBO) Reports 1/1 (2000) 4-6. Mieth argues that since 
there is an absence of statements of revelation in this area, theological or any other, it could be argued only 
philosophically. However, in reality, the debate is often contested polemically between philosophical and 
constitutional positions. Mieth is of the opinion that either form of argumentation is not as important as to an 
attempt to excuse research on human embryos by taking refuge and referring to the ailments and sufferings of 
patients. Cf. MIETH, Was wollen wir können?..., 243. Cf. also IDEM, „Das Proprium christianum und das 
Menschenwürde-Argument in Bioethik“, in: Adrian HOLDEREGGER/Dennis MÜLLER/Beat SITTER-LIVER/Markus 
ZIMMERMAN-ACKLIN (Hg.), Theologie und biomedizinische Ethik. Grundlagen und Konkretionen, Universitäts-
verlag, Freiburg i. Ue/Verlag Herder, Freiburg i. Br. 2002, 131-152. 
904 Cf. Friedo RICKEN, „Menschenwürde und Recht auf Leben“, in: ThPh 86 (2011) 574-577; 574. 
905 „Erstens lässt sich dieser Begriff auf menschliches Leben unterhalb des Organismus nicht anwenden. 
Zweitens stellt die Menschenwürde einen ausgezeichneten ethischen Status dar, der unveräußerlich und nicht 
gegenüber anderen ethischen Werten, Prinzipien oder Normen abwägbar ist. Und drittens enthält Menschenwürde 
inhaltlich die Vorschrift, einen Träger derselben niemals vollkommen zu instrumentalisieren.“ QUANTE, 
Menschenwürde und personale Autonomie..., 46. Tr. by author. Cf. RICKEN, „Menschenwürde und Recht auf 
Leben…“, 574. 
906 „dass die Bewertung des menschlichen Lebens und seine Selektion aufgrund einer 
Lebensqualitätsbewertung - beides sind fraglos wesentliche Aspekt der Präimplantationsdiagnostik - mit der 
Würde des Menschen unvereinbar sind.“ QUANTE, Menschenwürde und personale Autonomie..., 29. Cf. RICKEN, 
„Menschenwürde und Recht auf Leben…“, 574. 
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dignity can be an important resource for justification within biomedical ethics, especially if 
the intensional strategy is used. Therefore, the claim to ban the principle of human dignity 
from biomedical ethics is repudiated.907 
In order to show that the principle of human dignity is compatible with Pre-implantation 
Genetic Diagnosis, Quante distinguishes between two theses, namely compatibility thesis and 
incompatibility thesis.908 The compatibility thesis assumes that human dignity and the 
destruction of an embryo are compatible. The incompatibility thesis considers that human 
dignity and destruction of an embryo are incompatible without exception. Quante criticizes this 
incompatibility assumption.909  
In order to accommodate Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis as indeed compatible with human 
dignity, Quante further distinguishes within the compatibility thesis, two strategies, namely, the 
extensional strategy and the intensional strategy. According to the extensional strategy, the 
status of an embryo is questionable. According to this strategy, embryos do not have human 
dignity. The intensional strategy questions the intensionality of the human dignity. For Quante, 
an embryo is an entity, nothing else, not a human being. According to the intensional strategy, 
human dignity is compatible with Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis.910 
According to Quante, four central features of human dignity are recognizable. First, the concept 
of human dignity does not apply to organisms in their early developmental stages (they are just 
individual cells). Second, human dignity represents an excellent ethical status, which is 
inalienable. It cannot be weighed (abwägbar) against any other ethical values, principles, or 
norms. Third, human dignity contains a requirement that its bearer can never be 
instrumentalized.911 
Quante then presents three premises. First, the principle of human dignity is deeply rooted in 
German ethical and legal cultures. Second, the concept of human dignity is the integral and 
                                                 
907 The German version reads: „Das Prinzip der Menschenwürde lässt sich in einer sich selbst als pluralistisch 
verstehenden Ethik sinnvoll und mit problemaufschließender Kraft verwenden. Dies ist möglich auf der Grundlage 
der Unterscheidung zwischen der extensionalen Strategie, innerhalb derer bestimmte Arten von Entitäten (z.B. 
menschliche Embryonen oder embryonale Stammzellen) aus dem Bereich des Prinzips der Menschenwürde 
ausgeschlossen werden, und der intensionalen Strategie, innerhalb derer die Kompatibilität bestimmter 
Handlungsformen mit dem Menschenwürdestatus der so behandelten Entitäten aufgezeigt wird. Am Beispiel der 
Präimplantationsdiagnostik wird gezeigt, dass vor allem unter Verwendung der intensionalen Strategie das Prinzip 
der Menschenwürde eine zentrale Begründungsressource für die biomedizinische Ethik sein kann. Es gibt daher 
keinen Grund, das Prinzip der Menschenwürde aus dem Bereich der biomedizinischen Ethik zu verbannen.“ 
Michael QUANTE, „Wessen Würde? Welche Diagnose? Bemerkungen zur Verträglichkeit von Präimplantations-
diagnostik und Menschenwürde“, in: Ludwig SIEP/Michael QUANTE (Hg.), Der Umgang mit dem beginnenden 
menschlichen Leben. Ethische, medizintheoretische und rechtliche Probleme aus nieder-ländischer und deutscher 
Perspektive, Münsteraner Bioethik-Studien, Bd. 1, Lit Verlag, Münster/Hamburg /London 2003, 133-152; 133, 
Zusammenfassung. English tr. from ibid., 133, Abstract. Emphasis in original both in the English and German 
version. The extensional and intensional strategies are explained in ibid., 138-139. 
908 For a critical analysis of the two theses of Michael Quante, see Shinichiro MORINAGA, “The Current Debate 
on Human Embryo Research and Human Dignity”, in: Journal of Philosophy and Ethics in Health Care and 
Medicine 3 (2008) 3-23; 5-6 & 9-11; here 5. 
909 Cf. ibid., 5-6 and 9. 
910 Cf. ibid., 9. 
911 Cf. QUANTE, „Wessen Würde?...“, 136. Cf. MORINAGA, “The Current Debate on Human Embryo…”, 9. 
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central constitute element of German ethical belief system. Third, the principle of human 
dignity is to be distinguished from the right to life.912 
The “right to life” (Recht auf Leben) has two meanings. First, in its strict sense, it means duty 
to life as well as right to life. Second, in its non-strict sense, it admits of the possibility of ending 
one’s life by one’s own choice. Quante claims that, human dignity and the right to life should 
not be considered to be equal in meaning (bedeutungsgleich). There are two reasons for this. 
First, the right to life is not an inalienable right, as exemplified by the ethical permissibility of 
suicide or voluntary euthanasia. Second, the right to life can be weighed against other high-
ranking goods, such as autonomy.913 According to Quante, the conclusion is:  
Therefore, the attribution of human dignity to an entity does not imply the right to life of that 
entity, even though such a connection is given between them in the normal case. There is a 
prima facie connection, but not a compelling logical (or deontological) connection.914 
Thus, according to Quante’s third premise (that human dignity is to be distinguished from the 
right of life), there is a prima facie link between human dignity and right to life in the non-strict 
sense, so that, not every killing is per se is incompatible with human dignity.915 Consequently, 
according to Quante, the principle of human dignity is a useful concept and there is no reason 
to ban it from biomedical debate.916 
Another example in the area of protection-worthiness of an embryo and human dignity is 
regarding the question whether it is justified to destroy human embryo to derive embryonic 
stem cells. Again, the analysis of Quante may be recalled to answer this question. The 
conclusive answer to these questions according to Quante is:  
Analogous to the differentiation of our attitudes to sexuality and reproduction, it is 
conceivable that, in relation to the institution of the experimental and therapeutic handling of 
the beginning of human life [...] these forms of beginning of human life cannot be covered 
by the principle of human dignity.917 
Therefore, according to Quante, the ethical evaluation of stem cell research raises the question 
whether the principle of human dignity can be applied to all stages of early human life. In other 
words, is the destruction of human embryos for obtaining stem cells contrary to human dignity? 
In order to answer the question, once again as seen above, Quante makes a distinction between 
two strategies. Friedo Ricken, a German Philosopher, analyzes these two strategies of Quante: 
(a) The extensional strategy restricts the scope of the principle of human dignity. This strategy 
has far-reaching consequences. If, for example, an embryo is taken out of the scope of human 
                                                 
912 Cf. QUANTE, „Wessen Würde?...“, 136-137. Cf. MORINAGA, “The Current Debate on Human Embryo…”, 
9. 
913 Cf. QUANTE, „Wessen Würde?...“, 137-138. Cf. MORINAGA, “The Current Debate on Human Embryo…”, 
9-10. 
914 „Deshalb impliziert die Zuschreibung der Menschenwürde an eine Entität nicht das Recht auf Leben dieser 
Entität, auch wenn ein solcher Zusammenhang im Normalfall gegeben ist. Es gibt hier eine prima facie 
Verknüpfung, aber keine zwingende logische (oder deontologische) Verbindung.“ QUANTE, „Wessen Würde?...“, 
138. Emphasis in original. Tr. by author. Cf. MORINAGA, “The Current Debate on Human Embryo…”, 10. 
915 QUANTE, „Wessen Würde?...“, 138. Cf. MORINAGA, “The Current Debate on Human Embryo…”, 10. 
916 Cf. QUANTE, „Wessen Würde?...“, 133, Zusammenfassung. 
917 „Analog zur Ausdifferenzierung unserer Einstellungen zu Sexualität und Fortpflanzung ist es denkbar, dass 
man in Bezug auf die Institution des forschenden und therapeutischen Umgangs mit dem beginnenden 
menschlichen Leben [...] diese Formen beginnenden menschlichen Lebens nicht unter das Prinzip der 
Menschenwürde fallen lässt“. QUANTE, Menschenwürde und personale Autonomie..., 66. Tr. by author. Cf. 
RICKEN, „Menschenwürde und Recht auf Leben…“, 574. 
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dignity, then they cannot be taken up again in other problem areas.918 (b) The intensional 
strategy, advocated by Quante, does not exclude certain forms of human life from the scope of 
the principle, but rather sees the compatibility of certain forms of action with human dignity as 
claimed by an entity and must be assessed accordingly.919 Ricken’s conclusion is: “Quante is of 
the opinion that the killing of the so-called surplus embryos, which have been frozen for more 
than five years and therefore considered to be at risk when implanted, would be acceptable in 
view of high-level ethical objectives.”920 Nevertheless, Quante himself calls into question about 
the use of intensional strategy in its long-term use. Advocating for the extensional strategy 
states: “From a long-term perspective, an application of extensional strategy cannot be avoided 
and maybe it would be a more appropriate solution for all the ethical problems connected with 
the origins of human life.”921 In order to substantiate his argument Quante relies on the proposal 
made by another German philosopher, Ludwig Siep. According to him, one should consider, “a 
complete separation of reproductive and therapeutic dealing with gametes, zygotes and early 
embryos including clones”.922 However, Ricken, in his critique against the above opinions of 
Quante, concludes that his arguments are incomprehensible because they represent a nominalist 
proposal of Siep.923 
From the above discussions, both with regard to Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis and 
embryonic stem cells research, it becomes clear that the concept of human dignity alone does 
not suffice to answer questions in the field of bioethics. Thus, it is also very essential that a 
proper understanding of the concept of person, as described in Chapter 8 above, be taken into 
consideration, especially regarding questions pertaining to the beginning of life. Hilpert is of 
the opinion that the understanding of the concept of person is more important during the early 
developmental stage of the human being than the concept of human dignity itself, especially 
with regard to experimentation on them. He says: 
                                                 
918 Cf. RICKEN, „Menschenwürde und Recht auf Leben…“, 575. Ricken writes: „(a) Die extensionale Strategie 
schränkt den Geltungsbereich des Prinzips der Menschenwürde ein. Diese Strategie habe weitreichende Folgen. 
‚Sind z. B. Embryonen erst einmal aus dem Geltungsbereich der Menschenwürde herausgenommen, dann können 
sie in anderen Problemfeldern nicht wieder in diesen hineingenommen werden‘“. Cf. QUANTE, Menschenwürde 
und personale Autonomie..., 52.  
919 Cf. RICKEN, „Menschenwürde und Recht auf Leben…“, 575. Ricken states: „(b) Die intensionale Strategie, 
für die Q[uante]. plädiert, beruht nicht darauf, bestimmte Formen menschlichen Lebens aus dem Geltungsbereich 
des Prinzips auszuschließen; vielmehr ‚wird die Verträglichkeit bestimmter Handlungsformen mit der 
Menschenwürde einer Entität behauptet und muss entsprechend überprüft werden‘“. Cf. QUANTE, Menschenwürde 
und personale Autonomie..., 51. 
920 „Q[uante]. vertritt die Auffassung, dass die Tötung sogenannter überzähliger Embryonen, die länger als 
fünf Jahre eingefroren sind und deshalb aufgrund von Risikoabwägungen nicht mehr implantiert werden können, 
zugunsten hochrangiger ethischer Ziele vertretbar sei.“ RICKEN, „Menschenwürde und Recht auf Leben…“, 575. 
Tr. by author. Cf. QUANTE, Menschenwürde und personale Autonomie..., 64. 
921 „In langfristiger Perspektive wird eine Anwendung der extensionalen Strategie jedoch vielleicht nicht zu 
vermeiden und für die Gesamtheit der ethischen Probleme mit dem beginnenden menschlichen Leben die 
angemessenere Lösung sein“. QUANTE, Menschenwürde und personale Autonomie..., 65. Tr. by author. Cf. 
RICKEN, „Menschenwürde und Recht auf Leben…“, 575. 
922 „vollständige Trennung von reproduktivem und therapeutischen Umgang mit Gameten, Zygoten und frühen 
Embryonen einschließlich des Klonens.“ Ludwig SIEP, „Ethische Kriterien der Embryonenforschung im 
europäischen Vergleich“, Vortrag, gehalten in Alpbach am 26.8.2001, Manuskript, in: Perspektiven der 
Stammzellenforschung. Wissenschaft und Forschung im Dialog, Donnerstag, 30 August 2001, Congress Center 
Düsseldorf, Ministerium für Schule, Wissenschaft, und Forschung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf 
2001, 15 pages. Tr. by author. Cf. QUANTE, Menschenwürde und personale Autonomie..., 65-66. 
923 Cf. RICKEN, „Menschenwürde und Recht auf Leben…“, 575. 
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Whether the guarantee of human dignity, understood as respect for the inaccessibility of the 
other, including even embryos that are in their earliest stages - as in the production of stem-
cell lines – this can include and protect, but does not depend on how “human dignity” is 
understood, but on when the personality begins during the development of the human 
being.924 
One can see here that this is partly a question of biological developmental process, on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, partly a philosophical question. Referring to human dignity alone 
does not justify or sufficiently give clear-cut decision on the permissibility or non-
permissibility, at least in the case of protection of an embryo in its developmental stage or any 
such research done on it. The respect for human dignity is but a basic orientation and guideline 
for action in this field. Although the status of personhood of the human embryo in the early 
stages could be dubious and unlikely, yet it must be valid. This is because of the fact that insofar 
as embryos originate from human beings and have the possibility of developing into an 
individual human person, they are not mere matter and consequently deserve respect.925 
This fundamental respect demands in the treatment of human embryos, the following: First, 
since the embryos that have emerged from procreation are going to establish themselves in the 
body of the mother implies that they may not be used for research, which ultimately ends in 
their destruction. Second, human embryos should not be actively generated in order to use them 
solely for the purpose to gain knowledge. Third, experimentation with embryos (such as 
intervention in the germ line) that will grow into humans is not allowed. Fourth, in the case of 
surplus embryos produced in the course of in-vitro fertilization, one applies extreme caution 
and maximum thrift. In other words, when they are used for research purposes, in each and 
every case abuse is to be excluded. This could be spelt in the form of a proof that high-level 
goals of research are achieved, is therapeutic and that alternative ways have been exhausted. 926 
Since personhood and human dignity are closely connected, it would be enlightening and 
necessary to see the role of the status of an embryo in its protection. This is the next venture in 
this research. 
9.3 THE STATUS OF AN EMBRYO AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
The status of an embryo pertains to both the biological science and to the philosophical field. It 
is also to be remembered that neither the political nor the legal system is competent enough to 
address the question of the status of an embryo.927 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenforde, a former judge 
of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, vouchsafes this dilemma. He quotes the former 
President of the Federal Constitutional Court Jutta Limbach, who states, “The law is not 
competent to answer the question about when human life begins [...]. Science through its 
knowledge is not able to answer the issue as when human life should be placed under the 
                                                 
924 „Ob die Garantie der Menschenwürde, verstanden als Respekt vor der Unverfügbarkeit des Anderen, auch 
schon den Embryo, gar - wie bei der Herstellung von Stammzelllinien - den Embryo in seinen frühesten Stadien, 
umfasst und schützen kann, hängt nicht davon ab, wie ‚Menschenwürde‘ verstanden wird, sondern davon, wann 
innerhalb der Entwicklung des menschlichen Lebewesens die Personalität beginnt.“ HILPERT, „Die Idee der 
Menschenwürde…“, 52. Tr. by author. 
925 Cf. ibid., 52-53. Cf. also MIETH, “Going to the roots of the stem cell debate…”, 5. 
926 Cf. HILPERT, „Die Idee der Menschenwürde…“, 53. 
927 Cf. LEHMANN, „Vom Anfang des Menschseins…“, 217.  
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protection of the Constitution.”928 Thus, one can see that questions such as the beginning of 
human life, when an embryo becomes a person, from when on is it worthy of protection, and 
from which moment onward it has inherent human dignity, becomes debatable in Bioethics. 
Therefore, this section will deal with these questions, which is ultimately dependent on the 
status that is accorded to an embryo. German Moral Theologian Dietmar Mieth argues that if 
one is dealing with an embryo as a human being, one must consider giving it a status that is 
morally relevant.929 It is in this context that one needs to address the status of an embryo. 
Therefore, the question arises: what is a fertilized egg or what is an early embryo? The 
Convention on Biomedicine of the Council of Europe in the supplementary protocol on human 
cloning, offers three answers namely, an embryo is a person, a human being, or a conglomerate 
of human cells. Mieth writes: 
I suggest that the last possibility be excluded, because there is indeed a significant difference 
between human gametes, and an early embryo. The embryo has a gender. It has the ability – 
and not merely in the sense of an abstract potential, but in the sense of a real capacity – to 
become a human being if its development is allowed to follow its inherent intention.930 
Therefore, the two answers above needs to be taken into consideration, namely, an embryo is a 
person and an embryo is a human being. In Chapter 2.5.4 above, it was mentioned that 
contemporary philosophy considers the concept of person as a genuinely practical attributive 
term that is used to earmark the status of a human being. 
Consequently, one can assume that the status of an embryo is a person and a human being. One 
can identify various stances with regard to when exactly the status is accorded to an embryo. 
Reiter, for example, speaks of six different theories about the question of the beginning of life. 
They are: (1) at fertilization, (2) end of Nidation/implantation, (3) after the possibility of 
twinning (4) development of brain (5) sometime during pregnancy or with the birth, or (6) the 
first year of a baby’s life when self-consciousness and possibility of freely choosing is 
attained.931 The question is, among these various theories, when exactly does an embryo attain 
the status of a human being and person? The above question can be narrowed down into two 
main theories: simultaneous animation or delayed animation of an embryo. Following Hack, it 
was concluded that based on the current scientific knowledge, simultaneous animation is a more 
prevalent theory (See Chapter 5). 
Subsequently, the next step is to establish the concept of human dignity of an embryo. The 
inquiry can be narrowed down to four positions: 
                                                 
928 „Die Rechtswissenschaft ist nicht kompetent, die Frage zu beantworten, wann menschliches Leben beginnt 
[...]. Die Naturwissenschaft ist auf Grund ihrer Erkenntnisse nicht in der Lage, die Frage zu beantworten, ab wann 
menschliches Leben unter den Schutz der Verfassung gestellt werden sollte.“ Jutta LIMBACH, „Mensch ohne 
Makel“, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feuilleton, Nr.47, 25.2.2002, 51. Cf. BÖCKENFORDE 
„Menschenwürde und Lebensrecht…“, 248. 
929 Cf. MIETH, “Going to the roots of the stem cell debate…”, 5. Cf. A similar idea expressed in IDEM, Was 
wollen wir können?..., 243. 
930 IDEM, “Going to the roots of the stem cell debate…”, 5. Mieth writes: “Ich schlage vor, die letzte Mög-
lichkeit auszuschließen, da ein signifikanter Unterschied zwischen menschlichen Keimzellen, wie Ei- und 
Samenzelle, und dem frühen Embryo besteht. Denn der Embryo hat die Potenz, und zwar nicht nur im Sinne der 
reinen Möglichkeit, sondern im Sinne der Kapazität, ein Mensch zu werden, wenn die Entwicklung entsprechend 
der Intention, die in ihm angelegt ist, erfolgt, wenn also nicht eine Handlung zuungunsten dieser Entwicklung 
getan oder unterlassen wird.“ IDEM, Was wollen wir können?..., 242. 
931 See REITER, „Bioethik…“, 15-17. See Chapter 5.2 at fn. 599 above. 
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1. Human Dignity from the moment of existence of an embryo 
2. Human Dignity at Birth 
3. Human Dignity after Nidation 
4. Human Dignity as a Gradual Process.932 
Although, the arguments that speak of human dignity at a later stage will be addressed, yet the 
focus will be on the first position above. Owing to the scope and limit of this research, the 
positions held by philosophers like Singer,933 Norbert Hoerster934 and others will not be 
examined. 
The first position is that which holds that right from the moment of conception the fertilized 
ovum (embryo), which is a human being, is absolutely worthy of human dignity. Those who 
hold for this position, make use of the following four arguments: the fact of belongingness to 
the human species (Speziesargument), human development which is continuous 
(Kontinuumsargument), identity between an embryo and the new born (Identitätsargument) and 
the potentiality of an embryo as a self-existent being (Potentialitätsargument). These four 
arguments (species, continuity, identity and potentiality) must be understood as taken together 
in the sense that all of them are dependent on one another.935  The four arguments are abbreviated 
in German from the initial letter of the headwords, namely, Spezies, Kontinuität, Identität and 
Potentialität as the “SKIP Argumente”. The corresponding English equivalent is the so-called 
SCIP argument.936 The following paragraphs describe the SCIP arguments. 
9.3.1 The Species Affiliation Argument 
According to the Species Affiliation argument, the human embryo must be granted human 
dignity in its earliest phase because of the fact that each member of the human species has 
human dignity, so also an embryo must have dignity from the beginning since it is a member 
                                                 
932 For a detailed argumentation of these and other positions see Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 
121-156.  
933 For a brief description about the position of Singer and the objections against it, see Johannes REITER, 
„Wann beginnt personales Leben? Auseinandersetzung mit den Thesen moderner Bioethiker“, in: Diether 
DÖRING/Eduard J. M. KROKER (Hg.), Gentechnik zwischen Natur und Ethos, Societäts-Verlag, Frankfurt a. M. 
2005, 75-86; 77-78, 81-83. 
934 For a brief description about the position of Norbert Hoerster and the objections against it, see REITER, 
„Wann beginnt personales Leben?...“, 79-83. 
935 Cf. Gregor DAMSCHEN/Dieter SCHÖNECKER, „Argumente und Probleme in der Embryonendebatte – ein 
Überblick“, in: DIES. (Hg.), Der moralische Status menschlicher Embryonen. op. cit., 1-10; 6. 
936 Cf. Theo A. BAUER, “Stem Cells, Pluralism and Moral Empathy”, in: Lars ØSTNER (ed.), Stem Cells, Human 
Embryos and Ethics. Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Springer, New York 2008, 121-134; 132 at fn.9. For a pro 
and contra argument of all these positions, see DAMSCHEN/SCHÖNECKER, (Hg.), Der moralische Status 
menschlicher Embryonen. op. cit. 
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of this species.937 Thus, from the very moment of conception, that is, the fertilization of the 
ovum and sperm, which results in a zygote and referred from then on as an embryo,938 one can 
acknowledge human dignity. 
The syllogistic form of the Species Affiliation argument can be formulated thus: 
(1) Every member of the human species has dignity because of one’s 
natural species-affiliation. 
(2) Every human embryo is from the beginning a member of the human 
species. 
Therefore:  (3) Every human embryo has dignity.939 
Schockenhoff explains that the above argument has three argumentative prerequisites: 
1) The dignity of a being is rooted in its capacity to a moral subject being. 
2) Under the conditions of the real world, the moral subject being is bound to the biological 
presupposition of membership to the human species. 
3) Dignity must be acknowledged unconditionally; the idea of dignity is contradicted either 
when it is bound to the recognition of the extent of its actual realization or when subjected 
to the decisive confirmation of the society.940 
Although Schockenhoff is deliberating about human dignity, the main question under 
consideration is the concept of person. The arguments that he tries to put forward is to be seen 
in the context in which not only the personhood of the human embryo is denied but also the 
denial of the fact that it is an individual, a human being, an organism or member of the human 
species, namely Homo sapiens. Therefore, he asks the question whether all human individuals 
are entitled to human rights, whether all humans are persons and whether the entitlement is only 
                                                 
937 Cf. DAMSCHEN/SCHÖNECKER, „Argumente und Probleme in der Embryonendebatte…“, 3. Cf. also Friedo 
RICKEN, „‚Mensch‘ und ‚Person‘“, in: HILPERT/MIETH (Hg.), Kriterien biomedizinischer Ethik…, 66-86; 67. 
Ricken describes this position of belonging to the human species Homo sapiens as “Inclusion Thesis”. Kipke 
initially used this terminology. See Roland KIPKE, Mensch und Person. Der Begriff der Person in der Bioethik 
und die Frage nach dem Lebensrecht aller Menschen, Logos-Verlag, Berlin 2001, 11; 49-83. In the English-
speaking world, the Species affiliation argument is also referred to as Genetic Argument. See Karen DAWSON, 
“Fertilisation and moral status. A scientific perspective”, in: Journal of Medical Ethics 13 (1987) 173-178; 173. 
However, see a criticism of this “Geneticism” in SCHOCKENHOFF, „Lebensbeginn und Menschenwürde…“, 213-
214. For a counter argument to the species argument, see Reinhard MERKEL, „Contra Speziesargument. Zum 
normativen Status des Embryos und zum Schutz der Ethik gegen ihre biologistische Degradierung“, in: 
DAMSCHEN/SCHÖNECKER, (Hg.), Der moralische Status menschlicher Embryonen, op. cit., 35-58; 35. 
938 Here the term “embryo” is preferred, because most German Moral Theologians use this term. It is interesting 
to note that Breuer brings out the aspect of personhood of the zygote when he affirms that the zygote must be 
considered as a member of the human species as a person. Cf. BREUER, Person von Anfang an?..., 50. In a footnote 
there, he quotes Robert Joyce: “The human zygote is a member of a unique species of creature. No individual 
living body can ‘become’ a person unless it already is a person. No living being can become anything other than 
what is already essentially is”. See Robert E. JOYCE, “When does a Person begin?”, in: Thomas W. 
HILGERS/Dennis J. HORAN/David MALL (ed.), New Perspectives on Human Abortion, Maryland 1981, 345-356; 
351. 939 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, „Pro Speziesargument…“, 11. For a similar syllogistic form see also SCHOKNECHT, 
Mensch oder Material…, 95 and Nikolaus KNOEPFFLER, Der Beginn der menschlichen Person und bioethische 
Konfliktfälle. Anfragen an das Lehramt, Quaestiones Disputatae, Bd. 251, Herder, Freiburg i. Br./Basel/Wien 
2012, 58. For a contrary argument see MERKEL, „Contra Speziesargument…“, 35-58. 
939 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, „Pro Speziesargument…“, 11. For a similar syllogistic form see also SCHOKNECHT, 
Mensch oder Material…, 95 and Nikolaus KNOEPFFLER, Der Beginn der menschlichen Person und bioethische 
Konfliktfälle. Anfragen an das Lehramt, Quaestiones Disputatae, Bd. 251, Herder, Freiburg i. Br./Basel/Wien 
2012, 58. For a contrary argument see MERKEL, „Contra Speziesargument…“, 35-58. 
940 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, „Pro Speziesargument…“, 11-12. 
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for those with such conditions. In order to answer the queries one has to inquire into the 
definition of Boethius on person, which was later shared by positions held by philosophers such 
as Locke and Kant, but who wanted to detach the concept of person from the theoretical 
difficulties associated with specific idea of substance. However, being anchored in our moral 
intuitions, the identification of personhood and humanity under the present moral philosophical 
positions has become controversial. One takes the following considerations from a double point 
of departure. First, one adjusts the implications of the term ‘person’ for practical ethics. Second, 
one considers the fact of the significance of belonging to the biological species as recognition 
of question on human dignity and human rights. Finally, one demonstrates the unity of person 
and nature. The goal therefore, of the separate discussion of both concepts is to reject their 
hypothetical dissociation on the one hand; and, on the other hand, to show reasonable unity in 
the anthropological constitution of human beings.941 
Schockenhoff then compares between Locke, on the one hand, who gives a definition of person 
with metaphysical neutrality while stressing on the self-consciousness aspect, but rejecting 
those individuals who are disabled mentally and severely as persons. On the other hand, 
Schockenhoff compares Kant who agrees with Locke on the rejection of the concept of 
substance. However, the difference is that Kant sees the personhood of human beings as moral 
subjects. Through the categorical imperative formula, Kant formulates the idea that the human 
person exists as an end in himself/herself. It results in the basic moral imperative of respect for 
every human being: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or 
in any other person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (GMS IV, 
429) (see Chapter 2.3 above). Personhood and humanity appear in their entirety as identical – 
although not anymore due to the fact that each person substantially exists as a carrier of a human 
rational nature. Nevertheless, from the practical interest of reason, one cannot think of the idea 
of moral recognition without at the same time “acknowledging the dignity of mankind in 
practically every other person” (GMS IV, 462). In this way, Schockenhoff argues that 
(notwithstanding all the theoretical differences that exist between the metaphysical and the 
empirical and the transcendental concept of the person) it is through the moral-philosophical 
tradition that one can acknowledge that all humans are persons. He further states that it is a 
practical consensus of European ethics that concludes that all human beings – including 
children, mentally handicapped and aged people – are persons who unconditionally qualify for 
protection, which is expressed in the idea of human dignity.942 Thus, it is not the society, which 
confers human dignity on the human individual. Nevertheless, human dignity is acknowledged 
in his/her own individual essence as an unconditional right, which is based solely on his/her 
membership in the biological species.943 
In which sense can an embryo be called a person? According to Schockenhoff, whether the 
human embryo receives human dignity and consequently the right to life, protection and 
promotion, neither depends on questionable ontological assumptions nor on whether the eight-
or sixteen cells could be counted as a person. Rather, what is relevant is that one should not 
                                                 
941 Cf. ibid., 12-13. 
942 Cf. ibid., 13-14. 
943 Cf. ibid., 11. 
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arbitrarily limit human dignity and the protection of their rights, which are derived by every 
human individual on their own. Further, one must also embrace the precarious early stages of 
its existence. In addition, it should be emphasized that this practical conclusion alone – which 
refers to the postulate of justice and recognition of relationships between ourselves and our 
posterity – remains valid even if one has to leave the question of the ontological status of an 
embryo unanswered.944 The possible doubt regarding the personhood of an embryo (according 
to the tutiorist Principle of the reconstruction of theoretical justice [gerechtigkeitstheoretische 
Rekonstruktion]) should not lead to arbitrary restriction of human dignity, because no one is 
governed by a positive coercive justification (positiven Rechtfertigungszwang) for one’s own 
life. In essence, this amounts to a fairness rule for the burden of proof, which may leave open 
according to the metaphysical principle of economy, further questions about the ontological 
status of an embryo.945 
Schockenhoff then raises the question as to how one can possibly find a solution to the 
ontological status. He answers by saying that it depends on when a being is “potential” or when 
it is not. Citing Aristotle from his ninth book of his metaphysics (Book IX, Part 7)946, 
Schockenhoff argues that this question makes sense only if there are possibilities that the being 
does not stand contrary when compared to a pure non-being, but is itself a modality of being. 
Aristotle had shown that one cannot reckon all the not yet actualized possibilities with that of a 
non-existent, but must make a distinction in the concept of what is “possible”. Aristotle gives 
an example of builder who wants to build a house. The possibility of building a house becomes 
a potentiality only when it can exist as an idea in the builder’s mind or after laying the 
foundation. Therefore, a distinction could be made. (1) That which comes to exist actually 
because of a thought from having existed potentially is that if the agent has willed it, if nothing 
external hinders, so that it comes to be. It is on similar terms that one has what is potentially a 
house if nothing external acted on it from becoming a house. In addition, (2) in all cases where 
the generative principle is contained in the thing itself, a thing is potentially another, when it 
will of itself become the other, if nothing external hinders it.947 In a similar way, the term 
                                                 
944 Cf. ibid., 28-29. Schockenhoff in a footnote to this argument quotes Donum vitae I,1: “The Magisterium 
has not expressly committed itself to an affirmation of a philosophical nature”. However, speaking about the 
unconditional respect that is due to human life from the beginning, the Magisterium states: “Thus the fruit of 
human generation, from the first moment of its existence, that is to say from the moment the zygote has formed, 
demands the unconditional respect that is morally due to the human being in his bodily and spiritual totality. The 
human being is to be respected and treated as a person from the moment of conception; and therefore from that 
same moment his rights as a person must be recognized, among which in the first place is the inviolable right of 
every innocent human being to life.” 
945 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, „Pro Speziesargument…“, 29. For a cautious use of the principle of Tutorianism, see 
IDEM, „Lebensbeginn und Menschenwürde…“, 227-228 and IDEM, “Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. 
Theologische Perspektiven...“,.455-456. 
946 ARISTOTLE, The Metaphysics, Vol. I, tr. by Hugh TREDENNICK, The Loeb Classical Library. Vol. 271, 
Harvard University Press, Great Britain 1968, 451. Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, „Pro Speziesargument…“, 29. See also 
Dietmar MIETH, „Wann beginnt das Leben eines Menschen? Theologisch-ethische Überlegungen“, in: Bernhard 
NACKE/Stephan ERNST (Hg.), Das Ungeteiltsein des Menschen. Stammzellforschung und Präimplantations-
diagnostik Christentum und Gesellschaft, Bd. 4, Mathias-Grünewald-Verlag, Mainz 2002, 154-162; 154. 
947 Cf. ARISTOTLE, The Metaphysics…, 451. Aristotle gives here also the example of semen and says, “the 
semen is not yet potentially a man; for it must further undergo a change in some other medium. But when, by its 
own generative principle, it has already come to have the necessary attributes, in this state it is now potentially a 
man, whereas in the former state it has need of another principle.” Ibid. 
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“person” (characterized by self-status and self-origin) appears as a meaningful application in 
individual human beings independent of its growth and degree of development. Under these 
prerequisites, an embryo is not an ontological potential person, but a person who carries in 
himself/herself the future capabilities and characteristics as well as the later perceivable 
forms.948 
There are two counter arguments to the above position. First, is that it makes claims about what 
ought to be based on statements about what is. This is an ought-to-be-fallacy and therefore, not 
valid. The problem is that one moves from descriptive statements (e.g. what is) to prescriptive 
or normative statements (e.g. what ought to be), and it is not obvious how this is possible. Even 
in the very unambiguous cases of newborn human beings as the owner of basic human rights, 
it is not grounded on the biological nature, but could only be based on certain species-typical 
characteristics that are morally in need of protection and worthiness. Early embryos do not have 
such characteristics. Their inclusion in the protection sphere of morality and law therefore, can 
be evoked only through additional standards, namely, the principle of solidarity of origin. Such 
inclusion is morally required. However, the protection of human dignity in this way for an 
embryo is not certified based on a genuine subjective right conclusion. What can be justified is 
only the fact that a much weaker form is in need of protection. This is reinforced by the 
protective considerations of social norms.949 
Second, according to Seidel the whole discussion on the species argument in the context of the 
question of the ontological status of embryos suffers from a typological or essentialist 
understanding of species, because a biological evolutionary fact has not been reflected enough. 
From an evolutionist perspective, the personhood or non-personhood of a living being could be 
accepted in principle – not because of its species membership, but solely due to its individual 
natural resources – although the Species argument cannot be held scientifically to be rationally 
true.950 
Four arguments in favour of species argument will be described, other than the one that was 
already discussed (by Schockenhoff).  
First, referring to Donum Vitae, Karl Lehman argues that it is obvious that the zygote from the 
first moment of its being must be respected as a person. It has a genetic-biological identity 
similar to an adult human so as to constitute a new individual in itself. From this, one can 
conclude that there is “the rational perception of a personal presence with the very first 
occurrence (appearance) of a human life”.951  
                                                 
948 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, „Pro Speziesargument…“, 29-30. See also IDEM, „Lebensbeginn und 
Menschenwürde…“, 226. 
949 Cf. MERKEL, „Contra Speziesargument…“, 35. 
950 Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 280. 
951 „die rationale Wahrnehmung einer personalen Gegenwart schon mit dem ersten Auftreten (Erscheinen) 
eines menschlichen Leben.“ LEHMANN, „Die Würde der Weitergabe…“, 35. Tr. by author. Cf. BREUER, Person 
von Anfang an?..., 51. In a footnote here, Breuer also quotes Bioethicist Nicholas Tonti-Filippini in this context 
that the zygote has everything needed to develop into a human. Tonti-Filippini says, “The zygote is so organized 
as to be developing toward human adulthood and must therefore have whatever it is in the way of form to have 
that organization, dynamism and integration within the first cell, such that a human adult can result without any 
further addition of anything other than the nourishment which it assimilates into itself”. See Nicholas TONTI-
FILIPPINI, “A Critical Note”, in: Linacre Quarterly 56 (1989) 36-50; 47.  
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Second, one needs also to distinguish two strands of arguments in this context. The first position 
is that in which a human beings belong to the human species. This is known as Speciesism 
(Speziesismus). The second position claims that one is a human being based on self-
consciousness and other characteristics. This position is termed as Personism (Personizismus 
as distinct from Personalism).952 In this context, Mieth raises an apt question here: Because of 
giving an embryo a status that is morally relevant, “can we maintain that every embryo is the 
bearer of individual rights that would preclude its destruction or even it’s being put at risk?”953 
Mieth’s point of view is that simply belonging to the human species already entails a particular 
right to protection, which transcends that applied to animals. In his opinion, those who do not 
want to protect embryos individually, but would rather protect them only as a particular kind of 
“biological material” that has to be treated with respect but could be used for research, therefore, 
violate the morally relevant status of a human being.954 
Mieth sees a larger problem involved here. As far as the Catholic Church is concerned, she 
assumes that an embryo has to be respected and treated ‘as a person’. By looking at the 
formulation of this phrase, one can sense the careful wording, in that it does not simply maintain 
that embryos are identical with persons. The argument of the Church is that one cannot make a 
distinction between ‘human beings’ and ‘persons’ by assigning them to two different levels. 
The main argument here is that the development of a human being is a unified and continuous 
process. Although one can discern different phases, it cannot be broken into them. If one begins 
to distinguish human beings based on the stage of development, then it would have 
unpredictable consequences for the human society.955 
Third, in order to counter argue the thesis of Reinhard Merkel, a German Criminal Lawyer and 
Philosopher of Law, the inclusion thesis referred to by Ricken may be useful. The inclusion 
thesis states that personhood is a given by the very fact of belonging to the species Homo 
sapiens. When all members of the human species are persons, then the same applies for those 
who have certain characteristics or those who do not have, or those who would never have 
                                                 
952 Cf. MIETH, Was wollen wir können?..., 28. Mieth explains that by the term Speciesism (Speziesismus) is 
meant that every human being is a person because he/she belongs to the human species. All humanly living beings 
with physical unity and form is a person. Personism (Personizismus), on the other hand, is the distinction between 
mere human life, which is composed of human genetic material, on the one hand, and specific personal human life 
on the other hand (such as Rationality, self-consciousness, awareness, autonomy, pleasure and pain. Personalism 
means that a person is in relationship, to God and others and it means as the image of God. Cf. ibid. Cf. also 
Dietmar MIETH, „Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte in theologisch-ethischer Sicht“, in: Benita VON BEHR/Lara 
HUBER/Andrea KIMMI/Manfred WOLF (Hg.), Perspektiven der Menschenrechte Beiträge zum fünfzigsten Jubiläum 
der UN-Erklärung, Peter Lang, Frankfurt a. M. 1999, 77-97; 89-91. 
953 MIETH, “Going to the roots of the stem cell debate…”, 5. In his German text, Mieth expresses thus: „Kann 
man von diesem Status her bereits behaupten, dass jeder Embryo ein Träger von individuellen Rechten ist, die 
seine Vernichtung oder auch nur seine Gefährdung ausschließen“. IDEM, Was wollen wir können?..., 243. 
954 Cf. IDEM, “Going to the roots of the stem cell debate…”, 5. Mieth writes, „Wer Embryonen nicht als einzelne 
schützen, sondern sie nur als besonderes, mit Pietät zu beachtendes »biologisches Material« durch besonders 
geringen und eingeschränkten Gebrauch schützen will, der verletzt m. E. bereits den dargestellten moralischen 
Status eines menschlichen Lebewesens.“ IDEM, Was wollen wir können?..., 243. 
955 Cf. IDEM, “Going to the roots of the stem cell debate…”, 5. Cf. IDEM, Was wollen wir können?..., 243. Mieth 
does not give a reference to the Church document both in the English and German text. However, it is to be 
presumed that at the time of publication of these two citations, Mieth must be referring to Donum Vitae I, 1. It is 
to be noted that the phrase “respected and treated as a person” (“als Person geachtet und behandelt werden”) 
appears also in the later CDF Dignitas Personae 4. 
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because of organic defects. They are all to be treated as persons. However, Merkel denies this 
belongingness to the species because it does not follow a moral norm. According to him, anyone 
who wants to avoid the natural fallacy must designate properties that are found in humans and 
which is not found in any other species and that they are worthy of protection in a special way.956 
According to Ricken, accepting this thought would lead to unacceptable consequences. He 
argues that if one ignores the discussion of protection for an embryo, one finds that there are 
people born who are completely incapable of a subjective experience, such as, those in an 
irreversibly unconscious state or anencephalic newborns. In order to defend the inclusion 
theory, one must look for the human species characteristic property that belongs to all 
individuals of the species, regardless of their level of development and independently of all 
sorts of limitations and disabilities.957 
The conclusion of Mieth and Ricken seem to be similar in their argument against those who 
hold that certain characteristics need to be present in order to qualify as a person. They both 
agree that this would lead to unpredictable consequences for the human society. 
Fourth, Nikolaus Knoepffler, a German Philosopher, Theologian and Ethicist, finds that in the 
syllogistic argument mentioned above, both premises are problematic. It is not yet clear whether 
a human zygote is a member of the human species. Moreover, the first premise is an assumption. 
How can one accept the assumption that every member of the human species needs to get basic 
rights? As a solution, Knoepffler proposes an alternative to the syllogism 1. It would read as: 
la: The principle of extension applies to all members of a species.958 
However, why should this principle be valid? The reason is that human dignity extends to all 
members of the human species. Therefore, any narrowing of the boundary of people would be 
synonymous with the authorization of an ultimate arbitrarily assembled circle of citizens that 
excludes others from this circle of human life. It would judge as to whether and to what extent 
his/her admission to this select circle serves the interests of those who already belong to it or 
not.959 
Knoepffler suggests that the arguments from Spaemann would be useful here, according to 
whom one needs to realize that there is no transition from “something” to “someone”. From 
this basic realization follows Spaemann’s line of reasoning with regard to the question of the 
moral status of human zygotes960: 
1. Persons are “someone” and not “things” such as tokens that are exchangeable. 
                                                 
956 Cf. MERKEL, „Contra Speziesargument…“, 37. Cf. RICKEN, „‚Mensch‘ und ‚Person‘…“, 67. 
957 Cf. ibid., 68. Ricken uses the Kantian and the Aristotelian argument to defend the inclusion thesis against 
this objection. See ibid., 68-81. 
958 „Es gilt das Prinzip der Ausweitung auf alle Mitglieder einer Spezies.“ KNOEPFFLER, Der Beginn der 
menschlichen Person…, 58. Tr. by author. 
959 Cf. Walter SCHWEIDLER, „Zur Analogie des Lebensbegriffs und ihrer bioethischen Relevanz“, in: DERS./ 
Herbert A. NEUMANN/Eugen BRYSCH (Hg.), Menschenleben - Menschenwürde, LIT, Münster/ Hamburg/London 
2003, 13-29; 25. Schweidler writes: „[…] mit der Ermächtigung eines letztlich willkürlich zusammengesetzten 
Kreises seiner Bürger, das aus diesem Kreis ausgeschlossene menschliche Leben daraufhin zu beurteilen, ob und 
inwieweit seine Zulassung zu diesem ausgewählten Zirkel den Interessen der bereits zu ihm Gehörigen dient oder 
nicht.“ Ibid., 25. Cf. KNOEPFFLER, Der Beginn der menschlichen Person…, 58. 
960 Cf. ibid., 59. Knoepffler is here referring to SPAEMANN, Personen..., op. cit. 
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2. “But nothing develops into a person. You don’t become some-one from being 
something.”961 
3. The person “does not begin its existence after the human being, nor does it end its existence 
before the human being.”962 
4. “So we say [...], ‘I was conceived on such and such a date’.963 It would not be necessary 
that the zygote itself at this early stage of conception to have such an empirically perceptible 
self-consciousness. 
5. Therefore, human zygotes are already persons. 
6. Thus, it applies that “the rights of persons are human rights”.964 Since the zygotes have 
right to life, they must not be killed.965 
Knoepffler then concludes that the species argument gains its strength in the above argument. 
The arguments would not be misunderstood as a species-ism, namely, the simple assertion that 
every person has a to a right to life as a zygote, because of belonging to the species Homo 
sapiens. Nevertheless, it comes from the conviction that persons may never be ‘something’, but 
always be ‘someone’. This should apply to the zygote as well. 
However, Knoepffler notes here and criticizes Spaemann. Spaemann admits that the entitlement 
of persons to unconditional respect is something fundamental that originates from particular or 
specific persons. The absoluteness of “thou shall not kill” is based on specific human face. 
Person is not a concept of species, but the way in which individuals of the species “human” are. 
From this, it follows that Spaemann is admitting that persons have to be individuals with a 
specific human face. Embryos, on the other hand, do not have faces. Ontologically, the zygote 
is not an individual in the strict sense of the term, because the early embryo is still so elastic 
that it can become several individuals, and that they are only embryonic tissues. Therefore, they 
lack the necessary condition for personhood, namely, an individual in the full-bodied 
ontological sense, to be “someone”.966 
Sebastian Schoknecht, a German Moral Theologian, is of the opinion that the basic problem 
that lies in the debate by the opponents over species argument is that they separate or divide 
and focus on to the individual aspects of the argument while giving attention to weak points of 
the species argument. As mentioned earlier, each of the arguments in SCIP has to be taken 
together in combination with other major aspects of the status argument.967 
9.3.2 The Continuity Argument 
Every adult is bearer of human dignity and protected by the prohibition against killing. He/she 
has a right to life. The human embryo will develop under normal conditions into an adult. 
Within this development, there is no biological break (Zäsur) found in the embryonic 
                                                 
961 „Aber es kann sich nicht etwas zur Person entwickeln. Aus etwas wird nicht jemand.“ SPAEMANN, 
Personen..., 261. Emphasis in original. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 245. Emphasis in original. 
962 „[…] beginnt nicht später als der Mensch zu existieren und hört nicht früher auf.“ SPAEMANN, Personen..., 
261. Emphasis in original. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 245. 
963 „So sagen wir [...]: ‚Ich wurde dann und dann gezeugt‘“. SPAEMANN, Personen..., 261. Emphasis in original. 
Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 245. 
964 „Personenrechte sind Menschenrechte“. SPAEMANN, Personen..., 264. Tr. from IDEM, Persons…, 245. 
965 Cf. KNOEPFFLER, Der Beginn der menschlichen Person..., 59-60. 
966 Cf. ibid., 60. 
967 Cf. SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 99. 
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development, such that, from the beginning the dignity that belongs to an adult human is already 
given in an embryo. Consequently, the human embryo is protected from the very beginning.968 
Gerhard Luf, Professor of Philosophy of Law in Vienna, sums up the continuity arguments as 
follows: “The continuity argument stresses that the development proceeds in an overall 
continuous process in which a being does not develop to become human, but develops as a 
human.”969 
The syllogistic form of the continuity argument can be formulated thus: 
(1) Every human being, is a bearer of actual φ, has dignity970 
(2) Because of the fact that every human embryo is a human being, it 
undoubtedly is a bearer of actual φ, which under normal conditions 
continuously (with no breaks of moral relevance) develops into a born 
human being. 
Therefore:  (3) Every embryo has dignity.971 
According to Schockenhoff, although different stages of life can be perceived in human 
existence, yet it takes place in a single continuum, such that all the time their temporal form 
(Zeitgestalt) belongs to the same person during these stages. Against this anthropological 
background, the fact remains that even human prenatal life knows no morally relevant caesuras 
(Zäsuren) until its full significance. That is to say, at any given time before and after the birth, 
this human being still has his/her own future ahead with all unforeseeable life opportunities. To 
                                                 
968 Cf. ibid., 101-102. For a similar formulation see also DAMSCHEN/SCHÖNECKER, „In dubio pro embryone…“, 
210. However, in the opinion of these authors, this is one of the weakest arguments among the SCIP arguments. 
Cf. also Ludger HONNEFELDER, „Pro Kontinuumsargument. Die Begründung des moralischen Status des 
menschlichen Embryo aus der Kontinuität der Entwicklung des ungeborenen zum geborenen Menschen“, in: 
DAMSCHEN/SCHÖNECKER, (Hg.), Der moralische Status menschlicher Embryonen, op. cit., 61-79; 61. In the 
English-speaking world, the continuity argument is also referred to as discontinuity-continuity argument. See 
DAWSON, “Fertilisation and moral status…”, 175. Karen Dawson, an Australian Geneticist explains: “Proponents 
of this argument view events post fertilization as comprising a continuum of developmental changes, such that it 
is impossible to isolate any one stage at which to attribute the attainment of moral status. In contrast to this 
continuity, fertilization is seen as a radical discontinuity or “transformation” in development. It is then argued that 
the union of the two gametes to form the single zygote at fertilization is the only discrete stage at which it can be 
claimed that a human entity begins to exist.” Ibid. For a counter-argument see Mathias KAUFMANN, „Contra 
Kontinuumsargument. Abgestufte moralische Berücksichtigung trotz stufenloser biologischer Entwicklung“, in: 
DAMSCHEN/SCHÖNECKER, (Hg.), Der moralische Status menschlicher Embryonen, op. cit., 83-99. 
969 „Das Kontinuitätsargument betont, dass sich die Entwicklung in einem kontinuierlichen Gesamtprozess 
vollzieht, in dem sich ein Lebewesen nicht zum Menschen, sondern als Mensch entwickelt.“ Gerhard LUF, 
„Menschenwürde und Embryonenschutz – Rechtsethische Überlegungen“, in: Ulrich H. J. KÖRTNER/Christian 
KOPETZKI (Hg.), Embryonenschutz – Hemmschuh für die Biomedizin?, Manz, Wien 2003, 40-50; 45. Tr. by author. 
Cf. SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 102. 
970 The alphabet “φ”, which is the first letter of the Etruscan word ‘φersu’ (that means face, mask, persona), 
refers to the properties or abilities, which are usually believed in general to justify the dignity of a person or even 
a living being. They are, autonomy (the ability to set purposes), moral autonomy (freedom), cognitive abilities 
(such as abstract thinking), self-awareness, preferences (as a future-oriented desires), desires, interests and capacity 
for suffering, and also God’s image or the sanctity of life. For all beings, there is therefore at least one property φ, 
such that, if a creature has actual “φ”, it has dignity. Cf. DAMSCHEN/SCHÖNECKER, „Argumente und Probleme in 
der Embryonendebatte…“, 3 at fn. 5; See also Gregor DAMSCHEN/Dieter SCHÖNECKER, „Die Würde menschlicher 
Embryonen. Zur moralischen Relevanz von Potentialität und numerischer Identität“, in: Ralf STOECKER (Hg.), 
Menschenwürde. Annäherung an einen Begriff, Öbv & hpt, Wien 2003, 201-229; 203-204; and HONNEFELDER, 
„Pro Kontinuumsargument…“, 62 at fn. 2. 
971 Cf. ibid., 62. For these and similar syllogism see also KNOEPFFLER, Der Beginn der menschlichen Person..., 
75-80. 
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deny a human embryo its interest of survival, just because it has neither developed yet a self-
reflexive notion of its continuing being, nor able to express future oriented wishes, amounts to 
an arbitrary decretal act. It is also equally incomprehensible to assume that the process of 
individuation apparently begins until sometime after birth.972 
Further, according to Schockenhoff, if one views the individual genome as immediate 
substratum of human dignity, it would also lead to a misconception, such as “Geneticism” 
(Genetizismus) or “mysticism of the genes”. Such absurd objections often interfere with the 
reasoning that the newly formed human being has the protection of human dignity from the 
beginning of its biological origin. The connecting factor for the recognition of human dignity 
is not the DNA structure of an individual genome or an intangible information program, but the 
newly formed embryo, which has an individual genome that controls its development in 
conjunction with the required environmental conditions. The recombination of an individual 
genome, which takes place at random from the maternal and paternal components, represents a 
wonderful process that comprises a reference to the uniqueness of each person. However, it 
would be an incorrect interpretation of this wonderful process when the human soul is seen as 
a “dice of genes”. The entelechial life principle in Aristotelian-scholastic sense is inherent in 
the zygote itself, which develops further according to its genome. What results as a fruit of 
fertilization cannot be reduced to its genome and considered as a disembodied entity. The fact 
that the future body axis forms only with the formation of primitive streak, in no way entitles 
one to see the zygote before nidation as something similar to an intangible phantom structure 
or a virtual information carrier. Instead, there is already a human being as an extracorporeal 
embryo, which exists as a concrete body-soul unity developing by virtue of its inherent principle 
of life. The importance of the genome lies in the fact that an embryo after fertilization carries 
within itself all the unique assets. It will unfold in a continuous process without any morally 
relevant breaks (Zäsuren) as long as the necessary support is received in realizing its 
development potential and is not inhibited by violent action from outside.973 
Breuer attests to the above fact. He acknowledges what the Zurich Scientific Philosopher 
Antoine Suarez had already said: “The genetic composition of fertilization does not consist of 
an egg and a sperm. The 46 chromosomes in the zygote is a new way, a new reality, so that it 
can be said that all the characteristics that an adult obtains from this evolution, are already 
                                                 
972 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, Ethik des Lebens…, 514. 
973 Cf. IDEM, „Lebensbeginn und Menschenwürde…“, 213-214. Schockenhoff in a footnote (ibid. at fn. 29) to 
this argument, using the result of embryological study of human ontogeny as proposed by Rager, holds that the 
embryo from fertilization onwards constitutes human life and has the opportunity to develop this fully human life 
provided the necessary environmental conditions are commanded. Cf. RAGER, „Menschsein zwischen 
Lebensanfang und Lebensende. Grundzüge einer medizinischen Anthropologie“, in: Günter RAGER/L. 
HONNEFELDER (Hg.), Ärztliches Urteilen und Handeln. Zur Grundlegung einer medizinischen Ethik, Insel Verlag, 
Frankfurt a.M. 1994, 53-103; 82.  
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included in the zygote.”974 So that, “The two lives of the sperm and the ovum have ended 
because they have turned into an individual with a new life, the life carried by the zygote.”975 
Thus, one thing is clear from all the above statements. The developing embryo has an inherent 
capacity for development and is in a continuous process of change provided it is not hindered 
through any external agency. Moreover, it does not mean that an embryo is one being at one 
time and different at other time. The development is a continuous process. Therefore, it is 
necessary to see an embryo from the point of view of Schockenhoff, in order not to separate the 
stages of development and thereby dispense out different protection to them according to their 
stages, say e.g. at Nidation, or at the stage of primitive streak or after 14 days of fertilization as 
some hold.976 
Seidel is of the opinion that in human scientific studies and medical reasoning courses 
concerning the ontological evaluation of the ontogenetic development, one often compares 
specific events or breaks (Zäsuren) with continuous processes.977 Against such apparent 
alternatives, however, in scientific principles, it is clarified that in the biological reality there is 
no non-continuous events or discontinuities.978 
Seidel applies the above clarification in the context of individuation on an ontological level and 
explains the problem. On the one hand, if one interprets the intermediate states realistically, 
then there is, between not-yet-human and already human, an arbitrarily large number of more-
or-less-states-of-human-existence (this would correspond to a radicalized successive animation 
theory). On the other hand, if one assumes that there exists between not-yet-human and already 
human no intermediate states in the ontological sense, or even possible, then one is forced either 
to accept too probable statements (“probably not yet human”), or forced into a purely arbitrary 
non-criteria. In such a case, one is again in a dilemma as to which intermediate states have to 
be considered as not-yet-human and which intermediate states as already human. Besides, one 
incurs the problem of how to escape the setting implied by such mind-body dualism, namely, 
the many physically arbitrary intermediate states. Nevertheless, that is not the case regarding 
animation.979 
Seidel’s opinion is that if one correlates the “individuation” or “animation” with a biological 
event, one does not have a scientifically exact punctual biological event, which in principle is 
a continuous process. The conclusion is not that continuous processes can lead to qualitative 
changes and that certain continuous processes of change can be attributed to greater ontological 
                                                 
974 „Die genetische Zusammensetzung nach der Befruchtung ist hierbei nicht die von Ei- und Samenzelle. Die 
46 Chromosomen in der Zygote sind eine neue Art, eine neue Wirklichkeit, so dass gesagt werden kann, dass alle 
Eigenschaften, die ein Erwachsener aus der Evolution erhält, bereits in der Zygote enthalten sind.“ Antoine, 
SUAREZ, „Ist der menschliche Embryo eine Person? Ein rationaler Beweis“, in: Schweizer Ärztezeitung 24 (1988) 
1030-1033; 1031, as quoted in BREUER, Person von Anfang an?..., 48. Tr. by author. 
975 G. Elizabeth ANSCOMBE, “Were you a Zygote?”, in: Philosophy 18 (1984) 111-115; 115. Cf. BREUER, 
Person von Anfang an?..., 48. 
976 See also MIETH, “Going to the roots of the stem cell debate…”, 5. Cf. IDEM, Was wollen wir können?..., 
243. See also Chapter 9.3.1 at fn. 961 above. 
977 Cf. e.g., FORD, When Did I Begin?..., 85. Ford argues here that it is beyond our capacity to determine the 
“precise moment” when a human individual begins, though one cannot deny that there is no “precise point” when 
a human individual begins and dies. Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 315. 
978 Cf. ibid. 
979 Cf. ibid., 316. 
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significance. Whether the processes last for relatively long or relatively short have no relevance 
in answer to the ontological question of the individuation.980 
Despite the above clarification and the concession that fertilization is a process and not a 
moment, a fundamental question remains unanswered: Why should dignity, right to life and 
protection be linked to this first stage of human development? If one addresses them again with 
the argument of continuity of biological processes, it would amount to a circular reasoning. 
Therefore, one needs to turn to other criterion beyond continuity to that of identity and 
potentiality.981 
The starting point is that always the born human has his/her actual personal characteristics. 
These constitute an indisputable dignity. A human embryo has potentially these personal 
properties and is therefore a bearer of human dignity because under normal conditions it 
continues all along to develop until a born human. According to the German Philosopher 
Ludger Honnefelder, “The justification for the status of dignity of a human embryo occurs 
through the transferring of the moral status from an unborn human being to a born because of 
identity and continuity of development that leads from the unborn to the born.”982 
These arguments thus pave the way to another argument, namely, the identity argument, which 
will be discussed in the next section. 
9.3.3 The Identity Argument 
The identity argument is closely linked with the aspect of individuality and integrity.983 
Honnefelder emphasizes that in principle the continuity argument and the identity argument 
express the same point.984 The underlying thesis of this argument is that an embryo is identical 
to the born at all points during its development, which it was at an earlier point in time. There 
is one and the same human being who, as an embryo, has that same right to live as a newborn, 
adult or aging human being. The human embryo is neither an object nor a “something”, but (in 
order not to rashly adopt the problem-laden word “person”) a “somebody”, who would later 
utter “I”. A human embryo can bring about its own existence from its very beginning in 
conjunction with the mother’s womb.985 From the fact that a newborn possesses human dignity, 
the dignity of an embryo can be derived from the morally relevant, existing identity between it 
and the newborn, which ultimately develops after fertilization.986 
The syllogistic form of the identity argument can be formulated thus: 
(1) Every being which is a bearer of actual φ, has dignity 
(2.1) Many adults, who are bearers of actual φ, are identical with embryos 
in morally relevant respect. 
Therefore: (2.2) The embryos, with which they are identical, have dignity. 
(2.3) If any of the embryo has dignity, then all of them have it. 
                                                 
980 Cf. ibid., 316-317. 
981 Cf. SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 121-126. 
982 HONNEFELDER, „Pro Kontinuumsargument…“, 61. Cf. SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 120. 
983 Cf. ibid., 121. 
984 HONNEFELDER, „Pro Kontinuumsargument…“, 62. 
985 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, Ethik des Lebens…, 509.  
986 Cf. ENSKAT, „Pro Identitätsargument…“; 101. Cf. also KNOEPFFLER, Der Beginn der menschlichen 
Person..., 65. 
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Therefore: (3) Every embryo has dignity.987 
What ensures the identity between the adult and an embryo in morally relevant respect in the 
second premise? It is the human soul. Demelexplains this by remarking:  
From the moment of fertilization the following applies: ‘the human does not develop to 
become a person but as a person.’ And this continuous course of development can neither be 
done alone by the genetic code nor by the influence of the environment nor by both together, 
but determined significantly by an overarching principle of life, ‘a supreme controlling 
authority’', which may be called the spirit or soul. Because the genetic program cannot do 
anything by itself, but can only develop.988 
In the above syllogism, acceptance or non-acceptance of the third premise is crucial. The soul 
is the form of a body, which serves as the medium of expression. As long as this medium of 
expression is still in the zygotic stage, the soul naturally cannot express fully. Therefore, in the 
zygotic stage there is this conceptual model of a spiritual soul already present. Only their 
medium of expression, which requires a body, would be in its initial stage so that immaterial 
soul cannot yet express itself as a newborn or adult.989 
Assuming the above notion of ensoulment, the identity argument then answers the question 
whether it is appropriate to accept the zygote formation as the time of animation or the moment 
of self-transcendence and as the beginning of the individual history.990 
The critics of this argument point out to the fact that an embryo does not currently have all those 
qualities to be worthy of human dignity until it is born. One cannot also speak of an absolute 
identity. One can speak of absolutely identical objects only if all their properties are matching. 
Therefore, one can speak of such absolute identity only with itself. In other words, an embryo 
is identical to itself. Whether this identity is also with an adult, is yet to be proven.991 
Schoknecht is of the opinion that if one wants to continue with the identity argument in the 
debate over the status of an embryo; three different views need to be considered. 
a) The first would be to refer to a numerical identity. In applying the identity argument, one 
cannot consider the physiological or anatomical identity, but one must resort to a numerical 
identity. Zygote, embryo, unborn child and adult are identical in the numerical sense as an 
entity.992 
                                                 
987 Cf. DAMSCHEN/SCHÖNECKER, „Argumente und Probleme in der Embryonendebatte…“, 4. However, Ralf 
Stoecker, a German Medical Ethicist, suggests the following syllogism: (1) Every being which is a bearer of actual 
φ, has dignity, (2) Every embryo in morally relevant respect is identical to exactly a being, which is a bearer of actual 
φ, (3) Every embryo has dignity. Cf. Ralf STOECKER, „Contra Identitätsargument. Mein Embryo und ich“, in: 
DAMSCHEN/SCHÖNECKER, (Hg.), Der moralische Status menschlicher Embryonen, op. cit., 129-147; 129. 
However, Damschen and Schönecker are of the opinion that the above formulation is vulnerable to criticism. See 
DAMSCHEN/SCHÖNECKER, „Argumente und Probleme in der Embryonendebatte…“, 4. 
988 „Ab der Keimverschmelzung gilt daher: ‚der Mensch entwickelt sich als Mensch und nicht zum Menschen.‘ 
Und dieser kontinuierliche Entwicklungsgang kann weder allein durch den genetischen Code noch durch den 
Einfluss der Umwelt noch durch beide zusammen erfolgen, sondern ist entscheidend auf ein übergeordnetes 
Lebensprinzip, auf eine ,oberste Steuerungsinstanz‘ angewiesen, die man Geist oder Seele nennen kann. Denn das 
genetische Programm kann nicht etwas tun, sondern sich nur entfalten.“ Sabine DEMEL, „Was für ein Wesen ist 
der Fetus?“ in ThPh 69 (1994) 224-237; 233. Tr. by author. Cf. KNOEPFFLER, Der Beginn der menschlichen 
Person..., 65-66. 
989 Cf. ibid., 66. 
990 Cf. ibid. 
991 Cf. SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 121. 
992 Cf. ibid., 122. 
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However, the above argument would be objected from a scientific perspective. The counter 
argument against the above position is derived from the fact that around the 14-15th day, when 
the primitive streak is formed, and at the time of Nidation, there is a possibility of twinning (see 
Part I, Chapter 4.2.1 above). Moreover, it is also possible that two or more embryos could fuse 
together.993 Therefore, how could one speak of the human dignity of an embryo from the 
beginning of its life using identity argument? In the case of twinning, how could an individual 
divide? A similar position was held during the 70s and 80s of the last century by moral 
theologians like F. Böckle, J. Gründel and J. Mahoney and by medical professionals such as W. 
Ruff, K. Hinrichsen and H. Koester.994 Their position can also be found in a memorable 
formulation in the prestigious Handbook of Christian Ethics, “Prior to the biological 
determinism of a single and in itself indivisible individual, one cannot speak of a real existent 
human being in a strict anthropological sense”.995 
In an answer to the above objection, Schockenhoff explains that according to the etymology of 
the word “individual” (from indivisum = undivided), this objection assumes that not only a 
being is undivided, but also its future is indivisible, which is regarded as a necessary minimum 
requirement for the individual and personal life of a concrete human. This is certainly the case 
for the adult human. The question is however, whether the static notion of the indivisibility of 
the dynamic growth processes that characterize the early human embryo, will actually be 
appropriate. For, while the concrete existence of an adult requires individuality in the numerical 
sense, its divisibility would mean certain death; the division of early embryos is not destructive 
division, but a process of growth and thus an expression of life, which in rare cases is naturally 
possible in humans.996 
With regard to human twinning, Schockenhoff further explains that, what results in the death 
of the original zygote consequent to their division is not excluded. From the destruction of the 
zygote two new individuals would emerge, but is rather unlikely. A reasonable explanation is 
that the original zygote splits and an extension appears. In this case, one could assume that “the 
original individual carries within him the possibility of a majority of individuals.”997 In such an 
interpretation of the biological events, the possibility of twinning would not be contrary to the 
assumed individuality before the implantation of the developing zygote. The history of the 
concept of individuality shows that there prevailed not only the dynamic perspectives on the 
biological significance level, but it was also in no way foreign to the philosophical significance 
level. Thomas had already emphasized the unifying function of the human soul. For Kant, the 
                                                 
993 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, “Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theologische Perspektiven...“, 483-484. Cf. also 
SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 122. 
994 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, “Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theologische Perspektiven...“, 484. 
995 „Vor der biologischen Determinierung auf ein einziges und in sich unteilbares Individuum hin wird man 
darum anthropologisch im strengen Sinn noch nicht von einem real existierenden Menschen sprechen können.“ 
Franz BÖCKLE, „Probleme um den Lebensbeginn. Medizinisch-ethische Aspekte“, in: Anselm HERTZ/Trutz 
RENDTORFF/Herman RINGELING (Hg.), Handbuch der Christliche Ethik, Band 2, Herder/Gütersloher, Freiburg/ 
Basel/Wien 1978, 36-59; 43. Tr. by author. Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, “Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theo-
logische Perspektiven...“, 484. 
996 Cf. ibid., 485-486. 
997 „[…] dass ursprünglich eine Individuum die Möglichkeit für eine Mehrzahl von Individuen in sich trägt“. 
RAGER, „Menschsein zwischen Lebensanfang und Lebensende…“, 89. Tr. by author. Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, 
“Menschen-würde und Lebensschutz. Theologische Perspektiven...“, 486. 
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dynamic aspect becomes even more prominent, in that the person gives himself/herself up for 
her free-realization. Summarizing these findings, Günter Rager, an anatomist and embryologist, 
notes: “If the living individual is not primarily understood as something indivisible, but as a 
being that is constantly establishing its own dynamic unity, then the creation of identical twins 
represents no contradiction to our notion of the individual and person”.998 
Schoknecht is of the opinion that whether the numerical identity of every embryo with the 
newborn will allow the unconditional protection of all human embryos could be a left open 
question. However, it seems clear that a more sophisticated identity concept must be used for 
the foundation of a status-identity between an embryo and total natural born child. This could 
be found possibly in the concept of the genetic identity.999 
b) Therefore, one needs to consider the second possibility, namely, a genetic identity. In this 
argument, it is considered that “from the beginning” (that is, from the moment of fertilization 
of the nuclei of ovum and sperm) there is a determination.1000 This is the sense in which Donum 
Vitae formulates that: 
[…] modern genetic science brings valuable confirmation. It has demonstrated that, from the 
first instant, the programme is fixed as to what this living being will be: a man, this individual-
man with his characteristic aspects already well determined (Donum Vitae I,1).1001 
Nevertheless, the above view can be rejected. The reason is that specific genes may make a 
person identifiable as an entity from the beginning (genetic fingerprinting). However, a program 
for the development of all its characteristic features is not set at the beginning. These are 
primarily developed by one’s environment and upbringing. To this environment, the effects of 
the maternal organism and the self-organization of an embryo is included until the end of the 
fetal life.1002 
Seidel clearly answers the frequently asked question of the role of the genome, and points out 
that theologians, philosophers and lawyers often err in this regard. Contrary to the commonly 
encountered opinion, the human genome does not constitute a biological individual. Seidel 
remarks: “With regard to the question what biogenic material is necessary to make a biological 
individual, the genome is irrelevant”.1003 Thus, the genetic identity argument does not help here. 
Therefore, the third possibility, namely, a narrative or biographical identity is to be 
considered.1004 
                                                 
998 „Wenn das lebende Individuum nicht primär als etwas Unteilbares, sondern als ein Wesen Verstanden wird, 
das ständig dynamisch seine Einheit herstellt, dann stellt die Entstehung von eineiigen Zwillingen keinen Wider-
spruch zu unserem Begriff von Individuum und Person dar.“ RAGER, „Menschsein zwischen Lebensanfang und 
Lebensende…“, 88. Tr. by author. Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, “Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theologische 
Perspektiven...“, 486-487. 
999 Cf. SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 123. 
1000 Cf. ibid. 
1001 Cf. ibid. This idea is made more specific in Dignitas Personae 5: “Indeed, the reality of the human being 
for the entire span of life, both before and after birth, does not allow us to posit either a change in nature or a 
gradation in moral value, since it possesses full anthropological and ethical status.” Emphasis in original. Cf. also 
KNOEPFFLER, Der Beginn der menschlichen Person..., 65. 
1002 Cf. SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 123. 
1003 „Für die Beantwortung der Frage, was biogenes Material zu einem biologischen Individuum macht, ist das 
Genom ohne jede Relevanz.“ Cf. SEIDEL, „Embryonale Entwicklung…“, 92. Tr. by author. Cf. SCHOKNECHT, 
Mensch oder Material?..., 123-124. 
1004 Cf. ibid., 124. 
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c) Personal identity is an argument developed by Gisela Badura-Lotter, a German Medical 
Ethicist. This argument is based on explaining life history. She establishes the biographical 
argument as follows: 
It appears that many people (and at least those who are concerned about the idea of total 
availability of the human embryo) - consciously or unconsciously - view one’s own 
embryonic being as a necessary condition of self-realization and thus integrate it as a central 
factor into their own self-concept. Moreover, concerning our self-concept, we have plenty of 
concrete moral conceptions.1005 
Humans have been taught that embryonic being is part of one’s life history. This idea 
disintegrates when the human embryo is objectified and exploited. According to Badura-Lotter, 
the abstract embryo is received into one’s own integrity and identity creating a history of 
relationship. With this accessibility, our life history is inevitably confronted. This approach to 
the identity argument should be seen, as innovative and valuable.1006 
There is yet another argument exemplified by Rager known as the diachronic identity argument. 
What does it entail? He explains: 
Embryologists and molecular biologists agree that the embryo develops in a continuous 
manner from fertilization onwards. On the various levels, neither of morphologic 
observation, nor in molecular biology discontinuities or turning points can be observed. Each 
developmental process follows continuously from the preceding state. The embryo 
determines its own development. It is capable by itself to differentiate and mature to the adult 
state. It depends on suitable environmental conditions, such as nutrition and housing, which 
are necessary for it – as for adults – but not constitutive. Its own active potentiality will 
advance its development by itself. While it develops, it remains identical with itself, although 
it changes its appearance. This is what is meant by the term diachronic identity.1007 
Further, he argues from a bio-medical and clinical perspective: “If the zygote develops in a 
continuous manner to newborn and then on to an adult, then the identity of this being remains 
intact. If this being is a human as an adult, then it is the same also as an embryo.”1008 
Thus, one can see from the above discussions that identity argument has an important role in 
affirming the dignity of an embryo and its protection. It further depends on the continuity 
argument and on the potentiality argument. The latter will be taken up in the next section. 
                                                 
1005 „Es scheint so zu sein, dass viele Menschen (und zumindest diejenigen, denen die Vorstellung einer 
völligen Verfügbarkeit des menschlichen Embryos Sorgen macht) - bewusst oder unbewusst - das je eigene 
Embryosein als notwendige Bedingung der Selbstwerdung ansehen und damit als zentrale Größe in die je eigene 
Selbstauffassung integrieren. Und unsere Selbstauffassung betreffend haben wir sehr wohl konkrete moralische 
Vorstellungen.“ Gisela BADURA-LOTTER, Forschung an embryonalen Stammzellen. Zwischen Bio-medizinischer 
Ambition und ethischer Reflexion, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt a. M. 2005, 310. Tr. by author. 
1006 Cf. SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 124. Schoknecht explains that the background to this variant 
of the identity argument is a coherence model of morality, which is a more or less stable referential connection 
that forms a network of convictions of various orders. They enable us to explain our self and the world. Cf. ibid. 
1007 Günter RAGER, “Is Preimplantation genetic diagnosis ethically acceptable?”, in: Bioethical Forum 1/2 
(2008) 81-88; 85. 
1008 „Wenn aber die Zygote in kontinuierlicher Weise sich zum Neugeborenen und zum erwachsenen Menschen 
entwickelt, dann bleibt die Identität dieses Lebewesens erhalten. Ist dieses Lebewesen im erwachsenen Zustand 
ein Mensch, dann ist es dies auch als Embryo.“ RAGER, „Menschsein zwischen Lebensanfang und Lebensende…“; 
94. Tr. by author. See also LEHMANN, Zuversicht aus dem Glauben…, 383-384. 
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9.3.4 The Potentiality Argument 
The potentiality argument is the most influential among the SCIP arguments.1009 This argument 
implies that the fertilized ovum already possesses the full potentiality to develop into human 
existence. An embryo has from its beginning, in the natural process of anthropogenesis, the 
potentiality to develop as a personal being1010 and a moral subject. Because this potential exists 
from the very beginning, an embryo is worthy of unrestricted protection.1011 The genome 
contains that program (potential) that would ultimately unfold itself into the adult. According 
to many biologists, with the completion of fertilization an embryo can be regarded as self-
organizing, dynamic system and represents a structural and functional unity; an individual in 
biological sense. It has the active potency to develop into an adult.1012 
It was mentioned elsewhere that in Bioethics words, such as “human” and “person”, is highly 
debatable. Schoknecht illustrates how confusing the situation can become when several 
controversial terms are introduced. Take for example the summary of Ulrich Schroth, a German 
Jurist. He summarizes the potentiality argument as, “According to the potentiality thesis, an 
embryo is a person after the completion of nuclear fusion, because then it contains the potential 
to develop into a human.”1013 Here one can see the confusion over “person” and “human” 
brought into the potentiality argument. Therefore, according to Schoknecht, it would be better 
to avoid these terms. 
Regarding the potentiality of the development of a human, Demmer, in his argument against a 
group of 9 Evangelical Ethicists who published a Position Paper named “Pluralismus als 
Markenzeichen”,1014 affirms that, “One does not develop to become a human, but develops as a 
human; there is only one potentiality of a perfect stage of development of already given human 
existence. Therefore, the logic of the protection of life is always the same”.1015 Demmer through 
this argument clears the confusion by saying that one does not develop “into a human”, as held 
by Schroth, but rather one develops “as a human”. 
                                                 
1009 Cf. DAMSCHEN/SCHÖNECKER, „Argumente und Probleme in der Embryonendebatte…“, 5. Cf. 
SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 126. 
1010 A distinction is to be made between “development into a person” and “development of a person”. Cf. 
Teresa IGLESIAS, “In vitro fertilization. The major issues”, in: Journal of Medical Ethics 10 (1984) 32-37; 34-35. 
Cf. BREUER, Person von Anfang an?..., 49 Breuer states here: „Die Zygote entwickelt sich nicht zu einer Person, 
sondern sie entwickelt sich als Person.“ Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
1011 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, Ethik des Lebens…, 510-511. 
1012 Cf. Ruth BODDEN-HEIDRICH/Wolfgang WICKLER, „Der heranwachsende Mensch im Umfeld seiner 
Eltern“, in: RAGER (Hg.), Beginn, Personalität und Würde des Menschen, op. cit., 123-142; 123. Cf. SCHOKNECHT, 
Mensch oder Material?..., 128. 
1013 „Nach der Potentialitätsthese ist ein Embryo nach Abschluss der Kernverschmelzung eine Person, da er 
dann eine Potentialität enthält, sich zu einem Menschen zu entwickeln.“ Ulrich SCHROTH, „Forschung mit 
embryonalen Stammzellen und Prämplantationsdiagnostik im Lichte des Rechts“, in: Fuat ODUNCU/Ulrich 
SCHROTH/Wilhelm VOSSENKUHL (Hg.), Stammzellenforschung und therapeutisches Klonen, Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, Göttingen 2002, 249-281; 263. Tr. by author. Cf. SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 127. 
1014 Cf. Reiner ANSELM/Johannes FISCHER/Christofer FREY/Ulrich KÖRTNER/Hartmut KREß/Trutz 
RENDTORFF/Dietrich RÖSSLER/Christian SCHWARKE/Klaus TANNER, „Pluralismus als Markenzeichen. Eine 
Stellungnahme evangelischer Ethiker zur Debatte um die Embryonenforschung“, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, Feuilleton, Nr.19, 23.1.2002, 8. Cf. Klaus DEMMER, „Ökumenische Klippen im bioethischen Gespräch? 
Fragen zum Positionspapier ‚Pluralismus als Markenzeichen‘“, in: ThG 46 (2003) 242-253; 242. 
1015 „Man entwickelt sich nicht zum Menschen, sondern als Mensch; es gibt nur eine Potenzialität zu 
vollkommeneren Entwicklungsstufen des immer schon gegebenen Menschseins. Darum ist auch die Logik des 
Lebensschutzes immer gleich.“ DEMMER, „Ökumenische Klippen...“, 247. Emphasis in original. 
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The syllogistic form of the Potential argument can be formulated thus: 
(1) Every being which bears potential φ, has dignity 
(2) Every human embryo is a being that bears potential φ. 
Therefore:  (3) Every human embryo has dignity.1016 
The critics of potentiality argument raise certain objections. First, that fertilization cannot be 
considered as fundamental basis for potentiality argument for several reasons. One of the 
reasons is that fertilization is a process and not a starting point. Nonetheless, those who appeal 
for the potentiality argument are certain that the expression of an individual genome is fixed 
before the second meiosis in the pronuclear stage and not after the completion of fertilization. 
According to them, the program theory1017 argues with the existence of a complete genetic 
program. This is established with the fusion of the maternal and the paternal pro-nucleus. With 
the fusion, the fertilization process is completed and terminated. It can be biologically shown, 
how the new genome would look like in the pronuclear stage after the second meiotic division 
is complete. Therefore, there is no objection in speaking of an established program even at the 
beginning of fertilization and not at its completion. This fact admits to the linkage between the 
potentiality argument and fertilization. Clarifications seem necessary here only regarding legal 
issues. This is because currently, in Germany, the completion of the fusion of parental pronuclei 
is considered as the beginning of the basic legal status. With regard to freezing of “fertilized” 
eggs, it is legal at the pronuclear stage.1018 
A second and more serious is the objection that fertilization is – either its beginning or end –
neither the only nor the right reference point in the arguments over potentiality. For some, the 
full genetic program begins after fertilization with nidation. For others, there is already in the 
human germ cells the legitimate development potential well before fertilization. Both these 
objections are raised against the potentiality argument using potentiality as a reference point. 
How does one respond to them?1019 
The reference to the fact that genetic programming is complete only with the nidation allows 
one to speak legitimately of the potentiality of an embryo. This is supported by the biological 
                                                 
1016 Cf. Wolfgang WIELAND, „Pro Potentialitätsargument. Moralfähigkeit als Grundlage von Würde und 
Lebensschutz“, in: DAMSCHEN/SCHÖNECKER, (Hg.), Der moralische Status menschlicher Embryonen, op. cit., 
149-168; 149. 
1017 Perhaps, the program theory can be explained thus: An individual’s life begins with the fertilization of 
sperm and ovum. From this is deduced the fact that the maternal and paternal genome of the fertilized egg contains 
the full program for the development of the individual. Therefore, it concluded that a fertilized egg contains already 
the full meaning of human life. Cf. Christiane NÜSSLEIN-VOLHARD, „Wann ist ein Tier ein Tier und ein Mensch 
kein Mensch? Eine wunderbare Symbiose. Die Befruchtung ist nur der halbe Weg zur Entwicklung des 
Individuums“, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feuilleton, Nr. 229, 2.10.2001, 55. 
1018 The Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen (Embryonenschutzgesetz - ESchG) § 8 reads: „Als Embryo im 
Sinne dieses Gesetzes gilt bereits die befruchtete, entwicklungsfähige menschliche Eizelle vom Zeitpunkt der 
Kernverschmelzung an.“ See BUNDESMINISTERIUMS DER JUSTIZ, Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen 
(Embryonenschutzgesetz - ESchG), 13. Dezember 1990 (BGBI. I S. 2746), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes 
vom 21. November 2011 (BGBI. I S. 2228). “For the purpose of this Act, an embryo already means the human 
egg cell, fertilised and capable of developing, from the time of fusion of the nuclei” English tr. from THE FEDERAL 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, The Embryo Protection Act. Federal Law Gazette, Part I, No. 69, Bonn, 19th December 
1990, 2746. Cf. SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 128. Cf. also DEMMER, „Moraltheologie und 
Reproduktionsmedizin…“, 71-72. Demmer is of the opinion that when it comes to the question of right to life, 
then the potential argument with active potency seems to takes precedence. 
1019 Cf. SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 128. 
208  Part II: Moral Theological Perspectives in Germany   
 
 
fact that the implantation of an embryo is primarily established as necessary for its further 
development in the context of child-mother communication.1020  
The German Geneticist Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard denies the above fact that the genome of 
the fertilized egg contains the whole program. She is of the opinion that quite apart from the 
fact that a program is not the same as its result, the statement is not correct for serious reasons. 
She explains: 
The program of the embryo is indeed complete in terms of genetic makeup. However, this 
program does not proceed on its own until birth. It needs to be activated and controlled. This 
requires additional significant and irreplaceable contributions by the maternal organism in 
which the embryo develops. She contributes factors that control the activity of genes during 
development, as well as nutrients, which allow the growth and differentiation and so on. 
Without the maternal organism, the fertilized egg cannot develop on its own past the 
blastocyst stage, from a little over a hundred human cells with adequate factors in their own 
cytoplasm - but not further. [...]. The embryo has the full development program only after 
implantation in the mother’s uterus. Only during this amazing and wonderful symbiosis, the 
program is executed. Genes are not everything that a human needs to become human.1021 
Against the above view (which holds that the program theory is initiated only beginning with 
implantation and thus thereafter one can speak of the potentiality argument as a reference point), 
Schoknecht counter argues from two stances: either a weak or a strong argument. He writes: 
The weak argument holds that the original logic of the program theory is abandoned because 
the implantation of the early embryo into the uterus fails to complete the original genetic 
program. This is determined at fertilization. The implantation of the embryo adds no extra 
                                                 
1020 Cf. ibid. 
1021 „Das Programm des Embryos ist zwar vollständig, was die genetische Ausstattung betrifft. Dieses 
Programm läuft aber nicht von alleine bis zur Geburt ab. Es muss aktiviert und gesteuert werden. Dazu bedarf es 
zusätzlicher erheblicher und unersetzbarer Beiträge durch den mütterlichen Organismus, in dem der Embryo sich 
entwickelt. Dieser trägt Faktoren bei, die die Aktivität der Gene während der Entwicklung steuern, sowie 
Nährstoffe, die Wachstum und Differenzierung ermöglichen und anderes mehr. Ohne den mütterlichen 
Organismus kann sich die befruchtete Eizelle nur bis zu einem Bläschen aus wenig mehr als hundert menschlichen 
Zellen entwickeln, dazu reichen die Faktoren in ihrem eigenen Zytoplasma aus,- aber nicht weiter. [...]. Erst mit 
der Einnistung in den Uterus der Mutter hat der Embryo das volle Entwicklungsprogramm. Erst während dieser 
erstaunlichen und wundersamen Symbiose wird das Programm ausgeführt. Gene sind nicht alles, was der Mensch 
zur Menschwerdung braucht.“ NÜSSLEIN-VOLHARD, „Wann ist ein Tier ein Tier …“, 55. Tr. by author. Cf. 
SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 129. Earlier, Christian Kummer had presented the opinion that the 
embryo is a human being only when it is implanted into the uterus because the uterus is necessary for the formation 
of body axes. See Christian KUMMER, „Biomedizinkonvention und Embryonen-forschung. Wieviel Schutz des 
menschlichen Lebensbeginns ist biologisch «angemessen»?“, in: Albin ESER (Hg.), Biomedizin und Menschen-
rechte. Die Menschenrechtskonvention des Europarats zur Biomedizin – Dokumentation und Kommentare, Josef 
Knecht, Frankfurt a. M. 1999, 59 –78. Besides, Nüsslein-Volhard, as mentioned above, was of the opinion that the 
completion of the developmental program was also necessary. Cf. NÜSSLEIN-VOLHARD, „Wann ist ein Tier ein 
Tier …“, 55. Cf. also Christiane NÜSSLEIN-VOLHARD, „Forschung an menschlichen Embryonen“, in: Nikolaus 
KNOEPFFLER/Dagmar SCHIPANSKI/Stefan Lorenz SORGNER (Hg.), Humanbiotechnologie als gesellschaftliche 
Herausforderung, Alber, Freiburg i. Br./München 2005, 25-43; 33-34 & 42. Later, Kummer had to concede that 
the body axes are already laid out before implantation. He had to admit that from fertilization on the embryo has 
“the ontological status of a completely organized being”. See Christian KUMMER, „Stammzellkulturen – ein 
brisantes Entwicklungspotential“, in: StZ 218 (2000) 547–554. With regard to the completion and control of the 
developmental program as postulated by Nüsslein-Volhard, there is no evidence. See RAGER, “Is Preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis…”, 83. See also KNOEPFFLER, Der Beginn der menschlichen Person..., 83. 
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genes. The strong counterargument on the other hand, in my opinion, holds that the individual 
gene expression has begun even before the implantation and it is by no means complete.1022 
Schockenhoff is of the opinion that the sense of the argument could be mistaken if the concept 
of potentiality is held either too narrowly or too broad. A too narrow meaning is understood 
when human life is bound specifically to the successful completion of nidation or to the 
morphological conditions such as the formation of nervous system.1023 Moreover, a broader 
concept, which speaks of “potential” human life including eggs and sperms, is also a useless 
argument. However, its evidential value depends more on the moral significance that one gives 
to the possible subject of being human and his/her moral capacity in its natural context of the 
stages of development as an embryo.1024 
While explaining further about the moral capacity, Schockenhoff argues that the potentiality 
argument is an indicator that evaluates the membership of an embryo to the human species. 
Owing to its distinctive human capacity, a human embryo has human dignity. This indicator “is 
not justified, but only indicates, that in any case an individual belonging to this species should 
not be denied the moral capacity, especially under tutorianistic perspective, irrespective of when 
for the first time it realizes the options opened to it, or whether it is ever realized”.1025 
In answering the objections to potentiality argument, Schockenhoff makes a distinction 
between passive potency and active potency. He argues that the objection stems from the idea 
– with regard to eggs and sperms in their existence prior to fertilization as already a potential 
embryo –, that fails to recognize the importance of the fertilization process through which the 
zygote emerges as a new individual organism. A striking example for comparison of an embryo 
would be Prince Charles, the crown prince, who does not yet have the full rights of a king. The 
idea that an embryo should be regarded as only a “potential human being” is just like Prince 
Charles who is regarded only as “potential” king up to now.1026 This plausibility arises due to 
the confusion of a strong concept of potentiality over a weak concept of the potentiality. Every 
German citizen has the passive possibility to be a President (Bundespräsident/in), although this 
chance is apparently small for the great majority. One must distinguish the active potency from 
the passive ability, to become something that is not yet (e.g., those who are not Germans do not 
                                                 
1022 „Das schwache Argument besagt, dass die ursprüngliche Logik der Programmtheorie bereits verlassen 
wurde, denn die Einnistung des frühen Embryos in den Uterus vervollständigt nicht das ursprüngliche genetische 
Programm. Dieses liegt mit der Befruchtung fest. Die Nidation fügt dem Embryo keine weiteren Gene hinzu. 
Stärker ist hier m.E. das Gegenargument, dass einerseits die individuelle Genexpression schon vor der Nidation 
begonnen hat und mit dieser auch keineswegs abgeschlossen ist.“ SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 129. 
Emphasis in original. Tr. by author. 
1023 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, Ethik des Lebens…, 511. Schockenhoff, in his fn. 59 here, cautions about the opinion 
that British Bioethicist John Harris holds, which is misleading when he speaks about the fertilized egg as 
“potentially a human being” and is understood in the sense that “it will eventually become a human being”. Cf. 
John HARRIS, The Value of Life, Routledge, London/New York 1997, 11. 
1024 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, Ethik des Lebens…, 511. 
1025 Schockenhoff is quoting Wolfgang Wieland, a German Philosopher: „begründet nicht, sondern zeigt nur 
an, dass jedenfalls einem zu dieser Spezies gehörigen Individuum, zumal unter tutioristischen Gesichtspunkten, 
die Moralfähigkeit nicht abgesprochen werden darf, gleichgültig, wann es die durch sie eröffneten Optionen 
erstmalig realisiert, ob es sie überhaupt realisiert.“ WIELAND, „Pro Potentialitätsargument…“, 167. Tr. by author. 
SCHOCKENHOFF, Ethik des Lebens…, 511 at fn. 60. 
1026 Singer used this particular example about Prince Charles. Schockenhoff is referring to that example here. 
SINGER, Practical Ethics…, 138. Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, “Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theologische 
Perspektiven...“, 487-488. 
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fulfill this possibility), or, the material potency, according to which a marble statue is contained 
in a still rough-hewn stone block. Through active potency, the already existing organisms 
develop those abilities that are characteristic of their species. Accordingly, the full concept of 
potentiality is achieved through this active potency, which entails the development of active 
developmental potency of an existing being.1027  
Although, by the term active potency or real potency is understood the fusion of the nuclei 
during fertilization - whether at its beginning or completion – that renders a capacity for self-
transcendence to ever-higher levels of development, and therefore differentiation, yet, this idea 
of active potency is seriously questioned.1028 
Demmer is of the opinion that the objection is usually about the extreme dependence of the 
early embryo, in terms of a symbiosis, to the maternal environment.1029 This fact may be beyond 
doubt. However, it should not lead to hasty conclusions. For passivity, however big its 
magnitude may be, requires a minimum of activity, otherwise things would not exist. There is 
no metaphysical pure passivity, but a mixed ratio with activity, whatever that entails. However, 
whether and to what extent such activity is clearly detected by scientific methods, does not 
affect the metaphysical core problem.1030 
Having discussed the pros and cons of the potentiality argument, one can say that the argument 
emphasizes the ability of human embryos to develop its capabilities. However, its meaning is 
distorted when one highlights only the weak significance of a passive potency, as is the case 
with Anglo-Saxon bioethics; and more recently this tendency that is often seen also in the 
German debate.1031 However, the developmental biologists deny either that an embryo could 
have the active potency before nidation or cast doubt about an embryo’s ability to self-directed 
development. They suggest that after nidation more factors become effective for the successful 
intrauterine development. If such assumptions were confirmed, then one could in fact better 
speak of a co-programming of intrauterine development that is self-organized by an embryo. In 
order to gain a clear picture on this issue, it seems advisable to distinguish between nutritive 
and other factors that are of significance for the constitutive identity of an embryo. Although 
the former are necessary - since an embryo (as well as after birth) without adequate food and 
adequate shelter would not survive -, they are not constitutive to the identity of the developing 
embryo.1032 
                                                 
1027 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, “Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theologische Perspektiven...“, 488-489. 
Schockenhoff also gives the similar argument from Aristotle, which was already dealt with in connection with the 
species argument (see Chapter 9.3.1 above). See also SCHOCKENHOFF, „Pro Speziesargument…“, 29. 
1028 Cf. Klaus DEMMER, „Moraltheologie und Reproduktionsmedizin – eine prekäre Weggefährtenschaft; 
Nachdenkliches und Bedenkliches im Rückblick“, in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 58/1 
(2011) 62-85; 74. 
1029 Cf. DEMMER, „Moraltheologie und Reproduktionsmedizin…“, 74. Demmer notes here that this dependence 
of the child and mother continues even after childbirth. Cf. ibid. at fn.32. 
1030 Cf. ibid., 74. 
1031 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, “Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theologische Perspektiven...“, 489. 
1032 Cf. ibid. Cf. also RAGER, “Is Preimplantation genetic diagnosis…”, 85. See also Chapter 9.3.4 at fn.1013 
above. 
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9.4 CONCLUSION 
From what was deliberated above, the question whether an embryo is worthy of protection or 
whether it is worthy of human dignity depends on the status that one accords to it. The question 
ultimately hangs on whether an embryo is a person. In other words, the question, “is an embryo 
a person?” determines the reason, extent and the commencement of one’s obligatory moral 
behaviour towards it. 
It is in this context that the SCIP arguments can be seen as having a certain prima facie 
plausibility. They seem to be intuitively correct. However, on closer examination they reveal 
certain inconsistencies, contradictions and reasonable doubt.1033 Besides, according to 
Damschen and Schönecker, the species argument does not seem to hang together with other 
arguments. Species affiliation argument is neither a necessary nor an adequate condition for the 
other arguments. Nevertheless, the other arguments are dependent on one another. Therefore, 
the individual arguments of SCIP, at least partially and without doubts, are connected 
together.1034 
In addition, Honnefelder cautions us that the other three arguments, namely continuity, identity 
and potentiality should be seen together as an integrated argument when speaking of the human 
dignity of an embryo.1035 He clarifies: 
[…] the notion of human dignity – which is founded in the capability of the human being to be 
subject of and responsible for his acts and thus being conceivable as an end in itself – applies 
to the early embryo since right from the beginning: from this time on the embryo has the 
potential to develop into a moral subject and the embryo and the moral subject are identical, 
i.e. the same human being. The identity of the moral subject with the embryo corresponds to 
the continuity in the development of the embryo, which does not allow for the identification of 
certain developmental stages as a basis for the moral assessment of the embryo’s status. Since 
the dignity of the moral subject is entitled to protection, the two notions of identity and 
continuity need to entail the same protection for any early stage of human development which 
in itself bears the potentiality to develop into a moral subject. This potentiality is already present 
in a single cell stage embryo when the individual genome directing the development of the 
human embryo is constituted. As a consequence, proponents of this position call for the full 
protection of the embryo starting from the earliest beginnings of life.1036 
Backed up by human biological facts, the anthropological meaning of the embryonic 
development holds for a triple aspect, which is decisively important. The developing embryo is 
one and the same identical human being in which all assets to its subsequent development is 
already potentially contained in it and which is in a continuous process without any significant 
breaks from the start as the person develops. It is to this person that one owes, under the law of 
same origin and reciprocal respect, what one claims for oneself. This consideration requires no 
further additional assumptions, apart from human biological facts to which it relates. It also 
                                                 
1033 Cf. SCHOKNECHT, Mensch oder Material?..., 145. 
1034 Cf. DAMSCHEN/SCHÖNECKER, „Argumente und Probleme in der Embryonendebatte…“, 7. 
1035 Cf. HONNEFELDER, „Pro Kontinuumsargument…“, 61. 
1036 Ludger HONNEFELDER, “Embryonic Stem Cell Research – Arguments of the Ethical Debate in Germany”, 
in: Stem Cells, Human Embryos and Ethics; Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. by Lars ØSTNOR, Springer, Norway 
2008, 177-185; 179-180. Emphasis in original. 
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does not rely on any particular religious premises and is capable of being derived in principle 
from any position of rational consent.1037
                                                 
1037 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, Ethik des Lebens…, 508. 
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PART II 
Conclusion 
The principle of human dignity, which is central to German bioethical debates, is one of the 
useful principles within a pluralistic ethics.1038 It finds a normative basis in German moral 
theology. Along with its normative foundation, the Grundgesetz, especially Article I,1, where 
human dignity is spelled out, is very frequently used in their moral theology as one of the 
reasons to appeal on behalf of human dignity. The secular understanding of human dignity is 
not contrary to the religious understanding but complement one another.  
The term “sanctity of life”, which was a discussion of the past,1039 does not provide direct and 
immediate help for the debate on normative ethics in bioethical issues. They are helpful and 
useful as an extension insofar as they provide a policy framework for the debate on ethical 
standards. 
The documents of the German Bishop Conference brings out explicitly the fundamental 
importance of human dignity as the implicit premise of all normative as well as legal 
obligations. These documents bridge the gap between the secular and religious understanding 
of human dignity. Some documents apply the ‘image of God’ concept with regard to the 
protection-worthiness of an embryo.1040 However, Siep is skeptical about the usage of image of 
God concept because the concept itself does not clarify to which biological stage of life of an 
embryo one can apply human dignity.1041 
The debate over the question whether every human being is a person continues. The concept of 
person is all the more essential and useful in acknowledging human dignity of an embryo and 
consequently its protection. Therefore, the concept of person in its systematic theological 
perspective was taken up. Considering the human being as a body-soul unity, Schockenhoff 
warns against binding personhood to the factual evidence of cognitive and volitive skills such 
as to have actual characteristics or the ability to have self-conscious interests, preferences and 
desires. Theologically seen, functions, achievements, merits, or the presences of certain 
characteristics themselves do not give value and dignity to the human person. Human persons 
have dignity insofar as they are created and recognized by God. It is not the particular 
characteristics but the calling and personal relationship with God that makes a human person 
what he or she is, endowed with dignity. This applies equally to an unborn, which is created in 
God’s image and endowed with human dignity. It has the same claim as as an adult. Prenatal 
life is not merely and purely a vegetative life, but individual human life in the process of 
becoming. Therefore, one may not turn it into an object of arbitrary manipulations. The mandate 
                                                 
1038 Cf. QUANTE, „Wessen Würde?...“, 133, Abstract. 
1039 Although this may be the case in German Moral Theology and bioethical discussions, Singer, who first 
introduced the term “sanctity of life” in such discussions, still holds on to it as one can see from his latest Practical 
Ethics, Third edition published in 2011. See SINGER, Practical Ethics, op. cit. 
1040 Cf. DBK, Der Mensch: sein eigener Schöpfer?..., 5. See also Horst DREIER, „Lebensschutz und 
Menschenwürde in der bioethischen Diskussion“, in: Hans-Richard REUTER (Hg.), Bioethik und Menschenwürde. 
Ethik & Gesellschaft. Vorträge des Instituts für Christliche Gesellschaftswissenschaften, Lit, 
Münster/Hamburg/Berlin/Wien/London 2002, 9-49; 42. German Jurist and legal Philosopher Horst Dreier writes 
here that one can already recognize the divine spark of personal existence and dignity in the zygote. 
1041 Cf. Ludwig SIEP, „Das Menschenwürdeargument in der ethischen Debatte über die Stammzellforschung“, 
in: HILPERT (Hg.), Forschung contra Lebensschutz…, 190. 
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to respect and protect unborn human life is not only an individual duty but also solidarity and a 
public responsibility of the legal system. 
Questions regarding the personhood, protection, or inherent human dignity of an embryo is 
further dependent on the status of an embryo that is accorded to it, especially a status that is 
morally relevant. If one assumes the status of an embryo as both human and a person, then the 
next step is to establish its human dignity. Although several positions are held in this matter, 
one can assume that an embryo has human dignity from the moment of its existence. It is in this 
regard that the SCIP argument plays an important role. The argument as a whole brings in 
several terms into play, such as personal characteristics, personhood, human dignity and the 
protection of life from the beginning. In its totality, dependent on one another, the SCIP 
argument proves that an embryo has human dignity from the beginning of its existence, 
although objections are raised and criticized against them.  
In conclusion, the position of Reiter can be taken. While referring to the embryonic research of 
German Embryologist Erich Blechschmidt,1042 Rager1043 and others, who have demonstrated that 
the single-celled zygote is an individual organism, Reiter argues that right from conception 
onwards the zygote has human characteristics and therefore, the assumption must be that 
personhood exists right after fertilization. Reiter further states that he personally assumes that 
human beings have personhood from the beginning. In his view, personhood constitutes the 
essence and the dignity of human life.1044 Therefore, his conclusion is that human life is personal 
life from its beginning. There is not a single significant feature during the development, which 
could be stated as a separate beginning of individuation. The earliest possible moment of the 
anthropogenesis in the personal sense is the conception, i.e. “after” the fusion of egg and sperm. 
With regard to the moment of animation, German Gynecologist, Herman Hepp, asserts that, 
“we will never be able to punctually say for sure when personal life begins”.1045 
Spaemann’s insight might be useful in this regard as to the fixation of time, namely, when 
personality begins: 
The question as to the temporal beginning of human personhood is in a certain, real sense 
unanswerable. Personhood is something supra-temporal […]. One could put it like this: the 
identification of the coming-to-be of the person with human conception is the consequence 
of the more fundamental impossibility of pinpointing the beginning of the person in time. 
Those who suggest a later point in time claim to know more than they can.1046 
                                                 
1042 Cf. Erich BLECHSCHMIDT, Wie beginnt das menschliche Leben. Vom Ei zum Embryo, Christiana Verlag, 
Stein am Rhein 1984; IDEM, „Daten der menschlichen Frühentwicklung. Menschliches Leben beginnt im 
Augenblick der Befruchtung“, in: Paul HOFFACKER/Benedikt STEINSCHULTE/Paul-Johannes FIETZ (Hg.), Auf 
Leben und Tod. Abtreibung in der Diskussion, Gustav Lübbe Verlag, Bergisch Gladbach 1991, 31-52. 
1043 Cf. RAGER, (Hg.), Beginn, Personalität und Würde des Menschen, op. cit. 
1044 Cf. REITER, „Wann beginnt personales Leben?...“, 83-84. 
1045 „[…] werden wir niemals punktuell sicher sagen können, wann personales Leben beginnt“, Herman HEPP, 
„Moderne Reproduktionsmedizin – Chancen und Risiken“, in: ArztChr 32 (1986) 114-122; 121. Cf. REITER, 
„Wann beginnt personales Leben?...“, 85. 
1046 „Die Frage nach dem zeitlichen Beginn menschlicher Personalität fragt eigentlich nach etwas 
Unbeantwortbarem. Denn Personalität ist etwas Überzeitliches […]. Die Gleichsetzung der Personwerdung mit 
der Zeugung ist, so könnte man sagen, die Konsequenz der Unmöglichkeit, überhaupt einen Beginn der Person in 
der Zeit zu fixieren. Jeder, der einen späteren Zeitpunkt vorschlägt, beansprucht im Grund mehr zu wissen als er 
wissen kann.“ SPAEMANN, „Wann beginnt der Mensch Person zu sein?...“, 45. English tr. from IDEM, “When does 
the human being to be a person?...”, 304-305. 
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However, Seidel’s conclusion is negative. He asserts with certainty and entirely rules out the 
caesura of the 4-cell stage of an embryo, even more the “beginning” of the caesura of 
fertilization as the beginning of an organism, a person, a human or an individual (whether in an 
organismic or personal sense). According to him, the human being does not begin with 
fertilization.1047 However, Seidel does acknowledge that this assertion is not a carte blanche for 
an arbitrary use of human biological fertilized material. Tutorianistic considerations may be 
ethically required. For the concrete ethical assessment of dealing with human biological 
fertilized material, it is important that it involve beyond its ontological status determination, the 
objective of the action, the circumstances, the motivation and the immediate and remote 
consequences of doing so.1048 
Taking into consideration the above factors, in the last analysis, one can acknowledge that from 
the beginning of its existence, an embryo needs respect, care, protection and right to life. 
However, the time of ensoulment, or the question of personhood (which is a contended debate) 
does not take away the dignity due to an embryo. Human rights of an embryo are ensured when 
one acknowledges inherent human dignity from the beginning of human life. 
                                                 
1047 Cf. SEIDEL, Schon Mensch oder noch nicht?..., 402. 
1048 Cf. ibid. Since Seidel does not acknowledge the fertilized ovum as a human being, he uses the term “human 
biological fertilized material” (humanbiologischen Keimmaterial). 
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PART III 
Human Dignity from the Beginning of  Life: 
Moral Theological Perspectives in India 
Part III will deal with the question of human dignity from the beginning of life from an Indian 
Moral Theological Perspective. 
For a better clarification, Part III is divided into four Chapters: 
The concept of Human Dignity in Bioethics is dealt with in Chapter 10. The next Chapter 11 
deals with human dignity in the Teaching of the Catholic Church in India. Chapter 12 deals 
with the concept of Person from an Indian Perspective. Chapter 13 deals with human dignity 
and beginning of life issues. The Chapter titles and their main subtitles are somewhat similar to 
Part II that deals with German Moral Theological Perspectives. This is necessary in order to 
make a comparison between equally distributed topics. However, with regard to the subtitles in 
Chapter 11, it was impossible to categorize into similar subtitles because the Bishop 
Conferences of two countries are involved here, which have different emphasis and thrusts. 
Therefore, their nature of documents too are different.
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C H A P T E R  1 0  
BIOETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN DIGNITY  
IN INDIAN MORAL THEOLOGY 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
At the very outset, it must be noted that Indian Moral Theologians and the Catholic Church in 
India has not emphasized the concept of human dignity in an elaborate way both in general and 
more specifically in the field of Bioethics, theoretically or practically, as does German Moral 
Theology.1049 In spite of this fact, it is to be acknowledged that the appeal to human dignity does 
find its place in the field of Bioethics in Indian Moral Theology. Most of the Moral Theologians 
in India use the literature in Bioethics from Anglo-Saxon sources. This can be attested by the 
fact that Podimattam uses the words of Ashley and O’Rourke who formulated the principle of 
human dignity as follows:  
All ethical decisions in health care must aim at human dignity, that is, the maximal integrated 
satisfaction of the innate and cultural needs – biological, psychological, ethical, and spiritual 
– of all human persons, as individuals and as members of both their national communities 
and the world community.1050 
From this statement, it follows that it is imperative to make human dignity the universal key to 
moral interpretation, because there is no value greater than human person is.1051 Podimattam 
would acknowledge the role of human dignity from three different views. First, in a practical 
sense, at least minimally, human dignity has to do with human rights. Second, that human 
dignity caters to the whole person: physical, intellectual and psychological. Third, human 
dignity is about human fulfillment, which are necessary for the genuine good of human 
nature.1052 
Having made here these preliminary remarks about Indian Moral theology and their use of the 
concept of human dignity, in this Chapter other basic differences will be taken up, which is 
sometimes similar and sometimes not, in comparison to German Moral Theology, especially 
where legal recourse is concerned. For example, the Grundgesetz finds a prominent place in the 
discussion on human dignity in Germany. However, there is hardly any reference made to the 
                                                 
1049 It is to be noted here that indigenous moral theology literature available in India in general and on this topic 
of human dignity is scarce. Podimattam gives the following general reasons for the insufficiency and poverty of 
moral theological writings. 1. The apathy towards theologizing in general and moral theologizing in particular. 2. 
The financial constraints of research and publication of books. 3. The shortage of trained personnel. 4. The lack of 
suitable library facilities. 5. The willingness to pay the high price of research in terms of diligent and strenuous 
work from the part of the few experts present. 6. The lack of coordination among the efforts of individual moral 
theologians. 7. Moral theological themes do not figure in research seminars in important Catholic centres. Above 
all, moral theology in India continues to be weighed down, among other things, by paternalism, legalism and 
individualism, although they were already strongly defended by the Second Vatican Council. See Felix M. 
PODIMATTAM, Current Moral Questions, Asian Trading Corporation, Bangalore 1984, 6-8. 
1050 ASHLEY/O’ROURKE, Health Care Ethics, 19893, op. cit., 19. Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 51. 
Podimattam himself does not make a direct reference to the text. Perhaps, he seems to imply it. Interestingly in the 
1997 edition, Ashley and O’Rourke do not use the above quoted sentence. Instead, elsewhere while stressing the 
emphasis of the Catholic Church, they make a reference to human dignity: “A firm foundation for ethical analysis 
in regard to new developments may be derived from the church’s emphasis upon the dignity of the human person 
[EV 34].” Cf. ASHLEY/O’ROURKE, Health Care Ethics, 19974, op. cit., 136. 
1051 Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 51. 
1052 Cf. ibid., 52-53. See also KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 180-200. 
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Constitution of India in Indian Moral Theology. In this Chapter, the approaches made in Indian 
Moral Theology will be examined from four different perspectives in order to make a 
comparison. First, the philosophical basis of human dignity will be taken up, followed by the 
theological, ethical and finally the issue of sanctity of life and its connection with human 
dignity. 
10.2 PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
An idea that stems from Stoics is that human dignity is a genuine possibility beyond doubt for 
all human beings, regardless of their circumstances, social standing, or accomplishments, 
simply because they possess reason.1053 Following the Stoics, Kant based universal human 
dignity on a strictly philosophical foundation. Agreeing with the Stoics, he held that dignity is 
the intrinsic worth that belongs to all human beings. Kant’s doctrine of human dignity demands 
equal respect for all persons. It forbids the use of another person merely as a means to one’s 
own ends.1054 Thus, looking back at history one can see that, “Kant’s celebration of human 
autonomy and prohibition of the “instrumentalization” of human subjects has had certainly a 
lasting impact on modern ethical thought and on bioethics in particular.”1055 
Without alluding to religious convictions, one could claim that an individual is to be respected 
regardless of race or class. Such a respect is made possible because each human person is an 
immortal soul of equal value in the eyes of his Maker. Although this fact depends on religious 
convictions, yet it does not necessarily depend on it. The claim of a person is recognized not 
because he/she is endorsed by theological doctrine, but from the fact that this individual is a 
unique centre of self-consciousness. Besides, he/she is also a unique centre of freedom, 
creativity, responsibility and love. One cannot and ought not to repress the potentiality for good 
that is found in a person, regardless of belongingness to a religion.1056 
Further, the way in which a person comes to have rights may shed light into the inquiry. Human 
rights are based on human dignity. Therefore, what is the basis of human rights? Podimattam 
argues in the following way: Rights presupposes due. What guarantees a due to an individual? 
The act of justice presupposes that each be given his or her due. It means the act of justice is 
preceded by the act whereby something becomes his or her due. It follows that there is an act 
preceding justice, or in other words, justice is what follows a due. That is to say, due or right 
comes before justice. Therefore, the fact of something that is due to an individual comes into 
existence before the question of justice. What is the act by which something first becomes due 
to an individual and which is not at the same time an act of justice? One answer to this might 
be to indicate acts such as agreements, treaties, promises, legal decisions, and so forth. 
However, this answer is not sufficient. It raises the question as to what right one has in keeping 
a promise, or the fulfilling of an agreement. It presupposes an already established juridical order 
that is consequently unable to ground it. Nevertheless, this presupposition does not appeal well. 
One needs to turn to something more fundamental.1057 
                                                 
1053 Cf. JAMES, “Human Dignity…”; 129. 
1054 KANT, „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten…“, 429. Cf. JAMES, “Human Dignity…”, 129-130. 
1055 Ibid., 130. Emphasis in original. 
1056 Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 53-54. 
1057 Cf. ibid. 
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Man and woman have rights because he/she is a Person – a spiritual being, a whole unto himself, 
a being that exists for itself and of itself, that wills its own proper perfection. From this it 
follows:  
Therefore, and for that very reason, something is due to Man in the fullest sense, for that 
reason he does inalienably have a right which he can plead against everyone else, a right 
which imposes upon every one of his partners, the obligation at least not to violate it. In short, 
Man has inalienable rights because he is a person.1058 
Traditionally, as mentioned above, the fact that a human being is endowed with reason and a 
rational will - according to Kantian thesis - is what gives a person an absolute worth and an 
inalienable right. One objection to this claim is that human nature is more than just the ability 
to reason. However, this objection would misconceive the notion of “rational will”. To have a 
rational will is not just the capability of thinking rationally but also acting rationally. 
Acceptance of the concept of rational will means to commit oneself to the view that reason can 
be practical as well as theoretical. Thus, one need’s to see what is involved in the practical 
exercise of reason.1059 
First, it involves the ability to choose for oneself. Extensively it means to formulate purposes, 
plans and policies of one’s own. Second, it is the ability to carry out decisions, plans or policies 
without undue reliance on the help of others. Both these abilities are connected by a kind of 
pragmatic necessity: the ability to decide requires for its development the concurrent 
development of the ability to execute.1060 
Accordingly, in the philosophical arguments that were examined above, it becomes clear that 
the issue of human dignity is very much related to the issue of human rights as a due that is 
owed to human persons. In other words, human rights in turn spring from the fact of being a 
person. 
Comparison between Moral Theological Perspectives in Germany and India 
There are a few similarities here in comparison with German Moral Theology (see Chapter 6.2). 
Podimattam explains human dignity from the perspective of human rights. However, Spaemann 
holds that one cannot say that it is human right to have one’s dignity respected because the idea 
of human dignity is older than human rights. Moreover, for Reiter human dignity is a moral 
consensus that is enshrined in the first Article of the Grundgesetz and is not granted 
(Zuerkenntnis) but acknowledged (Anerkenntnis). It is also argued in German Moral Theology 
that it is enough to have a passive potentiality in order for an embryo to be considered as a 
moral being with dignity. Charles Davis James, an Indian Moral Theologian, is also of the same 
view, namely that human dignity gives ethical guidance in answering the question of what one 
owes to those at the very beginning of life, to those at the end and even to tiny embryos.1061 
                                                 
1058 Cf. ibid., 54-55. Emphasis in original. 
1059 Cf. ibid., 55. For an alternative approach, as opposed to an one-sidedly approach to the person as individual 
and rational, Johnstone proposes relational, as loving and loved. See Brian JOHNSTONE, “What does it mean to be 
a person?”, in: StMor 48/1 (2010) 125-141. 
1060 Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 55. 
1061 Cf. JAMES, “Human Dignity…”, 131. 
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10.3 THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
The theological foundations of human dignity will be treated from four perspectives, namely, 
relationality, the stewardship over creation, co-creatorship and the human participation in the 
divine. 
10.3.1 The Relationality Aspect 
According to Lobo, it is in the context of relationality, especially with God and with others that one 
can speak of a person-centred morality. He speaks of the lofty vocation of a Christian, which entails 
“an I-Thou relationship viz, a personal response to a personal call of the personal God”.1062 This 
personal God reveals himself as a “communion of Persons”, who made man and woman in the 
“image of God”.1063 This last concept is important because it is in it that the value and dignity of 
human life is founded.1064 Because we are made in the image of God, all human life is equal in value 
and dignity. Lobo remarks: 
From the Christian point of view there is no such thing as valueless life whether in the 
beginning or end of earthly existence […]. Personhood is never lost […]. Hence once there 
is human life, till God Himself withdraws the breath of life, it may not be directly 
terminated.1065 
Person-centred morality also entails moral responsibility because we are created in the image 
of God. Podimattam is also in agreement with this when he acknowledges, “On the basis of 
morality, human existence is an end in itself (Kant). Even though we partially control others or 
allow them to control us, human dignity is incompatible with degrading people by making them 
means to serve ends that do not consider their welfare.”1066 Thus, according to Lobo and 
Podimattam, person-centred morality that stems from a personal relationship with God is the 
very foundation of dignity and value of human life. 
Moreover, the Office of Theological Concerns of the Federation of Asian Bishops stresses on 
the above relationality. It affirms that in the course of the Christian history, the uniqueness, and 
the characteristic of the human being has also been spelt out in relational terms. One can speak 
of a discernible anthropological shift from “individuality” that stressed on uniqueness in 
seemingly isolationist terms, to “personhood,” which understood uniqueness in terms of 
relationship, especially between the sexes and with respect to community. A further 
development saw the understanding of the human person in his/her relationship to nature 
(ecological dimension), with its implication for human responsibility as steward of creation.1067 
These reflections point certain similarities with German Moral Theology. According to 
Schockenhoff, the spectrum of the three-fold fundamental relationship in the context of the 
theological substance of the idea of imago Dei extends to four areas, namely, the relationship 
to God (creatureliness); the relationship to other human beings (shared humanity as male and 
                                                 
1062 Cf. LOBO, Current Problems in Medical Ethics…, 20.  
1063 Cf. ibid., 21.  
1064 Cf. ibid., 36. 
1065 Ibid., 39. 
1066 Felix M. PODIMATTAM, “Fertility Techniques: Promise or Danger?” in Jeev 31 (2001) 437-451; 451. 
1067 Cf. FABC Papers, No.120, 42.  
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female); the relationship to oneself (totality) and the relationship to the creation (responsible 
stewardship).1068 
The above aspect of stewardship over creation will be deliberated in the next section. 
10.3.2 The Stewardship over Creation 
God made man and woman in his own image and committed the earthly reality to their care. 
“You have given them dominion over the works of your hands; you have put all things under 
their feet” (Ps 8,6). It is from this idea that one can derive and deepen the meaning of 
personhood. “To be a person is to be free from subjection to non-personal realities and to have 
dominion over them, to take up responsibilities, to give one’s imprint to nature, to shape the 
world according to one’s rationality.”1069 Just because God created the human person in his own 
image and subsequently committed the earth to his or her care, it does not mean human 
domination over creation. Rather, the ground of such dominion is always constituted by a caring 
dominion (stewardship), and never a domination over creation.1070 
Consequently, one can see that one of the important historical aspects of the imago Dei is 
stewardship over creation. This aspect is most frequently appealed to as a model that 
emphasizes the fact that humans are entrusted with responsibility for conserving and preserving 
creation. Stewardship places limits on human freedom to alter what the Divine Being has 
created. It also claims some knowledge of God’s purposes by reference to a doctrine of 
creation.1071 
Being made in the image of God opens up tremendous possibilities to human beings to 
transform reality, for example, in the atomic sphere, biological sphere, psychological sphere 
etc. In other words, these are to be seen as opportunities in realizing God’s original mandate to 
“subdue the earth” (Gn. 1, 28). However, one needs to be warned quickly here, “[…] we must 
be careful that there be no manipulation that makes man less human, that violates the dignity 
of his personality made to the image of God”.1072 
10.3.3 Co-creatorship 
The aspect of “created co-creator” characterizes a recently emerged model of imago Dei.1073 
This model portrays us as created beings that ultimately rely on the Divine for our existence. 
Only God can create human beings ex nihilo. However, as human beings we mirror the Divine 
in our capacity to create. Although, that ability in us to create is restricted to fashioning what is 
                                                 
1068 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, Natural Law…, 229f. Cf. IDEM, Naturrecht…, 238f. See Chapter 8.2 above at fn.881. 
Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 195. Kusumalayam also mentions about the exegete V. P. Hamilton who 
holds for the four levels of relationships of the human person as the imago Dei. Cf. ibid. Cf. V. P. HAMILTON, 
“Genesis: Theology of”, in: W. A. VANGEMEREN (ed.), The New International Dictionary of Old Testament 
Theology & Exegesis, IV, Grand Rapids, Zondervan 1997, 663-675; 672.  
1069 LOBO, Guide to Christian Living..., 81. 
1070 Cf. FABC Papers, No.120, 36. Cf. THUMMA, “Human Person…”, 222. Lucas Thumma is an Indian Moral 
Theologian. 
1071 Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 57. 
1072 LOBO, Guide to Christian Living..., 81. 
1073 Cf. RAHNER, Theological Investigations 9, op. cit., 205-224 and 225-252. Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be 
Moral?..., 57. 
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already in the created order, still we have the responsibility of bringing to completion what is 
incomplete in creation.1074 
One of the facts that distinguish us from all other creatures on earth is that God created us to be 
co-creators. He also gave human beings the capacity, drive and motive necessary for creative 
acts. Collaboration with God makes human beings His coadjutor.1075 
The possibility of human beings to participate in the creative activity of God as co-creators 
opens up also the freedom to intervene into the genetic material. As co-creators, there opens 
also the prospect of discovering the divine purposes so that one may intervene into the disorder 
within nature in order to correct it.1076 
10.3.4 Human Participation in the Divine 
Lobo, in his discourse on Christian Anthropology, defines “human” in the following way: “In 
the Christian view, man is a creature, made to the image of God, fallen, but recreated to the 
likeness of Christ as an active agent in the history of salvation.”1077 Thus, human person in the 
image of God has the capacity to participate in the history of salvation. 
According to Thomas Merton, writer and mystic, two elements rooted in human nature 
constitute us in God’s image. These two elements, namely, a capacity for perfect freedom and 
for pure love, make us capable of perfect union with God.1078 The freedom in our nature is our 
ability to love someone besides ourselves, a power that transcends and escapes the inevitability 
of self-love.1079 To affirm that we are made in the image of God is to say that love is the reason 
for our existence, because God is love.1080 Our capacity to love gives us the essential and peculiar 
power, which is the most intimate secret of our humanity and our greatest dignity. This power 
stamps us in the image and likeness of God in the depths of our soul.1081 
Srampickal gives a further nuance to the definition of human. Since the eternal Word took flesh 
and became man, the ultimate definition of man or woman can also be formulated as ‘a 
(possible) mode of existence of God’.1082 In other words, humanity is a good enough alternative 
mode of divine existence. In essence, this is the mystery of man and woman and his or her 
worth.1083 Srampickal makes the worth of the human person even clearer in the statement, “It 
means that man is an end in himself. Man has an intrinsic worth and value that comes not from 
his being useful for something or someone else, but from what he is by his makeup; from his 
                                                 
1074 Cf. ibid. 
1075 Cf. IDEM, “Sanctity of Human Life...”, 36. 
1076 Cf. IDEM, Why be Moral?..., 57. Podimattam’s reflection on the possibility of intervening into the genetic 
material when extended further may open up to possibilities like pre-implantation diagnostic techniques etc. 
However, he has also cautioned us that one needs to discover the divine purpose behind such an act. 
1077 LOBO, Guide to Christian Living..., 79.  
1078 Cf. Thomas MERTON, The Seven Story Mountain, Image Books, New York 1970, 365. Cf. PODIMATTAM, 
Why be Moral?..., 57-58. 
1079 Cf. Thomas P. MCDONNELL (ed.), A Thomas Merton Reader, Doubleday/Image Books, New York 1974, 
341. Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 58. 
1080 Cf. Thomas MERTON, New Seeds of Contemplation, James Laughlin, Norfolk, Connecticut 1961, 60. Cf. 
PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 58. 
1081 Cf. Thomas MERTON, Disputed Questions, Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, New York 1960, 98. Cf. 
PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 57-58. 
1082 Cf. SRAMPICKAL, “The Catholic View of Human Life …”,84. 
1083 Cf. ibid. 
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personal nature and destiny endowed on him by God.”1084 Inasmuch as we are created in the 
image of God and insofar as the “immediate existential union with God residing in our souls” 
becomes “the source of our physical life. Our supernatural union with God is an immediate 
existential union with the Triune God”.1085 It is in this way that the human person participates 
in the divinity of God. Therefore, the doctrine of the image of God is the only valid basis for an 
authentic Christian Anthropology.1086 
The vertical relationship with God makes human persons prominent and consequently stewards 
over creation and head over the visible creation. In order to carry out this task, human persons 
are endowed with intelligence, freedom, moral sense, responsibility, etc. Natural qualities such 
as these clearly manifest the character of the divine image in the person. Rational intelligence, 
free will, moral conscience and the way the person interacts with others make the person “the 
crown and glory of creation”.1087 
Let us consider the first contributing factor to human dignity, namely, the human intellect. 
Although the human intellect is not perfect, it is through it that the person “shares in a unique 
way in the knowledge and wisdom of God, thereby gaining a corresponding status and 
dignity”.1088 The capacity for self-knowledge is an extraordinary knowledge that only a human 
possesses in contrast to all other creatures which implies his or her closeness to God.1089 
The second contributing factor to human dignity is the free will. This is a power of self-
determination, which gives him or her freedom of choice in all things. It is a participation of a 
human being in the divine element.1090 
The third significant aspect of human dignity is the human person’s moral conscience. He/she 
“is equipped with a discerning mind and a moral conscience to make a right choice”.1091 
Comparison between Moral Theological Perspectives in Germany and India 
In conclusion, it can be summarized as follows: In this whole section on the theological 
foundation of human dignity, one finds that the argument of the human person made in the 
image of God is often repeated from various nuances. In some ways, these findings are similar 
to German Moral Theology, which also bases its theological foundation of human dignity on 
the concept of the image of God. Although there the Christological-Soteriological and 
Eschatological aspects of human dignity were dealt with, in Indian Moral theology these 
perspectives are not handled. On the other hand, one can say the relationality, stewardship, co-
                                                 
1084 IDEM, “Abortion and its Evil…”, 221. 
1085 Thomas MERTON, The New Man, Burns & Oates, New York 2003, 99. Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 
61. 
1086 Cf. ibid. 
1087 Cf. SRAMPICKAL, “The Catholic View of Human Life …”, 82-84. 
1088 Cf. ibid., 85. 
1089 Cf. ibid. Being self-aware and self-possessed, human beings are capable of asserting their ego while 
uttering “I” with confidence. In affirming the “I”, human persons in contrast to all other creatures, through their 
rational spiritual nature and their unique existence, imply their closeness to God, who is Supreme Self-
Consciousness or as expressed in Indian spirituality the ‘sat-cit-ānandá’ (which means Truth, Intelligence and 
Happiness). See ibid. For a further explanation on these aspects as well as the concept of sat-cit-ānandá, see 
Chapter 14.4.1 below. 
1090 Cf. SRAMPICKAL, “The Catholic View of Human Life …”, 86. 
1091 Cf. ibid. 
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creatorship and human participation in the Divine is another perspective that Indian Moral 
Theology has brought out, which has not been dealt with in German Moral Theology.  
10.4 A THEOLOGICAL ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN 
DIGNITY 
The basic understanding of human dignity stems from the fact that human life is sacred because 
it is a gift of God. According to Lobo, this basic understanding forms “the fundamental principle 
of bioethics” as understood in Jura et bona1092: 
Human life is the basis of all goods, and is the necessary source and condition of every human 
activity and of all society. Most people regard life as something sacred and hold that no one 
may dispose of it at will, but believers see in life something greater, namely, a gift of God’s 
love [...].1093 
Except God, every being is composed of essence and existence. While “every human person is 
a living model of the dignity, worth and perfection” that was mentioned above, “every living 
man, woman and child is a living embodiment of the divine image, deserving respect, love and 
care”.1094 In other words, human life is the most precious gift of God.1095 
Podimattam would agree on the above point. Connecting the ideas of life as a gift of God and 
the stewardship that God has entrusted to human beings, he would affirm that the Catholic 
tradition accepts both the notion of dignity and respect for human life. This is “based on the 
fact that life is a gift from God and destined for the fullness of life and the realization that human 
stewardship leaves some significant determination in human hands”.1096 
South Korean Theologian, Bioethicist and member of National Council of Bioethics, Remigio 
Dong-Ik Lee would also agree with Lobo regarding the fundamental basis of Bioethics. 
According to Dong-Ik Lee, “The cord conception supporting the outlook of Christian bioethics 
is the dignity of human life”1097. Further, he considers three important milestones in 
understanding the Christian tradition on human dignity.1098 
First, human dignity is original, natural and cannot be transferred. In support of this statement, 
Dong-Ik Lee quotes Gen 1, 26-27. The dignity created by God is direct when he made man and 
woman in his own image and likeness and no one can disturb this dignity. The Second Vatican 
Council in Gaudium et spes 24 makes this explicit, when it spells out: “This likeness reveals 
that man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself […].” This is a fact that 
                                                 
1092 LOBO, Moral and Pastoral Questions..., 263. 
1093 CDF, “Declaration on Euthanasia: Jura et bona, op. cit., 511. Cf. LOBO, Moral and Pastoral Questions..., 
263. 
1094 SRAMPICKAL, “The Catholic View of Human Life …”, 89.  
1095 Cf. LOBO, Current Problems…, 61. 
1096 Cf. PODIMATTAM, “Sanctity of Human Life...”, 40. 
1097 Remigio DONG-IK LEE, “‘Quality of life’ and ‘Sanctity of Life’ Bioethics”, in: CBCI: HEALTH 
COMMISSION, Reproductive Health. Catholic Ethics and Praxis in India, ed. by Alex VADAKUMTHALA, Health 
Commission CBCI, Media House, New Delhi 2007, 49-66; 60. Emphasis by author. 
1098 Cf. William E. MAY, “Human Dignity and Biomedical Research. The Respective Positions of the Subject 
of Research and the Researcher”, in: Juan de Dios Vial CORREA/Elio SGRECCIA (ed.), Ethics of Biomedical 
Research in a Christian Vision. Proceedings of the Ninth Assembly of the Pontifical Academy for Life. Vatican 
City 24-26 February 2003, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican 2004, 172-176. Cf. DONG-IK LEE, “‘Quality of 
life’…”, 60-61. 
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every scientist and researcher should consider, in other words, it should form the basic ethics 
of every bio-scientific research on human beings.1099 
Second, the dignity bestowed on human beings with the ability of intellectuality and free will 
is neither given nor granted but understood as some kind of achievement, in other words, this 
dignity is given to us by freeing our choices and actions in accordance with the truth.1100 This 
dignity is materialized by following our conscience and obeying God’s law as clarified again 
in Gaudium et spes: 
In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he does not impose upon himself, 
but which holds him to obedience. Always summoning him to love good and avoid evil, the 
voice of conscience can when necessary speak to his heart more specifically: do this shun 
that. For man has in his heart a law written by God. To obey it is the very dignity of man; 
according to it he will be judged.” (GS 16)1101 
Third, the dignity given to human beings is not only an achievement but also something beyond 
human nature; it is the natural dignity of sacred human beings. This dignity is intimately related 
to human activity, which is the subject of ethical activities. Therefore, human dignity is a core 
principal that should be respected in the field of bioscience. This is the idea that was attested 
by Pope John Paul II, when he said, “The standard of judging ethics should be based on the 
human dignity and every result made by this should be examined and applied at every stage of 
research.”1102 
However, the value of human beings does not come from the fact of activity or expression but 
from the fact of existence itself and also from the fact that God created human beings as a 
gift.1103 
According to Lobo, respect for life in a person-centred morality “implies that the essential 
nature and basic values of the human person are inviolable”.1104 Life as such is a premoral value. 
However, respecting life is a moral value.1105 
Agnelo Rufino Gracias, the Auxiliary Bishop of Bombay and the Chairman of the CCBI 
Commission for Family, agrees in this regard of respecting life as a moral value. Referring to 
the 1984 Charter of the Rights of the Family that unambiguously states, “Human life must be 
absolutely respected and protected from the moment of conception” (Article 4),1106 Gracias 
adds, “This is the rock on which the Church’s moral stand on various questions is based: it is a 
stand based on absolute respect for the human person.1107 
                                                 
1099 Cf. ibid., 60. 
1100 Cf. ibid. 
1101 Cf. ibid., 60-61. 
1102 “La norma etica, fondata nel rispetto della dignità della persona, deve illuminare e disciplinare tanto la 
fase della ricerca quanto quella dell’applicazione dei risultati, in essa raggiunti.” See IOANNIS PAULI PP. II, 
“Allocutiones. Ad quosdam italos artis medicae et chirurgicae peritos occassione oblate eorum conventus Romae 
habiti: recentiores questiones ad ethicae christianae normam perpendetur. 27 Octobris 1980”, in: AAS 72 (1980) 
1125-1129; 1127. English translation from DONG-IK LEE, “‘Quality of life’…”, 61. 
1103 Cf. ibid. 
1104 Cf. LOBO, Moral and Pastoral Questions..., 46. 
1105 Cf. ibid., 47. 
1106 PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR THE FAMILY, “Charter of the Rights of the Family…”, 64. Cf. GRACIAS, “Dignity 
of Human Procreation…”, 26. 
1107 Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
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The root, from which this respect for oneself and others stems, according to Podimattam, is 
from the Indo-European religious tradition (from which Hinduism, Islam, Judaism and 
Christianity sprang). They consider human life (including life in the womb) as: 
[…] sharing a dignity that derives from the human relationship with God – however variously 
this relationship was explained in the different religious creeds of this tradition. The human 
dignity is an overflow from God’s dealing with him. Christianity, Judaism, and Islam see 
human life as a gift, a loan, a stewardship. Humans must respect their own life and life of 
others not only because they receive it from God but also because it is to be held in trust and 
used according to his will. 1108 
Besides these religions, it is also noteworthy to recognize that many philosophical systems are 
explicitly based on respect for others. The Kantian principle, which developed the theory of 
respect for person, is one such example. Kant held that one should treat others as ends and never 
merely as a means. Another example as a respect for others is the utilitarian principle of doing 
the greatest good.1109 Historical facts show that for a long time the liberal principle of “respect 
for persons” has been a useful term in resolving many ethical problems.1110 
However, it is unfortunate to see that the theological and pastoral attempts to protect and 
promote life very often tend to show a bioethical bias. On the one hand, there is the direct and 
clear violation of human life. On the other hand, there are also economic patterns, cultural 
constructs, social structures, political orderings, etc., which “are structures and contexts that 
ultimately destroy life or challenge the dignity of human life”.1111 
Comparison between Moral Theological Perspectives in Germany and India 
In conclusion, Indian Moral Theology analyses the theological ethics of human dignity from 
the following perspectives. First, the discussion is centred on the sacredness of human life 
because it is a gift of God. Second, because it is a gift of God and a sharing as stewards of 
creation, the emphasis is on the respect for life. Third, once again falling back on the argument 
of being made in the image of God, human dignity given to men and women is original, natural 
and non-transferrable. Fourth, human dignity is understood as an achievement owing to the 
intellect and free will given to men and women, which is materialized by following one’s 
conscience. Fifth, human dignity is not only an achievement but also something natural given 
to sacred human beings that manifests in ethical activities. It is not just the activity but also the 
very being of human beings that calls for a respect. From a person-centred morality, the value 
of human persons is inviolable and respecting life is moral value. 
In comparing the findings of German Moral Theology (see Chapter 6.4) with Indian Moral 
Theology, one finds that the perspectives of approaches are somewhat different. The first and 
basic argument for human dignity comes from the Grundgesetz that has biblical roots apart 
from Kantian. Second, the normative core of the concept of human dignity consists in making 
human persons moral through his/her capacity to act freely and in an autonomous lifestyle. 
Third, from the moral capacity one can derive another meaning of human dignity, namely, the 
                                                 
1108 PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 29. 
1109 Cf. IDEM, Why be Moral?..., 97. 
1110 Cf. JAMES, “Human Dignity…”, 130. 
1111 Cf. ILLATHUPARAMPIL, “Promotion of Life…”, 96. 
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humanization of the public-political space, or individual life phenomena. Humanization 
reminds that human persons are an end-in-himself/herself and of the fundamental moral 
principle of the prohibition of instrumentalization. To repeat Schockenhoff: “Every person is 
to be respected for his/her own sake and must never be willed exclusively as a means to an end 
outside its intended purpose.”1112 Through these two meanings, namely, the categorical 
normative meaning of respect for oneself and others and the humane purpose, human dignity 
becomes a binding interpretive principle, which is the normative basis of the entire state system. 
However, the formula of the inalienable human dignity serves only the affirmation of formal 
moral insights, but does not contributes to the substantive definition of what is morally correct 
or not. Experience shows that the realization of what is morally right or wrong action cannot be 
derived from human dignity alone. Especially in bioethical decisions, the principle of human 
dignity only formulates a few absolute obligations, but does not provide a complete set of 
obligations to act.  
One can see a common factor in the above two perspectives, that is, the respect for human life, 
which is an outcome of human dignity. Sometimes, the value, the worth and the respect for 
human life, which is sacred, is expressed in such terms such as “sanctity of life”. This term will 
be examined in the next section. 
10.5 THE SANCTITY OF LIFE ISSUES IN BIOETHICS OF AN EMBRYO 
The discussions with regard to the terms sanctity of life, sacredness of life and quality of life, 
although have different emphasis in the way they are interpreted and especially in the field of 
bioethics, they find their expression in theological discussion among Indian Moral Theologians. 
The following discussions explain this fact. 
According to Gracias, “Not only is a human being sacred. A human being is sacred, from his/her 
first moment, even before he or she is born into this world and visible to the human eye.”1113 
Lobo had already affirmed the reality of the sacredness of life in his writings. He affirms, “So 
human life is not mere vital existence or merely physical and biological reality; it is an ethical 
and religious reality whose health and vigour ultimately depend upon integration of the human 
will with the divine will.”1114 
Further, the teaching about the respect and sanctity of life that was held emphatically by Lobo 
becomes clear when he relates to us the role of Christian hospitals in the world. He says: 
Christian hospitals must manifest a firm adherence to transcendent values. They must respect 
the sanctity of human life. They must witness to the truth that all human life is a gift of God, 
who is sovereign in the whole process from conception until the withdrawal of the breath of 
life in death. Every man is made in the image of God and hence human life must be held in 
the utmost respect from the beginning even to the worst decrepitude.1115 
Unfortunately, human life is facing an identity crisis in today’s world due to the radical 
interpretation of individual autonomy. Some distinguish between ‘quality of life’ and ‘sanctity 
                                                 
1112 SCHOCKENHOFF, „Lebensbeginn und Menschenwürde…“, 206. See Chapter 6.4 at fn.818 above. See also 
IDEM, Ethik des Lebens…, 237. 
1113 GRACIAS, “Dignity of Human Procreation…”, 26. Emphasis in original. 
1114 LOBO, Current Problems in Medical Ethics…, 39. Cf. also KOCHAPPILLY, “Celebration of Old Age…”, 
455. 
1115 LOBO, Moral and Pastoral Questions..., 246. 
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of life’, which form the two basic ethical principles of Bioethics. Those who hold on, on the 
one hand, for quality of life, point out that the subjective judgments about the individual with 
regard to life should be based on social worth and usefulness. For example, when the life of a 
person is in poor condition and is of no use to society, he or she be allowed to die. On the other 
hand, the Catholic Church holds for the sanctity of human life and values it from its beginning 
to its end in whatever condition it is.1116  
The important function and purpose of any ethic is to facilitate authentic human life. Such ethics 
admits of an integral moral approach that protects true human dignity while respecting the 
inviolability and sacredness of human life.1117 Indian Moral Theologian Lucose Chamakala, in 
his book “The Sanctity of Life vs. The Quality of Life”, explores Germain Grisez’s sanctity-of-
life view based on natural theory, Helga Kuhse’s quality-of-life approach based on utilitarian 
approach and Richard McCormick’s quality-of-life approach based on proportionalist method. 
Chamakala then suggests a new sanctity-of-life ethics that acknowledges the personhood of all 
human beings as well as admitting quality-of-life considerations in life and death decision-
making. In such decisions when the quality-of-life is considered then it enables in respecting 
the values and beliefs that the person treasured in his/her life. Through this new approach to 
sanctity-of-life, he sees that such considerations serve human life and dignity better. In the best 
interest of the person, considering his/her autonomy and valuing his/her freedom human dignity 
is ultimately preserved.1118 
According to Dong-Ik Lee, Christian bioethics starts at the above kind of outlook on life, which 
emphasizes the sanctity of human life.1119 Although some bio-scientists ignore the sanctity of 
life and adhere to human life from a scientific value, yet sanctity of life cannot just be 
understood as a religious outcome. This is because human persons are different; in that, their 
excellence and incomparable value are characterised by transcending the scientific 
dimension.1120 From what Dong-Ik Lee argues it is to be understood here by the term “sanctity 
of human life” perhaps referring to the sacredness, respect, reverence, excellence and value of 
life. 
Comparison between Moral Theological Perspectives in Germany and India 
From the above discussion on sanctity of life, it is clear that Indian Moral Theologians have 
given importance to this concept. The importance given to the concept lies in the sense of 
                                                 
1116 Cf. ALENCHERRY/KANNIYAKONIL, “General Introduction…”, xxvi. 
1117 Cf. CHAMAKALA, The Sanctity of Life…, 215. See also IDEM, “Assisted Reproductive Technologies. A 
Catholic Perspective”, in: JULIAN/MYNATTY (ed.), Catholic Contributions to Bioethics…, 246-264; 248, 262. 
1118 Cf. CHAMAKALA, The Sanctity of Life…, 221-224. 
1119 Cf. DONG-IK LEE, “‘Quality of life’…”, 61. It is to be noted that the term “sanctity of human life” meant 
by Dong-Ik Lee is not the same as understood by Peter Singer and others. See Chapter 1.5 and 6.5 above. 
1120 Cf. DONG-IK LEE, “‘Quality of life’…”, 61. In his footnote to the above reference, he writes, “The outlook 
of life in Eastern ideology also starts from the sanctity. The Chinese character myung (Ù¤) comes from everything 
from the sky and the world not from the land. This myung (Ù¤) has comprehensive meaning not just pointing at 
breathing but every rule of whole universe. It includes not only the life of human but also the rule of nature, ethics 
of human behaviour, etc. Therefore myung (Ù¤) should not be limited to the life but something given by the sky 
(ô ̧ ). This will of god is absolute. This is not something that can be vanished by human. Therefore the life of human 
does not belong to human but the sky who gave that life to human and this means the absolute life. Dong-Ik Lee, 
The Manager of Life, 1994, The Catholic University Press, pp 36-38.” See DONG-IK LEE, “‘Quality of life’…”, 
65-66 at fn. 29. Emphasis in original. 
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respecting the inviolability and sacredness of human life. Moral Theologians in India take 
shelter in the fact that it is a useful concept insofar as it protects true human dignity. German 
moral theology, on the other hand, sidelines the concept of sanctity of life in applying it to 
human dignity. Neither do German Moral Theologians use the “sanctity of life” as a religious 
concept, nor do they find any normative statement in the term. Insofar as the concept of 
“sanctity of life”, or sometimes also referred to as “reverence for life”, can protect human life 
beginning at birth, the notion remains a useful and meaningful concept. Furthermore, the 
discussion on the sanctity of life no longer forms an essential discussion in German Moral 
Theology. 
10.6 CONCLUSION 
From a philosophical point of view, the historical background of human dignity is derived from 
the same sources such as the Stoics and Kant. The concept of human dignity is understood as 
one that prevents in instrumentalizing human beings. Besides, every individual is a unique 
centre of self-consciousness, a unique centre of freedom, creativity, responsibility and love. 
Moreover, human right is related to human dignity. That is to say, human rights are based on 
human dignity. Human rights entail dues. The due that is owed to a human individual is his/her 
inalienable right because he/she is a person. This is because the human person is endowed with 
reason and a rational will and according to Kantian thesis this is what gives a person an absolute 
worth and an inalienable right. Therefore, the due that comes before the right is human dignity. 
From a theological point of view, the fact that human beings are made in the image of God, 
forms the basis for a relation between them, the world, others and God. Moreover, the entrusting 
of the stewardship of creation to human persons made in the image of God is an 
acknowledgement from God in sharing His own dignity with human persons. Besides, the 
responsibility entrusted to human beings to be co-creators is another participation in the Divine 
dignity, reflected in human persons as human dignity. In addition, a participation in the Divine 
intellect and will with the capacity to discern through conscience ennobled through a capacity 
for perfect freedom and pure love while being made in the image of God forms the basis of 
human dignity. 
The sanctity of life also forms a part of the discourse on human dignity in Indian Moral 
Theology. Human life is seen as a mystery and therefore sacred. It also applies to prenatal life. 
Beyond its physical and biological reality, human life is also a religious and ethical reality. The 
respect due to life comes from the fact that human life is a gift of God and an image of God. In 
contrast to the quality of life, the Catholic Church holds for the sanctity of life. Chamakala 
proposes a new sanctity-of-life approach. Besides sanctity of life, it includes also quality of life 
consideration in life and death decision-making. In the East, the concept of sanctity of life plays 
an important role. 
In the last analysis, one can say that when both the German and Indian Moral theological 
perspectives are taken together, although the approach and the thrust is from different angles, 
perhaps owing to their cultural difference and their commitment, they would complement and 
enrich one another in their theological foundation of human dignity.
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C H A P T E R  1 1  
HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE TEACHINGS 
OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN INDIA 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
One should acknowledge the sad plight of the ethical approaches in the pragmatic, utilitarian 
and hedonistic milieu, facilitated by relativism and subjectivism that have reduced the value of 
human life. This is very much true in India.1121 The basic attitude of the Catholic Church in India 
on human life could be summed up in the following words: “The Catholic Church always 
upholds the value of human life in whatever form it exists.” 1122  
As already mentioned, the Moral Theologians in India have not used arguments from human 
dignity point of view as one of the main argument in bioethical issues. On the part of the 
Catholic Church in India, it must be acknowledged that in general she does raise its voice when 
questions of human rights violation take place in other areas. Nevertheless, human dignity as 
an argument does not play a pivotal role. 
It is also to be noted that unlike in Germany, although there is an Ethical Commission in India, 
there is no representative from the Catholic Bishops Conference of India (CBCI)1123 or from 
local State Bishop Conference, in the Commission. Therefore, the Catholic Church is not 
directly involved in the ethical discussions of the Country. However, the Catholic Church does 
raise its voice when proposals are raised to make it legislative in the Parliament. Since 
Christians are a minority in India, often the voice of the Church goes unheard. 
Although no official document has been issued so far on the issue of human dignity, to the best 
of our knowledge, the discussion of the CBCI on human dignity on various occasions shows 
the involvement of the Catholic Church in India in this field. 
This Chapter will deal with certain pastoral letters, documents, interventions, colloquium that 
the Catholic Church in India have issued or called forth, which refer to human dignity. They 
will be dealt with under the headings of the various Offices and Rites that issued such 
interventions. The final section will deal with the Federation of Asian Bishop Conference 
(FABC) involvement on the issue. 
                                                 
1121 ALENCHERRY/KANNIYAKONIL, “General Introduction…”, xxv-xxvi. 
1122 Cf. ibid. 
1123 The Catholic Bishops’ Conference of India (CBCI) governs the Roman Catholic Church in India. Under 
the banner of the CBCI, there are the three different rites in India, namely, the Latin Rite, the Syro-Malabar Rite, 
and the Syro-Malankara Rite. The Latin rite comes under the auspices of the Conference of Catholic Bishops of 
India (CCBI), while the Syro-Malabar Rite and the Syro-Malankara Rite have their respective Synods. According 
to the Union of Catholic Asian News (UCAN) Directory, as of November 2012, India has 166 dioceses, of which 
129 are Latin, 29 Syro-Malabar and 8 Syro-Malankara. See http://directory. ucanews.com/country/india/12, 
accessed on 04.05.2013. The CBCI was established in 1944. At that time, it had its “Standing Committee” and its 
sections termed as “Working Committees”. During the “General Meeting”, “Commissions” replaced the Working 
Committees. See John DESROCHERS, The Social Teaching of the Church, Centre for Social Action, Bangalore 
1982, 407. 
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11.2 CATHOLIC BISHOPS CONFERENCE OF INDIA (CBCI) 
Since its establishment in 1944, the CBCI did not issue any major statement on social questions. 
However, they were concerned with defense of the rights of Christian minorities among other 
things.1124 
On 1 May 1971, the CBCI issued a Statement on “Poverty and Development” drawing the 
attention of the people of India on the discussions of the Roman Synod of Bishops.1125. In its 
Statement, the CBCI asserted that the people of India have: 
[…] pinned their expectation to the hopes of a higher income, more employment and better 
opportunities for acquiring skill that will make them self-dependent […]. In conformity with 
the new demands for a better sharing of national wealth and opportunities, a new set of values 
is indicated based on human dignity and the inherent personal rights of every individual [...]. 
The Church must carry on His mission and He speaks to us today in the demands of our 
fellowmen for bread, health, education, work – in short, for human dignity and justice.1126 
In this connection, the CBCI also sent a Memorandum to the Synod of Bishops on “Justice in 
the World”.1127 
In 1972 at Madras, the General Meeting of the CBCI adopted some important resolutions on 
“Social Justice”.1128 It issued a statement as an “Appeal to the People of India”. In its Statement, 
which was an urgent appeal to the universal brotherhood among the people of India, the CBCI 
after quoting the Preamble of the Constitution of India,1129 said: “Love implies an absolute 
demand for justice, namely a recognition of the dignity and rights of one’s neighbour.”1130 
In January 1974, the CBCI finalized its conmunication for the Synod of Bishops in Rome on 
Evangelization, Justice and Development. It elaborates on the insights of the statements of 1971 
and 1972. In a special section on “Justice and Development”, the CBCI explains the Christian 
concept of development. It said: 
Today the Church clearly recognizes that salvation is not restricted to spirituality and pure 
eschatology but includes the renewal, liberation and fulfillment of the human person and 
human society. On the other hand, Christians emphasize that development is not a mere 
technical organizational matter. Material aid and economic growth must be built on 
principles of equality and must lead to a wholeness of life for the individual and a better 
social order. It must be based on initiatives coming from the grass-root levels and on a social 
organization that overcomes the gap of donor and beneficiary giving the people a share in 
                                                 
1124 The 1948 Statement of the Standing Committee and its Memorandum to the Government of India on the 
proposed Constitution are good examples of this concern. See DESROCHERS, The Social Teaching of the Church…, 
407-408 and fn. 2. 
1125 The origin of this Statement can be found in CBCI, Report of the General Meeting of the CBCI, Bombay, 
15 & 16 April 1971, CBCI Centre, New Delhi 1971, 5-6. See DESROCHERS, The Social Teaching of the Church…, 
410 and fn. 23. 
1126 CBCI, “Poverty and Development”, in: Report of the General Meeting of the CBCI, Bombay, 15 & 16 April 
1971…, 42-46; 42-43, as quoted in DESROCHERS, The Social Teaching of the Church…, 411-412. Emphasis in 
original. 
1127 Cf. ibid., 410-411. 
1128 CBCI, Report of the General Meeting of the CBCI, Madras, 6-14 April 1972, CBCI Centre, New Delhi 
1971. 
1129 Preamble to the Constitution of India will be dealt separately in Chapter 18.4.1 below. 
1130 CBCI, “Appeal to the People of India”, in: Report of the General Meeting of the CBCI, Madras, 6-14 April 
1972, CBCI Centre, New Delhi 1971, 48-52; 49, as quoted in DESROCHERS, The Social Teaching of the Church…, 
414. Emphasis in original. 
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decision-making powers in keeping with their dignity. This broad vision of development 
embraces the whole person and the whole community.1131 
In 1978, in Mangalore, the CBCI issued a Statement on “The Church’s response to the Urgent 
Needs of the Country”.1132 While expressing their desire to be “sensitive to the urgent needs of 
the country”, the bishops distinctly articulated the following general principle with regard to 
discrimination: 
The dignity of man confers certain inalienable rights upon him, whatever be the accident of 
is birth. Any curtailment, or, what is worse, denial of these rights is an act of injustice. Hence, 
discrimination of any type must be part of our Christian concern. When unfortunately, it is 
practiced within the Church itself, it becomes a countersign to the Gospel values we 
profess.1133 
All the above statements of the CBCI show us their involvement in the human right and human 
dignity issues of the people of India. However, everyone assumes the terms human dignity or 
human person as universally known. Other than the theological fact that human beings are made 
in the image of God, there is no elaboration, foundation, basis or verification of the said terms. 
They are taken for granted. In the next section, other interventions of the CBCI that pertain in 
particular to the area of Bioethics will be examined. 
11.2.1 CBCI Pastoral Letter on Abortion 1992 
In the year 1992, the CBCI issued a Pastoral Letter on Abortion.1134 At the very outset speaking 
about the violence in India as a cause for concern, the Catholic Bishops of India expressed that 
they: 
[...] are greatly disturbed by the dangerous social trends that prevail, especially those that 
denigrate human life and life processes. These are often expressed in violence, and grievously 
devalue the inestimable worth of human life, almost always for the sake of immediate 
material benefit or convenience [...]. Human life is being denied its sacred status.1135 
This Pastoral Letter, as the title suggests, is mainly concerned about “the most widespread and 
violent injustice prevalent in our country: abortion”.1136 The Letter further elaborates that direct 
abortion is the destruction of human life, an ultimate violence and perversion of the 
sophistication of medical science. The Letter gives the reason for it: “Because it strikes at the 
most defenceless [stet], the most innocent, those most in need of our protection, it is the ultimate 
violence prevalent in this age of unprecedented violence.”1137 
The Letter puts forward certain arguments such as those that either minimizes the seriousness 
of assault on life, or justifies it. Some other arguments place the mother’s interest as supreme 
                                                 
1131 CBCI, Report of the General Meeting of the CBCI, Calcutta, 6-14 January 1974, CBCI Centre, New Delhi 
1974, 40, as quoted in DESROCHERS, The Social Teaching of the Church…, 420. Emphasis in original. 
1132 CBCI, “The Church’s response to the Urgent Needs of the Country”, in: Report of the General Meeting of 
the CBCI, Mangalore, 9-17 January 1978, CBCI Centre, New Delhi 1978, 78-85. 
1133 CBCI, Report of the General Meeting of the CBCI, Mangalore, 9-17 January 1978…, 14-17, as quoted in 
DESROCHERS, The Social Teaching of the Church…, 425. Emphasis in original. 
1134 CBCI, “Pastoral Letter on Abortion”, in: Donald H. R. DESOUZA (ed.), Final Statements of the General 
Body Meetings of Catholic Bishop’s Conference of India (C.B.C.I.) (1966-2002), CBCI Centre, New Delhi 2003, 
133-139. 
1135 CBCI, “Pastoral Letter on Abortion…”, 133. Note the use of the word “sacred” here, which is attributed to 
human life. 
1136 Cf. ibid. 
1137 Ibid., 133-134. 
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over that of the unborn child. The Pastoral Letter categorizes this argument as false and states, 
“The unborn in the womb, from the moment of conception, is a distinct individual human 
life.”1138 Thus, biologically speaking from the moment of fertilization a human individual exists. 
The CBCI Pastoral Letter on Abortion simply assumes and acknowledges the individuality of 
an embryo. As a basis for this argument, the Letter substantiates from Donum vitae 5, especially 
the phrases: “man is the only creature on earth that God has «wished for himself»1139 and the 
spiritual soul of each man is «immediately created» by God1140.”1141 
Another false argument is that which says that a foetus is not viable outside the womb. The 
Letter counter argues that such an argument is only specious. It is very irrelevant to speak of 
viability outside the womb when the foetus is meant to be in the womb.1142 
Moreover, once again referring back to Donum vitae, the Pastoral Letter, with regard to the 
justification for direct termination, makes it clear that in order to save the life of the mother, the 
life of another cannot be sacrificed intentionally and directly.1143 
Further, the Letter specifies certain “euphemistic terms” or “a deceptive resort to semantics” 
that cloak or disguise the stark fact of abortion in order to give it a semblance of social 
acceptance. Besides other terms, the term “medical termination of pregnancy” is used instead 
of “abortion”. Mechanical suction for early abortion is tapered down as “menstrual regulation”; 
RU 486 pill that brutalises women is called “the morning after pill” and passed off as being 
merely “contragestational” procedure. Other abortifacients are offered to people as 
“contraceptives”.1144 
The document also speaks about the “horrifying trends” that are prevalent in modern society. 
These trends erode the value of human life, such as manufacture of “collagen enriched” 
cosmetics extracted from aborted babies, experimentation on live foetuses that have survived 
abortion, in vitro fertilization or deliberate conception of babies in order to abort them at a 
certain stage of development and providing compatible tissue for transplantation surgery.1145 
As a response to such crimes, the Bishops propose the following measures:  
We therefore warn the faithful and all of good will not to be misled by semantic 
misinterpretation or philosophical arguments, or by pretensions of concern for social and 
material well being, all of which are designed to justify and even encourage direction [stet] 
abortion and an anti-life attitude. We also emphasize that secular legislation to permit 
abortion does not give moral sanction.1146 
The Bishops also express their deep concern over the distortion, namely, “the mother’s womb, 
which was designed by the Creator to be the safest place for the defenceless and vulnerable new 
life, has become potentially the most dangerous place to be”.1147 
                                                 
1138 Ibid., 134. 
1139 DV 5 is referring here to GS 24. 
1140 DV 5 is referring here to PIUS PP. XII, “Litterae Encyclicae. Humani generis”, in: AAS 42 (1950) 561-578; 
575. The original Latin phrase here reads: “animas enim a Deo immediate creari”. 
1141 CBCI, “Pastoral Letter on Abortion…”, 134. 
1142 Cf. ibid. 
1143 Cf. ibid. 
1144 Cf. ibid., 134-135. 
1145 Cf. ibid., 135. 
1146 Ibid., 137. 
1147 Cf. ibid., 137. The Letter actually quotes GS 51 that speaks about guarding of life with greatest care from 
the moment of conception while abortion and infanticides being unspeakable crimes. 
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In conclusion, the Pastoral Letter also exhorts all Catholics that they “be better informed on the 
subject, to express themselves, gently but firmly, and to support, in whatever way they can be, 
the cause of the yet to be born child’s right to life”.1148 
It is to be noted here that although the Pastoral Letter speaks of the value, inestimable worth 
and sacredness of human life and “yet to be born child’s right to life”, yet there is no mention 
or an argument from the point of view of human dignity from the very beginning that is at stake 
in direct and intentional abortion. 
11.2.2 CBCI Standing Committee: Bioethics Norms 1995 
During the CBCI Standing Committee Meeting held in Delhi from March 28-30, 1995, 
discussions took place in particular pertaining to the area of Bioethics.1149 Bosco Penha, 
Auxiliary Bishop of Mumbai, highlighted the developments in genetic engineering and life 
sciences and their practical implications with regard to world health and the quality of life. He 
further drew the attention of the members of the Standing Committee to Cardinal Sodano’s 
letter, which asked the Episcopal Conferences to be alert to the impact of the direction taken by 
the international organizations upon the legislation of individual nations in this matter. Penha 
requested that under such circumstances it would be desirable to designate an office to examine 
carefully the relative norms issued in India. Highlighting the significant advances in the 
biomedical and life sciences and their practical applications, which has yielded promising new 
prospects for health and the quality of human life, there was a need felt to regulate them through 
appropriate legal norms, in order to avoid practices contrary to human rights and the dignity of 
persons.1150 
The bishops discussed then on “The International Norms in the area of Bioethics” document.1151 
The said document in footnote No.1 refers to the World Conference on Human Rights held in 
Vienna (1993). It states that: 
The World Conference on Human Rights notes that certain advances, notably in the 
biomedical and life sciences as well as in information technology, may have potentially 
adverse consequences for the integrity, dignity and human rights of the individual, and calls 
for international cooperation to ensure that human rights and dignity are fully respected in 
this area of universal concern.1152 
The document then takes up the Juridical Instruments and Directives that are being prepared on 
the International level. Commenting on these initiatives taken, the Holy See finds it important 
that the values and fundamental rights of the human person should be protected also on the 
international level. It specifies the reason for doing so, namely, that these are questions touching 
                                                 
1148 CBCI, “Pastoral Letter on Abortion…”, 138. 
1149 CBCI, “Other Matters”, in: Report of the CBCI Standing Committee Meeting (Delhi, March 28-30, 1995), 
CBCI Centre, New Delhi 1995, 15-16. 
1150 Cf. CBCI, “The International Norms in the area of Bioethics” in Report of the CBCI Standing Committee 
Meeting (Delhi, March 28-30, 1995), CBCI Centre, New Delhi 1995, Appendix X, 54-62., 54. The original source 
of this Appendix is unknown. 
1151 Cf. ibid. 
1152 Ibid., 60. The reference is from the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna (1993), Part I, No. 
11, paragraph 3. See UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION, “World Conference on Human Rights…”, 142. 
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on the lives of individuals and the very future of the human species. Therefore, it is obvious 
that the Church has particular interest on them.1153 
On the topic on Ethical and Juridical Questions concerning the person and the family, the 
document “The International Norms in the area of Bioethics” quotes from the International 
Juridical instruments like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (UDHR 1948) 
that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”.1154 The said document also 
affirms that juridical protection is necessary even before birth.1155 In the footnote to this 
statement, it refers to the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) and the subsequent 
Convention (1989). In the preambles to both these declarations, it is stated: “an appropriate 
legal protection, before as well as after birth” is needed.1156 
Consequently, the CBCI Standing Committee decided that the Health Commission in 
collaboration with Bioethics Centre in Bombay (FBMEC)1157 should study the developments in 
the field, formulate a set of norms and guidelines, and present it to the next Standing Committee 
meeting in September the same year. Penha further said that efforts would be made to 
popularize the Church’s position on Bioethics and to sensitize Indian political leaders.1158 
Penha in line with the reference to the document “The International Norms in the area of 
Bioethics”, concurred that: “Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right 
shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception”.1159 The said 
document falls in line with the mind of the Church expressing: “The Holy See maintains that 
the right to life of every human being must be recognized and safeguarded from the moment of 
conception.”1160 Further, speaking about the techniques of artificial procreation, and the 
dispersal of human embryos or freezing them or experimentation upon them, the document says 
that there is a “downgrading of the juridic and ethical value of the human embryo in the first 
phases of life (through the concept of “pre-embryo”)”.1161 
                                                 
1153 Cf. CBCI, “The International Norms...”, 55. 
1154 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Article 1. See UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, “Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948…”, 24. 
1155 Cf. CBCI, “The International Norms...”, 56. 
1156 Cf. ibid., 60 at fn.6. See CBCI, COMMISSION FOR HEALTH, “Information on Bioethics”, in: Report of the 
CBCI Standing Committee Meeting (Bangalore, September 14-17, 1995), CBCI Centre, New Delhi 1995, 18-19. 
1157 It was during the XIV World Congress of the Fédération Internationale des Associations Médical 
Catholique [FIAMC] held in Bombay in January 1978 that it was resolved to establish Bio-Ethics Centres for the 
association at convenient locations where the various traditions of the world would be represented. After many 
unsuccessful attempts at starting the first such Centre in Europe, North America, and Australasia, it was decided 
in 1981 that it be initiated in India. Bombay was chosen for this activity with the Secretary General, Dr. C. J. Vas 
as the first Managing Trustee. At that time (1981), the Bio-Ethics Centre in Bombay, known as the FIAMC Bio-
Medical Ethics Centre (FBMEC), was the 6th Centre for medical ethics in the world and the first in Asia, 
Australasia and Africa. FIAMC BIO-MEDICAL ETHICS CENTRE, MUMBAI, INDIA, Aims, Genesis of FIAMC. See: 
http://fiamc. blogspot.de/2009/02/aims-genesis-of-fiamc.html, accessed on 27.12.13. 
1158 Cf. CBCI, “Other Matters...”, 15-16. 
1159 Ibid. The quotation is taken from a footnote in the said document, which is a reference to the American 
Convention on Human Rights (1969) that states so in article 4.1. See ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, 
“American Convention on Human Rights 1969”, in: BROWNLIE/GOODWIN-GILL (ed.), Basic Documents on 
Human Rights…, 933-954; 935. 
1160 CBCI, “The International Norms...”, 56. Emphasis in original. 
1161 Cf. ibid. The concept of “pre-embryo” was dealt with already in Chapter 4.2.1 at fn. 498 and Chapter 5.4.2 
at fn. 728 above. 
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11.2.3 CBCI Commission for Healthcare 2005 
The C.B.C.I. created a separate Commission for the Health Care Apostolate in 1990. From time 
to time, this Commission has issued statements, policies, conducted seminars, colloquiums, etc. 
in the field of health care and bioethics. 
The Church in India has a unique role to play in creating a culture of care, which implies that 
respect, and value of the life of every human being is taken into consideration.1162 The Church 
in India also opposes the culture of death and upholds life because God stands for life.1163 This 
statement is attested to by the CBCI in their Health Policy when treating the topic on the 
theological foundation of the Catholic Healthcare Apostolate. Regarding the value and respect 
of human life, it states: 
[…] from the moment of conception, the life of every human being is to be respected in an 
absolute way […]. Human life is sacred because from its beginning it involves ‘the creative 
action of God’ and it remains forever in a special relationship with the Creator, who is its 
sole end […]. Therefore, respect for the sacredness of life marks an important element of a 
Catholic healthcare institution. Every medical procedure, care and treatment has to be 
oriented to the betterment of the quality of life of the patient.1164 
The Catholic Ethics and Praxis in India also shows its concern for the right of life of the unborn. 
For example, Alex Vadakumthala, the executive secretary of the CBCI Health Commission, 
cited a quotation from the Pontifical Council for Health Pastoral Care during the colloquium, 
“Reproductive Health: Catholic Ethics and Praxis in India”, which throws open the mind of the 
Commission in these words: 
Today’s forms of scientific knowledge allow us to affirm that human life begins at the 
moment of fertilisation. Reason is thus called upon to accept, in philosophical and ethical 
terms, the pre-eminent human value of individual life from that moment, and its defense and 
protection is a requirement of natural law. The Church also affirms, on the basis of reason as 
well as of Revelation, the obligation to respect and to protect the right to life of every human 
embryo and rejects as immoral every action which brings about its abortion or 
manipulation.1165 
Gracias during the same colloquium stressed that every human being, no matter how deformed 
he or she may be, is the image of God and sacred to him and cited the words of Pontifical 
Academy for Life in February 2004,1166 which speaks about the right to life and reads: 
Among all the fundamental rights that every human being possesses from the moment of 
conception, the right to life is certainly the primary right because it is the pre-condition for 
the existence of all other such rights. On the basis of this right, every human being, especially 
                                                 
1162 Cf. Alex VADAKUMTHALA, “Healthcare in the Face of Commercialization”, in: JULIAN/MYNATTY (ed.), 
Catholic Contributions to Bioethics…, 46-70; 65. 
1163 Cf. CBCI: COMMISSION FOR HEALTHCARE, Sharing the Fullness of Life. Health Policy of the Catholic 
Church in India, Commission for Healthcare Catholic Bishop's Conference of India, CBCI Centre, New Delhi 
2005, 6. 
1164 Ibid., 6-7. 
1165 PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR HEALTH PASTORAL CARE/PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR THE PASTORAL CARE OF 
MIGRANTS AND ITINERANT PEOPLE/PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR THE FAMILY, The Reproductive Health of Refugees. 
A Note for the Bishops’ Conferences, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican 14 September 2001, No. 3. See CBCI: 
HEALTH COMMISSION, Reproductive Health…, 15. 
1166 Cf. PONTIFICAL ACADEMY FOR LIFE, “Final Communiqué”, in: The Dignity of Human Procreation and 
Reproductive Technologies. Anthropological and Ethical Aspects. Proceedings of the Tenth Assembly of the 
Pontifical Academy for Life. Vatican City 20-22 February 2004, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican, 2005, 7-10. 
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if weak or not self-sufficient, must receive adequate social defence against every form of 
offence or substantial violation of his or her physical and mental integrity.1167 
The Health Policy, under another section on the “Dignity and inviolability of Human Life”, 
under Human Right to Life, further states: 
Human life must be respected and protected absolutely from the moment of conception. From 
the first moment of its existence, a human being must be recognized as having the rights of 
a person – among which is the inviolable right of every innocent being to life.1168 
The Health Policy further substantiates these statements through three biblical references and 
then goes on to speak from the point of view of the natural law written in the heart of people 
(Cf. Rom 2, 14-15).  This natural law applies both to the believer and the non-believer alike 
who recognize by the light of reason and the hidden action of grace “the sacred value of human 
life from its very beginning until its end, and can affirm the right of every human being to have 
this primary good respected to the highest degree”.1169 
Finally, in the section on threats and attacks against human life, under the section on abortion, 
the Health Policy states: “The inviolability of the human person from conception prohibits 
abortion as the suppression of prenatal life. This is a direct violation of the fundamental right 
to life of the human being and is an abominable crime.”1170 Although this statement was given 
in 2005, there is no reference to the Pastoral Letter on abortion issued in 1992. Moreover, it is 
interesting to note once again the repetition of the terms like “sacred” and “sacredness” of life 
and the “inviolable right of every innocent being to life”. 
11.2.4 CBCI Health Commission Colloquium 2006 
At certain times, the CBCI through its Health Commission has convened colloquiums in order 
to discuss and place its stand on the question of human dignity in the field of Bioethics. One 
such colloquium was held in collaboration with the Institute of Reproductive Health, 
Georgetown University, Washington DC titled “Reproductive Health: Catholic Ethics and 
Praxis in India” from 13 to 14 November 2006 in New Delhi.1171 
The sacredness of the human being comes from the fact that a human being is God’s image on 
earth.1172 The sacredness of human life is attributed from his or her first moment, even before 
being born in this world. To reiterate his point, Gracias quotes from the Instruction Donum 
Vitae (I,1).1173 Having made clear the Church’s standpoint that human life begins from the 
moment of conception, Gracias says, “The Church is well aware of the debates regarding the 
exact moment when the zygote becomes a human person, the moment of human identity; but 
her stand remains unchanged.”1174 It is also interesting to note once again here the use of the 
phrase “sacredness of the human being”. 
                                                 
1167 Ibid., 8. Cf. GRACIAS, “Dignity of Human Procreation…”, 15. 
1168 CBCI: HEALTH COMMISSION, Reproductive Health…, 53. At fn.25 to this statement, Donum vitae, 5, is 
cited. 
1169 Ibid. 
1170 Ibid., 54. 
1171 See CBCI: HEALTH COMMISSION, Reproductive Health, op. cit. The fruit of this colloquium was published 
in the form of a book under the same title and edited by Vadakumthala. 
1172 Cf. GRACIAS, “Dignity of Human Procreation…, 24. 
1173 Cf. ibid., 26. 
1174 Ibid. 
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Further, Vadakumthala quotes three fundamental principles of the culture of life that is 
encapsulated in John Paul II’s encyclical letters Evangelium Vitae and Veritatis Splendor. These 
principles are summarized in an article, on the respect for conscience in life issues, by Carl 
Anderson, vice president of the John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and the Family. 
He writes: 
The first is the incomparable value and dignity of every human being regardless of age, 
condition or race. This is especially true in the case of the poor, the weak and the defenseless. 
And this is also true for the dignity of the human conscience. 
The second is that it is always a violation of human dignity to treat anyone as an instrument 
or means to an end. Instead, every person must be seen as good in himself or herself and 
never as an object to be manipulated. 
The third principle is that the intentional killing of an innocent human being, whatever the 
circumstances and particularly in cases of abortion and euthanasia, can never be morally 
justified.1175 
These reflections show that the Catholic Ethics and Praxis in India is concerned about human 
dignity in reproductive health.  
11.3 THE RITES UNDER CBCI ON HUMAN DIGNITY 
As mentioned earlier, there are three Rites under the banner of CBCI. The following sections 
will deal with the Latin and Syro Malabar Rite on the concept of human dignity. 
11.3.1 Conference of Catholic Bishops of India (CCBI) National Symposium on the 
Church’s Social Doctrine 2009 
A National Symposium on the Church’s Social doctrine was held at St. Pius X College, 
Goregaon, in Mumbai from 13th March to 15th March 2009, under the auspices of the 
Theological and Doctrinal Commission of the CCBI. The outcome of the Symposium was 
brought out as a book titled: “National Symposium on the Church’s Social Doctrine (CCBI 
Theological and Doctrinal Commission)”.1176 Commenting on the Compendium of the Social 
Doctrine of the Church, the symposium reiterated that the Compendium upholds the principle 
of “The Inherent Dignity of the Human Person” which is the basis of all other principles and 
content of the Church’s social doctrines.1177 The term “dignity” here is defined as ‘worth’, 
‘nobleness’, ‘position’. The term “inherent” connotes ‘to abide in’ or ‘to be invested in’ 
conveying the meaning ‘being an intrinsic part of one’s being’. Consequently, “The Inherent 
Dignity of the Human Person” implies that every human being enjoys a certain worth or 
nobleness, which is part of his or her nature, being something he or she is born with. Being 
created in the image of God, the Church sees every human person the living image of God 
                                                 
1175 Carl ANDERSON, “Respect for Conscience in Common Law Countries”, in: Elio SGRECCIA/Jean LAFFITTE 
(ed.), The Christian Conscience in Support of the Right to Life. Proceedings of the Thirteenth General Assembly 
of the Pontifical Academy for the Life. Vatican City, 23-25 February 2007, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican 
2008, 102-114; 112. Cf. Alex VADAKUMTHALA, “Introduction”, in: CBCI: HEALTH COMMISSION, Reproductive 
Health…, 12-19; 16. 
1176 Thomas DABRE/Stephen FERNANDES (ed.), National Symposium on the Church’s Social Doctrine (CCBI 
Theological and Doctrinal Commission), Mumbai 2009. Thomas Dabre is the Bishop of Vasai, Mumbai. Stephen 
Fernandes is an Indian Moral Theologian. 
1177 Cf. Elaine Ann CHARLES, “The Inherent Dignity of the Human Person”, in: DABRE/FERNANDES (ed.), 
National Symposium on the Church’s Social Doctrine…, 39-42; 39.  
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himself and hence every human individual consequently possesses the dignity of a person who 
is not just “something” but “someone”. Subsequently, it means that he or she is capable of self-
knowledge, self-possession, of freely giving himself or herself and of entering into communion 
with other persons.1178 
The human person’s likeness to God shows that the essence and existence of human individuals 
are constitutively related to God in the most powerful way, which exists in itself and not added 
from outside and hence the term “Inherent Human Dignity”. Since God shows no partiality all 
people have the same dignity as creatures made in his own image and likeness (Acts 10,34; cf. 
Rom 2,11; Gal 2,6; Eph 6,9). The Incarnation of the Son of God shows the equality of all people 
bestowed with dignity. “There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there 
is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus” (Gal 3,28). Because the 
glory of God shines on the face of every person, the dignity of every person before God becomes 
the basis of the dignity of each person before the other.1179 
For the reason that they are created in the image and likeness of God, both men and women 
have the same dignity and are of equal value, even though they are sexually different. In a more 
profound manner, they are equal, because the reciprocity or relationship between man and 
woman (which give life to the “we” in the human couple) is an image of God. However, the 
situation is sad today. It is due to the countless assaults committed against the dignity of women, 
assaults in the form of domestic violence, exploitation, oppression, discrimination, sexual 
assaults. Moreover, such crimes as trafficking of women and the degradation of the image of 
woman by the media, atrocities in the name of religion against women, women deprived of the 
right to education, and the deprivation of life of equality with men; all have had a negative 
influence on the image of women. The present market economy, economic and cultural 
globalization, materialism and consumerism have converted woman from a “someone” created 
in the image of God, to a mere “something” made by man.1180 
In their unity and relationship as man and woman, God has entrusted the work of procreation 
and family life, a participation in his creation. Therefore, the offspring born of this unity and 
relationship possess the inherent dignity possessed by their parents, who first gave them life. 
However, it is sad to know that today abortion, the destruction of unborn children, preference 
for the male child, the exploitation of children to suit materialistic ends, child labour and unjust 
working condition and the depravation of children of their legitimate right to be educated are 
all assaults on the inherent dignity of children.1181 
Since the roots of human rights are to be found in the very dignity of human beings, the 
physically handicapped, the physically impaired, the mentally challenged, the aged and infirm, 
all need to be treated with respect and consideration, because of their intrinsic, inherent human 
dignity.1182  
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1179 Cf. CHARLES, “The Inherent Dignity…”, 40. 
1180 Cf. ibid., 40-41. 
1181 Cf. ibid., 41. 
1182 Cf. ibid. 
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In addition, it is saddening to know that there are violations often committed against the dignity 
of the old, aged and infirm, in the form of indifference, insensitivity and visible hostility. The 
dignity and rights of the disabled thus needs to be protected and safeguarded.1183 
Drawing on the teachings of the social doctrines of the Catholic Church, this document thus 
provides a comprehensive understanding of the concept of human dignity. 
11.3.2 Syro Malabar Church Major Archiepiscopal Assembly 
The contribution of the Syro-Malabar Church1184 to the Indian theological thinking on the 
question of human dignity is also worth mentioning. The third Major Archiepiscopal Assembly 
of the Syro Malabar Church Lineamenta No. 18 acknowledges that the human being is an image 
of God. The Lineamenta quotes Gen 1,27 that human beings are created in the image and 
likeness of God. Further, it quotes GS 19: “The root reason for the human dignity is in man’s 
call to communion with God.” Explaining this statement, the Lineamenta affirms that what is 
meant here is that life is a gift of God. According to Thomas Aquinas, if life is a gift of God, 
only God enjoys dominion over it. Human beings have only been entrusted with the stewardship 
over life; they however, do not have ownership rights.1185 It can be observed here that the 
arguments about image of God in human, communion with God, stewardship over life are some 
of the themes that were already dealt (Chapter 10.3 above). 
The value of human life in other contexts and its deliberation was already dealt with in the 
Catholic Church in India. However, this Section will deal with the interesting contribution of 
the Syro-Malabar Church in India. Speaking from the concept of the culture of death that has 
become prevalent today, the third Major Archiepiscopal Assembly of the Syro Malabar Church 
in No. 15 of its Lineamenta, says: “The growing culture of death does not give due value to life. 
We must be very cautious about this.”1186 
The same Lineamenta in No. 17 speaks about the significant value of human life:  
                                                 
1183 Cf. ibid., 42. 
1184 Pope Leo XII established the Catholic Hierarchy of India through the promulgation of the Bull “Humanae 
Salutis” on 1 October 1886. The next year, in 1887, the same pope created for the Syro-Malabar faithful two 
Vicariates Apostolic, Kottayam and Thrissur in Kerala. However, the Vicars Apostolic appointed for them were 
of the Latin Rite. It was only in 1896, when the two Vicariates were reorganized into the three Vicariates of 
Changanacherry, Ernakulam and Thrissur, that the Syro-Malabar Church received Vicars Apostolic of its own 
Rite. In 1911, the Vicariate of Kottayam was constituted exclusively for the Suddists of the Syro-Malabar Rite, 
descendants of the colony of emigrants from Edessa, Syria, in 345 A.D., under Thomas of Cana. On 21 December 
1923, Pope Pius XI established the Syro-Malabar Hierarchy in India with Ernakulam as the Metropolitan See and 
Changanacherry and Thrissur as suffragans. Kottayam was also raised to the status of a Diocese. On 11 June 1932 
because of the Reunion Movement inaugurated by Mar Ivanos, the Syro-Malankara Hierarchy was established by 
Pope Pius XI. On 16 December 1992, Pope John Paul II raised the Syro-Malabar Church to the status of a Major 
Archiepiscopal Sui Juris Church. On 10 February 2005, the Syro-Malankara Church was raised to the status of a 
Major Archiepiscopal Sui Juris Church. Presently, Cardinal Mar George Alencherry heads the Church of The 
Syro-Malabar Church. Cf. Jacob MARANGATTU, The Syro-Malabar Church (History and Statistics), Deepti 
Publications, Rajkot 20063, 2-11. Moran Mor Baselios Cardinal Cleemis Catholica Bava is the present Catholicos 
of the Syro-Malankara Church. The Head of a Particular Church outside the Roman Empire was known as 
Catholicos. The term Catholicos means ‘head of the Church’. The authority of Catholicos is below that of Patriarch. 
1185 Cf. MAJOR ARCHIEPISCOPAL ASSEMBLY, Faith in Service of Life. Lineamenta of the Third Major 
Archiepiscopal Assembly, Secretariat, Major Archiepiscopal Assembly 2010, Kochi, Kerala 2010, 1-23; 10-11. 
This Lineamenta was privately circulated. The purpose of the Lineamenta was to prepare for the third Major 
Archiepiscopal Assembly of the Syro Malabar Church scheduled to be held from 20th to 22nd August 2010. 
1186 Cf. MAJOR ARCHIEPISCOPAL ASSEMBLY, Faith in Service of Life. Lineamenta…, 9. 
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The gospel of life implies that human life is the highest good, though not the absolute good. 
There can be higher values for which human life might be sacrificed. However, life is always 
a good. Because, “the life which God gives man is quite different from the life of all other 
living creatures, in as much as man, although formed from the dust of the earth (Genesis. 2,7; 
3,19; Job. 34,15; Psalm. 103,14; 104,29), is a manifestation of God in the world, a sign of his 
presence, a trace of his glory (Genesis. 1,26-27; Psalm. 8,6)” (Evangelium Vitae, 34). 
Evangelium Vitae rightly says that life is an indivisible good (Evangelium Vitae, 101). 
Therefore, considerations about human life cannot be limited to biological life alone. It must 
necessarily include the spiritual and psychological good and the social life also.1187 
The observation that human life is beyond biological life, which necessarily includes spiritual, 
psychological and social life dimensions, is noteworthy. 
In No. 19, the Lineamenta – while upholding that life begins at conception and ends in death – 
says that in order to be true to the natural moral law; the gospel of life obliges us to protect all 
human life, from the moment of conception to natural death. “The present-day exclusion of the 
unborn, the elderly, the disabled and the sick are acts against the dignity due to human life.”1188 
This statement is in accord with the Catholic Church teaching that human life begins at 
conception. 
The protection and promotion of life hinges on the inviolability of the person. This inviolability 
demands a gospel of life, which is much more than just stopping to kill (Lineamenta No. 20). 
As a conclusion to this section, one can acknowledge that the Syro-Malabar Church teaching is 
the same as that one finds in the Latin Rite that upholds life from the moment of conception. 
11.4 THE FEDERATION OF ASIAN BISHOP’S CONFERENCE (FABC) 
After the Second Vatican Council, the Churches in Asia became aware of the need to 
concentrate on vitalizing the local Churches. One of the outcomes was the origin of the 
Federation of Asian Bishop’s Conference (FABC). The Federation of the Asian Bishop’s 
Conference (FABC) is the general body including the various local churches of South East Asia 
represented by their bishops. The members of this conference are the Episcopal conferences of 
the South East Asian countries, namely, Bangladesh, Brunei, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea, Laos-Kampuchea, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam.1189 
Following are the two important documents published by the FABC that deals with the concept 
of human dignity. 
                                                 
1187 Ibid.. 10 
1188 Ibid., 11. 
1189 Cf. Felix WILFRED, “The Federation of Asian Bishop’s Conferences (FABC). Orientations, Challenges and 
Impact”, in: For All the Peoples of Asia. Federation of Asian Bishop’s Conferences Documents from 1970 to 1991, 
ed. by Gaudencio B., ROSALES/Catalino G., ARÉVALO, Orbis Books and Claretian Publications, 
Maryknoll/Quezon City, New York/Philippines 1992, xxiii-xxx; xxiii. The idea of a Federation of Asian Bishop’s 
Conference came to being at the historical visit of Pope Paul VI to Manila in the Philippines in 1970. Cf. Catalino 
G. ARÉVALO, “The Times of the Heirs”, in: ROSALES/ARÉVALO (ed.), For All the Peoples of Asia…, xv-xxii; xvii-
xviii. The Conference itself was realized through the First Plenary Assembly of the Asian Bishops that took place 
in Taipei, Taiwan, 27 April 1974. See ROSALES/ARÉVALO (ed.), For All the Peoples of Asia..., 11-25.  
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11.4.1 Respect for Life in the Context of Asia 20071190 
The value of human life is enhanced when the human person is seen as the image and child of 
God. From this it also follows that all life is sacred, and as such, to be valued and preserved. 
Nevertheless, all life does not have the same value or claim for preservation, because human 
life is qualitatively different from all other forms of life. Hence, the dignity of human life based 
on the dignity of the human person is stressed within the inter-connectedness of all creation.1191 
The Sixth General Assembly of the FABC held in January 1995 in Manila reflected on the 
theme of the Church in Asia as discipleship in service of life. Due to the increase in the threats 
to life, not only at a global level but also at the level of the Asian continent, it was necessary to 
reflect on these forces of death. The outcome of the reflection by the FABC Office of 
Theological Concerns (OTC) was drafted into a paper: “Respect for Life in the Context of 
Asia”. This was is in continuity with the understanding of the Church in Asia as discipleship in 
service of life. “It focuses its reflection on respect for human life, its dignity and its promotion 
in the face of a growing culture of death at the beginning of 21st century.”1192 
Consequently, a new awareness of human potentiality has arisen along with new problems and 
possibilities, namely, with reference to human beings’ responsibility for life as a whole, for the 
biological integrity and the responsibility for the created world. Therefore, in positive terms the 
document affirms1193: 
[…] that Christian understanding of human person in all dimensions including life stands for 
a holistic understanding of human person of which relationality is constitutive of the 
wholeness of human person. This understanding of the wholeness of human person is also 
the foundation of the dignity and sacredness of human life without distinction and 
discrimination. Moral obligations of respect, care and promotion of human life are rooted in 
the same foundation.1194 
Various threats to life characterize the Asian continent. They are: 
1. In South Asian countries, hierarchy of castes together with “untouchability” is in the fore. 
They are a form of racism that functions as a force of segregation and exclusion. Consequently, 
human dignity is graded as high and low according to the hierarchy that grades people into high 
and low; and ultimately resulting in the lower castes being at a discount. “Hierarchy of castes 
is totally antithetical to human dignity and the intrinsic worth and sacredness of all human 
life.”1195 It is an ideology of power. What is at stake is human dignity and human life because 
human beings themselves are being ranked. In other words, it is anti-human and anti-life 
perpetuating and promoting a culture of death. A confirmation of this can be found in India and 
South Asian countries where daily atrocities against dalits are very common.1196 
2. Culture of Patriarchy coupled with gender bias is a sure sign against dignity and life of 
woman, girl child and negating woman’s life even at foetal stage in the womb. It is a matter of 
grave concern and a major factor for all who hold dignity and sacredness of all human life of 
                                                 
1190 FABC Papers, No.120, 1-51. 
1191 Cf. ibid., 35-36. 
1192 Ibid., 1. 
1193 Cf. ibid., 42. 
1194 Ibid. 
1195 Ibid. 
1196 Cf. ibid., 2-3. 
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man and woman. Not only is a girl child not welcome, she has no home even in her mother’s 
womb. In India, some communities celebrate the birth of a son, while not at the birth of a girl 
child.1197 “Hence care, protection and promotion of life for women and the girl child are still of 
low esteem in many situations of Asia. The nefarious and criminal practice of female foeticide, 
especially in South Asian countries, is on the increase in spite of laws against the practice.”1198 
In the areas of nutrition, health care and education, discriminatory treatment of the girl child 
and preferential treatment of the boy child are well known. Woman and the girl child are the 
worst sufferers and victims when it comes to poverty or HIV-AIDS.1199 
Both, the culture of patriarchy and gender bias - antihuman and anti-life in its core - not only 
diminishes and denies respect for the dignity of woman and the girl child but also puts them at 
risk at all stages of their life.1200 
Nevertheless, there is a ray of hope amongst these common daily occurrences of violation of 
rights and dignity of women. There are movements committed to fight against these threats to 
protect and promote their dignity. The Church, especially the Pro-Life movements, plays a 
pivotal role and becomes a sign of hope for life and dignity of woman and girl child.1201 
3. In a multi-religious context of Asia, there is also religious fundamentalism, cultural 
nationalism, terrorism and violence. These phenomenon leads to the denial of human dignity.1202 
4. Besides the above, there are also other forms of religious fundamentalism and extreme 
militancy in some Asian countries. These too are antihuman and anti-life. When a country 
adopts a state religion, other religions in these countries become aliens and strangers whose 
dignity and rights are not respected. One country in South Asia has adopted Islam as a state 
religion and enacted a Blasphemy Law. Those who violate it are given death sentence. Some 
misuse this law out of vested interests against innocent citizens, especially those belonging to 
minority religions. This has led to the frequent denial and violation of human dignity.1203 
5. In the context of globalization and neo-liberal market economy, there is also an ever 
increasing and invasive commercialization and instrumentalization of human life. This too, is a 
blatant violation of human dignity and human rights and a threat to human life.1204 
6. Drug abuse and drug pushing, threatens some communities, especially the youth. These have 
become veritable threats to life.1205 
7. Asia is famous for its sense of harmony. All the great Asian religions and cultures teach a 
harmony between human beings, nature and God. However, due to globalization and the threat 
of greedy exploitation of natural resources as raw materials, the environment has been disturbed 
and thereby harmony too.1206 
                                                 
1197 Cf. ibid., 3. 
1198 Ibid. 
1199 Cf. ibid. 
1200 Cf. ibid. 
1201 Cf. ibid., 3-4. 
1202 Cf. ibid., 4. 
1203 Cf. ibid., 4-5. 
1204 Cf. ibid., 5. 
1205 Cf. ibid., 6. 
1206 Cf. ibid. 
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8. Apart from what has been said above, there are also bioethical and specific issues that affect 
the reverence for life in a negative way in different parts of Asia,  
a) Abortion: This is another common attack on human life in Asian countries. The statistics 
regarding abortion is shocking. The main factors that leads one to abortion, according to 
sociologists and other experts in human sciences, is poverty and destitution. On the one hand, 
families themselves perceive a growing foetus as “yet another burden to the family”; on the 
other hand, in order to curb the rising population, respective governments encourage people to 
procure abortions. Besides, the failure of some types of contraceptives, leads one to procure 
abortion. There are also cases of violence or rape, which many Asians see as occasions for a 
“legitimate” abortion. Opposition from the part of the Church can be prophetic, in being 
courageous and tireless in proclaiming that the human life, from the moment of fertilization till 
death, is sacred, and that abortion is “an abominable crime” (Cf. GS 51).1207 
b) Euthanasia: Though it is not a common occurrence as in developed countries, it is fast 
becoming common in some parts of Asia, mostly some developed Asian nations, urban or 
cosmopolitan Asian cities. In spite of the value of respect for elders and the sick, what hovers 
over personal consciences, is the anti-life mind-sets and attitudes like individualism, over-
sensitivity to pain and other utilitarian values in a consumerist culture of the contemporary 
globalized economy. Consequently, as an easy solution to suffering, pain and incurable 
sicknesses in some parts of Asia, euthanasia is readily embraced. This has led to the abandoning 
of the compassionate care for the terminally ill until their death.1208 
Referring to Pope John Paul II’s Tertio Millennio Adveniente 33, the FABC acknowledged, 
“The Asian Church takes the words of the late Pope to heart. It asks for a sincere apology for 
her inconsistencies and lacunae in the area of respect for human life in all its forms, which 
hopefully will be manifested in a more resolute and more courageous stance against everything 
that diminishes the value of human life”.1209 
Thus, in conclusion the FABC document continuously repeats and reiterates the importance of 
the human person and human dignity. Most of the times it expresses its stance on human dignity 
by adhering to variables like, “sacredness of life”, “value of human life”, “respect, care and 
promotion of human life”. 
11.4.2 On Being Human in the Changing Realities of Asia 2011 
The Office of Theological Concerns (OTC) of the FABC reflecting on what it means to be 
human in the contemporary world brought out in March 2011 a Paper “On Being Human in the 
Changing Realities of Asia 2011”.1210 This Paper has four parts that deals with the realities, 
challenges, resources and responses in an Asian context.1211  
In the first part, it takes on the realities in Asia, like the religious realities, the political realities, 
the social realities, economic realities and ecological realities. In the section on social realities 
                                                 
1207 Cf. ibid., 7. 
1208 Cf. ibid. 
1209 Ibid., 47. Cf. JOHN PAUL II, Apostolic letter Tertio millennio adveniente of His Holiness Pope John Paul 
II. To the Bishops, Clergy, and Lay Faithful. On Preparation for the Jubilee of the Year 2000, Pauline Books & 
Media, Pennsylvania 1994. 
1210 FABC Papers, No.133, 1-64. 
1211 Cf. ibid., 2 & 3. 
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the paper stresses the fact that, “At the very heart of social life is the inestimable dignity and 
value of the human person”.1212 In the same section, while reflecting on the family, its 
breakdown and new forms of family becoming more frequent, the paper urges us to discern and 
renew a Christian view of human life and dignity.1213 In dealing with the economic realities in 
Asia, the paper highlights the pros and cons of Globalization and the ever-growing difference 
between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’, so much so, that they are becoming a separate class in 
themselves with their own cultures. These tendencies are indicators against basic human 
dignity. Besides, the concept of ‘worker’ too is radically changing and profit seems to be 
replacing the inherent dignity of the human person and consequently the dignity of work.  
In the second part, challenges faced by the above Asian realities are explored. Here it deals with 
the challenges to being a human person in contemporary society and in living in the milieu of 
multi-religious/multi-cultural context. The human person’s worth in the contemporary society 
is often perceived by what one possesses rather than what one is. “‘Having’ is more stressed 
than ‘Being’”. In this context, human beings are considered as a ‘commodity’. Often the victims 
of such mentality are women and children (minors) whose basic dignity is not respected. “They 
are not only treated as cheap labour, but also as sexual objects”.1214 This results in the exclusion 
and marginalization of human persons who are considered as ‘nobodies’ because they are 
denied to be ‘somebodies’ in the society. This has led to the misconception that one’s dignity 
has to be earned, an indicator that human beings have no inherent dignity. In addition, “some 
societies behave as if it is they (or their governments) who confer dignity on human persons”.1215 
In the third part, while dealing with the resources in Asia, the paper deliberates on the cultural 
and religious resources, its characteristics and religions as sources of harmony and peaceful co-
existence. In the section on the religious sources, the paper reflects on the people’s wisdom as 
an important source of knowledge. Knowledge is regarded as belonging to the community. 
Knowledge enjoys the dignity of the human person, which is relational.1216 With regard to the 
characteristics of the cultural reality in Asia, the positive aspects are acceptance of diversity, 
courtesy, hospitality and sense of community. The negative aspects are the caste hierarchy, 
patriarchy, slavery to customs and traditions, the religious practice of worship of creatures, such 
as cow and monkey, which sometimes distorts the respect for human dignity leading to regard 
cows as superior to human beings.1217 
In the fourth part, the paper reflects on the response based on the resources of religion and 
culture of the people of Asia. It deals with spirituality, prayer life, asceticism, inter-religious 
dialogue, ecumenical movements, prophetic role, vital role of FABC, the crucial role of Media, 
participation in political processes, Christian advocacy and non-violence movements. The vital 
role of FABC is seen as a prophetic role in the Church that involves the faithful in the promotion 
of dignity of life and integral development of the poor.1218 In its section on the crucial role of 
                                                 
1212 Ibid., 12. 
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1215 Cf. ibid., 34. 
1216 Cf. ibid., 45. 
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1218 Cf. ibid., 59. 
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the media, the paper proposes that media can be effectively used to promote respect for human 
dignity in the defense of human rights.1219 Reflecting on the Church’s participation in political 
progress and its prophetic role, the paper encourages the role of the Church in the political life 
in Asia in order to support and build equality, justice, peace and human dignity.1220 
11.5 CONCLUSION 
In its long history in India, the CBCI has played a vital role in the promotion of human dignity. 
Although at times the response of the Church to violations of human dignity or human right has 
been slow, it does raise its voice against such violations. In the field of Bioethics, the Catholic 
Church in India uses the term human dignity. However, using human dignity as a fundamental 
argument in Bioethics is found lacking. 
As a conclusion, one can say that the Indian Catholic Church, represented by the CBCI, lays 
before us the invaluable contribution she can make to the moral progress of not only her own 
members but also to the whole community. In the words of Lobo: “She brings a clear 
understanding of the dignity of the human person made in the image of God and called to share 
in His own life.”1221 
With regard to the teaching of the Syro-Malabar Church, one can acknowledge that it is the 
same as the Latin Rite when it comes to upholding life from the moment of conception. 
The Asian Church reality, represented by the FABC, acknowledges the plight, the atrocities and 
the sufferings of the Church that is in dire need of acknowledging human dignity and upholding 
the rights of the poor, the girl child and the unborn. 
It is fitting to conclude here what Kochappilly says: “In India, a land known for ahimsa paramo 
dharmah (non-violence is supreme dharma), should take every step to protect and promote the 
value of human life and its inviolability.”1222 Nonetheless, it is yet to see how far the Catholic 
Church in India will translate the value of human life and its inviolability in terms of a 
fundamental argument from the point of view of human dignity. 
Comparison between Moral Theological Perspectives in Germany and India 
It is interesting to note that German moral theology makes always an attempt to bridge the gap 
between the secular and theological understanding and shows its concern in such matters. There 
is also a positive move by the Bishop’s Conference in Germany (sometimes along with the 
Evangelical Church in Germany, which is also a great move in the field of ecumenism!) to 
bridge the gap between the secular and religious understanding. This positive approach is not 
only with regard to the concept of the research on human dignity, but also on an ethical-legal 
level (as was already pointed out in Chapter 7.3 above) or on a secular framework (Chapter 7.4 
above). However, in Indian Moral Theology no attempt has been made in this direction. It is to be 
remembered that the comparison is here between two different Bishop Conferences involving 
different countries. It is to be noted that not all the documents have been examined in this Chapter 
that might speak of the human person and human dignity, perhaps in another area. Only those issues 
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1222 KOCHAPPILLY, Life in Christ…, 14. 
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that are related to the research of this topic, especially pertaining to Bioethics have been handled in 
this Chapter. 
Having seen the teachings of the Indian Catholic Church, the next Chapter will focus on the concept 
of human person from an Indian Catholic perspective.
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C H A P T E R  1 2  
THE CONCEPT OF PERSON 
FROM AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
A fundamental principle in morality is respect for persons and human dignity. They are given 
central place in such basic philosophical works such as Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals or John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty.1223 This immediately raises the question: Why is the 
human person supremely important? In an exploited, expendable and global world, can one 
claim that the human person is of supreme importance? Notorious and criminal abuses were 
already mentioned. It may enlighten here to name a few examples from South Asia: The 
nefarious practice of “untouchability”; hierarchy of castes, atrocities against dalits in India and 
South Asian countries; the culture of patriarchy with its gender bias against the dignity and life 
of woman and girl child even at the foetal stage; religious fundamentalism, cultural nationalism, 
terrorism; violence, extremism, suicide bombing, militancy; commercialization and 
instrumentalization of human life; drug abuse; etc., besides bioethical and other specific issues 
like abortion, genocide, capital punishment.1224 The picture presented here is not very 
welcoming to accept the human person as important, at least in an Asian and Indian context. 
The problem that one is faced with while speaking about dignity of the human person is that 
modern reflection on human personhood draws on two different sources: First, the Judeo-
Christian tradition, based on the Scriptures, and second, the rationalism of Enlightenment and 
the response of the Church through social teaching.1225 However, are these two sources sufficient 
to highlight the importance of the human person? 
Podimattam speaking about the supreme importance of the human person in this context says, 
“In fact, there is no value in this world greater than the human person. As such, it is imperative 
to make the human person and his dignity the universal key to moral interpretation”.1226 Is this 
possible and how? Before this question can be answered, a look into the key concept of the 
meaning of human person from a systematic theological perspective is appropriate here. 
12.2 A SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF 
PERSON 
One can describe a person as the actual unique reality of a spiritual being, an undivided whole 
existing independently and not interchangeable with any other. The reality of the being is such 
that it belongs to itself and an end in itself. In other words, a person is a concrete form of a 
spiritual being taken in freedom, on which is based its inviolable dignity.1227 Nevertheless, the 
above descriptions are only a partial description of a human person. The notion of person is 
                                                 
1223 Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 45. 
1224 Cf. FABC Papers, No.120, 2-9. See also SOOSAI, Human Dignity and Human Rights, op. cit., 17. Soosai 
writes, “We witness to this daily pattern of violation of human rights in caste-ridden society against dalits marked 
by gender bias against women, still worse against women from Scheduled castes and tribes in our country [India].” 
Ibid. Addition by author. 
1225 Cf. DWYER, “Person, Dignity of…”, 724. Cf. THUMMA, “Human Person …”, 220. 
1226 Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 45. 
1227 GEDDES/WALLACE, “Person (in Philosophy)…”, 147. Cf. also PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?.., 47-48. 
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both a concept and a living reality. Further, the notion of personhood cannot be limited only to 
the self-existent reality, as a bodily being, but should be seen in relation to God, the world and 
others as mentioned above.1228 These notions will be described in the following sections. 
12.2.1 Human Person as a Bodily Being 
The human person must be seen not just as a pure intelligence, but a bodily being, sharing with 
the natural world. Although the human person emerges through evolution out of the world, yet 
is never separated from it. Accordingly, the emergence of the human self-awareness and 
freedom is a very high complex process, subconscious and determined by nature. At conception, 
the unique human organism is genetically determined and comes into existence through a novel 
combination and fusion of different traits never previously combined. The unique human body 
is at this moment continuously identifiable. Contrary to the partial idealistic conception of the 
human person as a “self-conscious mind”, recent philosophical intervention is of the opinion 
that the bodily identity is also necessary to the understanding of the human person. The 
medieval scholastics too – who argued for the survival of the human soul – insisted that the soul 
alone is an incomplete person and believed that the identity it received at the resurrection is in 
its relation to the body. After conception, the whole life process that follows involves a 
development of this unique body in constant relation to its environment.1229 
From what was deliberated above, it can be concluded that every individual human person has 
a biography. The life story that begins at conception passes through several phases of foetal and 
infant life before the higher functioning of the brain becomes possible. As an adult, a person 
functions with intelligent freedom only at certain times and in relation to his or her environment. 
What is meant here is that much of the adult’s life is spent in sleep, times of feeding and 
relaxation when intelligence is working at a very low level of creative freedom. Yet, the same 
person carries on in totality the process of living in all its phases. Therefore, one can define the 
human person as “embodied intelligent freedom”.1230 In defining so, one acknowledges that the 
process of life is a multi-layered activity and manifested in its high point of integration.1231 
12.2.2 Human Person as Relational and Social 
Along with the above idea of human person as a whole in his or her physical, psychic and 
spiritual dimensions, one also needs to consider him/her in his/her individual and social aspects. 
The concept of human person is correlative. That is to say, it is in relation to a community that 
the concept can be defined satisfactorily. The fact is that no human person can exist apart from 
a human community. Our first existence comes through our parents. Further development both 
physically and psychologically requires that we be in constant inter-human relationships. To 
develop as a fully functional human being, language is important, and language is a cultural, 
                                                 
1228 See: GEDDES/WALLACE, “Person (in Philosophy)...”, 147-148. For these notions of human personhood, 
see David COFFEY, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, 
76-80. 
1229 Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 48. 
1230 It was Ashley and O’Rourke who first used the definition of person as “embodied intelligent freedom”. 
See ASHLEY/O’ROURKE, Health Care Ethics…, 19974, 5. Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be Moral?..., 48. 
1231 Cf. ibid., 51.  
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social creation. With regard to test-tube babies, they too are the product of a technological 
community and will be able to develop in relation to them.1232 
12.2.3 Human Person in Relation with God 
For Christians, the correlation between the human person and God has a deeper significance on 
two grounds.  
First, the Christian God is a personal God, a Trinity of Persons. The Trinitarian life within the 
Godhead consists of a living and total sharing of one single being, life, knowledge and love. 
The Son has his Godhead only through the relation to the Father; the Father is God only in 
begetting the Son. Both the Father and the Son have their divine being only through the 
community of the Spirit. The Trinitarian Persons do not have their being from or through 
themselves, or one cannot conceive of God’s unity apart from three Persons. In like manner, 
the human person does not have the unity of his/her existence in himself/herself, but in 
relationship with God and with others.  
Second, each unique human person has been created by God for himself, in order to share 
(κοινωνία) his own eternal, Trinitarian life (cf. 1 Jn 1,3).1233 
As mentioned earlier, on the one hand, the human person knows himself or herself as open to 
the world through communication with others. On the other hand, he/she knows that at the same 
time he/she is different from others. This openness to others and the world implicitly contains 
openness for something higher, namely, God. The human person is a being who is referred to 
God. The finite and mundane human person and the infinite and transcendent God are partners. 
According to Rahner, this truth can be formulated in another way be referring the human person 
as an Absolute Mystery.1234 
Besides being in relation with God, human persons also have a capability of transcending 
themselves to make a donation or gift of himself or herself to another. It is in this way that the 
human person becomes most fully himself or herself. Human persons are created essentially to 
relate to others. In order to fulfil one’s own destiny as being human, he/she has to enter into a 
genuine community with others, which is based on love, a warm, human, affectionate series of 
relationships.1235 It is in the embracing of love that the human person discovers and experiences 
his or her highest dignity and real freedom. 
The notion of the human person can also be extended to the imago Dei in the three-fold 
relationships: with God (human person as a creature oriented to the divinity and a partner in 
                                                 
1232 Cf. ibid., 48. 
1233 Cf. ibid., 48-49.  See also LOBO, Guide to Christian Living..., 90-93. George Lobo speaks here about the 
Trinity in the Christian life in similar terms. He bases himself on the following authors: Cf. Ceslaus SPICQ, The 
Trinity in our Moral Life According to St. Paul, Newman, Westminster 1963, John J. GREEHY, “The Blessed 
Trinity and the Christian Life”, in: Enda MCDONAGH (ed.), Moral Theology Renewed, Gill, Dublin 1965, 70-84, 
J. B. MACKEY, “Preaching on the Blessed Trinity”, in: Furrow 21 (1970) 6-18, G.F. MACKNELL, “The Trinity and 
Human Love”, in: New Blackfriars 53 (1972) 270-275, Joseph MATTAM, “The Mystery of the Trinity in Christian 
Life”, in: Vidyajyoti Journal of Theological Reflection 40 (1976) 338-348. 
1234 “[…] mit dem Satz formuliert werden, dass der Mensch der auf das absolute Geheimnis Verwiesene ist.” 
Karl RAHNER, „Mensch. III. Zum theologischen Begriff des Menschen“, in: Sacramentum Mundi: theologisches 
Lexikon für die Praxis, Bd. 3, Herder, Freiburg i. Br./Basel/Wien 1969, 395-417; 411. Cf. PODIMATTAM, Why be 
Moral?..., 49. 
1235 Cf. ibid. 
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dialogue); with the cosmos (human persons as co-creators and their stewardship); and with 
others (interpersonal relationships as male and female).1236 
Taking a step further, the relationship of the human person with Christ brings theology closer 
to anthropology. According to Barth, “theology has become anthropology since God became 
man”.1237 A right understanding of the incarnation of the Son of God as the finest and noblest 
of humanity is required for an adequate understanding of the human person. Such an 
understanding of the human person in his/her wholeness has led to a Personalistic and 
Existentialist current of modern thoughts presenting the basic Christian moral message. This 
has been attested to by Gaudium et Spes: “[…] it remains each man's duty to preserve a view 
of the whole human person, a view in which the values of intellect, will, conscience and 
fraternity are preeminent” (GS 61).1238 
Comparison between Moral Theological Perspectives in Germany and India 
In this section on the systematic theological perspective of the concept of person it was observed 
that Indian Moral Theologians have deliberated on the concept of person as bodily being and 
as a relational being. In comparison with German Moral Theology, one can see that the bodily 
being of a person has not been considered there. On the other hand, German Moral Theology 
considers the human person being grounded on God’s call, which brings into existence the very 
constitution of the personal being of man and woman. This aspect has not been considered by 
the Indian Moral Theologians. Schockenhoff’s emphasis on the person (Chapter 8.3) who must 
remain withdrawn through interpersonal instances (while holding on to the call by God  and 
relativizing of the importance in the development of personal identity in its encounter with the 
social or interpersonal relations) seems to be in contrast to what Podimattam holds, namely, 
openness to others and the world implicitly contains openness to God. Moreover, the emphasis 
of Schockenhoff that human persons in their relation can only develop where there is a free and 
mutual recognition as long as the justification of human personality is prior to their social 
acceptance, makes it clear the importance of the person over other things in the world. 
Podimattam’s stance harmonizes with the statement of Rahner (which expands relationality to 
include not only the concept of a person, but also that of the image of God, creature, soul and 
body), namely, that openness to others and the world is in fact openness to God. 
12.3 THEOLOGICAL ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
One way of connecting a metaphysical account of the person to a moral account – along with 
other characteristics that have been described so far – is by invoking “dignity”.1239 Various 
expressions affirm the dignity and intrinsic worth of human persons. One such expression is 
that persons are end in themselves, never a means. This means that political and legal order 
exist to serve human persons. Another similar expression is that human person is not a 
functional and utilitarian entity. It means that persons are respected and loved for their own 
                                                 
1236 Cf. Dermot COX, “Human Dignity in Old Testament Wisdom”, in: StMiss 39 (1990) 1-20; 8-9. Cf. 
KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 195. 
1237 ANDERSON, On Being Human..., 70. Cf. SRAMPICKAL, “Abortion and its Evil…”, 218-245; 220. See also 
IDEM, “The Catholic View of Human Life …”, 88. 
1238 Cf. LOBO, Guide to Christian Living..., 20.See also FABC Papers, No.120, 42. 
1239 Cf. JOHNSTONE, “What does it mean to be a person?...”, 136. 
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sake and can never be treated as a thing. Instrumentalization of human persons as a means for 
another end, however noble, will only derogate the dignity of the human person (Cf. Deus 
Caritas est 31). This affirms the foundational Gospel axiom: “Sabbath is made for man and not 
man for Sabbath” (Mk 2,27). Nevertheless, in all forms of slavery and unjust exploitation, 
human dignity is violated. In the spirit of Catholic rights tradition, human dignity is an 
indicative rather than an imperative because human dignity stands for the intrinsic and 
inalienable worth of human person. Expressed in another way, human rights are moral 
imperatives flowing from the value (indicative) of human dignity. Thus, human person and 
human dignity are inseparable.1240 Therefore, the better one understands human person the better 
one understands human dignity.1241 
The nature of human person is four fold: First, it is rational (intelligence and freedom). Second, 
it is relational (two fold relatedness: to human persons, human community, and human 
relatedness to other beings; and for believers, their relatedness to God, who is the foundation 
and ultimate source of all relatedness and relations). Third, it is embodied (affirming the body-
soul unity of human person – which also includes that they are sexually differentiated – that 
they live in time and space and relatedness to earth and cosmos). Therefore, fourth it is also 
responsible (for living and actualization of the above characteristics of the nature of human 
person). These four natures of the human person, namely, rational, relational, embodied and 
responsible, is what is endowed with intrinsic worth and inalienable dignity.1242 
A human being may be referred to as a “person” in three different ways. First, the word refers 
to the distinct, unique and incommunicable selfhood of the individual. Second, a person is as a 
subject of rights and duties and consequently an end and never a means. Third, a person is, as 
a consequence of consciousness and moral sense, one who is capable of meaningfully 
experiencing and influencing the environment. These three elements are important for 
understanding human dignity. In contemporary discussions on human rights and of the dignity 
on which they are based, the concept of “person” is anthropocentric. That is, the human being 
is understood as the independent, autonomous subject whose independence must be 
safeguarded from all violations.1243 Moreover, the “rationalism of Enlightenment placed this 
autonomous subject at the center of a world that had been stripped of mystery and in which God 
was at best a somewhat benign if distant observer of the human scene.”1244 
Later, Christian Personalism saw the extreme importance of promoting the dignity and freedom 
of the human person, especially in an age of unparalleled organization and socialization.1245 
Lobo writes, “There is need to respect absolutely every person for himself, regardless of sex, 
age, race, social status, wealth and usefulness. The worth of a human person cannot be gauged 
merely by his economic contribution or social usefulness.”1246 However, in the Asian and Indian 
context this worth of the human person has been undermined. It is in this context that Lobo 
                                                 
1240 Cf. SOOSAI, Human Dignity and Human Rights, op. cit., 8-9. 
1241 Cf. ibid., 4. 
1242 Cf. ibid., 9. 
1243 Cf. DWYER, “Person, Dignity of…”, 724-725. Cf. THUMMA, “Human Person…”, 219-221. 
1244 DWYER, “Person, Dignity of…”, 725; THUMMA, “Human Person…”, 221. 
1245 Cf. LOBO, Guide to Christian Living..., 96. 
1246 Ibid. 
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expresses his deep concern with regard to some of the many evils that have been vehemently 
neglected by moral theologians, namely, “racial discrimination, castism, economic exploitation, 
cultural imperialism, subhuman living conditions, torture, disgraceful working conditions and 
bonded labour”. Perhaps, it is due to these evils that, “prostitution, murder, mutilation and 
abortion strike at the root of reverence for the human person”.1247 Clement Campos, an Indian 
Moral Theologian, mentions that in addition to the above there is also gender discrimination, 
which is widespread in India. It is alarming to know about the selective abortion of the girl child 
and the falling birth rate of women. These issues have not been sufficiently addressed by 
theological ethicists. A few women activists and feminist theologians have taken up these 
issues.1248 
Because India is an unjustly divided country, it becomes structurally easy with regard to the 
issues of violation of human rights of the powerless and marginalized. In such circumstances, 
it is inadequate to have an ethical approach, which is based on the dignity of the human person 
that is merely individualistic. The reason is that such an approach can be easily exploited to the 
advantage of the elite or the dominant class.1249 John Chathanatt, an Indian Moral Theologian, 
speaking about the experience of dignity and relationality through solidarity and fellow feeling, 
brings out clearly what is expected in this situation. He writes: 
One ought to reject the liberal, individualistic, asocial representation of the human person 
and instead embrace his or her fundamental socio-relational character. We are creatures who 
require community in order to become what God has intended us to be. Thus interdependence 
is the condition within which the dignity and sacredness of the human person is either 
honoured or abused.1250 
Therefore, another approach suggested by an Indian Theologian, Felix Wilfred,1251 would be of 
importance to note here. According to him, some Asian countries have distanced themselves 
from the common standard of human rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948, because of 
the alleged difference of Asian values. “Wilfred argues that the modern understanding of human 
rights was based on the theory of natural law and an appeal to reason. An Asian approach would 
be more spiritual in the sense of a movement away from the world of the self toward the world 
of the other.”1252 The suffering of the other provokes such a movement. It is similar to what 
Gandhi in his life underlined as important, namely, ahiṁsā, which is not inflicting suffering on 
others (in other words, it could be translated as a non-violation of human rights).1253 
                                                 
1247 Ibid. 
1248 Cf. Clement CAMPOS, “Doing Christian Ethics in India’s World of Cultural Complexity and Social 
Inequality”, in: James F. KEENAN (ed.), Catholic Theological Ethics in the World Church. The Plenary Papers 
from the First Cross-cultural Conference on Catholic Theological Ethics, Continuum, New York and London 
2007, 82-90; 86.  
1249 Cf. CAMPOS, “Doing Christian Ethics in India’s ...”, 87. 
1250 John CHATHANATT, “An Ethical Analysis of Globalization from an Indian Perspective”, in: Linda HOGAN 
(ed.), Applied Ethics in a World Church. The Padua Conference, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York 2008, 21-
31; 26. 
1251 Wilfred was a member and Executive Secretary of the Theological Commission of FABC (1987-1997), 
consulter to the Doctrinal Commission of the CBCI, member of the International Association of Mission Studies, 
Hamburg, Germany. 
1252 CAMPOS, “Doing Christian Ethics in India’s ...”,, 88. 
1253 Cf. ibid. For a detailed study on Gandhi’s ahiṁsā, see Chapter 17.4.1.2 below. 
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Moreover, Wilfred also implies that a different anthropology from the perspective of the victims 
is necessary. The anthropology that Wilfred suggests is that: 
[…] human beings are defined not simply in terms of reason; human beings are 
compassionate beings. In this anthropological perspective, human rights are expressions of 
the compassion for the sufferings of the poor. Human suffering and compassion offer the 
anthropological and spiritual key to interpret human rights of the poor.1254 
Underlying the different anthropological perspective that Wilfred is suggesting above, there is 
the compassion that overflows in the care of the poor and the sick. This in turn is to be seen as 
social justice. One owes to Christianity that has fostered the change in emphasis on this social 
aspect of justice. Lobo therefore reminds us that, “it is Christianity above all that has brought 
to light the inherent dignity of the human person made in the image of God and called to sonship 
of God in Christ.”1255 This recognition is a matter of justice because justice is a necessary 
expression of love. Further, the recognition of the human person as having an inalienable 
autonomy and therefore, rendering service to which one has the right as a human being, flows 
out of genuine love arising out of a deep sense of justice.1256 Although human reason alone can 
grasp the concept that the human person is endowed with inviolable values, “Christianity makes 
people more sensitive to these values and brings out their full depth by the revelation of the 
sonship of God to which man is called in Christ.”1257 Thus, one can see that the idea of being 
sensitive, which Lobo is mentioning here, corresponds to Wilfred’s idea of the anthropology 
from the perspective of the victims, especially in showing compassion for the sufferings of the 
poor, interpreted as human rights of the weak. 
Comparison between Moral Theological Perspectives in Germany and India 
The contemporary understanding of the person by Indian counterpart is seen in three different 
ways, namely, as a distinct, unique and incommunicable selfhood of the individual; as a subject 
of rights and duties and as a consequence of consciousness and moral sense. German Moral 
Theology also deals with first and the third characteristics of a person, namely, distinctiveness, 
uniqueness, incommunicability and as a conscious and moral being. However, the concept of 
person as a subject of rights is not described in German Moral Theology.  
Moreover, from what has been explored above, it can be said that the contemporary problems 
facing moral theology in both India and Germany seem to be identical with regard to the issue 
on the concept of person, particularly to issues related to the beginning of life. While German 
Moral Theologians answers this question from a normative framework of reference of the 
concept of person, the Indian counterpart does not do so. In Germany the arguments, especially 
in cases that deals with issues related to the beginning of life, find their support not just from a 
socio-psychological stance (which is insufficient), but both from a philosophical and 
theological perspective in a normative understanding of the concept of person. On the other 
hand, Indian Moral Theology brings out situations that are more practical. 
                                                 
1254 Felix WILFRED, “Asia and Human Rights in the Age of Globalization”, in: Vaiharai 5/1 (2000) 44-45. 
1255 LOBO, Moral and Pastoral Questions..., 238. 
1256 Cf. ibid. 
1257 Ibid., 242. 
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From a theological ethical perspective, it was pointed out that it is inadequate to have an ethical 
approach, which is based on the dignity of the human person that is merely individualistic. It 
would be appropriate here to state what Wilfred had said, namely, that an Asian approach would 
be more spiritual as well as a different anthropological approach would be necessary from the 
perspective of the victims, which is both social and communitarian, with a preferential option 
for the rights of the powerless. In the context of the situation in India that was described above, 
such thoughtfulness would find a better place in theological-ethical discussions. 
However, Indian Moral Theology has not answered the question of applying the principles of 
personhood to bioethical issues connected with beginning of life. On the other hand, German 
Moral Theology opens up the way for discussions in this field. 
In addition, when compared to the German counterpart (Chapter 8.4), the problem with the 
Anglo-American bioethics of personhood, which emphasizes on the cognitive and volitive 
skills, has not been treated in Indian Moral Theology. Schockenhoff’s argument, namely, the 
immense importance of the human being considered as the body-soul unity seems to be a fitting 
argument against such claims.1258 
12.4 CONCLUSION 
The deliberation on the human person began with the consideration of his/her importance in the 
world. It is imperative to make the human person and his/her dignity as one of the universal key 
to moral interpretation. Why is the human person so unique? 
Theologically seen, the human person is considered as a spiritual being and is not only self-
existent reality and a bodily being, but seen in relation to God, the world and others. Every 
individual human person has a biography and one can define the human person as “embodied 
intelligent freedom”. The concept of human person is correlative, in that one needs to consider 
the human person in a social relationship and as one who cannot bypass this relationship. The 
human person is also in relation with a Triune God. This creates a partnership between human 
persons and God and therefore one can describe the human person as an Absolute Mystery. 
Extending the idea to the imago Dei, one can see a three-fold relationship: with God, with the 
cosmos and with others. The Personalistic and Existentialist current of modern thoughts comes 
from the idea of the incarnational aspect of the Second Person of the Trinity, the Son of God.  
From a theological ethical perspective, persons are respected and loved for their own sake and 
cannot be treated as a thing or instrumentalized. Human dignity is an indicative rather than an 
imperative because human dignity stands for the intrinsic and inalienable worth of human 
person. Thus, the concepts of human person and human dignity are inseparable. 
The contemporary understanding of a person is seen as a distinct, unique and incommunicable 
selfhood of the individual; as a subject of rights and duties because of consciousness and moral 
sense. Christian Personalism promotes the dignity and freedom of the human person. In reality, 
in the Indian and Asian context human persons have not been treated likewise. An ethical 
approach in India based on the dignity of the human person that is merely individualistic is 
inadequate. An individualistic concept of person based on the theory of natural law and an 
appeal to reason does not serve the concept of person. Instead, the Asian approach would be 
                                                 
1258 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, „Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz. Theologische…“, 468-470. 
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more spiritual and communitarian, which moves away from the world of the self toward the 
world of the other. 
Having deliberated about the human person in whom human dignity is inherent, the next 
Chapter will examine the central theme of this dissertation, namely, human dignity and 
beginning of life issues.
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C H A P T E R  1 3  
HUMAN DIGNITY AND BEGINNING OF LIFE ISSUES 
13.1 INTRODUCTION 
Thus far, the concept of human dignity in Bioethics and its various nuances and connotations 
from an Indian Moral Theological Perspective were dealt. It was seen that each of us are 
intrinsically valuable, that each of us have an intrinsic worth, that each of us have inherited the 
respect of life and that we are sacred by the fact of our being made in the image of God. These 
facts gear up to acknowledge our human dignity. Since human dignity is acknowledged of a 
human person, the concept was further examined. In this present Chapter, the intention is to 
take a closer look at the beginning of life issues and human dignity. In order to better clarify 
the issue at hand the question of the protection-worthiness of the human embryo will be first 
explored. Then an examination into the question of the human dignity of an embryo and its 
status will be carried out. 
13.2 PROTECTION-WORTHINESS OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO AND THE RIGHT 
TO LIFE 
As mentioned in Chapter 9.2 above, the protection worthiness and right to life of an embryo 
entails three different concepts, namely, the status, the personhood, and the human dignity of 
an embryo. In other words, a human embryo has to be protected because it is a human being, a 
human person and consequently, having human dignity. Thus, the question involves around the 
right to life of an embryo, especially in cases where a research is carried out on an embryo, or 
in which bioethical issues are concerned with the beginning of life. 
The right to life of an embryo is basically a question of human right. Although, human rights 
are solemnly proclaimed, yet, the painful reality of violations of human rights and violence of 
every kind that contradicts these rights needs to be faced. Some of these violations have already 
been enumerated above (Chapter12.1). These violations contradict the social mission of the 
Church in the area of human rights and deny the UDHR of the United Nations. In an unbalanced 
world divided between the powerful rich and the powerless poor, human rights of the latter are 
more easily violated than the former. One witnesses to this daily pattern of violation of human 
rights in India. Perhaps, one can also include here all violations of the unborn child, like 
abortion, experimentation on foetuses, embryonic stem cell research etc., for which India is 
gradually opening its arms. It is a matter of serious social concern for the mission of the Church. 
Often these violations happen in countries with democratic forms of government like India, 
which is a signatory to the UN charter of rights.1259 It is in this context that it is important to 
speak even stronger with regard to the right of life of an embryo. 
Deliberating on the issue of the moment of hominization, Lobo notes, “when there is probable 
presence of a human person, it would be wrong to destroy the human conceptus since it would 
amount to exposing oneself to homicide.”1260 However, since Lobo held for delayed 
hominization – that is, about two weeks after fertilization, or before nidation – he was also of 
the opinion that expulsion of the zygote before nidation “would be more than contraception” 
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but does not seem to “incur the malice of abortion”.1261 Hence, he strongly held that: “Once 
hominization has taken place, no artificial line can be drawn in the moral judgment concerning 
the termination of life of a born and an unborn child.”1262 
Thus, according to Lobo, it is after hominization (after two weeks) that one can speak of an 
embryo as a human person. It is thereafter that an embryo would be qualified in a similar manner 
as a born individual and therefore, worthy of right to life. This argument seems to suggest that 
before two weeks, either abortion or experimentation on an embryo would not amount to 
violation of human rights. 
However, although Lobo held for delayed hominization and did not acknowledge that an 
embryo is a human person, yet he strongly held the right of the unborn to life and said that 
personhood does not depend on the stage of development of human life or on any other 
accidental quality. “Respect for life demands that it be respected in its weaker forms.”1263 
Srampickal further reiterates the respect and protection of an embryo. In his article on abortion, 
while commenting on Gaudium et Spes – which says that ‘human person is the only creature 
on earth that God has willed for itself’ (GS 24,3) and Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC) 
17031264, which repeats the phrase –, he remarks that: 
It means man is an end in himself. Man has an intrinsic worth and value that comes not from 
his being useful for something or someone else, but from what he is by his make up; from 
his personal nature and destiny endowed on him by God. Human dignity is not the largesse 
of any other human being, group, system or state. It is therefore to be respected, protected 
and promoted and no human being may be made use of or sacrificed for the sake of someone 
or something.1265 
From the above acknowledgement, Srampickal concludes, “A fundamental right flowing from 
this dignity is the right to life of every human being, without discrimination, because everyone 
is a living embodiment of the divine image, deserving respect, love and care.”1266  
The above statement is in accord with what was already acknowledged, namely, that from 
human dignity proceeds the right to life and thereby protection. 
Comparison between Moral Theological Perspectives in Germany and India 
At the very beginning, German Moral Theology uses the argument from Grundgesetz Art. 1,1 
and 2,2 as a high level protection of the human embryo, because wherever there is human life, 
there is human dignity (see Chapter 9.2). Indian Moral Theology does not use any parallel 
argument from the Constitution of India. However, it does mention about the social mission of 
the Church and the UDHR being violated in the area of human rights. Although India is a 
signatory to the UN charter of rights, innumerable violations take place in India. Such atrocities 
                                                 
1261 Cf. LOBO, Current Problems…, 110. 
1262 Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
1263 Ibid., 111. 
1264 Catechism of the Catholic Church. Revised Edition with amendments following the publication of the Editio 
Typica, containing extended subject index and the Reader’s Guide to Themes, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, English 
translation for United Kingdom, Burns & Oates, London 2006, 384. 
1265 Cf. SRAMPICKAL, “Abortion and its Evil…”, 221. Srampickal acknowledges in his fn.8 to this passage that 
the view of man expressed in the passage above “may appear to be too rosy and optimistic; however, we are not 
unaware of the flaws, failures, sins and tragedies of man; but they do not deprive him of his essential dignity.” 
Ibid, 243 at fn.8. 
1266 Ibid., 221. 
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are hardly heard in Germany. Nevertheless, an objection to using the principle of human dignity 
to beginning of life issues is common to both countries.  
It was observed that in Germany, philosophers like Quante, who bases himself on another 
philosopher Siep, object to the use of the principle of human dignity in Bioethical discourse. 
According to Quante, in debates involving the discourse on human dignity actually stops all 
arguments abruptly. For him, the concept of human dignity alone does not suffice to answer 
questions in the field of bioethics. There are no such objections raised among Indian Moral 
Theologians. 
According to Hilpert, what is very essential is a proper understanding of the concept of person. 
It was reiterated that the respect for human dignity is but a basic orientation and insofar as 
embryos originate from human beings and have the possibility of developing into an individual 
human person, they are not mere matter and consequently deserve respect. Practical solutions 
that render respect and human dignity to an embryo were also suggested. 
In Indian Moral Theology, it was noted that according to Podimattam, the concept of 
personhood is not as important as human individuality and humanity of an embryo. Similarly, 
Lobo, who held for delayed animation, was also of the opinion that personhood began at a later 
stage and therefore, in the earlier stages, one cannot make a moral judgment. It can be made 
only at a later stage after hominization has taken place. Srampickal derives the fundamental 
principle of the use of human dignity that can be extended to include an embryo too. He uses 
the Church documents to support his argument (cf. CCC 1703 quoted above). 
13.3 THE STATUS OF AN EMBRYO AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
The question regarding the human dignity of an embryo is a complicated issue. From a 
metaphysical point of view it is difficult to defend regarding the question that revolves around 
the position which holds that an embryo after fertilization and before implantation is human 
and has its ‘unique genetic individuality’ but not yet a ‘human individual or a human person’. 
Metaphysically one has to answer several difficult questions such as, what is the status of such 
entity before implantation?1267 Does this entity have an ontological identity? Does it maintain 
its existential or operational unity? What predications can be made of the growing embryo and 
whether these predications are attributed to the same embryo or to separate beings? A 
meaningful answer to these questions requires a distinction between ontological reality and 
physiological reality.1268 
However, the question remains, from when on did one begin to have human dignity? Is it from 
the beginning of life? Was human dignity vested upon us from the moment he/she began his/her 
life as an embryo, or has one inherited human dignity? In other words, each of us is a human 
physical organism. This physical organism came into being at conception. Does it mean an 
embryo, which is a physical organism, is also a human individual? Is this human individual a 
person? Does this human person have human dignity? This is the challenge that one is faced 
with and it is a difficult to answer the question. Ultimately, the matter of human personhood of 
an embryo has several implications, such as whether it possesses inestimable value, whether it 
                                                 
1267 Cf. ibid., 229. Srampickal notes here that as a substance grows, it does not become more of its kind but 
matures according to its kind. See ibid., 244, at fn. 20. 
1268 Cf. ibid., 229. 
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is a subject of fundamental right to life.1269 Thus, the status of an embryo and its human dignity 
are closely related to the question of ensoulment. Nevertheless, in spite of scientific progress, 
the moment of hominization is still a cause of disagreement among experts. Therefore, the 
question of ensoulment was discussed (Chapter 5). As previously mentioned, both the positions, 
of immediate hominization and delayed hominization is debatable in the light of present day 
scientific observations and findings. In this intricate situation, what is at stake is the human 
dignity of an embryo. Additionally, it becomes ever more challenging to establish the fact. 
Depending on the theory one holds for, the status of an embryo is determined, and consequently 
its human dignity. The conclusion in Chapter 5 was that the time of ensoulment does not play 
an important role when compared to the role of right to life and human dignity of an embryo 
right from the moment of its conception. 
However, several difficult questions need to be answered here. For example, what is the status 
of an embryo? What is the ontological identity of an embryo? Does it maintain its existential or 
operational unity? To which being (same or separate) does one attribute the predications one 
makes about the growing embryo?1270 The discussions that follow will highlight the answer to 
these questions from an Indian Moral Theological perspective. 
As mentioned above, Srampickal argues that to give meaningful answers to the above questions 
require a distinction between ontological reality and physiological reality. In other words, a 
distinction between ontological entity and its physiological manifestations and realizations is 
necessary. Until such a distinction can be made, “nobody can say with authority and certainty 
that a human being has no rights in the first 2 weeks of its life and it has them after 2 weeks!”1271 
There are some scientists and even some nations, (like Korea in the Asian context, and their 
Bioethics and Safety Act [BSA]1272), which consider the human embryo as a simple lump of 
cells and therefore have taken an open position on the research carried on it. Therefore, it is 
important to see how the right to life of an embryo is bound with the issue of the beginning of 
life. BSA law contradicts the position of the Catholic Church that considers a human embryo 
as whole human being. In no way should the human embryos be degraded as a simple object 
but it should be considered as a subject. The BSA law is trying to destroy human dignity by 
degrading an embryo as a biological material under the pretext of improvement of quality of 
life. The consideration of human embryo as a lump of cells and not a life, intends to bypass 
ethical problems right at the root.1273 
                                                 
1269 Cf. Eustace J. DE SOUZA, “Individuation as a Problem for Early Personhood”, in: Bulletin of Indian 
Federation of Medical Guild, 18/2 (1993) 2-3; 2. Eustace J. De Souza, is the executive Director of FBMEC, 
Biomedical Ethics Centre, Bombay. 
1270 Cf. SRAMPICKAL, “Abortion and its Evil…”, 229. 
1271 Ibid. 
1272 The South Korean Government is relatively permissive on various forms of stem cell research from 
embryonic stem cells, Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT), induced Pluripotent Stem cells (iPS) generation and 
adult stem cells. In the year 2005, the Government enacted the Bioethics and Safety Act (BSA). This Act aims to 
enhance the health of human beings and the quality of human life. This is done by creating conditions that allow 
for the development of life sciences and biotechnologies that can be used to prevent or cure human diseases. In 
addition, the act aims to protect human dignity and to prevent harm to human beings. It ensures that these life 
sciences and biotechnologies are developed safely and in accordance with the principles of bioethics. The new act 
became effective on December 6, 2008. Cf. Kyu W. JUNG, “Regulation of Human Stem Cell Research in South 
Korea”, in: Stem Cell Reviews & Reports 6/3 (2010) 340-344. 
1273 Cf. DONG-IK LEE, “‘Quality of life’…”, 58. 
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Dong-Ik Lee, in a footnote to these statements (No.18), quotes the stand of the Catholic Church 
expressed in the statement published by the Vatican Life Academy in 2000 regarding the above 
problem, which says:  
1. On the basis of a complete biological analysis, the living human embryo is - from the 
moment of the union of the gametes – a human subject with a well-defined identity, which 
from that point begins its own coordinated, continuous and gradual development, such that 
at no later stage can it be considered as a simple mass of cells.  
2. From this it follows that as a “human individual” it has the right to its own life; and 
therefore every intervention which is not in favour of the embryo is an act which violates that 
right. Moral theology has always taught that in the case of “jus certum tertii” the system of 
probabilism does not apply.1274 
Besides, discarding the empirical data, philosophy and theology alone cannot simply decide on 
this issue. What is needed is an integral approach, enlightened by scientific findings, 
philosophical reflection and at the same time based on theological anthropology. Such an 
approach will help us to appreciate the dignity and value of the human person while taking a 
corresponding stand with regard to an embryo.1275 Yet it is important to recognize that the issue 
with regard to treating the human embryo is primarily moral, not philosophical.1276 
Therefore, in the following sections, the status of an embryo will be examined from the point 
of view of its individuality and personhood. In this context, whether they are worthy of human 
dignity will be analyzed. 
13.3.1 An Embryo as an Individual 
Scientific evidences concerning an embryo have limitations. Moreover, science cannot make a 
qualitative judgment about an embryo that can pass from non-human to human life. Therefore, 
the only moment that can be determined as assigning a beginning to human life is 
fertilization.1277 However, biological sciences do help us better understand human life. 
Regardless of its developmental stage, biologically speaking, every living being is assigned to 
only one species, which is genetically determined. When one designates the status “human” to 
an embryo, it means, “Its [a living being’s] designation [to a species] is determined not by the 
stage of development, but by the sum total of its biological characteristics – actual and potential 
– which are genetically determined. However, if we say it [the fetus] is not human, i.e., a 
member of Homo sapiens, we must say it is of another species. But this cannot be.”1278 
                                                 
1274 Pontifical Academy for Life, “Declaration on the Production and the Scientific and Therapeutic Use of 
Human Embryonic Stem Cells”, tr. into English from the original Italian text, in: L’Osservatore Romano, Friday, 
25 August 2000, Vatican City 2000, 6. Emphasis in original. Cf. Dong-Ik Lee, “‘Quality of life’…”, 58 and fn.18 
at 64. 
1275 Cf. SRAMPICKAL, “The Catholic View of Human Life...”, 96. 
1276 Cf. BUECHE, “Destroying Human Embryos…”, 92. 
1277 Cf. Ronald M. NARDONE, “The nexus of biology and the abortion issue”, in: The Jurist 33/2 (1973) 153-
161. Cf. PAZHAYAMPALLIL, Pastoral Guide…, 1388. 
1278 NARDONE, “The nexus of biology …”, 154. Emphasis in original. Additions by author. See also UNITED 
STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS: SECRETARIAT FOR PRO-LIFE ACTIVITIES, Testimony of United States 
Catholic Conference on Constitutional Amendment Protecting Unborn Human Life before the Sub-Committee on 
Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops, Washington D.C., March 7, 1974. 
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Podimattam clarifies that although the sperm and the ovum, prior to fertilization obviously 
belong to those from whom they come, yet, “once conception occurs, a cell exists which cannot 
be identified with either parent, and so the new individual begins with conception.”1279 
Therefore, biologically speaking from the moment of fertilization a human individual exists. 
Srampickal uses three types of argument, namely biological, genetic and development 
argument, to establish that an embryo is a human being. According to him, an offspring 
produced by the union of human parents must also be naturally a human being. According to 
biological laws, it cannot be anything else (biological argument).1280 The zygote is a human 
being because it carries the genetic pattern, which is programmed for human development. In 
addition, what is developing is a unique human being who will never be produced again.1281 The 
genes within control the zygote’s operation, growth and development. Therefore, the zygote is 
the future child and adult in miniature. What is lacking is its further development (genetic 
argument). Once the zygote is formed, its growth now depends on its interaction with the 
environment while it develops by virtue of its own inner dynamism and goal orientation. During 
the stages of the development of an embryo one does not notice any significant change that 
would persuade one to say that it is this event or this point that definitely makes an embryo 
truly human. Therefore, if the developing embryo, which is organic, continuous and 
autonomous, is human at any stage, then it follows that from the beginning of life it is a human 
being (development argument).1282 Thus, it is to be noted that a human embryo is a human 
individual from the beginning of life and is a human being. 
Pazhayampallil gives further evidence about the developing embryo. He refers to the 
Conference of Australian Catholic Bishops, which on 13 June 1980 in a statement on Abortion 
declared: 
Through new techniques of colour photography, in both still and moving pictures many have 
seen for themselves the development of the new, separate human individual soon after 
conception. They have seen its own separate response to stimuli of light, and of pain and 
discomfort. Thanks to other remarkable techniques, many people have heard for themselves 
a recording of the unborn child’s separate heartbeat, and so come to a new realization that a 
separate human being is living and growing in the womb.1283 
It is true that during the early stages of development, an embryo or foetus does not look like a 
human being. However, the genus and species of a being are determined not by its appearance 
at any given stage of development, but by its genetic inheritance and make-up. The embryonic 
human being belongs to the same human race as the mature man or woman although they are 
in different stages of development.1284 
There are also opinions held that the zygote before the implantation in the womb should not be 
classified as a human being because its status is not certain. This kind of reasoning has difficulty 
because it begs the question. When one questions why the status of zygote is not certain, the 
                                                 
1279 PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 31-32. 
1280 SRAMPICKAL, “The Catholic View of Human Life...”, 93. 
1281 Cf. PAZHAYAMPALLIL, Pastoral Guide…, 1385. 
1282 SRAMPICKAL, “The Catholic View of Human Life...”, 93. 
1283 CONFERENCE OF AUSTRALIAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Statement on Abortion, in: OR, Weekly Edition in 
English, 7 July 1980, 20. Cf. PAZHAYAMPALLIL, Pastoral Guide…, 1386. 
1284 Cf. George KUYKENDALL, “Thinking about Abortion”, in: Cross Currents 27 (1977-1978) 403-416; 404. 
Cf. PAZHAYAMPALLIL, Pastoral Guide…, 1387. 
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reply is because it is not human.1285 The concern whether an embryo is a human being or not, 
according to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, A German Lutheran Theologian, is merely to confuse the 
issue. God certainly intended to create a human life and one needs to take this at face value.1286 
Podimattam, who also shares this view, says that to raise the question whether an embryo is a 
human being or not is merely to confuse the issue.1287 
13.3.2 An Embryo as a Human Person 
Having seen that an embryo is a human individual and a human being, the question remains 
whether it qualifies as a human person. In the following sections the arguments for and against 
the proposition will be analyzed, namely whether an embryo is a human person. 
13.3.2.1 The Arguments that an Embryo is not a Human Person 
Many contemporary, prominent authors in bioethical circles distinguish sharply between a 
human being and being a human person. According to these authors, an entity can claim to be 
regarded as a person only when it has developed at least certain incipient exercisable cognitive 
capacities or abilities, some minimally self-conscious rational acts, etc. Those who represent 
this type of anthropology in its various forms highlighting one or other aspect of consciousness 
are Locke, Peter Strawson, Michael Tooley, Singer, Daniel Maguire Ronald Green and 
Fletcher.1288 
For example, American Philosopher Tooley argued that in order to be a person, an entity must 
have self-consciousness.1289 Similarly, American Philosopher Mary Anne Warren argued that 
in order to be a person, an entity must have not only consciousness, but also reasoning, self-
motivated activity, the capacity to communicate an indefinite variety of types of messages, and 
the presence of self-concepts and self-awareness.1290 Since the human embryos have none of 
these mental functions, they concluded that a human embryo is not a person. 
In defending the argument that the conceived foetus does not have the reasoning as that of a 
grownup child, Podimattam says that the very dynamics of the human brain exists at conception. 
In this connection, he makes a distinction between “being” and “having”. He says:  
                                                 
1285 Cf. James M. HUMBER, “Questions on Abortion”, in: Petrus, April 1978, 15. Cf. PAZHAYAMPALLIL, 
Pastoral Guide…, 1390. 
1286 Cf. Augustine REGAN, “Abortion - The Moral Aspect”, in: StMor 10 (1972) 127-217; 217. 
PAZHAYAMPALLIL, Pastoral Guide…, 1396. 
1287 Cf. PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 28. 
1288 Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?...,, 56. Cf. MAY, “Foreword”, in: Bioethical Issues and the Family..., 
vii-xv; x. The references to the authors they make are: LOCKE, Essay Concerning Human …, Book II, Chapter 27, 
Paragraphs 6-8, 9 and 26, P.F. STRAWSON, Individuals, and an Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, University 
Paperbacks, London, Methuen 1959, 101-102, Michael TOOLEY, Abortion and Infanticide, Oxford University 
Press, New York 1983, Peter SINGER, Rethinking Life and Death. The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics, St. 
Martin’s Press, New York 1994, Daniel MAGUIRE, Death by Choice, Doubleday, New York 1974, Daniel 
MAGUIRE, Sacred Choices. The Rights to Contraception and Abortion in Ten World Religions, Fortress Press, 
Philadelphia 2001, Ronald GREEN, The Human Embryo Research Debates. Bioethics in the Vortex of Controversy, 
Oxford University Press, New York 2001, Joseph FLETCHER, Morals and Medicine, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton 1954, 1979 and Joseph FLETCHER, Moral Responsibility. Situation Ethics at Work, Westminster Press, 
Philadelphia 1967. 
1289 Cf. TOOLEY, Abortion and Infanticide, op. cit. 
1290 Cf. Mary Anne WARREN, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion”, in: The Monist 57 (1973) 43-61; 
57. 
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The being of the human brain is actually present in the zygote, though the child in that stage 
of life does not have a brain. The animal zygote does not develop a human brain because the 
being of the human brain is not present in the animal zygote. Thus, the human is qualitatively 
different (different in the kind of being that is) from the animal zygote. The capacity for 
reasoning actually exists at conception, and may even be implicitly operative, though it 
becomes explicitly operative only several years after birth. No such capacity actually exists 
in the animal zygote.1291 
The critical question is whether the embryonic life is personal. According to Podimattam, it is 
partly a question of semantics to define a human person. One can take the recourse to arguments 
and prove that embryo is not a human person and one can define it in another way and still 
prove that it is. However, one cannot speak of an embryo in the early stages as a human person 
in the way one means by the concept of person. This argument is similar to the one that was 
stated above, namely, from Tooley and Warren. Podimattam says, “It is [embryo] not self-
conscious, rational, self-consciously related to others, capable of making decisions, etc.”1292 
Podimattam emphatically states that to ask a question whether a foetus is a person is a bad 
question. He says that such a question is pernicious when it implies that if the foetus is not a 
person, it has no claims to reverence. Such claims pose a threat not only to foetuses but also to 
infants. “For if personhood and distinctive affective, imaginative, intellectual activities thereof 
are foundation of respect for fetal and infant life, fetuses and infants are in trouble.”1293  
When the above criteria of personhood are applied to an embryo, it becomes clear that it is not 
a person. What conclusion follows from that? Is the growing embryo a mere tissue or a 
negligible material growth? Could one treat it as with a flower by plucking it off for no 
reasons?1294 “Is the question of personhood, in other words, ethically decisive? The question: 
‘Is the fetus a person?’ in our context implies this. It is then a bad question.”1295  
Although by way of correction, Podimattam agrees that the fetus is not a person in terms of the 
above criteria, yet it does not answer the question about whether it is moral to abort it. 
Therefore, he concludes: 
The conceptus from the very beginning is a human reality. From the first moment of its 
existence it is in a process toward personhood. And from the first moment, too, it is a miracle 
deserving of an awe-filled reverence. In a situation of value conflict, there may be a 
proportionate reason to terminate fetal life, but not because fetal life is valueless or worthless. 
Rather, it is valuable but not so absolutely valuable that no other value could ever outweigh 
it in the unavoidable and sometimes tragic calculus of ethics. But in the calculus, the 
determinative issue is not personhood or non-personhood. The fetus, from its beginnings, is 
a human development, a human being.1296 
Podimattam also raises the question whether personhood should be the sound basis for human 
rights. His answer is in the negative. He substantiates his arguments in the following manner. 
Overstating the importance of personhood could underestimate the constant, which is humanity. 
Humanity is the most fundamental attribute in the order of being although it may not be in the 
                                                 
1291 PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 34. Emphasis by author. 
1292 Ibid., 35. Addition by author. 
1293 Ibid., 35. 
1294 Cf. ibid. 
1295 Ibid. 
1296 Ibid., 35-36. 
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order of time. All other attributes presupposes humanity, without which one cannot conceive 
of soul, mind or personhood. By the mere fact of the fusion of the human ovum and sperm, a 
new human being is involved and it cannot be other than human species. Unless an untoward 
event intervenes, the fertilized ovum will automatically develop and possess its own on-going 
existence. Now that a new human being has arrived – given the fact that it is of human origin 
and consequently because of humanity –, it is endowed with the attendant rights of humanity 
along with others. This means that it is a possessor of the right to life; irrespective of whether 
the soul or the personhood has arrived, and the claim to right to life cannot be altered.1297 
Through the above arguments, Podimattam is perhaps of the opinion that an embryo is first a 
human individual and therefore worthy of being included under humanity. For him, humanity 
precedes human personhood. According to him, humanity is necessary to qualify for human 
right and not human personhood. However, it was already discussed that in order to qualify for 
human rights, human dignity has to be acknowledged. Human dignity precedes human rights 
and it is because one possesses inherent human dignity that one becomes the subject of rights, 
namely human rights (see Chapter 4.3). Therefore, it is to be stated here that the argument of 
Podimattam, namely, that human personhood is not the sound basis for human rights seems to 
be contradictory. 
Thus, Podimattam is of the opinion that the foetus is a human being. The question regarding its 
personhood is not determinative. In other words, when it comes to the question of abortion, the 
criteria of personhood cannot be applied because it is a human being from its beginning. 
Therefore, according to Podimattam, an embryo is a human being but not a human person. It 
was also noted that Podimattam argues in favour of the capacity for reasoning, which actually 
exists at conception. However, according to him, it is not rational. Who is one in whom the 
capacity for reasoning exists and still not rational? Is an embryo then not a human person? Here 
too, Podimattam seems to be contradicting his earlier statements. 
Podimattam further explains that in comparison to other cell cultures and other organs that are 
artificially maintained, one important and critical attribute of embryos and foetuses is that 
(unless they are aborted) they will almost certainly grow into human persons. This moral status 
can only be attributed to human persons and to no other cell cultures and organs that may be 
kept alive outside. While embryos and foetuses deserve to be treated as human beings, other 
cell cultures and organs outside the living body do not.1298 
Podimattam further argues against those who hold for a functional definition of a potential 
person that can exist at conception. For them a person is conceivable only when he or she 
actually functions as one. Podimattam says that the human zygote has all the capacities to 
function as a person, which in turn indicates the real presence of a person. Those who argue 
from the functional definition of a person may deny that a human person exists at the time of 
conception. However, they cannot argue convincingly that a human person does not exist.1299 
Through this argument, Podimattam is proving that a human zygote is a human person. 
However, he seems to be contradicting what he already affirmed that an embryo is not a person. 
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1299 Cf. ibid. 
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In order to substantiate the presence of a person in a fertilized ovum, Podimattam gives an 
example of an acorn, from the viewpoint of a botanist. He says that an acorn has the potential 
to become an oak tree. For a botanist a fertilized acorn is a potential oak tree. Although the 
trunk, roots, branches and leaves may not be expressed at this stage, still the dynamic being of 
an oak tree is present in the acorn. Eventually when the tree is fully developed, these parts are 
expressions or internal revelation of its original being that was already and actually present in 
the fertilized acorn.1300 Podimattam intends perhaps to say that in the case of the human fertilized 
ovum, there is the potency already present that indicates personhood. 
It appears that Podimattam has brought in various opinions with regard to individual, human, 
human being, human person, humanity, personhood, etc. without consistently holding that from 
the moment of conception an embryo is a human individual and a human person. On the one 
hand, he says that owing to the fact that these attributes are present in an embryo, one cannot 
deny the right and the protection that is due to it. On the other hand, when he seems to favour 
delayed animation – that is, ensoulment until two weeks after fertilization – he seems to support 
abortion (in desperate cases) because it would not amount to abortion in the moral sense.1301 
It is also noteworthy to take into consideration Lobo’s views. According to him, the fertilized 
ovum is a distinct genotype, i.e., having a unique genetic code. The innate dynamism of the 
blastocyst – the descent to uterus from the fallopian tube, its further development, the 
implantation in the uterus – suggests the presence of a marvellous principle of life, developing 
into a human child. With regard to the quality of the foetus, the consensus among experts can 
be summarized in the words of a Californian biophysicist Thomas L. Hayes: 
The foetus is not an appendage or organ of the mother, but rather a separate organism; it can 
be identified as belonging biologically to the human race. It contains all of the growth 
information that, during development, will interact with its environment to produce the 
complete human organism; the differences between the foetus shortly before birth and the 
infant shortly after birth are not biologically of basic significance; no point in the 
development exists where the biological form and function of the body are suddenly 
added.1302 
Lobo’s opinion is that the above conclusion does not necessarily mean that there is actually a 
human person right from the beginning, while, it seems, “almost to provide moral certainty that 
during the first few days, the conceptus is not yet an actual human person”. 1303 
John Britto, an Indian scientist, cites the example of Margaret Farley, an American Ethicist, 
who seems to postulate a liberal view that the moral status of an embryo is not that of a person 
                                                 
1300 Cf. ibid. 
1301 Cf. ibid., 49. 
1302 Thomas L. HAYES, “Abortion I. A Biological View”, in: Commonweal 85/23 (1967) 677-679; 677. Cf. 
LOBO, Current Problems…, 107-108. 
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person in an embryo. See Lisa Sowle CAHILL, “The Embryo and the Fetus. New Moral Contexts,” TS 54 (1993) 
124-142. Here Lisa Sowle Cahill, an American Ethicist, points to authors who are of the same opinion as hers: C. 
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and its use for certain kinds of research can be justified.1304 Others, like American lawyer John 
A. Robertson, strongly adhere to a developmental view of personhood and deny moral value to 
foetuses and embryos,1305 while Gene Outka, an American Philosopher and Ethicist, holds that 
an embryo is a form of human life, and therefore deserves some respect.1306 
13.3.2.2 The Arguments that an Embryo is a Human Person 
Referring to William Bueche, an American Moral Theologian, Pazhayampallil holds that 
human life that began at the time of fertilization is a human being by the very fact of its existence 
as a human zygote. Since every human being is a person, it also has a personal worth. This 
worthiness does not depend on the fact whether there is actualization of the capacities or 
faculties that are ordinarily associated with the self-actualization and self-actualizing human 
being.1307 Bueche poses then an intriguing question: “If we ask: When is a human person not a 
human being?, the answer is: never. If we ask the converse: When is a human being not a 
person? I think the answer is the same: never.”1308 
The argument of Bueche is that the self-actualization, although not recognizable in an embryo, 
is however, self-evident. He gives an example from the past when whole races of people who 
were seen as savages were not recognized as persons. The difficulty lay in not recognizing the 
essential human being-ness, human personhood and human dignity of these races. So also, 
similar problem still exists today with regard to an embryo of not being recognized of their 
human being-ness, human personhood and human dignity. Although morphologically an 
embryo appears so different from the human species, it is a member of that species. Motivation 
against the recognition has not always been disinterested or impartial.1309 
It was already mentioned that some authors locate the beginning of personhood at various stages 
of the development of an embryo-foetus. Arguing against them, Bueche argues that such 
authors have: 
[...] all fallen into the same fundamental error. They have settled on a physical model that 
doesn’t do justice to the deeper underlying reality of biological life. The deeper reality is 
inherent in the life-principle itself. The life-principle is not inherent in the brain, which 
                                                 
1304 To quote the words of Farley: “A growing number of Catholic moral theologians, for example, do not 
consider the human embryo in its earliest stages (prior to the development of the primitive streak or to 
implantation) to constitute an individualized human entity with the settled inherent potential to become a human 
person. The moral status of the embryo is, therefore (in this view), not that of a person, and its use for certain kinds 
of research can be justified. (Because it is, however, a form of human life, it is due some respect—for example, it 
should not be bought or sold.) […]. I myself stand with the case for embryonic stem cell research […]”. See 
Margaret FARLEY, “Roman Catholic Views on Research Involving Human Embryonic Stem Cells”, in: Ethical 
Issues in Human Stem Cell Research, Vol. 3, Religious Perspectives, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 
Rockville, Maryland 2000, D1-D5, at D4. Cf. S. John BRITTO, “Stem Cell Research and Applications. An Ethical 
Perspective”, in: JULIAN/MYNATTY (ed.), Catholic Contributions to Bioethics…, 195-217; 210. 
1305 Cf. John A. ROBERTSON, “Ethics of Stem Cell Research”, in: Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9/2 (1999) 
109-136. Cf. BRITTO, “Stem Cell Research...”, 210-211. 
1306 Cf. Gene OUTKA, “Ethics of Human Stem Cell Research”, in: Brent WATERS/Ronald COLE-TURNER (ed.), 
God and the Embryo. Religious Voices on Stem Cells and Cloning, Georgetown University Press, Washington 
D.C. 2003, 29-66. Cf. BRITTO, “Stem Cell Research...”, 210-211. 
1307 Cf. BUECHE, “Destroying Human Embryos…”, 89. Cf. PAZHAYAMPALLIL, Pastoral Guide…, 1381. 
1308 BUECHE, “Destroying Human Embryos…”, 89. Bueche refers here to DV I,1, which puts the same question 
rhetorically: “[...] how could a human individual not be a human person?” Cf. DV, op. cit., 14. 
1309 Cf. BUECHE, “Destroying Human Embryos...”, 89-90. Cf. PAZHAYAMPALLIL, Pastoral Guide…, 1381-
1382. 
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eventually takes over the complex co-ordination and control of the developed and developing 
systems of the living self-actualizing organism. Nor is it inherent in the differentiation of the 
cells and the loss of totipotentiality. It is in the DNA – the human genome – the genetic code 
– which not only exists prior to all these stages, but is the active and activitating principle 
which is responsible for the continuity, the coordination, the gradually increasing complexity, 
the unity, and the individuality of the organism.1310 The development of the human person 
requires continual differentiation and complexification. But these, in turn require the 
unchanging, individual genetic code. What is the one aspect of the human being that remains 
unchanged throughout his/her life – a period of continuing, successive differentiation and 
development? It is the human genome.1311 
Bueche eventually acknowledges what the CDF morally affirms regarding the status of an 
embryo in DV I,1. He says: 
The document attributes personhood to the human embryo from the moment of fertilization. 
Therefore, it affirms that from the moment of conception: 1) we must attribute to the human 
embryo the unconditional respect due to each human being; 2) we must treat the human 
being (and an embryo, perforce) as a person; and 3) we must recognize an embryo’s rights 
as a person, the foremost of which is the inviolable right of every human being to life.1312 
Pazhayampallil says that the question regarding the constitution of a human person is not left 
entirely to the biological sciences to make a definitive judgment, but it is one of a philosophical 
and moral question.1313 “Personhood is a quality which belongs inherently to the human being. 
It is given with human nature. At every stage of life, from beginning to end, whatever the 
condition, an individual human being is a person.”1314 However, acknowledging the role of 
biological science in this regard, which cannot be bypassed, Pazhayampallil cites Ratzinger 
who evaluates the role of science that provides a valuable indication in this direction: 
Certainly no experimental datum can be in itself sufficient to bring us to the recognition of a 
spiritual soul; nevertheless, the conclusions of science regarding the human embryo provide 
a valuable indication for discerning by the use of reason a personal presence at the moment 
of the first appearance of a human life: how could a human individual not be a human person? 
Regarding this question, if the Magisterium has not expressed itself in a binding way by a 
philosophical affirmation, it has still taught constantly that from the first moment of its 
existence, as the product of human generation, the embryo must be guaranteed the 
unconditional respect which is morally due to a human being in his spiritual and bodily 
totality.1315 
                                                 
1310 BUECHE, “Destroying Human Embryos ...”, 100. Bueche, here in a footnote, gives the citation of THE 
CENTRE FOR BIOETHICS OF THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF THE SACRED HEART, “Identity and status of the human 
embryo”, Medicina e Morale, Supplement to n. 4, Rome 22 June 1989, 15-26. This article deals with a more 
comprehensive philosophical treatment of the biological and genetic characteristics, which argue in favour of the 
identity, and individuality of the early human embryo as a basis for attributing personhood to it. 
1311 BUECHE, “Destroying Human Embryos ...”, 100. Emphasis in original. Cf. PAZHAYAMPALLIL, Pastoral 
Guide…, 1382. The footnote reference to the above direct quotation is missing in Pazhayampallil. 
1312 BUECHE, “Destroying Human Embryos...”, 109. Emphasis in original. Bueche is referring to DV I,1, op. 
cit., 13-14. Cf. PAZHAYAMPALLIL, Pastoral Guide…, 1383. 
1313 Cf. ibid., 1394. 
1314 Ibid. 
1315 Joseph RATZINGER, “The Problem of threats to human life”, in: OR, Weekly Edition in English, 8 April 
1991, 3. This was an address to the Extraordinary Consistory of Cardinals, from April 4-7, 1991, Vatican City, 
discussing the challenges faced by today’s war on life, the reasons for the logic of death and some possible 
responses. It is interesting to note that this consistory became a key preparatory moment for the preparation of the 
Encyclical Letter Evangelium Vitae. 
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Thus, according to Ratzinger, an embryo is worthy of an unconditional respect from its first 
moment of existence. In agreement, the then Indian Theologian Gali Bali and now Bishop of 
Guntur and Chairman of the Commission for Ecumenism and Dialogue of the CBCI, reiterated, 
“Discussion on whether a human person emerges at the moment of conception or somewhat 
later are within the scope of theological (and scientific and philosophical) freedom, provided 
respect for all human life from its inception is enjoined.”1316 Bali thus respects theological 
freedom that discusses whether an embryo has to be regarded as a human person or not. 
However, ultimately, this freedom should also respect human life from its beginning. 
As mentioned earlier, the awarding of a status to an embryo or regarding it as a human person 
pertains strictly to the field of philosophy and theology, while at the same time relying on the 
contribution of scientific research. Legislation, on the other hand, makes sure from what is 
derived from their outcome is implemented. Therefore, one can still say, “The status of the 
human embryo and its dignity and rights under the law should be determined by the human life 
it undoubtedly has from the beginning.”1317 
Hence, in the present discussion about the status and personhood of an embryo, an integrated 
approach was necessary to emphasize the role played by theology, philosophy and science. In 
the last analysis, it can be said that the life of an embryo is a form of individual human life. It 
is an individual of the human species based on its parental properties. It has an autonomy of its 
own that proceeds towards maturity. An embryo like an adult; reveals the inbuilt self-
constructive, self-maintaining capacity, which comes from within. Hence, it is definitely a 
living individual of the human species. Therefore, the quality of the human life begun as an 
embryo can be compared to that of an adult. From its inception onwards the human embryo is 
also a person. 
Comparison between Moral Theological Perspectives in Germany and India 
It is to be noted that although this section has been titled as “The Status of an Embryo and 
Human Dignity”, Indian Moral Theologians have not adequately argued for the concept of 
human dignity of an embryo. They have deliberated on establishing the fact that an embryo is 
in fact a human individual, a human being and a human person. These arguments may point out 
to the fact that an embryo is worthy of absolute respect and dignity. However, German Moral 
Theologians have taken a clear stance in not only establishing that an embryo is an individual, 
a human being and a human person, but also through the arguments of SPIC, they have 
convincingly argued for the dignity of an embryo. Although, the SPIC argument as such is not 
named as in German Moral Theology, Indian Moral Theologians have incorporated these 
arguments in dealing with the issue of status and personhood of an embryo. However, what 
lacks there is also the conclusion that an embryo is worthy of dignity. The SPIC argument 
makes this point amply clear. 
                                                 
1316 It was during his presentation of a paper at the Hong Kong Meeting of the Doctrinal Commissions of Asia, 
March 1983 that he made the above statement. See Gali BALI, “The Problems of Asia of a Theological and Moral 
Nature”, in: Papers Presented at the Hong Kong Meeting of the Doctrinal Commissions of Asia, March 1993, The 
Commission for Clergy and Religious (Doctrinal Committee), CBCI Centre, New Delhi 1993, 20-36. 
1317 PAZHAYAMPALLIL, Pastoral Guide..., 1395. 
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In the following paragraphs, the SCIP argument is compared, which upholds the dignity of an 
embryo from the moment of conception, proposed by the German Moral Theologians: 
The Species Affiliation Argument (see Chapter 9.3.1): In comparison to the Indian Moral 
Theological thinking (see Chapter 13.3), it is in some ways similar to that of Schockenhoff’s 
argument. For example, the belongingness to the human species makes an embryo worthy of 
human dignity. What is interesting in the arguments of Schockenhoff is that he makes use of 
Kant’s assertion of the human person as a subject of morality and therefore worthy of human 
dignity. Schockenhoff’s reiteration of the practical consensus of European ethics that all human 
beings are worthy of human dignity based solely on his/her membership in the biological 
species, which also includes embryos, is something new to the Indian thinking. His use of 
Tutiorism, although with reservations, is a significant intervention. Likewise, Schockenhoff’s 
argument (also Mieth’s) referring back to Aristotle regarding an embryo not being a potential 
person, but a person by all means is noteworthy. 
The Continuity Argument (see Chapter 9.3.2 above): When a comparison with the continuity 
argument of German Moral theology is made with the Indian Moral thinking, there are some 
similarities. While the German Moral Theologians use the term “continuity argument”, the 
Indian Moral Theologians use the “development argument”. By that they mean that the 
developing embryo is organic, continuous and autonomous (see Chapter 13.3.1 above) and from 
the moment of conception a human subject with a well-defined identity begins its own 
coordinated, continuous and gradual development, such that at no later stage can it be 
considered as a simple mass of cells (see Chapter 13.3 above). Although, the Indian counterpart 
acknowledges this continuous process of growth, one does not find a philosophical basis for 
such argument. However, among the German Moral Theologians we can find a philosophical 
basis for such arguments. While the weakness of Singer, Hoerster and others lies in the fact that 
they concentrate only on the personhood of an embryo1318, the German philosophical and 
theological thinking brings in the aspect of human dignity into dialogue, alongside the 
personhood concept and its dignity, and argue that the growing embryo is worthy of protection. 
The Identity Argument (see Chapter 9.3.3): When one compares the arguments given there 
about the identity of an embryo with the Indian Moral Theological thinking, there are once 
again similarities. For example, the concept of identity and individuality of an embryo (see 
Chapter 13.3.1, 13.3.2 and 13.3.2.2) are similar to the German Theological Perspective. 
The Potentiality Argument (see Chapter 9.3.4): When a comparison with the potentiality 
argument of German Moral Theology is made with the Indian counterpart, once again certain 
similarities can be noticed. For example, it was already stressed about the fact that an embryo 
in the womb is not a potential human being but a human being in potency. Schockenhoff had 
made a distinction between passive potency and active potency. He would argue that the 
meaning is distorted only when the weak significance of a passive potency is highlighted. 
Although Podimattam does not agree that an embryo is a person from the moment of 
conception, yet he is of the opinion (see Chapter 13.3.2.1) that the human zygote has all the 
capacities to function as a person, which in turn indicates the real presence of a person.1319 
                                                 
1318 Cf. KAUFMANN, „Contra Kontinuumsargument…“; 84. 
1319 Cf. PODIMATTAM, Medical Ethics (Vol. 4)…, 37. 
 Chapter 13: Human Dignity and Beginning of Life Issues 271 
 
 
 
13.4 CONCLUSION 
From human dignity proceeds the right to life and thereby protection. The status of an embryo 
plays an important role in Bioethics with regard to the question whether an embryo is worthy 
of protection or whether it is worthy of human dignity. The status of an embryo ultimately 
depends on the question whether an embryo is a person. Some Moral Theologians do not accept 
that an embryo is a human person. Nevertheless, they also held that personhood does not depend 
on the stage of development of human life or on any other accidental quality. Respect for life 
and right to life is to be extended to all life in its weakest forms. 
In order to give a meaningful answer to the questions regarding personhood, and consequently 
human dignity, requires a distinction between ontological reality and physiological reality. 
Until such a distinction can be made, no one can with authority deny right to life of an embryo. 
Besides, what is essential is an integral approach, which is backed up by scientific findings, 
philosophical reflection and a solidly based theological anthropology. An approach such as this 
will help appreciate the dignity and value of the human person, especially an embryo.  
The fact that an embryo is a human individual follows from three arguments, namely, 
biological, genetic and developmental. Based on these arguments a human embryo is a human 
being and a human individual from the beginning of its existence. 
The question remains whether a human embryo is also a human person. There are arguments 
for and against accepting an embryo as a person. The main argument against the proposition is 
that an embryo lacks cognitive abilities, some minimally self-conscious rational acts, self-
awareness, etc. The counter-argument is that irrespective of whether an embryo has already a 
soul or the personhood, it is still a possessor of the right to life. Thus, those who argue against 
the personhood of an embryo would still hold that an embryo, being a form of human life, 
deserves some respect. 
Those who argue for the personhood of an embryo would say that human life begun at 
fertilization, points to the reality that it is a human being. Since every human being is a person 
and cannot be something else, an embryo too is a person worthy of protection. This worthiness 
does not depend on the fact whether there is self-actualization or functional capabilities. 
Theological freedom that discusses whether an embryo is a human person or not is an open 
question. However, ultimately, this freedom should also respect human life from its beginning. 
Although, the Indian Moral Theologians do not argue logically from a SCIP point of view, yet 
their arguments when dealing with the individuality and personhood of an embryo carries some 
of the hints towards a SCIP argument.
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PART III 
Conclusion 
In this Part III, in Chapter 10, the exploration of the Indian Catholic Moral Theological 
Perspective on human dignity in the field of Bioethics was carried out. It was noted that Indian 
Moral Theology has not emphasized the concept of human dignity in an elaborate way, as do 
the German Moral Theologians. A philosophical and anthropological foundation finds a greater 
emphasis among the German Moral Theologians. Although, this is lacking in the Indian Moral 
Theological perspective, yet there is always an acknowledgement of the importance of human 
dignity in various fields and especially in the field of bioethics. It was mentioned in Part II that 
the concept of human dignity, according to the German Moral Theologians, has a normative 
role to play in the field of Bioethics. For example, Reiter analyses the more recent and currently 
debatable questions on Cloning, Stem-cell Research, Stem-Cell import, Pre-implantation 
diagnosis and Euthanasia from the normative principle of human dignity.1320 However, in the 
writings of the Indian Moral Theologians the normative foundation of human dignity is not 
fully analysed. Nevertheless, Indian Moral Theology does make an appeal to human dignity as 
a universal key to moral interpretation. This appeal however, is not something that is derived 
from within an indigenous Indian moral perspective, but borrowed from the Anglo-Saxon 
world. 
Second, the arguments on the Indian side, in order to take a stand on behalf of human dignity, 
especially with regard to religious involvement in ethical-legal order, are hardly noticeable. It 
was observed that German Moral Theologians, often in the field of Bioethics, besides other 
arguments, take a legal recourse, namely, to the Grundgesetz. This is something that is wanting 
in Indian Moral Theology. They use neither the provisions (which refers to human dignity) 
found in the Preamble to the Indian Constitution1321, nor to the right to life provided in the 
Constitution proper in Moral Theological discussions.1322 Nevertheless, in secular fields, 
especially in cases of suicide and euthanasia, appeals to human rights and human dignity have 
been raised. 
From a theological point of view, there are some aspects that are highlighted by German Moral 
Theologians, which does not find place in Indian Moral Theologians thinking. So too there are 
some other aspects, which Indian Moral Theologians have discussed, but not examined by 
German Moral Theologians. However, what is common to both the perspectives is the use of 
the concept of image of God. It finds a repetitive and constant use in Indian Moral Theology 
whenever there is a reference to human dignity. 
Another interesting factor is the concept of sanctity of life. Indian Moral Theology has given 
an over-emphasis on this concept. It also equates the value, worth, the sacredness of life – all 
of these concepts being enshrined as sanctity of life and equated sometimes to human dignity. 
                                                 
1320 See REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz …“, 138-145. 
1321 The Constitution of India: as amended by The Tamil Nadu Legislative Council Act 2010 (16 of 2010), ed. 
by Parvinrai Mulwantrai BAKSHI/Subash C. KASHYAP, Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Delhi 2011. The 
Preamble to the Constitution reads, “[…] assuring the dignity of the individual”. Ibid., 1. 
1322 The Constitution of India Part II: Fundamental Rights: Article 21 states: “No person shall be deprived of 
his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law.” See The Constitution of India…, 
46. The Preamble and Article 21 of the Constitution of India will be taken in the next Part IV, Chapter 18.4. 
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On the other hand, again interestingly, the discussion on the sanctity of life finds no longer an 
essential discussion in German Moral Theology. 
In Chapter 11, the role of the Indian Church was discussed in the field of human dignity and 
especially in the field of Bioethics. It was seen that the value of human life, dignity, 
inviolability, significance of human life, etc. are all major and current issues in the life of the 
Church in India. However, it was noted that the role of the Catholic Church in the field of human 
rights has been rather wanting and more so in the field of Bioethics. The only document that 
deals directly with the issue of Bioethics is the Pastoral Letter on Abortion. However, in this 
document there is neither a mention nor an argument from the point of view of human dignity 
that is at stake in direct and intentional abortion. Perhaps, in the Church’s discussion, other 
important views find a better place. Just to name a few, such as poverty, atrocities against 
women, atrocities in the name of religion, violations against human rights, etc. Although India 
is a secular, democratic republic and is known for a country where religious tolerance was well 
accepted, yet the situation today is grim. In this regard, unlike German Bishop Conference, who 
have brought out valuable documents in this regard, the CBCI has not made efforts to bridge 
the gap between the secular and the religious in the issuance of any documents in this field. 
The Concept of Person from an Indian Perspective formed the content of Chapter 12. Although 
it is acknowledged that the human person is of supreme importance, yet the situation, as 
described above, gives one the impression that the human person has been taken for granted. 
From a philosophical perspective, the human person has been defined based on certain criteria. 
In this regard, however, Indian Moral Theologians have not taken the views of contemporary 
philosophers into consideration, as do the German Moral Theologians, such as Spaemann or 
Habermas. 
In Germany, the theological concept, especially just after the period of war, proved to be extremely 
helpful to all the people in bringing a unifying expression in a pluralistic society.1323 Such efforts in 
the field of Bioethics seem to be lacking in Indian Moral Theology. However, in general, one can 
say that the contribution of Christian thinking in this area has been given more importance than in 
bringing a dialogical or unifying effort. 
It was observed that an individualistic approach can be easily exploited to the advantage of the 
elite or the dominant class. The common standard of human rights adopted by the United 
Nations does not seem to solve the issue. This is because of the alleged difference of Asian 
values. Therefore, a different approach suggested by Wilfred seems to be an answer to this 
problem. 
The final Chapter 13 dealt with the discussions about the beginning of life issues and human 
dignity. Issues such as the question of the protection-worthiness of the human embryo and its 
status formed the content of this Chapter. With regard to the status of an embryo, the 
individuality and personhood of an embryo was analyzed. It was pointed out that the SCIP 
argument, which is used in German Moral Theology, is not used in its logical form and totality 
or even named as such in Indian Moral Theology. In German Moral Theology it can be 
acknowledged that the tying together of the SCIP argument is something very significant to 
them. It must however be acknowledged that these arguments find its place in Indian Moral 
                                                 
1323 Cf. SCHLÖGEL, „Zum Menschenwürdeargument ...“, 91. 
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Theology integrated when dealing with the issue of the status of an embryo. Moreover, from 
the part of the German Moral Theology, the SCIP arguments, the biological and embryological 
findings along with the image of God concept, form an integrative solid argument that an 
embryo beginning from its existence, is a human person, worthy of protection and human 
dignity. This integrated approach is not found in Indian Moral Theology. 
In all the deliberation in this research, both the sides of the coin were analyzed. In other words, 
the arguments for and against the proposition that an embryo is inherently endowed with human 
dignity from the beginning of life were examined. To lend the words of Chamakala: “In the 
Christian understanding, all human beings are equal in dignity and equal in their right to life 
and every person has a God-given right be born with dignity and to live with dignity.”1324 Here 
one can extend the phrase “all human beings” to include embryos. 
In conclusion, it can perhaps be said that although the results reached may be the same, the 
emphasis and perspectives of approach are different in both the moral thinking of Germany and 
India. The approaches, as such, are not contradictory but are complementary to the 
understanding of human dignity, especially from the beginning of life. 
In this research, it was observed that there is a function and responsibility of moralists to uphold 
the dignity of human beings especially in its weaker forms such as an embryo. Chamakala 
reiterates this aspect, namely, “the important function of moralists is to facilitate authentic 
human life by protecting human dignity and preserving basic human values, and to promote the 
welfare of the persons involved and of the entire humanity”.1325 Besides, Indian Moral 
Theologians like Lobo and Campos have pointed out that there is a great challenge as well as a 
need to develop a contextualized “moral theology that is truly Indian, authentically human, and 
socially liberative”.1326 The realization of these words is still a long way to go in India. With this 
impetus in the background, the next Part IV will be an attempt at dialogue with Hinduism on 
the perspectives on human dignity, especially pertaining to beginning of life issues. How does 
Hinduism deal with the question about human life, human person and human dignity? Do these 
concepts exist in Hinduism? Do they play a role in the protection-worthiness of an embryo and 
its right to life? Does Hinduism have the same respect to human life from its very beginning? 
Can we find parallel arguments and issues in Hinduism similar to Catholic Moral Theology 
within the field of Bioethics, regarding these questions? Does Hinduism treat the human being 
as an image of God? Can we find strands of arguments within these two religions that can give 
us a universal answer to the question of human dignity of an embryo? These are some of the 
questions that will be treated in the next Part IV. The purpose of the research will be to identify 
grounds where a dialogue is possible. The hope is that it will open up a new way of looking at 
the topic of discussion. 
                                                 
1324 CHAMAKALA “Assisted Reproductive Technologies…”, 262. See also IDEM, “John Paul II, the Promoter 
of Human life”, in: Indian Journal of Family Studies 4/1 (2006) 37-56; 54. 
1325 IDEM “Assisted Reproductive Technologies…”, 248. See also IDEM, The Sanctity of Life…, 215. 
1326 Cf. CAMPOS, “Doing Christian Ethics in India’s ...”, 90. 
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PART IV 
Human Dignity from the Beginning of  Life: 
An Attempt at a Dialogue with Hinduism 
At the outset, it would be good to clarify what has motivated this research to attempt at a 
dialogue with Hinduism. Four reasons can be enumerated. 
First, owing to their presence in a pluralistic society, German Moral Theology makes ample use 
of the legal forum as well as philosophical arguments with regard to the question of human 
dignity that appeal to all, especially in order to address people of all nationalities, religions and 
cultures as well as believers and non-believers. Therefore, this Part IV is an analogous attempt 
at a dialogue in trying to find certain common grounds with the largest religion in India, namely 
Hinduism. Although there are a few examples, in general, as said in the conclusion to Part III, 
this effort is something that is lacking in Indian Moral Theology. 
Second, it is assumed that a dialogue with Hinduism be seen from an ecumenical movement 
perspective. The word “ecumenical” has various meanings. The modern meaning of the word 
is what refers to the relations and the unity between two or more Churches or between Christians 
of different denominations. The word “movement” means that which combines the ideas of 
tension, need, quest, dynamic trust, and also receptivity, obedience, acquiescence in the impulse 
that directs us and in the goal which draws us on. “So the phrase «ecumenical movement» 
denotes an immense activity undertaken by every Christian communion, which by means of 
dialogue, co-operation, integration, and individual and institutional union, aims at drawing 
Christians together and reconciling them, healing their damaged traditions, and, in short, 
bringing the mystical Body of Christ to its perfect fulfilment.”1327 Nevertheless, the word 
“ecumenism” and its derivatives are used nowadays not only with regard to the unity among 
Christians, but also in an extended way to the people of other faiths,1328 which is “an effort of 
Christianity towards the unity of humankind”.1329 
Third, owing to its restriction and narrow understanding of ecumenism, a better term would be 
“inter-religious dialogue”.1330 In this sense one can speak of an ecumenical dialogue, which is a 
part of the Church’s service as communio in its readiness for a dialogue, which encompasses 
                                                 
1327 Bernard LAMBERT, Ecumenism Theology and History, tr. by Lancelot C. SHEPHERD, Herder and Herder, 
New York 1967, 29-30. 
1328 “The word is sometimes used in a still larger meaning, indicating any effort toward unity among religions 
or within the world.” See Jos E. VERCRUYSSE, “Ecumenism” in René LATOURELLE/Rino FISICHELLA (ed.), 
Dictionary of Fundamental Theology, St. Pauls, Slough, U. K.1994, 259-267; 259. Cf. Ulrike BECHMAN (u.a.), 
„Ökumene: Praktisch-theologisch“, in: LThK 7/3 (Sd. Ausg. 2009) 1017-1028., 1027. 
1329 „[…] das Bemühen der Christenheit um die Einheit der Menschheit.“ Aloys KLEIN (u.a.), „Ökumene: 
Begriff“, in: LThK 7/3 (Sd. Ausg. 2009) 1017-1028., 1017. Tr. by author. 
1330 Horst BÜRKLE, „Dialog der Religionen“, in: LThK 3/3 (Sd. Ausg. 2009) 196-197, 197. One can distinguish 
four types of dialogue, which together are necessary and complementary. They are “Dialogue of life” (Neighbourly 
coexistence, sharing of joys and sorrows, problems and hardships with each other), “Dialogue of action” 
(cooperation for the development and liberation of people), “Dialogue of theological exchange” (deepening of 
understanding, estimate mutual values) and “Dialogue of religious experience” (spiritual wealth from one’s own 
religious roots). Cf. ibid. Cf. Karla POLLMANN/Gavin D’COSTA/Hendrik M. VROOM/Dietz LANGE/Peter 
NEUNER/Volker KÜSTER/Hans-Gebhard BETHGE, „Dialog“, in: Hans Dieter BETZ/DON S. BROWNING/Bernd 
JANOWSKI/Eberhard JÜNGEL (Hg.), Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Handwörterbuch für Theologie und 
Religionswissenschaft, Bd. 2, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 19994, 815-822. 
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all levels including inner (within the Christian Churches), with the “World”, the ideologies of 
the world and religions.1331 
It is in the wider sense that a dialogue with Hinduism, especially a “Dialogue of theological 
exchange” and “Dialogue of religious experience” is attempted. Since inter-religious dialogue 
strives for a dialogue as well as other noble activities, an approach to achieve this end will be 
fostered. 
The impetus given by the Catholic Church towards ecumenism and dialogue is clear from the 
following texts. The Second Vatican Council in its Declaration on the Relationship of the 
Church to Non-Christian Religions (Nostra Aetate) establishes certain principles that govern 
the Church’s attitude and relation to other religions in general. Nostra Aetate 2 clarifies the 
stand: 
The Catholic Church rejects nothing which is true and holy in these religions. She looks with 
sincere respect upon those ways of conduct and of life, those rules and teachings which, 
though differing in many particulars from what she holds and sets forth, nevertheless often 
reflect a ray of that Truth which enlightens all men.1332 
Obviously, the Church’s approach to other religions in the above statement is one of openness 
to dialogue, a quest after the Truth in finding out what is “true and holy” in other religions, in 
order to establish a common ground.1333 
Fourth, the Second Vatican Council in its Decree on the Church’s Missionary Activity (Ad 
Gentes), encourages Christians to “be familiar with their national and religious traditions, gladly 
and reverently laying bare the seeds of the Word which lie hidden in them” (Ad Gentes 11). In 
this endeavor to search for the Truth or holiness in other religions, enlightened and purified 
through the kindly workings of Divine Providence, one is assured by the Catholic Church that 
it “may sometimes serve as a guidance course toward the true God, or as a preparation for the 
Gospel” (Ad Gentes 3; emphasis by author).1334 
Therefore, it is with this spirit of searching for the Truth that this Part IV engages itself. In 
addition, as Gandhi suggests, a sympathetic approach is also necessary for an attempt at 
dialogue with other religions. This is made clear in the following account. Eli Stanley Jones, a 
20th century Methodist Christian missionary and theologian, who met Mahatma Gandhi, asked 
him: 
“How can we make Christianity naturalized in India, not a foreign thing, identified with a 
foreign government and a foreign people, but a part of the national life of India and 
contributing its power to India’s uplift? What would you, as one of the Hindu leaders of India, 
tell me, a Christian, to do in order to make this possible?” 
He [Gandhi] responded with great clarity and directness: “First, I would suggest that all of 
you Christians, missionaries and all, must begin to live more like Jesus Christ. Second, 
practice your religion without adulterating it or toning it down. Third, emphasize love and 
make it your working force, for love is central in Christianity. Fourth, study the non-Christian 
                                                 
1331 Wolfgang BEINERT, „Dialog, Dialogik: Ökumenisch“, in: LThK 3/3 (Sd. Ausg. 2009) 191-197, 194. 
1332 THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, “Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian 
Religions. Nostra Aetate”, in: Walter M. ABBOT (ed.), The Documents of Vatican II…, 660-668; 661. Cf. Martin 
GANERI, “Catholicism and Hinduism”, in: Gavin D’COSTA (ed.), The Catholic Church and the World Religions. 
A Theological and Phenomenological Account, T&T Clark International, New York 2011, 106-140; 123. 
1333 Cf. GANERI, “Catholicism and Hinduism…”, 123. 
1334 Cf. ibid., 124 
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religions more sympathetically to find the good that is within them, in order to have a more 
sympathetic approach to the people.”1335 
Hence, based on these impulses, a sympathetic approach at dialogue with Hinduism from a 
philosophical and theological understanding of the concept of human dignity will be attempted. 
All the same, an indigenous study on the concept of human dignity from an Indian Perspective 
is no small venture. Considering India as a part of the Asian continent, one is confronted with 
the situation in which three elements dominate the Asian landscape, namely, religious plurality, 
cultural diversity, and dehumanizing poverty.1336 Asia is said to be the seat or the cradle of the 
great religions of the world such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Islam. It is also 
noteworthy that Asia is the birthplace of other religious traditions such as Taoism, 
Confucianism, Zoroastrianism, Jainism, Sikhism, Shintoism, etc., besides multitudes of Tribal 
Traditions. Most of these religions are soteriological in character. They offer interpretations of 
the Absolute, the universe, the human person and his/her existential situation, the concepts of 
which sometimes conflict with one another. It is in this religious context that the Church in Asia 
is challenged – leave alone other contrasting differences that exist among peoples, cultures, and 
the circumstances and details of life – and still lives and bears witness to Jesus Christ.1337 
Given the scope of this work, to deliberate into the whole reality of Asia is a mountainous task. 
The research will restrict itself to India, which is one part of South Asia and is a subcontinent 
in itself with a population over a billion. India is also the birthplace of some of the great religions 
of the world. It has given birth to newer religions too. Although Hinduism is the predominant 
religion with over an 800 million, “India is also the second biggest Muslim country in the world, 
the current count of Indian Muslims being 120 million. Christians number 25 million and Sikhs 
18 million, each bigger than the total population of several countries. Nearly 80 per cent of the 
world’s Zoroastrians live in India.”1338 There are also “the pre- and non-Aryan peoples – the 
Dravidians, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes – who together constitute nearly 50 per cent 
of the population of India”.1339  
With regard to the cultural diversity, there are twenty-two officially recognized languages in 
the county.1340 Although “Rich in religion and culture, highly advanced in science and 
                                                 
1335 E. Stanley JONES, Mahatma Gandhi. An Interpretation, Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, New York Nashville 
1948, 51-52. Addition by author. Cf. Jose THACHIL, “Attitudes and Practice – Gandhian Ethics as a Model”, in: 
Jeev 32/192 (2002) 490-498; 495-496. Jose Thachil is an Indian Philosopher. 
1336 Cf. CAMPOS, “Doing Christian Ethics in India’s…”, 82. 
1337 Cf. SYNOD OF Bishops, “Special Assembly for Asia. Jesus Christ the Saviour and His Mission of Love and 
Service in Asia: “[...] That they may have Life and have it abundantly” (Jn 10: 10) Instrumentum Laboris”, in: 
L’Osservatore Romano, Weekly Edition in English, Special Insert, 25 February 1988, No.7. 
1338 T. K. OOMMEN, “Futures India: society, nation-state, civilization”, in: Futures 36/8 (2004) 745-755; 750. 
See also IDEM, State and Society in India. Studies in Nation Building, Sage Publications, New Delhi 1990, 126. At 
the census 2001, at the national level, of 1028 million population, 828 million (80.5%) have returned their religion 
as Hindus, followed by 138 million (13.4%) as Muslims, 24 million (2.3%) as Christians, 19 million (1.9%) as 
Sikh religion, 8 million (0.80%) are Buddhists and 4.2 million (0.4%) are Jains. In addition, over 6 million belong 
to “Other Religions and Persuasions” including tribal religions, which are not part of the six main religions 
mentioned. See Jayanth Kumar BHANTIA, The First Report on Religion Data, REGISTRAR GENERAL & CENSUS 
COMMISSIONER, New Delhi 2004, xvii. 
1339 T. K. OOMMEN, “Conceptualising Nation and Nationality in South Asia”, in: S. L. SHARMA/T. K. OOMMEN 
(ed.), Nation and National Identity in South Asia, Orient Longman Private Limited, New Delhi 20022, 3. 
1340 Cf. K. M. MATHEW (ed.), Manorama Yearbook 2006, Malayala Manorama Press Kottayam 2006, 507. 
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technology”, yet “India is also a country with massive poverty, large-scale illiteracy, and a 
dehumanizing caste system.”1341 
Given this large cultural diversity, the challenge is thus set forth in an endeavour in this 
research, namely, “to try to weave the various strands of wisdom from these religions and little 
traditions together with the insights of Christian theology into a comprehensive moral 
discourse”.1342 In this context, one can raise a question as to what type of ethical approach one 
needs to take in order to attempt at a dialogue with other religions. The guidance given by Lobo 
could be helpful. In his own words: 
Christians should not hesitate to accept the possibility that some non-Christians might have 
developed some deeper moral insights. If natural morality is knowable through human 
reason, there is no reason why non-Christians may not at times have a clear vision in some 
areas, the strengthening grace of the Holy Spirit being available also to them. Besides, today, 
if the precept of universal brotherhood is accepted, at least in principle, by all, the Christian 
must see in it the fulfillment of the aspirations of every man as well as a victory of the Gospel 
that has acted as leaven all these centuries.1343 
Therefore, it is important in the discourse on human dignity to have a wider understanding 
between the ethical systems of different religions. “For a Christian who realizes the universality 
of the Gospel message, there should be no question of opposing Christian ethics, say, to Hindu 
ethics.”1344 When Thomas could express the Gospel message in Aristotelian terms, so also a 
similar possibility of expressing in Hindu terms exists. This is crucial now because one needs 
to “be liberated from a Western problematic which is also becoming increasingly difficult”.1345  
As Lobo rightly acknowledged: “Christians would be impoverishing their lives if they were 
satisfied with a certain philosophical ethic derived only from human wisdom. They would 
deprive the non-Christian of the rich insights concerning man and his vocation which their faith 
offers them.”1346  
Hence, motivated by the above inspirations, the approach would be one of a search for the riches 
that are found in other religions. In pursuing this cause, given the magnitude and diversity of 
religions in India, only one major religion of India will be handled in this Part IV, namely, 
Hinduism and their understanding of human dignity as well as their application of the concept 
to the beginning of life. 
In order to better clarify the approach in this work, Part IV is divided into five Chapters. Chapter 
14 will deal with the basic notions from a classical Hindu Perspective. The following Chapter 
15 will deal once again from a classical Hindu perspective with the bioethical and the beginning 
of life issues. Chapter 16 will engage in the theological system in Hinduism, namely, the 
Vedānta System. Contemporary Hinduism and Human Dignity will be taken up in Chapter 17. 
In this Chapter, the concept of human dignity as understood by the Reformers and practiced by 
them ever since the Hindu Renaissance will be deliberated. The final Chapter 18 will dedicate 
                                                 
1341 CAMPOS, “Doing Christian Ethics in India’s...”, 82. 
1342 Ibid., 89. 
1343 LOBO, Guide to Christian Living..., 70. 
1344 Ibid., 21. 
1345 Cf. ibid., 22. 
1346 Ibid., 67. 
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to questions pertaining to the contemporary praxis of Bioethics in India today. A separate 
section on the Indian Constitution will be considered there as an Excursus.
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C H A P T E R  1 4  
CLASSICAL HINDU PERSPECTIVE I: BASIC NOTIONS 
14.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Second Vatican Council gave a basis for a Catholic approach to Hinduism in Nostra Aetate 
2. It says:  
Thus in Hinduism men contemplate the divine mystery and express it through an unspent 
fruitfulness of myths and through searching philosophical inquiry. They seek release from 
the anguish of our condition through ascetical practices or deep meditation or a loving, 
trusting flight toward God. 
The above statement clearly points to certain aspects of Hinduism, which will be considered in 
this Chapter in order to derive the theme of the research on human dignity. These themes are: 
the pursuit of mokṣa (‘release from the anguish of our condition’), the intellectual pursuit 
through traditions like Vedānta and Yoga (‘through searching philosophical inquiry’), the 
devotional theism or bhakti (‘a loving, trusting flight toward God’) and the rich and diverse 
narrative traditions, which Hindus cherish (‘an unspent fruitfulness of myths’).1347 
In particular, while dealing with beginning of life issues and human dignity, the guidance given 
by Nostra Aetate 1, may be useful, namely: 
What is man? What is the meaning and purpose of our life? [...].What, finally, is that ultimate 
and unutterable mystery which engulfs our being, and whence we take our rise, and whither 
our journey leads us? 
The questions raised above pertain to the human being and his/her quest to find out from his/her 
own religion for answers to the fundamental questions facing human life. In this Chapter, 
answers given by Hinduism to these universal human questions will be attempted. 
Consequently, the way Hinduism understands the concept of human dignity will be 
interpreted.1348 
At the outset, one must acknowledge that one cannot find the concept of human dignity in 
Hinduism because the concept “human” does not exist. Moreover, the concept “human being” 
would have no specificity or moral significance because the term is not even recognized as a 
descriptive category.1349 Therefore, the term “man”, as is often used by Hindu writers to mean 
the human being, whether female or male will be used. In the absence of a clear concept of 
human dignity as in the West, an attempt would be to find out those variables, for example, 
worth, value, respect, etc., that are somewhat similar in their meaning with the concept of 
human dignity that could be helpful in a dialogue with Hinduism. 
This Chapter on Classical Hindu Perspective will deal first with the sacred texts and philosophy 
in Hinduism. Topics like the concept of “man”, “person”, social ethics, rebirth and dignity will 
be handled in this Chapter. These clarifications will help deliberate in the next Chapter 
                                                 
1347 Cf. GANERI, “Catholicism and Hinduism…”, 123. Martin Ganeri, a promoter of Hindu-Christian dialogue, 
warns that the passage from Nostra Aetate 2 should be read in the wider context of the document along with other 
Conciliar documents regarding the teaching of the Church in its relationship with other religions. Cf. ibid. 
1348 Cf. ibid. 
1349 Cf. Jack DONNELLY, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Second Edition, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca and London 2003, 91. 
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regarding the understanding of man and his/her beginning of life from a medical and 
philosophical perspective based on Ayurveda. 
14.2 THE SACRED TEXTS AND PHILOSOPHY 
Hinduism is known as “Sanātana Dharma”.1350 It is said that Hinduism is more a philosophy 
than a religion because philosophy and religion are blend in one. Louis Renou, a French 
Indologist, aptly describes this in his book on Hinduism: “Philosophy in India involves men; it 
aims at practical results. Thus, it constitutes an approach toward religion or, better still, is an 
integral part of religion.”1351 This could be the reason why, “Hinduism knows no distinction 
between philosophy and religion.”1352 Since the classical Hindu view involves scriptures, 
religion and philosophy, the sacred Texts of Hindus will be dealt first. 
14.2.1 The Sacred Texts 
For the purposes of this research, the Sacred Texts, by which is meant the Sanskrit texts of the 
Hindus, ranging from 600 B.C.E. 600 C.E, will be dealt. The two most important texts are ṡruti 
and smṛti. Ṡruti1353 means that which has been heard and communicated from the beginning. It 
represents the revealed canonical scriptures of the Hindus, comprising of the Veda.1354 
The Veda is divisible into three strata, namely, Saṁhitās, which are collections of hymns and 
formulas, the Brāhmaṇas, which are sacrificial texts, and Āraṇyakas, which are forest treaties 
                                                 
1350 The Skt. words ‘sanātana’ means eternal and ‘dharma’, which is difficult to translate into English, means 
“the values of life that sustain”. Thus, “sanātana dharma” means “the religion based on the eternal sustaining 
values of life”. CENTRAL CHINMAYA MISSION TRUST, Hinduism. That is Sanatana Dharma, Central Chinmaya 
Mission Trust, Bombay 2007, 6. 
1351 Louis RENOU (ed.), Hinduism, George Braziller, New York 1961, 40. German tr. from Louis RENOU, Der 
Hinduismus, aus dem Französischen übertragen von Siglinde Summerer und Gerda Kurz, Edito-Service, Genf 
1972, 43. Cf. David MILLER, “The guru as the centre of sacredness”, in: Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 
6 (1977) 527-533; 527. 
1352 Durga Das BASU, The Essence of Hinduism, Second Edition, Prentice-Hall of India, New Delhi 2002, 3. 
Cf. also Troy Wilson ORGAN, Hinduism. Its Historical Development, New York 1974, 11. 
1353 Skt. from the root ṡru means to hear, listen or attend to anything, give ear to anyone. Cf. Monier MONIER-
WILLIAMS, Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Etymologically and Philologically Arranged with Special Reference to 
Cognate Indo-European languages, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1960, 1100. Hereafter abbreviated as MWM. 
1354 The word Veda means wisdom and is related to the English ‘wit’ and the German ‘wissen’. Wisdom here 
means absolute, intuitive, and esoteric wisdom as distinguished from discursive knowledge, either rational or 
empirical. Cf. ORGAN, Hinduism…, 56. The word Veda in singular means the sacred knowledge and sacred 
wisdom contained in the revealed texts, which forms the primary authority in religious matters. In the plural it 
refers to the four Vedas: Ṛg Veda (verses used during sacrifices), Sāma Veda (comprising of chants or melodies), 
Yajur Veda (collection of sacrificial formulae), and finally Atharva Veda (collection of magical formulae). Cf. 
Mariasusai DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism, Documenta Missionalia 15, Università Gregoriana Editrice, Roma 
1982, 5, at fn. 1. According to Mariasusai Dhavamony, a Professor of Theology and History of Religions at the 
Gregorian University and former consultant to the Pontifical Council for interreligious dialogue, two different 
theologies explain the authority and nature of the Veda as containing revealed doctrine. 1. Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta 
system holds that the Veda is not only infallible but also eternal. The Vedas adopt a non-dualist position, i.e. the 
soul realizes its complete identity with the Absolute. 2. The Nyāya and Sāṁkhya system, which reject the eternity 
of the Veda, base the authority of the Veda on God’s authorship, while depending on God for its existence and 
validity. In the Sāṁkhya system, the soul realizes only the unfractionable unity of itself, i.e. the soul is very distinct 
from all other souls without any communion between them. Cf. ibid., 17-19. Cf. Robert Charles ZAEHNER, 
“Salvation in the Mahābhārata”, in: Samuel G. F. BRANDON (ed.), The Saviour God. Comparative studies in the 
concept of salvation presented to Edwin Oliver James by colleagues and friends to commemorate his seventy-fifth 
birthday, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1963, 218-225; 219. 
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that culminate finally in the Upaniṣads.1355 These texts along with Bhagavad-Gītā were 
considered containing sacred knowledge.1356 
Smṛti1357 means that which has been remembered by human teachers. It denotes the oral tradition 
and non-canonical scriptures, which derive their authority from ṡruti and supplement them. 
Under smṛti are the seminal writings on law (Dharmasūtras and Dharmaśāstras)1358, the 
Purānas (sources of folklore and popular religion) and the two great epics, namely, 
Mahābhārata1359 and Rāmāyaṇa1360.1361 
Besides ṡruti and smṛti, the medical works of Caraka and Suśruta will be used. One of the 
earliest oaths in Eastern bioethics can be found in the Indian manuscript namely the Caraka 
Saṁhitā1362 and Suśruta Saṁhitā.1363 Mention is also to be made to the later authority on law: 
the well-known manual, the Manusmṛti or Manava Dharmaśāstra (200 B.C.E. – 200 C.E.), 
attributed to Manu.1364 
                                                 
1355 The Upaniṣads are theological treatises in which the spiritual aspirations of the Indian sages are preserved. 
Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 5. Upaniṣad literally means a mystical “connection” and is often 
“secret”. In a more conventional etymology, it is the “sitting down” of a disciple “near to” his spiritual master or 
guru (upa = near; ni = down; sad = sit). Cf. Alf HILTEBEITEL, “Hinduism”, in: Lindsay JONES (ed.), Encyclopedia 
of Religion, Second Edition, Vol. 6, Thomas Gale, Munich et al. 2005, 3988-4009; 3993. 
1356 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 5. Bhagavad-Gītā (literally “the song of the sublime” or 
Krishna’s song) is part of the epic of Mahābhārata but separated from it and is considered to be the most 
influential, most luminous and authoritative of all Hindu Scriptures. It consists of 18 Chapters and 700 verses. Cf. 
ibid., 6 at fn. 6. Cf. Peter SCHREINER, „Bhagavadgītā”, in: BETZ (u.a.) (Hg.), Religion in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart, op. cit., Bd.1, 1403. Cf. MWM, 744. Cf. also Julius J. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion 
and the Moral Status of the Unborn”, in: Harold G. COWARD/Julius J. LIPNER/Katherine K. YOUNG (ed.), Hindu 
Ethics. Purity, Abortion and Euthanasia, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York 1989, 41-69; 
42-43. Cf. also FABC Papers, No.120, 10. 
1357 Skt. from the root Smṛí which means to remember, to recollect, bear in mind. Cf. MWM, 1271. 
1358 “The term dharma, as mentioned earlier, is difficult to define in the Hindu context. It is the form and the 
power of things that keeps them as they are. The eternal dharma sustains the whole cosmos in being and holds 
together humankind in the moral and religious sphere. The eternal dharma is set down in the Hindu sacred texts 
and includes all the religious assumptions on which the Hindu laws are based.” DHAVAMONY, Classical 
Hinduism…, 6. 
1359 Mahābhārata, written perhaps between the 8th and 9th centuries B.C.E, is one of the Skt. epics of ancient 
India attributed traditionally to the author Vyāsa, also called Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana, a mythical saint who also forms 
a character in it. He is known to have arranged the Vedas and hence known as Veda-Vyāsa, literally meaning 
arranger or compiler of the Vedas. One of the principal work and part of Mahābhārata is the Bhagavad-Gītā, in 
which Kṛṣṇa imparts his teaching to his disciple Arjuna. Cf. Aditya MALIK, „Mahābhārata“, in: BETZ (u.a.) (Hg.), 
Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, op. cit., Bd. 5, 682. Cf. MWM, 1035. Cf. also Barend A. VAN NOOTEN, 
The Mahābhārata, Twayne Publisher, Inc., New York 1971, 43. 
1360 Rāmāyaṇa, in Skt. meaning relating to Rāma, another great epic dating to 5th to the 4th centuries B.C.E, is 
the celebrated poem of sage Valmiki that describes the ‘goings’ [ayana] of Rāma and his wife Sītā. Cf. Annemarie 
MERTENS, „Rāmāyaṇa“, in: BETZ (u.a.) (Hg.), Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, op. cit., Bd. 7, 31. Cf. 
MWM, 878. 
1361 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 6. 
1362 Cf. M. S. VALIATHAN, The Legacy of Caraka, Orient Longmans, Chennai 2003, i. 
1363 Cf. Suśruta Saṁhitā. Text with English Translation, A full and Comprehensive Introduction, Additional 
Text, Different Readings, Notes, Comparative Views, Index, Glossary and Plates, tr. by Kaviraj Kunjalal 
BHISHAGRATNA, ed. by Laxmidhar DWIVEDI, Vol.2, Third Edition, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi 
(India) 2007, xvi. 
1364 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 42-43.  
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14.2.2 The Philosophy 
With regard to Philosophy, the Indian philosophical systems are classified into two categories: 
orthodox (āstika) and heterodox (nāstika). The system that accepts the authority of the Veda is 
orthodox, while the system that does not accept its authority is heterodox. The six orthodox 
systems are Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta, which are also referred 
to as Darśanas and popularly called as the Hindu system of Philosophy. These are grouped into 
three pairs – Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Mīmāṁsā-Vedānta, to show their closeness. 
The three heterodox systems are Buddhism, Jainism and Cārvāka (materialism). It is to be 
remembered that a system can be orthodox and still not believe in the existence of Creator-God, 
just as the Mīmāṁsā and Sāṁkhya.1365 
It is also to be noted that although the Hindu philosophical systems accept the authority of the 
Veda, yet they do make use of reasoning in formulating their philosophical positions. Therefore, 
one cannot conclude that Hindu philosophical systems are dogmatic. It is not only based on the 
scriptural authority as a means of knowledge, but also on philosophy. Moreover, both the 
orthodox and heterodox systems attach importance to tradition as a source of philosophical 
knowledge.1366 The six orthodox systems are described below. 
14.2.2.1 Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika 
The Nyāya epistemology is realistic and accepts four sources of knowledge: perception, 
inference, analogy and verbal testimony. It builds its pluralistic metaphysics based on realism, 
which holds that the objects of the world have an independent existence of their own, apart 
from all knowledge or experience believing in the reality of the external world, the existence of 
plurality of individuals, and the Creator-God.1367 
The Vaiśeṣika system is realistic in epistemology and pluralistic in metaphysics accepting only 
two sources of knowledge: perception and inference. The system holds that the composite 
objects of the world are products of four kinds of atoms: earth, water, fire and air. While the 
system combines realism and pluralism with theism, it holds that the world is created and 
destroyed by God according to the moral deserts of individual souls and for the proper 
realization of their moral destiny.1368 
14.2.2.2 Sāṁkhya and Yoga 
The epistemology of both systems of Sāṁkhya and Yoga, which are realistic, is based on three 
sources of knowledge: perception, inference and verbal testimony. The Sāṁkhya system accepts 
only two ultimate entities, namely, spirit (puruṣa) and primal matter (prakṛti) and accounts for 
the evolution of the world from primal matter. The Yoga system, which follows closely the 
metaphysics of Sāṁkhya, accepts God as the object of meditation. While devotion to God was 
                                                 
1365 Cf. R. BALASUBRAMANIAN, “The Origin of the World, the Concept of God, and the Image of the Human 
Person in Hinduism”, in: Peter KOSLOWSKI (ed.), The Concept of God, the Origin of the World, and the Image of 
the Human in the World Religions, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London 2001, 11-42; 11. For 
a brief summary of the orthodox systems, see ibid, 12-14. 
1366 Cf. BALASUBRAMANIAN, “The Origin of the World…”, 11. 
1367 Cf. ibid., 12. 
1368 Cf. ibid., 12-13. 
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considered to be of great practical value, the practice of yoga is one of the means for the final 
attainment of the goal of samādhi (state of trance or concentration).1369  
While the Sāṁkhya system denies the existence of a creator God and is, therefore, an atheistic 
philosophy, the Yoga system teaches the existence of a creator Cod and is, thus, a theistic 
philosophy.1370 In Sanskrit, Yoga literally means “yoke”, as in a yoke used to harness oxen.1371 
It refers to an organized form of discipline that leads to moksha (liberation), namely, the release 
of the soul from cycle of death and rebirth (samsara). This discipline usually involves practices 
of meditation, mental concentration, exercises of the body including both ones of control and 
asceticism leading to union with the self (ātman).1372 Yoga outlines an eight fold path (Astāṅga 
- aṣṭa = eight and aṅga = limbs) to achieve this goal that includes: self-regulation (yama), 
disciplines (niyama), postures (asana), expansion of the breath (prāṇāyāma), withdrawal of 
senses (pratyahāra), concentration (dhāraṇā), meditation (dhyāna) and realization/integration 
(samādhi).1373 
14.2.2.3 Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta 
The primary aim of Mīmāṁsā system is to defend and justify the Vedic ritualism. Apart from 
what the Nyāya system acknowledges as the sources of knowledge, it accepts two other sources, 
namely, postulation and non-cognition. It believes in the reality of the external world, the 
existence of souls, heaven, hell and gods to whom sacrifices are to be offered according to Vedic 
prescriptions. The souls and material elements that make the world are eternal.1374 
The Vedānta school concerns itself with the end (anta) of the Vedas and particularly with 
knowledge and mokṣa (liberation). The system comprises of further systems under it, the most 
popular being the dualism (dvaita1375), non-dualism (advaita1376) and qualified non-dualism 
(viśiṣṭādvaita1377).1378 
Non-Dualism (advaita) believes that the ultimate reality is bráhman (Absolute Reality or God) 
and he alone is the only true existence while all creation is merely a manifestation of bráhman 
in time and space. The root cause of all suffering in this world is due to the soul’s ignorance of 
its real nature and therefore, the purpose of life is to release oneself from this suffering and 
union with bráhman. One can obtain release from suffering by understanding one’s true nature 
(self-knowledge). Qualified Non-Dualism (viśiṣṭādvaita) considers bráhman to be impersonal, 
                                                 
1369 Cf. ibid., 13. 
1370 Cf. Farnáz MA‘SÚMIÁN, Life after Death. A Study of the Afterlife in World Religions, Kalimat Press, 
California 2002, 1. 
1371 Yoga in Skt. means the act of yoking, joining, attaching or harnessing. Cf. MWM, 856. 
1372 Cf. The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, Translated from the Sanskrit with an outline of the Philosophy of 
the Upanishads and an Annotated Bibliography, tr. by Robert Ernest HUME, Humphrey Milford Oxford University 
Press, London et al.1921, 68. 
1373 Yoga Sūtra 2.29: “yama-niyamāsana-prāṇāyāma-pratyahāra-dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhayo‘ṣṭāv aṅgāni.” 
Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali with Expositions of Vyāsa, a tr. and commentary by Swāmi VEDA BHĀRATĪ, Motilal 
Banarasidas, Mumbai et al. 2001, 469. 
1374 Cf. BALASUBRAMANIAN, “The Origin of the World…”, 13. 
1375 Skt. meaning doubleness or duality. Cf. MWM, 504. 
1376 Skt. meaning without a second, sole, unique, matchless. Cf. MWM, 19. 
1377 In Skt., the prefix viśiṣṭ means distinguished, distinct, particular or peculiar. Viśiṣṭādvaita means qualified 
non-duality, the doctrine that the spirits of men have a qualified identity with the one Spirit. Cf. MWM, 990. 
1378 Cf. BALASUBRAMANIAN, “The Origin of the World…”, 13. 
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transcendent, indescribable, and the essence of pure consciousness. According to this view at 
some point in history, bráhman transformed Himself into a personal God (Īśvara), the universe, 
and all the individual selves. The human self (ātman) is in bondage because of its alienation 
from this personal God, and one can free oneself only by attempting to communicate with 
God.1379 
Dualism (dvaita) considers bráhman as a personal God who is the creator of everything. 
However, it regards the world of creation as real but separate from bráhman and dependent on 
Him for its existence. The system attributes the bondage of the human soul to its forgetfulness 
of its creator, and believes that liberation can be achieved through communion with God.1380 
14.3 THE CONCEPT OF MAN 
The roots of the concept of God, the concept of man or the world in Hinduism must be traced 
back to the primal mythology of the Vedic times.1381 The Vedic religion was a system of rich 
ritualistic cult and a complicated system of sacrifices. The Vedas explain that the universe is a 
consequence of a great cosmological sacrifice. In the Vedic times (from 1200 B.C.E.), the 
sacrifice was the most important of all religious ceremonies. For the religion of the Vedic 
Indians at that time, sacrifice played a very prominent role.1382 Sacrifice was considered as the 
hub of the universe.1383 There were two representative basic forms of sacrifice, namely, the 
Soma-sacrifice and Fire-sacrifice.1384 An authority on the importance of sacrifice is the Ṛg Veda, 
which is a collection of hymns of prayer and praise to gods. It records the Hindu religious 
thoughts while trying to penetrate the ultimate origin of cosmos and of man in a system of 
sacrifice. The Ṛg Veda speaks about Manu,1385 the first man, the ancestor of human race and the 
first sacrificer of fire. Having kindled the fire, he along with seven other priests offers the first 
sacrifice, which becomes the prototype and exemplary model of all other sacrifices.1386 The 
primal man Manu sought the help of gods1387 through prayer and worship, adoration and rituals, 
because he thought of them as the unseen powers that controlled nature and other beings.1388 
                                                 
1379 Cf. MA‘SÚMIÁN, Life after Death…, 2. The terms ātman and bráhman, being important central concepts 
in the research, will be taken up later in detail, especially in Chapters 14.4 and 14.4.1 below. 
1380 Cf. MA‘SÚMIÁN, Life after Death…, 2. 
1381 Cf. BALASUBRAMANIAN, “The Origin of the World…”, 33. Cf. also Louis RENOU, Religions of Ancient 
India, The Athlone Press, London 1953, 17. 
1382 Cf. Ulrich SCHNEIDER, Einführung in den Hinduismus, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 
1989, 37. 
1383 Cf. Bernard KÖLVER, Das Weltbild der Hindus, hg. v. Adalbert J., GAIL, Reimer, Berlin 2003, 62. 
1384 Cf. SCHNEIDER, Einführung in den Hinduismus…, 37. Soma is a deity and the juice of the Soma plant was 
offered in libation to the deities in the Soma-sacrifice in a Vedic ritual. Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 
46 and 121. Fire-Sacrifice, in Skt. hóma which means the act of making an oblation to the deities or gods by casting 
clarified butter into the fire, oblation with fire, burnt-offering, any oblation or sacrifice. Cf. MWM, 1306. 
1385 Skt. could be masc./fem./neut. and means thinking, wise, intelligent, man, humankind, man par excellence. 
Cf. MWM, 784. 
1386 Ṛg Veda 10.63.7. Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 112-113. Cf. also SCHNEIDER, Einführung in 
den Hinduismus…, 24. 
1387 The Vedic gods were divided into three groups: the gods of the earth (Agni = fire and Soma = moon or 
water); the gods of the atmosphere (Indra and Maruts); and the gods of heaven (Mitra and varuṇa). Thus, the 
Vedic gods were personified natural phenomena. Cf. BALASUBRAMANIAN, “The Origin of the World…”, 33. 
1388 Cf. ibid. 
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The ritual itself was identified with Manu as an “analogy of magical temporal dimension” and 
the sacrifice gained complete magical power.1389 
Thus, it is clear that the universe and the human race emerged from sacrifice and they are 
regarded as of divine origin and as a descent from deities or gods.1390 Although it was considered 
that gods are the agents of creation, the material used is that of the body of a Primaeval giant 
(comparable to the Germanic Ymir), named Puruṣa (who is the same as “Manu”).1391 Creation 
is said to be a product of ritual, sacrificial dismemberment of Puruṣa.1392 Puruṣa-Sūkta 10.90.8-
14, which is part of the Ṛg Veda, speaks of the characteristics of Puruṣa: 
1. A THOUSAND heads hath Purusha, a thousand eyes, a thousand feet.  
On every side pervading earth he fills a space ten fingers wide.  
2. This Purusha is all that yet hath been and all that is to be;  
The Lord of Immortality which waxes greater still by food.  
3. So mighty is his greatness; yea, greater than this is Purusha.  
All creatures are one-fourth of him, three-fourths eternal life in heaven.  
4. With three-fourths Purusha went up: one-fourth of him again was here. 
Thence he strode out to every side over what eats not and what eats […] 
6. When Gods prepared the sacrifice with Purusha as their offering,  
Its oil was spring, the holy gift was autumn; summer was the wood.  
7. They balmed as victim on the grass Purusha born in earliest time.  
With him the Deities and all Sādhyas and Ṛiṣhis sacrificed.  
8. From that great general sacrifice the dripping fat was gathered up.  
He formed the creatures of the air, and animals both wild and tame […]  
11. When they divided Purusha how many portions did they make?  […]  
14. Forth from his navel came mid-air the sky was fashioned from his head;  
Earth from his feet, and from his ear the regions. Thus they formed the worlds […] 
15.  […]When the Gods, offering sacrifice, bound, as their victim, Purusha.  
16. Gods, sacrificing, sacrificed the victim: these were the earliest holy ordinances.  
The Mighty Ones attained the height of heaven, there where  
the Sādhyas, Gods of old, are dwelling.1393 
                                                 
1389 Cf. SCHNEIDER, Einführung in den Hinduismus…, 40. 
1390 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 114. 
1391 Skt. means man, male, human being, in plural people, mankind, a person, the Primaeval man as the soul 
and original source of the universe. Cf. MWM, 637. Cf. Axel MICHAELS, Der Hinduismus. Geschichte und 
Gegenwart, C. H. Beck, München 1998, 317. English tr.: IDEM, Hinduism. Past and Present, tr. by Barbara 
HARSHAV, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 2004, 286. As will become clear, the concept of Puruṣa is a 
very important one from the research point of view and therefore will be dealt with elaborately under Chapter 
14.4.2. 
1392 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 115.  
1393 Ṛg Veda 10.90.8-14. from The Hymns of the Rigveda, tr. with a Popular Commentary by Ralph Thomas 
Hotchkin GRIFFITH, Second Edition, Vol. II, E. J. Lazarus & Co., Benares 1897, 517-520. Ralph Thomas Hotchkin 
Griffith commenting in a footnote about the characteristics of Puruṣa says that he is the “embodied spirit, or Man 
personified and regarded as the soul and original source of the universe, the personal and life-giving principle in 
all animated beings […] as being one with all created life”. Ibid., 517, at fn. 12. For a German tr. of the Puruṣa-
Sūkta, see SCHNEIDER, Einführung in den Hinduismus…, 43-44. Note that some authors write Puruṣa as Purusha. 
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The above hymn portrays Puruṣa as the creator and as one who is himself sacrificed.1394 One 
can derive two important religious truths from the hymn: 
 […] since creation is a sacrifice, every other sacrifice on earth is a repetition and renewal of 
the creative act; and that the macrocosmic man (Purusha) is the prototype of the microcosmic 
man (the individual human being). This gives us an insight into the ontological structure of 
the individual man.1395 
Thus, an individual man is considered as the image of the Primaeval Man (Puruṣa), “whose 
three-fourths are spiritual and immortal or divine, and one-fourth is material and mortal. Hence 
the individual man is the image of God and of the world”.1396 The continued orderly existence 
of the universe and of man thus depends on every renewed sacrifice on the microcosmic 
level.1397 The Vedic thinker considered that the spiritual or immaterial soul could separate itself 
from the body, even during unconsciousness and continue to exist after death. Insofar as the 
individual man is spiritual, he is also an image of the divine.1398 The term used to denote the 
immaterial soul is ātman1399 and is used in Ṛg Veda as an animating principle,1400 the ultimate 
essence of the universe, and for the vital breath in man.1401 This important term has no equivalent 
etymological correspondence in the Western philosophy.1402 There are also two other technical 
terms ásu1403 and mānasá1404 used to denote the animating principle.1405 However, a more 
common and important term that is used to signify the individual soul is the word jīva.1406 
                                                 
1394 Cf. MICHAELS, Der Hinduismus…, 317. English tr. IDEM, Hinduism; Past and Present…, 288. Classical 
Indologist Axel Michaels explains that just as a single cell contains the genetic code of the whole living creature, 
so too the whole (world) is contained in the part (sacrifice). This is because of the essential identity between the 
part and the whole. Cf. ibid. 
1395 DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 115-116. Cf. also KÖLVER, Das Weltbild der Hindus…, 69. 
1396 DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 116. Cf. Ṛg Veda 10.90.8-14. Cf. HILTEBEITEL, “Hinduism…”, 
3993. 
1397 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 116. Cf. Arthur Llewellyn BASHAM, The Origins & the 
Development of Classical Hinduism, Oxford University Press, Delhi et al. 1989, 30. 
1398 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 117. 
1399 The Skt. word ātman is variously derived from an (which means to breathe); āt (which means to move); 
vā (which means to blow) or tmán (which means the breath) and could mean soul, principle of life and sensation 
in the Ṛg Veda. In the Atharva Veda and others, it could mean as the individual soul, self, abstract individual. A 
similar implication can be seen in the Greek terms ἀυ…τμήν, which means to blow or breath and ἀτμός, which means 
vapor. A closer term is the one from the German noun Atem, which means breath and the verb atmen, which means 
to breathe. Cf. MWM, 135. Since this word ātman is important, it will be dealt with elaborately in Chapter 14.4.1 
and throughout this research. 
1400 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 117. 
1401 Cf. Surendranath DASGUPTA, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.1, University Press, Cambridge, First 
Published 1922, Digital Print 2009, 45. 
1402 Cf. Katrin SEELE, „Das bist du!“. Das „Selbst (ātman) und das „Andere“ in der Philosophie der frühen 
Upaniṣaden und bei Buddha, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2006, 9. 
1403 Skt. in the Vedas it means breath, life. Cf. MWM, 121. 
1404 Skt. means belonging to the mind or spirit, mental, spiritual, expressed only in the mind. Cf. MWM, 810. 
1405 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 117. 
1406 Skt. meaning to living, existing, alive. Cf. MWM, 422. This term, being important, will be dealt with in 
the next section (14.4.4). 
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It is also regarded that Agni1407, the god of fire, consumes the sacrificial offering and as a priest 
presents it to the gods; thus becoming the mediator between gods and men.1408 Thus, Agni begets 
the offspring of men.1409 
During the period of the Brāhmaṇas, the theme of the Primal Man becomes even more 
important under the traits of Prajāpati1410 who is the same as Puruṣa and the same as sacrifice.1411 
The sacrifice itself is meant to reintegrate this Prajāpati in order to secure the wholesomeness 
of world and man by becoming himself all in all (sárva1412).1413 
Further, in the Upaniṣadic period, the term ātman was used with a complementary concept, 
namely, the bráhman. This term, which is often denoted with an adjective sárva or Absolute 
Being, has no complementary concept, just as ātman, in the Western Philosophy.1414 The self of 
man (ātman) was considered not just as a part but identical with the Absolute universal being 
(bráhman). During this period, sacrifice still had importance but was not an essential requisite 
of religion and of salvation. In its place, importance was given to knowledge, which secures 
release. “This change of outlook takes place in as much as the sacrificial conception of man 
yields to the metaphysical understanding of his nature.”1415 Man was considered a sacrifice and 
the person’s entire life was symbolically represented as a Soma-sacrifice. The individual man 
(Puruṣa), who is identified with the Self (ātman) of man, was considered as composed of desire 
resulting in the law of action (karma1416) and the cycle of rebirth (saṁsāra1417) as well as the 
ultimate ground of the manifold world and of the individual.1418 
Dhavamony summarizes the central religio-philosophical doctrine of the Upaniṣads regarding 
the conception of man as follows: 
                                                 
1407 Skt. literally means fire, sacrificial fire or the god of fire. Compare also with the Latin ignis. Cf. MWM, 5. 
1408 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 45. 
1409 Cf. ibid., 114. 
1410 The word Prajāpati appears in Yajur Veda 18.43. The word Prajāpati in Skt. is from the root Prajā, which 
means procreation, propagation and birth. In the Ṛg Veda, it means a creature, animal, man, humankind, people, 
seed and semen. In the Ṛg Veda, along with the word pati, it means ‘lord of creatures’ or creator. Cf. MWM, 658. 
Cf. also KÖLVER, Das Weltbild der Hindus…, 166. 
1411 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 119. 
1412 Skt. means whole, entire, all, everything. Cf. MWM, 1184. 
1413 Cf. Richard V. DE SMET, The Indian Understanding of Man. History of Philosophy Section. Presidential 
Address. 44th Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, under the auspices of University of Poona, 5-8 
November, Poona 1970, 3-12; 4. Richard De Smet (1916-1997) was a Belgian Jesuit Indologist and Philosopher 
and a Professor at De Nobili College, Pune. 
1414 Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 9. 
1415 DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 121. 
1416 According to the universal law of immanent retribution, every good act meets with reward and every evil 
act meets with punishment in strict justice either in this life or in the next and therefore the law demands that a 
man be reborn to reap the fruit of his action. This is the law of karma. See Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.2-6; 
3.2.13. Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 134. 
1417 Saṁsāra or cycle of rebirth is a wheel of life in which man is caught up due to “desire, anger, delusion, 
covetousness, fear, depression, envy, union with undesirable and separation from desirable, hunger, thirst, old age, 
death, disease and sorrow”. See DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 444. In other words, saṁsāra is a belief in 
multiple lifetimes of existence both in the past and in future due to desire. These lifetimes are determined by the 
quality of present life based on the quality of one’s past life (especially one’s moral life) as led in previous lifetimes 
(karma). It is thus possible to improve one’s quality of life over several lives and attain a better rebirth. See Arvind 
SHARMA, “The Hindu Traditions. Religious Beliefs and Healthcare Decisions”, in: Religious Traditions and 
Healthcare Decisions. Handbook Series, Park Ridge Center for the Study of Health, Faith and Ethics, Park Ridge, 
Illinois 2002, 1-17; 2. 
1418 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 122-123. 
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The World-Soul (ātman) or Brahman is the one, simple, eternal, infinite, incomprehensible 
Reality which assumes every form and name, itself without any form or name; the only cause 
of all change and action, itself immovable and immutable. The world is its manifestation, its 
body; for the world emanates from, and is absorbed into, its substance by an act of its will, 
just as the spider spins forth and draws back into itself the thread of its web. All finite 
existences proceed from it and return to it, as sparks leap from the furnace and fall back into 
it again. The multiplicity of these emanations no more affects its own inner unity than the 
formation of the foam and the wave affects that of the sea. The absolute Reality cannot be 
described in spatial and temporal terms. We can only say, ‘more minute than the minute, 
greater than the great, infinite’. Still it has a dwelling, the cavity of the heart of every man in 
which it resides in its fulness. Because of this direct and spatial immanence of the absolute 
being in creatures, man can attain to it by reentering his heart through intense meditation. 
A human body which, though ‘appropriated to death’, is nevertheless the support of the 
immortal, incorporeal Self (ātman), is itself a sprout rooted in food which, through water and 
heat, is rooted in Being. On death the self rejoins the ‘highest divinity’ which is Being.1419 
The immortal self becomes incarnate in bodily form and passes its individual condition through 
a series of states of consciousness. The individual soul, according to the Upaniṣads consists of 
four stages. These are explained as “waking, dream sleep, deep sleep, i.e., dreamless sleep in 
which the soul becomes temporarily one with Brahman and enjoys a corresponding 
unsurpassable bliss, and finally the ‘fourth’ state in which the disappearance of the manifold 
universe and the union with Brahman takes place in perfect consciousness”.1420 
Thus, according to the Upaniṣads it was considered that man in his essence is a purely spiritual 
self (ātman) independent of the material body. The spiritual self (ātman) is either totally 
identical with the Absolute Being (bráhman) or a part or attribute existing in God, the supreme 
personal Being.1421 
In the Epic of Rāmāyaṇa (which revolves around the personality and doings of the ‘Ideal Man’ 
Rāma who is loyal, patient in affliction, obedient to higher authority, the ideal husband, son, 
and brother, and the chastiser of evil powers), the human soul is considered immortal, not 
meaning a cessation from rebirth, but a blissful existence in heaven (svarga). The corporeality 
of man includes the five elements (panchatatvaṁ āpanne) of earth, air, ether, water and light. 
However, man is not merely a corporeal being composed only of these five elements but a 
composite of material and spiritual constituents. Thus, one can find an emerging form of 
Sāṁkhya philosophy in the Rāmāyaṇa.1422 
In the Epic of Mahābhārata (excluding the Bhagavad-Gītā), the religio-philosophical concept 
of man developed as follows: There is a Supreme Being, called Person (puruṣa) or Self (ātman) 
or the Absolute (bráhman) emanating and reabsorbing both material Nature (prakṛti1423) and 
souls (puruṣas). A plurality of souls is assumed and the liberated soul is indwelled by the 
Supreme Self from which it had originally proceeded. The individual soul is pervaded by the 
                                                 
1419 Ibid., 124-125. 
1420 Ibid., 125. 
1421 Cf. ibid., 134. 
1422 Cf. ibid., 127.  
1423 Skt. word which literally means ‘making or placing before or at first’, primal matter, primary substance. It 
is distinguished from puruṣa and ātman. The three guṇas are its qualities (see next fn.1424). Cf. MWM, 654. 
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Supreme Self (sarvātman) and be the three constituents (guṇas1424) such as goodness or purity 
(sattva), passion or energy (rajas) and darkness or dullness (tamas).1425 Moreover, the unity of 
man with God as Father is clearly portrayed in the acclamation: “I am the Father, the Mother 
and the Son; I am in the heart of every man and I am the soul of all”.1426 Thus, in the 
Mahābhārata a neat Sāṁkhya system or an extreme non-dualist position is rarely adopted.1427 
The Bhagavad-Gītā teaches that the embodied self is in itself immortal because it has being 
outside of time and hence is not subject to birth and death.1428 Commenting and using the 
Bhagavad-Gītā, Dhavamony explains the attributes of the self in the following words: 
The self in its inmost essence is “eternal omnipresent (literally, roving everywhere), fixed, 
immovable, primeval.” Not only does the self transcend time and space, birth and death, but 
also it is a ‘minute part of God himself’[…]1429 yet in so far as it becomes linked with a 
psychosomatic organism it is subject to rebirth […]1430 although the individual self in itself 
is static, timeless, eternal, it is indissolubly connected with a given human personality when 
it transmigrates from body to body […]1431 in itself the self is both static and passive, for it 
cannot act or begin to act since action belongs to the sphere of material Nature. The self can 
be said to act only in so far as it is linked with a psychosomatic organism […]1432 Because 
the self “attaches itself to the psychosomatic elements, it comes to birth in good and evil 
wombs.”1433 
In the Bhagavad-Gītā, early Sāṁkhya ideas with regard to the nature of the psychosomatic 
organism of man is found. According to this system, Matter (prakṛti) and Spirit (puruṣa) are 
totally distinct and independent principles. However, Bhagavad-Gītā differs in this idea insofar 
                                                 
1424 Skt. guṇa literally means a quality, peculiarity, attribute or property. Here it means chief quality of all 
existing beings (viz. sattva, rajas and tamas i.e., goodness, passion and darkness or virtue, foulness and ignorance). 
Cf. MWM, 357. 
1425 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 128.  
1426 The Mahābhārata 5.46.27-28 as quoted in DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 128.  
1427 Cf. ibid. In the Epic of Rāmāyaṇa, one can trace an incipient form of Sāṁkhya philosophy. Cf. ibid. Cf. 
ZAEHNER, “Salvation in the Mahābhārata…”, 221. Robert Charles Zaehner, a British academician and a specialist 
in Eastern religions, is also of the same opinion. According to him, the Epic of Mahābhārata rarely adopts a neatly 
Sāṁkhya or an extreme non-dualist Vedānta position. Cf. ibid. 
1428 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 129. The reference here is to The Bhagavad-Gītā 2.20: “Never 
is it born nor dies; never did it come to be nor will it ever come to be again: unborn, eternal, everlasting is this 
[self], - primeval. It is not slain when the body is slain.” This citation indicates the Chapter and the verse according 
to The Bhagavad-Gītā. With a commentary based on the original source, ed. by Robert Charles ZAEHNER, Oxford 
University Press, London et al.1969. This source will be used to cite The Bhagavad-Gītā throughout this work and 
will be abbreviated as BG unless otherwise noted. 
1429 DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 130. BG 15.7: “In a world of living things a minute part of Me, 
eternal [still], becomes a living [self], drawing to itself the five senses and the mind which have their roots in 
Nature.” 
1430 DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 130. BG 2.26: “And even if you think that it is constantly [re-]born 
and constantly [re-]dies, even so you grieve for it in vain.” 
1431 DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 130. BG 3.40: “Sense, mind, and soul, they say, are the places where 
it lurks; through these it smothers wisdom, fooling the embodied [self].” 
1432 DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 130-131. BG 5.13-15: “[And so,] all works renouncing with the 
mind, quietly he sits in full control, - embodied [self] within the city with nine gates: he neither works nor makes 
another work. Neither agency nor worldly works does [the body’s] lord engender, nor yet the bond that work to 
fruit conjoins: it is inherent Nature that initiates the action. He takes not on the good and evil works of anyone at 
all, — [that] all-pervading lord. By ignorance is wisdom overspread; thereby are creatures fooled.” 
1433 DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 131. BG 13.21: “For ‘person’ is lodged in material Nature, 
experiencing the ‘constituents’ that arise from it; because he attaches himself to these he comes to birth in god and 
evil wombs.” 
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as God is the source of both. As mentioned earlier, ‘selves’ or ‘spirits’ are ‘minute parts’ of 
God,1434 and like God are eternal and changeless and Matter or Nature is also dependent on God 
who is the source of all change. According to Bhagavad-Gītā, the structure of the human psyche 
consists of ‘soul’, mind, ego, and the five senses.1435 
Therefore, in the Hindu Classical view it can be stated that man is a composite of the spiritual 
self and matter, made up of three constituents: goodness, activity and dullness (these are called 
the guṇas, namely, sattva or rajas or tamas). The human psyche is structured in such a manner 
that it: 
[…] divides itself into the soul (buddhi) with intellect and will, and the ego or self-
consciousness or sense of individuality, which in turn consists of five subtle elements, five 
gross elements and even organs, the last of which is manas1436 (mind), the internal organ of 
perception, volition and action. The soul can act, will, and know when conjoined with the 
organs internal and external and with sense-objects. The transcendental self becomes an 
individual self through association with these principles of organism.1437 
In the last analysis, in the deliberation on the concept of man in Hinduism, one can conclude 
that the human being is of divine origin and descent. He/she is an image of the Primaeval Man 
(Puruṣa); since individual human being is spiritual, he/she is also an image of the divine; and 
the spiritual self (ātman) is either totally identical with the Absolute Being (bráhman) or a part 
or attribute existing in God, the supreme personal Being. Owing to its attachment in accordance 
to one or other of the three constituents (the guṇas, namely, sattva or rajas or tamas), the ātman 
is bound to the body and consequently causes it to be reborn in a divine or human or animal 
form.1438 
Besides what has been deliberated above, in order to understand the concept of man in Hindu 
classical tradition, one needs to discover the mystery behind three primordial terms, namely, 
ātman, bráhman and puruṣa and also terms connected with them, namely, śarīra, jīva, vyakti. 
The following section will deal with these terms. 
                                                 
1434 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 131. BG 15,7: “In a world of living things a minute part of Me, 
eternal [still], becomes a living [self], drawing to itself the five senses and the mind which have their roots in 
Nature.” 
1435 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 132-133. BG 7.4: “Eightfold divided is my Nature, – thus: earth, 
water, fire and air, space, mind, and also soul, – and the ego. & 13.5-6: Gross elements, the ego, intellect (buddhi), 
the Unmanifest, the eleven senses, and the five [sense-objects] on which the senses thrive, Desire, hate, pleasure, 
pain, sensus communis, thought and constancy, – these, in briefest span, are called the field together with their 
changes.”  
1436 Manas in Skt. means mind. In its widest sense it is applied to all the mental powers, namely, intellect, 
intelligence, understanding, perception, sense, conscience, will, etc. In Philosophy, it also means the internal organ 
of perception and cognition, the faculty or instrument through which thoughts enter or by which objects of sense 
affect the soul. In this sense manas is always regarded as distinct from ātman and puruṣa, ‘spirit or soul’ and 
belonging only to the body. With the root man, it means to think in one’s mind, be willing or inclined. A synonym 
for manas is cit. Cf. MWM, 783-784. 
1437 DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 134-135. 
1438 Cf. ibid., 135. BG 14.6-8: “Among the Goodness, being immaculate, knowing no sickness, dispenses light, 
[and yet] it binds by [causing the self] to cling to wisdom and to joy. Passion is instinct with desire, [this] know. 
From craving and attachment it wells up. It binds the embodied [self] by [causing it] to cling to works. But from 
ignorance is Darkness born: mark [this] well. All embodied [selves] it leads astray. With fecklessness and sloth 
and sleepiness it binds.” 
292 Part IV: An Attempt at a Dialogue with Hinduism  
 
 
14.4 WHO AM I? 
It was already mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter that the term “human” does not 
exist in Hinduism. Therefore, one can raise the question: “Who am I?”1439 It was also mentioned 
there that in dealing with beginning of life issues and human dignity, an answer to the question: 
“What is man?” becomes important in the said context. The problem lies in the fact that terms 
like human, body, soul, supreme being, individual and person are all derived from the European 
world as was already discussed in Part I-III. Therefore, it becomes important to clarify these 
terms as understood in Indian Philosophy. Moreover, this attempt would help understand the 
incongruence in Western and Eastern understanding and advance a tolerance towards 
Hinduism, while at the same time accepting the fact that one cannot give an equivalent 
definition to these terms. Nevertheless, this attempt will help find a fruitful and rich conceptual 
model of these competing concepts. Given this background, in this section the terms ātman, 
bráhman, puruṣa, śarīra, jīva and vyakti will be examined.1440 
The three terms ātman, bráhman and puruṣa were already introduced (see Chapter 14.3 above). 
It must be understood that it is somewhat misleading to translate ātman as “soul” and bráhman 
as “Supreme Being”, found quite frequently in Western thoughts. These words, “soul” and 
“supreme being” have a Western background that reveal a specific solution to a problem. 
However, such a problem is left open in the Upaniṣads regarding the question of the oneness 
and the plurality of reality. Therefore, a wrong identification of these terms with the Western 
idea needs to be avoided.1441 Similarly, the word puruṣa is often translated as individual or 
person. Besides the three concepts, in a discussion on the philosophical, ethical, psychological 
aspect of the human person, three other important components needs to be discussed, namely, 
śarīra (body) and jīva (individual), vyakti (also translated as individual or person).1442 All these 
six terms will be discussed below. 
14.4.1 Ātman and Bráhman 
Etymologically speaking, in Sanskrit, the word ātman is the grammatical form of the reflexive 
personal pronoun. According to the context, it can mean the body, anything that one considers 
belonging to or a part of oneself, or what really constitutes one’s “self”, which is the subject of 
all feelings, thoughts and wishes.1443 Moreover, in the Indian spiritual context, while breath is 
linked with the vital principle giving life to humans, stopping to breathe ceases one’s life. Thus, 
as discussed in the Ṛg Veda (Chapter 14.3 above), the word ātman stands primarily for the 
functioning of the vital core of reality.1444 
                                                 
1439 It owes to Katrin Seele in her book „Das bist du!“ in selecting this title and some parts of the work. 
Although, she uses the title „Was ist ‚Ich‘?“ translated as “What is ‘I’”, it is found as impersonal and therefore, a 
more personal address, “Who am I?” (Wer bin “Ich”) is preferred. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 30ff. 
1440 Cf. ibid. 
1441 Cf. Klaus K. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism, State University of New York Press, Albany, New 
York 20073, 167-168. 
1442 Cf. Rajendra PRASAD, A Conceptual-Analytic Study of Classical Indian Philosophy of Morals, Centre for 
Studies in Civilizations, New Delhi 2008, 125. 
1443 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 167. 
1444 Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 195. 
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Vaman Shivram Apte, a Sanskrit scholar, ascribes the following meanings for ātman: 1) The 
soul, the individual soul, the breath, the principle of life and sensation; 2) Self, oneself; in this 
sense mostly used reflexively for all three persons and in the singular number, masculine 
gender, whatever be the gender or number of the noun to which it refers; 3) Supreme deity and 
soul of the universe, Supreme Soul, Brahma; 4) Essence, nature; 5) Character, peculiarity; 6) 
The natural temperament or disposition; 7) The person or whole body (considered as one and 
opposed to the separate members of it); 8) Mind, intellect; 9) The understanding; 10) Thinking 
faculty, the faculty of thought and reason; 11) Spirit, vitality, courage; 12) Form, image; 13) A 
son; 14) Care, efforts, pain;15) The sun; 16) Fire; 17) Wind, air; 18) Mental quality.1445 This 
clearly demonstrates the richness of the word ātman, and therefore, one cannot equate, as 
already mentioned, with the Western thought. 
Although in English ātman is often translated as Self or Soul (accordingly in German as Selbst 
or Seele), the investigation of the word ātman in the Upanishads will illustrate how these 
correlate very heterogeneous components of meaning forming a cohesive whole. Ernest Wood, 
a Sanskrit scholar, for example, generally translates ātman as “Self”, which is really the highest 
principle in man, being above him, and therefore his very self. However, Wood limits its 
meaning: “This is beyond all that could be called mind, including his will, his highest 
intelligence or wisdom or intuition, which includes love of the lives in the forms, and his mental 
operations relating to all his bodily activity and environment.”1446 
Moreover, the problem with regard to the concept of ātman, Self or individual and the related 
concepts of “I” and its identity, stems not only from its comparison to the “Western” 
philosophy; it is already present within the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. For example, in 
Sanskrit, the personal reflexive pronoun “I” (aham, self) and its everyday use is problematic in 
its comparison to the philosophical reflection of its content. Wood therefore warns1447: 
Students do well to take care when using the words Self (ātman) and I (aham), because when 
thinking of the Self we are philosophizing about a topic. Even if we say that the Self is beyond 
thought, because beyond all comparison in any particular with any not-self, it is still, so to 
say, a noun, the name of something.1448 
According to Wood, the application of the philosophical “I” is one of consciousness, the content 
of which is our existence or being. He says, “But if we allude to I we are alluding to that 
consciousness which we are conscious that we are”.1449 When one thinks about oneself as “I”, 
it is not a thought of any object, but a pure experience, without any object.1450 In other words, 
according to Wood, there could be a conception of “I” even without reflecting, consolidating 
or definitely validating the impression of “I”.1451 
In its widest sense, the concept of ātman corresponds to bráhman, the all-encompassing, highest 
principle. This identification of ātman and bráhman is a novelty in Indian philosophy, which 
                                                 
1445 Cf. Vaman Shivram APTE, The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Vol.1, ed. by P. K. GODE and C. G. 
KARVE, Prasad Prakashan, Poona 1957-1959, 323. This dictionary will be hereafter abbreviated as APTE. 
1446 Ernest WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary, Philosophical Library, New York 1964, 16. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist 
du!...“, 31-32. 
1447 Cf. ibid., 30-31. 
1448 WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary…, 84.  
1449 Ibid., 16. Cf. SEELE, “Das bist du!...“, 31. 
1450 Cf. WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary…, 16. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 31. 
1451 Cf. WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary…, 16. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 31. 
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finds its first expression in the Upaniṣads while differing from the Vedic philosophy.1452 Ātman 
is also the highest goal of knowledge and as such the path to mokṣa1453 (liberation).1454 The nature 
of the Self or ātman is declared to be being or absolute existence (sat1455), pure consciousness 
(cit1456) and happiness or bliss (ānandá1457), which are the triad that go to make the famous saying 
sat-cit-ānandá, also a synonym for bráhman.1458 Therefore, it is necessary to understand the 
concept of bráhman, which is closely linked to the concept of ātman, in order understand it. 
The word bráhman too has several meanings, which is derived from the verbal root bṛih.1459 
When used in the Vedas, bráhman1460 means sacred utterance or that by which the devas (gods) 
become great. At a later stage, the word came to denote the ritual and those who employed it, 
namely, the Brāhmaṇas. The Upaniṣads use it as a designation for the ultimate reality, denoting 
the life breath of the universe. In a loose sense, bráhman is analogously used for the word, the 
eye, the ear, the heart, the sun, and the space. In popular Hinduism, bráhman is equated with 
Viṣṇu, Śiva, or Devī, giving it the qualities and attributes of the creator, the preserver, and the 
destroyer respectively.1461 
Apte, gives the following translations for bráhman: 1) The Supreme Being; 2) A hymn of 
praise; 3) A sacred text; 4) The Vedas; 5) The sacred and mystic syllable om; 6) The priestly of 
Brahmanical class (collectively); 7) The power or energy of a Brāhmaṇa; 8) Religious penance 
or austerities; 9) Celibacy, chastity; 10) Final emancipation or beatitude; 11) Theology, sacred 
learning, religious knowledge; 12) The Brāhmaṇa portion of the Veda; 13) Wealth; 14) Food; 
15) A Brāhmaṇa; 16) Truth.1462 Apte also characterizes the Supreme Being. According to him, 
the Supreme Being is “regarded as impersonal and divested of all quality and action […] 
according to the Vedāntins,1463 Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the visible 
universe, the all-pervading soul and spirit of the universe, the essence from which all created 
things are produced and into which they are absorbed”.1464 
                                                 
1452 Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 32. Cf. MICHAELS, Der Hinduismus…, 70. English tr. IDEM, Hinduism; Past 
and Present…, 56. 
1453 In Skt., mokṣa means emancipation, liberation, release from worldly existence or transmigration and final 
or eternal emancipation. Cf. MWM, 835. 
1454 Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 32. 
1455 In Skt. sat means being, existence, the self-existent, truth or Universal Spirit, bráhman. ‘Absolute 
existence’ is one of the three attributes of bráhman. (The other two are consciousness [cit] and the happiness or 
bliss [ānandá]). Cf. MWM, 1134. 
1456 In Skt., the word cit, a synonym for manas could mean to perceive, fix the mind upon, observe, to 
understand, comprehend, know, be conscious of and reflect upon. Cf. MWM, 395 & 783. 
1457 In Skt., ānandá means happiness, joy, enjoyment, sensual pleasure. Cf. MWM, 139. 
1458 Cf. WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary..., 165. 
1459 Skt. meaning to grow great or strong, increase, expand. Cf. MWM, 735. 
1460 Skt. literally meaning ‘growth’, expansion, swelling of the spirit or soul from the root bṛih, pious effusion 
or utterance, outpouring of the heart in worshipping the gods, the sacred word (as opposed to vāc, the word of 
man), the Veda, sacred text. Cf. MWM, 737. In comparison to bráhman, the nominative neutral Brahmă is used 
for the impersonal (nirguna) Spirit and the nominative masculine Brahmā for the personal (saguna) god. Cf. ibid., 
738. 
1461 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 3.9.1&9. Bṛihad-āraṇyaka Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, 
op. cit., 119-121. Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 167. 
1462 Cf. APTE, Vol.2, 1173. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 35. 
1463 A follower of Vedānta philosophy. Cf. APTE, Vol.3, 1496. 
1464 APTE, Vol.2, 1173. Emphasis by author. 
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These different contours of meanings point to the fact that the concept of bráhman is equally 
as difficult to understand as the concept ātman. Therefore, how does one comprehend their 
meanings? 
The central concern of the Upaniṣads is the knowledge of and path to ātman and bráhman. An 
obvious tendency found in the Upaniṣads is the repeated attempt to arrange those that are 
seemingly infinite plurality of things in a limited number of categories, by coordinating 
macrocosm and microcosm, by attempting to understand manifold reality as a combination of 
relatively few primordial elements. Through a process of progressive reduction, one arrives at 
the One, which is further reduced to an immaterial essence that pervades everything without 
itself being identical with them. In other words, the wise men of the Upaniṣads seek to grasp 
the real as the ultimate support of all phenomena.1465 
How is this process achieved? The wise men of the Upaniṣads follow two distinct paths. First, 
beginning from the outside world and the manifold object, they reduce everything to five 
elements, then to three and finally to one. Second, they begin with a person’s subjective 
consciousness and discover in its depths the real, which is ultimately the source of everything. 
Both these types of realization narrows down to the truth that the immanent ātman is identical 
with the transcendent bráhman, in other words, ātman is bráhman.1466 This is the sum and 
substance of the Upaniṣad teaching.1467 
To illustrate the above process, in the derivation of the two words ātman and bráhman, a text 
from Taittirīya Upaniṣad will be useful, where these terms are brought into play. The text here 
reveals the complex meaning of the terms involved. It further supports the point that was made 
above that these terms cannot be equated to the Western understanding of the term soul and 
Supreme Being. Reproduced below are parts of the text from Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.1-8 that 
clarifies these terms ātman-bráhman realization: 
Om! He who knows Brahma, attains the highest! As to that this [verse] has been 
declared:– He who knows Brahma as the real (satya), as knowledge (jñāna), as the infinite 
(ananta), set down in the secret place [of the heart] and in the highest heaven (parame 
vyoman), He obtains all desires, together with the intelligent (vipaścit) Brahma. 
From this Soul (Ātman), verily, space (ākāśa) arose; from space, wind (vāyu); from 
wind, fire; from fire, water; from water, the earth; from the earth, herbs; from herbs, food; 
from food, semen; from semen, the person (puruṣa) […].  
This, verily, is the person that consists of the essence of food. This, indeed, is his head; 
this, the right side; this, the left side; this, the body (ātman); this, the lower part, the 
foundation […]. From food, verily, creatures are produced, whatsoever [creatures] dwell on 
the earth. Moreover, by food, in truth, they live. Moreover, into it also they finally pass. For 
truly, food is the chief of beings […]. Verily they obtain all food who worship Brahma as 
food. 
Verily, other than and within that one that consists of the essence of food is the self that 
consists of breath. By that this is filled. This, verily, has the form of a person […].  The gods 
                                                 
1465 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 166. Bernard Kölver, an Indologist from Leipzig, explains 
that the human being in his/her constitution is a fraction and image of the whole Cosmos. In other words, he/she 
is the miniature of the Cosmos. The macrocosm world corresponds to the microcosm man. See KÖLVER, Das 
Weltbild der Hindus…, 69. 
1466 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 166. 
1467 Cf. DASGUPTA, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.1, op. cit., 45. 
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do breathe along with the breath (prāṇa), as also men and beasts, for truly, breath is the life 
(āyus) of beings. Therefore it is called the Life-of-all (sarvāyuṣa). To a full life (sarvam āyus) 
go they who worship Brahma as breath. For truly, breath is the life of beings; therefore it is 
called the Life-of-all. This, indeed, is its bodily self (śarīra-ātman), as of the former.  
Verily, other than and within that one that consists of breath is a self that consists of 
mind (mano-maya). By that this is filled. This, verily, has the form of a person […]. 
Verily, other than and within that one that consists of mind is a self that consists of 
understanding (vijñāna-maya). By that this is filled. This, verily, has the form of a person. 
According to that one’s personal form is this one with the form of a person. Faith (śraddhā) 
is its head; the right (ṛta), the right side; the true (satya), the left side; contemplation (yoga), 
the body (ātman); might (mahas), the lower part, the foundation […]. Understanding, directs 
the sacrifice; and deeds also it directs. ’Tis understanding that all the gods do worship as 
Brahma, as chief […]. 
Verily, other than and within that one that consists of understanding is a self that 
consists of bliss (ānanda-maya). By that this is filled. That one, verily, has the form of a 
person. According to that one’s personal form is this one with the form of a person. Pleasure 
(priya) is its head; delight (moda), the right side; great delight (pra-moda), the left side; bliss 
(ānanda), the body (ātman); Brahma, the lower part, the foundation […].  
In the beginning, verily, this [world] was non-existent. Therefrom, verily, Being (sat) 
was produced. That made itself (svayam akuruta) a Soul (Ātman). Therefore it is called the 
well-done (su-kṛia). Both he who is here in a person and he who is yonder in the sun – he is 
one. He who knows this, on departing from this world, proceeds on to that self which consists 
of food, proceeds on to that self which consists of breath, proceeds on to that self which 
consists of mind, proceeds onto that self which consists of understanding, proceeds on to that 
self which consists of bliss […]. Wherefrom words turn back, Together with the mind, not 
having attained – The bliss of Brahman he who knows, Fears not from anything at all.1468 
The above passage speaks of the five strata of ātman, which corresponds to five different 
bráhman realities. Each reality is the inner core of the one preceding it, until one reaches the 
very heart of being, which is ānandá, or the bliss and which cannot be further qualified as 
“exterior” or “interior”. The self of person requiring nourishment builds up on a material self 
that requires breath, which further builds on a subtle material self that requires mind, on which 
the intellectual self develops, that further requires understanding and finally developing the 
sphere of deep insight. Finally, the ātman is seen as consisting of and resting on bráhman as 
the core and heart of all reality where the sphere of bliss (ānandá) is found. In order to reach 
the true ultimate, the sphere of the self has to realize systematically a corresponding ultimate.1469 
The Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad further explains the immanence of bráhman in all things as the 
result of entering into them after creating them. Thus, the Upaniṣads instructs us that the one 
who meditates on the ātman realizes that all things to be one, and oneself to be one with it. The 
Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.1 states: 
In the beginning this (world) was only the self [ātman], in the shape of a person [puruṣa]. 
Looking around he saw nothing else than the self [ātman]. He first said, ‘I am’ [so'ham asmī]. 
Therefore arose the name I. Therefore, even to this day when one is addressed he says first 
                                                 
1468 Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.1-8. Taittirīya Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 283-289. 
Additions and emphasis in the original. 
1469 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 168-169. 
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‘This is I’ and then speaks whatever other name he may have. Because before all this, he 
burnt all evils, therefore is a person [puruṣah].1470 
Thus, in the beginning of the world there is the Self or ātman, who knows himself that he exists 
“I am” (so'ham asmī).1471 This Self has the form or shape of a puruṣa (see Chapter 14.4.2 below). 
Thus, the Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad establishes here clearly a contact with the Vedic Creation 
Myth, while reinforcing it, in the already mentioned Vedic Puruṣa hymn (Puruṣa-Sūkta; see 
Chapter 14.3 above).1472 
After the ātman recognizes his existence and creation, he finds himself alone without happiness 
or bliss (similar to the creation story of biblical Adam). Nonetheless, there was no necessity for 
ātman of a God who could create a woman out of his ribs. The ātman developed longing, desire 
and lust. These driving forces are adequate for creation of a second being, more specifically, 
the division of the ātman into two whole beings. Then, perhaps, the two became four, four 
became eight, eight became sixteen. This process continued so on and so forth in a chain 
reaction leading to the creation of humankind.1473 The Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.3 explains 
this process: 
Verily, he had no delight. Therefore one alone has no delight. He desired a second. He was, 
indeed, as large as a woman and a man closely embraced. He caused that self to fall (√ pat) 
into two pieces. Therefrom arose a husband (pati) and a wife (patni). Therefore this [is true]: 
‘Oneself (sva) is like a half-fragment,’ […]. Therefore this space is filled by a wife. He 
copulated with her. Therefrom human beings were produced.1474 
Interestingly, in Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.6, the word bráhman is substituted for ātman as 
the designator for the creator Being:1475 
That was Brahma’s super-creation: namely, that he created the gods, his superiors; likewise, 
that, being mortal, he created the immortals. Therefore was it a super-creation. Verily, he 
who knows this comes to be in that super-creation of his.1476 
                                                 
1470 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.1: “ātmaivedam agra āsīt puruṣavidhaḥ, so'nuvīkṣya nānyad ātmano'paśyat, 
so'ham asmīty agre vyāharat; tato'haṁ nāmābhavat, tasmād apy etarhy āmantritaḥ; aham ayam ity evāgra uktvā, 
athānyan nāma prabrῡte yad asya bhavati. sa yat pῡrvo'smāt sarvasmāt sarvān pāpmana auṣat, tasmāt puruṣah.” 
English Text and transliteration from Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, in: The Principal Upaniṣads. Edited with 
Introduction, Text, Translation and Notes, by S. Radhakrishnan, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey 
1996, 163. Addition by author. The word puruṣah is the masculine form of puruṣa. Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey 
of Hinduism…, 89 & 171. Cf. also SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 44. 
1471 Cf. ibid. Seele explains that this knowing itself is similar to the Cartesian cogito ergo sum, “I think, 
therefore I am”. Descartes following the methodical doubt of one’s own existence comes to the truth that the very 
act of doubting serves as proof of the reality of one’s own existence. The Cartesian doubting that led to the cogito 
ergo sum is the final reason how the world can be known. However, the “Ego” verifying doubt does not exist in 
the Upaniṣads. Cf. ibid. at fn.24. 
1472 Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 44. 
1473 Cf. ibid., 44-45. 
1474 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.3: “sa vai naiva reme; tasmād ekākī na ramate; sa dvitīyam aicchat; sa 
haitāvān āsa yathā strī-pumāṁsau sampariṣvaktau; sa imam evātmānaṁ dvedhāpātayat, tataḥ patiś ca patnī 
cābhavatām; tasmāt idam ardha-bṛgalam iva svaḥ, iti ha smāha yājñavalkyaḥ; tasmād ayam ākāśaḥ striyā pῡryata 
eva. tāṁ samabhavat, tato manuṣyā ajāyanta.” Bṛihad-āraṇyaka Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal 
Upanishads, op. cit., 81. Cf. also SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 44-45. 
1475 Cf. ibid., 45. 
1476 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.6: “saiṣā brahmaṇo'tisṛṣṭiḥ, yac chreyaso devān asṛjata: atha yan martyaḥ 
saṅn amṛtān asṛjata, tasmād atisṛṣtiḥ. atisṛṣṭyaṁ hāsyaitasyāṁ bhavati ya evaṁ veda.” Bṛihad-āraṇyaka 
Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 82. Cf. also SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 45. 
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Then again, in the Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.10, the Creation-myth is repeated once again 
from the perspective of the bráhman:1477 
Verily, in the beginning this world was Brahma. It knew only itself (ātmānaṃ): ‘I am 
Brahma!’[aham brahmāsmi] Therefore it became the All. Whoever of the gods became 
awakened to this, he indeed became it; likewise in the case of seers (ṛṣi), likewise in the case 
of men [...]. Whoever thus knows ‘I am Brahma!’ [aham brahmāsmi] becomes this All; even 
the gods have not power to prevent his becoming thus, for he becomes their self (ātman ). So 
whoever worships another divinity [than his Self], thinking ‘He is one and I another,’ he 
knows not.1478 
Bráhman now realizes that he is ‘I am Brahma!’ (aham brahmāsmi) and became everything. 
The ‘I am Brahma!’(aham brahmāsmi) referred to in the tenth Stanza above (Bṛihadārnyaka 
Upaniṣad 1.4.10) corresponds to the previously cited ‘I am’ (so'ham asmī) of the first stanza 
(Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.1). This circular reference causes an additional affirmation of the 
statement that bráhman and ātman are one, or rather that they are two aspects of the same 
matter.1479 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.25 clearly affirms this same wonderful and supreme 
Reality: “This is that great unborn Self [ātman] who is undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, 
Brahman.”1480 
This unity is constituted by the execution of ātman as jīva (individual) in the diversity of the 
world.1481 According to Wood, the unity between ātman and bráhman is the cardinal doctrine 
of Vedānta “that the world has sprung from the Self (Ātman) – that true Self  which on being 
found in oneself reveals itself as the Self of all beings, as Brahman as well as Ātman”.1482 Both 
the premises, namely, that ātman/bráhman is comprised in every living being, including the 
plants, as well as every single incarnation of jīva ātman (individual soul; see Chapter 14.4.4 
below) that has come into being, is due to the original desire (sa dvitīyam aicchat – “He desired 
a second”) that was expressed in Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.3. In other words, this impulse 
triggered the first creative act.1483 Wood thus declares that every further single creative 
incarnation of jīva ātman is a joint responsibility: “This being the case, all these selves are 
                                                 
1477 Cf. ibid., 47. 
1478 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.10: “brahma vā idam agra āsīt, tad ātmānam evāvet, aham brahmāsmīti: 
tasmāt tat sarvam abhavat, tad yo yo devānām pratyabubhyata, sa eva tad abhavat, tathā ṛṣīṇām, tathā 
manuṣyāṇām.[…] tad idam api etarhi ya evaṁ veda, aham brahmāsmīti sa idaṁ sarvam bhavati; tasya ha na 
devāś ca nābhῡtyā īśate, ātmā hy eṣāṁ sa bhavati. atha yo anyāṁ devatām upāste, anyo'sau anyo’ ham asmīti, na 
sa veda.” Bṛihad-āraṇyaka Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 81. The first two additions 
are by author. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 47. Cf. Paul DEUSSEN, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie. Mit 
besonderer Berücksichtigung der Religionen, Erster Band, Zweite Abteilung. Die Philosophie der Upanishad’s, 
Brockhaus, Leipzig 1920, 311. Paul Deussen, a German Orientalist, Sanskrit Scholar, Philosopher and Indologist, 
explaining the term aham brahmāsmi says: „‚Ich bin Brahman‘, bin in Wahrheit nicht Individuum, sondern der 
Ātman, der Inbegriff aller Realität, bin das Prinzip, das alle Welten schafft, trägt und erhält. ‚Und auch heutzutage, 
wer also eben dieses erkennt: «Ich bin Brahman!» der wird zu diesem Weltall; und auch die Götter haben nicht 
Macht, zu bewirken, dass er es nicht wird. Denn er ist die Seele (ātman) derselben.‘ (Bṛih 1.4.10).“ Addition in 
original. 
1479 Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 47. 
1480 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.25: “sa vā eṣa mahān ajātma, ajaro, amaro’ mṛto’bhayo brahma.” English 
Text and transliteration from Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, in: The Principal Upaniṣads; op. cit., 281. Addition by 
author. Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 216, at fn.99. 
1481 Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 47. 
1482 WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary..., 165. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 47. 
1483 Cf. ibid. 
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responsible directly or indirectly for the production of every form. Such ideas justify the 
scriptural statement that ‘All this is only the Self’”.1484 
Similarly, the emergence of the idea of the unity of all creation culminates in another famous 
dictum: tat tvam asi, which means, “That art thou”.1485 The Chāṇdogya Upaniṣad 6.8.7 declares: 
That which is the finest essence [aṇima] – this whole world has that as its soul [ātman]. That 
is Reality (satyam). That is Ātman (Soul). That art thou […]!1486 
The term tat tvam asi, “That are thou”, is a valid Summa of all Upaniṣadic teaching.1487 Two 
things in this quotation are of central importance: First, that tat tvam asi is applied for the first 
time as an identification of the ātman with the real truth (satyam) of microstructure of the 
Universe. Second, there is an allusion to the qualitative difference between matter and aṇima1488 
(finest essence). That which is no longer divisible has fundamentally a different quality than 
that which is divisible because it is no more a sensual experience.1489 
Along with the above ideas, namely, aham brahmāsmi and tat tvam asi, two other expressions 
explain the unity of bráhman and ātman, namely, ayam ātma bráhman, “This Self is 
brahman”,1490 and prajñānam brahman, “Wisdom is brahman”.1491 These four sayings, or 
mahāvākyas, are the Great Sayings, which express the gist of the Upaniṣadic teachings in a 
concise formula, the understanding of which leads to ultimate liberation.1492 
Thus, one can see that different possibilities were analyzed in order to arrive at an answer to 
the question: “Who am I?” The answer was obviously, ‘that art thou’ (tat tvam asi). 
Nevertheless, to find an answer to this question was tedious and confused. Perhaps, what was 
arrived at after such an investigation was that it is the inmost essence, a soul; an answer that 
seems not so different from that of Christianity. Nevertheless, the ‘that art thou’ cannot be both. 
In the last analysis, a solution was found. A word was coined that above all has a very neutral 
meaning, namely, ātman. It was quite simply used as a reflexive pronoun, namely, “itself, the 
self”. However, this answer also seemed evasive, because the question remained as to the 
characteristics and properties of ātman. A pliable answer was insufficient. Behind this search 
                                                 
1484 WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary..., 165-166. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 47. 
1485 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 169 & 171. The English word “that” when translated in Skt. 
is tat. It means either that or this, as a demonstrative pronoun. It could also mean: on that account, for that reason, 
therefore or consequently. Here it means you are that, namely, the Ātman. It is from this the famous saying is 
derived: tat tvam asi, which means “that art thou”. For a brief description of tat tvam asi and the origin of the term 
within the context of a story see Simone RAPPEL, Gemeinsame Weltverantwortung und globales Ethos. 
Christentum-Hinduismus-Konfuzianismus-Daoismus, Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 
2007, 228. 
1486 Chāṇdogya Upaniṣad 6.8.7: “sa ya eṣo'ṇimā aitad ātmyam idaṁ sarvam, tat satyam, sa ātmā: tat tvam asi 
[…]” Chāṇdogya Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 246. Addition by author. 
1487 Cf. Chāṇdogya-Upanishad, in: Paul DEUSSEN, Sechzig Upanishad’s des Veda: aus dem Sanskrit Übersetzt 
und mit Einleitungen und Anmerkungen versehen, Dritte Auflage, F. A. Brockhaus, Leipzig 1921, 61-205, 157. 
English tr. from Chāṇdogya Upaniṣad, in: Paul DEUSSEN, Sixty Upaniṣads of the Veda, tr. from German by V. M. 
BEDEKAR/G. B. PALSULE, Part I, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited, Delhi 1990, 61-205; 159. See 
also KÖLVER, Das Weltbild der Hindus…, 69. 
1488 Skt. for minuteness, smallness, fineness, atomic nature. Cf. APTE, Vol.1, 37. 
1489 Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 61. 
1490 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 2.5.19. Bṛihad-āraṇyaka Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. 
cit., 105. Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 171. 
1491 Aitreya Upaniṣad 3.1.3. Aitreya Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 301. 
1492 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 171. 
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remained the fact that a great potential was hidden under this word ātman, namely, it is not all 
that.1493 
A core text in the Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 3.9.26 applies the incomprehensible characteristics 
of the ātman: 
That self [ātman] is not this, not this [na iti na iti]. It is incomprehensible for it is not 
comprehended. It is indestructible for it is never destroyed. It is unattached for it does not 
attach itself. It is unfettered. It does not suffer. It is not injured.1494 
Thus, this expression ‘not this, not this’ (often described as neti neti) has become a famous 
saying. One uses this expression because one’s conceptual thought cannot describe it by any 
positive content.1495 
Interestingly, while describing the form of the puruṣa, Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 2.3.6 also 
describes it as neti neti (not this, not this): 
–But the characterization of this (Puruṣa) is: ‘it is not so’ ‘it is not so’ (neti, neti); because 
there is nothing outside this (characterization) that is not so, not anything else. (na hi etasmād 
‘iti na’ iti anyat param asti) –But its name is ‘the reality of reality’. i.e. the vital spirits are 
the reality and he (the Puruṣa or Brahman) is its reality.1496  
In the above passage, two formulations are given for the puruṣa, namely, neti neti and ‘the 
reality of reality’. This means ultimately that the rigorous negation of ātman/bráhman/puruṣa 
in every possible way cannot be bound by any language or its barriers. Neither as ‘not this, not 
this’ (neti neti) nor as ‘the reality of reality’ is ātman/bráhman/puruṣa cognitively 
comprehensible, in that, both formulations are beyond the cognitive access.1497 Through this 
expression, the Self eliminates its characteristics (in other words, it is without attributes) and 
raises it beyond the level of the material world, without removing it out of the system. One can 
thus imagine that through this idea a hierarchical order was strengthened.1498 Consequently, this 
definition neti neti served the purpose of not confining the ātman but leaving it open to its 
boundlessness. 
In the last analysis, what now remains to be figured out is the relationship of ātman in the 
microcosm to the macrocosm. The answer was found in the ambit of the Sacrifice, namely, the 
                                                 
1493 KÖLVER, Das Weltbild der Hindus…, 69. 
1494 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 3.9.26: “sa eṣa, na iti. Na ity ātma, agṛhyaḥ, na hi gṛhyate, aśīryaḥ na hi śīryate, 
asaṅgaḥ na hi sajyate, asito na vyathate, na riṣyati.” Transliteration and translation from Bṛhad-āraṇyaka 
Upaniṣad, in: The Principal Upaniṣads; op. cit., 242-243. Addition by author. Cf. KÖLVER, Das Weltbild der 
Hindus…, 69. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 71. A parallel verse can also found in Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 4.2.4, 
4.4.22 and 4.5.15. See Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, in: The Principal Upaniṣads; op. cit., 194. Cf. KÖLVER, Das 
Weltbild der Hindus…, 69. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 71. 
1495 Cf. DASGUPTA, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.1, op. cit., 45. 
1496 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 2.3.6. “athāta ādeśaḥ na it na iti, nah hy etasmād iti, na ity anyat param asti; 
atha nāma-dheyaṁ satyasya satyam iti. prāṇā vai satyam, teṣām eṣa satyam.” Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, in: 
DEUSSEN, Sixty Upaniṣads of the Veda, op. cit., Part I, 389-544; 432-433. Addition and emphasis in original. Here 
one can see that Deussen also translates this same passage and equates ātman with puruṣa or bráhman. 
Transliteration from Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, in: The Principal Upaniṣads; op. cit., 194. The German Original 
tr. from Skt.: „Aber die Bezeichnung für ihn [den Purusha] ist: ‚es ist nicht so! es ist nicht so‘ (neti, neti); denn 
nicht gibt es außer dieser [Bezeichnung], dass es nicht so ist, eine andre  (na hi etasmād «iti na» iti anyat param 
asti). –Sein Name aber ist: ‚die Realität der Realität‘; nämlich die Lebensgeister sind die Realität, und ist ihre 
Realität.“ Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad; in DEUSSEN, Sechzig Upanishad’s des Veda, op. cit., 414-415. Addition and 
emphasis in original. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 69-70. 
1497 Cf. ibid., 70. 
1498 KÖLVER, Das Weltbild der Hindus…, 70. Cf. also SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 67-74. 
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power of the Sacrifice, which unfolds itself through the effect that contained in bráhman. The 
process of creation by bráhman is stated in the Śatapathabrāhmaṇa 11.2.3: 
Verily, in the beginning, this (universe) was the Brahman (neut.). It created the gods; and, 
having created the gods, it made them ascend these worlds: Agni this (terrestrial) world, Vāyu 
the air, and Sūrya the sky. And the deities who are above these he made ascend the worlds 
which are above these; and, indeed, just as these (three) worlds and these (three) deities are 
manifest, so are those (higher) worlds and those (higher) deities manifest – (the worlds) 
which he made those deities ascend. Then the Brahman itself went up to the sphere 
beyond.1499 
This same bráhman is the one, “who plucks apart and puts together these persons and passes 
beyond them”1500 It is to him, i.e., bráhman, that the ātman returns after death, just as the air 
leaves a person after death the limits of his/her earthly body. Thus, a person eventually goes 
beyond this world to the otherworldly realm. Therefore, one can understand bráhman being 
designated as the “world soul”, because all souls return to him.1501 
In this way, the two levels, that of the individual ātman, and that which lies beyond every grasp, 
namely, the bráhman are constantly brought together and set against each other. This is 
explained Chāṇdogya Upaniṣad 3.14.3-4 as: 
[…] this Soul of mine within the heart is smaller than a grain of rice, or a barley-corn, or a 
mustard-seed, or a grain of millet, or the kernel of a grain of millet; this Soul of mine within 
the heart is greater than the earth, greater than the atmosphere, greater than the sky, greater 
than these worlds […].1502 
This very soul, which is tiny as well as great, finally returns to its destination, namely bráhman. 
The above verse then ends with this assertion: “this is the Soul of mine within the heart, this is 
Brahma. Into him I shall enter on departing hence.”1503 
The spiritual knowledge of the identity (ātman) with the Supreme Reality (bráhman) helps the 
Self to end his individuality with himself – in other words to attain the mokṣa (salvation). To 
achieve this goal, the Self journeys from one body to another. Death is not the end, but just a 
crossroad – from one physical body to another until the final destination is reached.1504 
However, the conditional nature of the ātman to recognize its identity with bráhman, is the 
doctrine of karma, namely, the deeds and the consequence of those deeds.1505 The identity of 
ātman with bráhman is explained in the Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.5 and the doctrine of 
karma is treated within that context: 
Verily, this soul [ātman] is Brahma, made of knowledge, of mind, of breath, of seeing, of 
hearing, of earth, of water, of wind, of space, of energy and of non-energy, of desire and of 
nondesire [stet], of anger and of non-anger, of virtuousness and of nonvirtuousness [stet]. It 
                                                 
1499 Śatapathabrāhmaṇa 11.2.3. Satapatha-Brâhmaṇa according to the Text of the Mâdhyandina School, tr. by 
Julius EGGELING, Part V, The Clarendon Press, Oxford 1900, 27. Cf. KÖLVER, Das Weltbild der Hindus…, 70. 
1500 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 3.9.26. Bṛihad-āraṇyaka Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. 
cit., 125. Cf. KÖLVER, Das Weltbild der Hindus…, 70. 
1501 Cf. ibid. 
1502 Chāṇdogya Upaniṣad 3.14.3. Chāndogya Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 210. 
Cf. KÖLVER, Das Weltbild der Hindus…, 70. 
1503 Chāṇdogya Upaniṣad 3.14.4. Chāndogya Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 210. 
Cf. KÖLVER, Das Weltbild der Hindus…, 70. 
1504 Cf. Ramchandra Narayan DANDEKAR, „Der Mensch im Denken des Hinduismus“, in: Andreas BSTEH 
(Hg.), Sein als Offenbarung in Christentum und Hinduismus, Verlag St. Gabriel, Mödling 1984, 139-179; 149. 
1505 Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 74-75. 
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is made of everything. This is what is meant by the saying “made of this, made of that.” 
According as one acts, according as one conducts himself, so does he become. The doer of 
good becomes good. The doer of evil becomes evil. One becomes virtuous by virtuous action, 
bad by bad action.1506 
The first half of the above passage deals with the ātman, which is the same as bráhman. The 
second half treats the topic of karma. The above passage also emphasizes that every living being 
has the opportunity to improve his karma.1507 
14.4.2 Puruṣa 
Etymologically, the word ‘puruṣa’ in Sanskrit means “the real man or Self”1508 or ātman.1509 The 
word puruṣa literally means a “city dweller”. It is derived from the root pur meaning rampart, 
wall, stronghold, fortress, castle, city, town, the body and from usha a derivative of vāśa 
meaning abiding, dwelling, residence.1510 Puruṣa is also a word phonetically close and 
equivalent to the concept of person as portrayed in the Sāṁkhya and Yoga tradition. Puruṣa 
represents the “male”, or the thinking principle, as the witness (sākṣī) of all activity performed 
by the female counterpart prakṛti (nature), as a distinct principle in all human beings of which 
the supreme example is God himself (paramapuruṣa). While ātman is considered as a feminine 
concept of immanence, inherence and substratum, puruṣa is essentially a male concept 
connoting distance, transcendence and awareness.1511  
From a scriptural background, in the Viṣṇu Sahasranaama (Thousand Names of Shri Maha 
Viṣṇu) Stanza 2 (which forms part of the Mahābhārata)1512, the word puruṣah (masculine form 
of puruṣa) is used to refer to the ātman in each of us. The etymology of the word puruṣah itself 
serves as the proof that it dwells in the body, i.e. in the soul or ātman or the Self. Puruṣah or 
the Self is described in Viṣṇu Sahasranaama as, “that which dwells or resides or sleeps within 
the township/Fort-city of the body” (puri shete iti puruṣah). Alternatively, “He that lies in a 
pura (meaning a fort or the nine-doored mansion,), i.e., the body”. The soul while remaining in 
                                                 
1506 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.5. Bṛihad-āraṇyaka Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. 
cit., 140. Addition by author. See also Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 3.2.13. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 75-76 and 
Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 134. 
1507 Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 77. 
1508 WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary..., 141. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 41. 
1509 Cf. Vishnu Sahasranaama. Thousand Ways to the Transcendental, commentary by Swami 
CHINMAYANANDA, Central Chinmaya Mission Trust, Mumbai 2008, 21. 
1510 Cf. MWM, 635 & 947. Cf. WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary..., 141. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 41. 
1511 Cf. George GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person and Indian Thought – An Attempt at a Cross-Cultural 
Dialogue”, in: Philosophy and Human Development (Essays in honour of Father Emilio Ugarte, S.J.), Satya 
Nilayam Publication, Madras 1986, 27-44; 37. 
1512 The Skt. transliteration of the Viṣṇu Sahasranaama Stanza 2 reads: “pūtātmā paramātmā ca, muktānāṁ 
paramā gatiḥ, avyayaḥ puruṣah sākṣī, kṣetrjño’kṣara eva ca”. See The Mahābhārata 13.135.15. Pūtātmā: One 
whose nature is pure, one with an extremely Pure Essence. Paramātmā: being entirely the soul of the universe or 
the Ātman, that which transcends all limitations and imperfections of matter, the Transcendental Reality. 
Muktānāṁ paramā gatiḥ: The final or supreme goal (paramā gatiḥ) attained by the liberated souls. Avyayaḥ: not 
liable to change, imperishable, indestructible. Puruṣah: One who reposes in the body/Fort-city or pur (considered 
as the stronghold). Sākṣī: One who witnesses, evidences, testifies. Kṣetrajña: ‘knowing the body’, i.e., the soul, 
the conscious principle in the corporeal frame, one who knows the body and all the experiences within the body. 
Akṣara: imperishable, unalterable and indestructible, i.e., the bráhman. Cf. MWM, 3, 111, 332, 588, 635, 637, 
641, 820 & 1198. Cf. CHINMAYANANDA, Vishnu Sahasranaama…, 19-22. Cf. also RAVI, Viṣṇu Sahasranāma. A 
Comprehensive Treatise, Manblunder Publications, Chennai, India 2012, 26-30. 
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the body, rules it. 1513 Two other variations are suggested to the nature of the Self. First, Purusha 
can mean, “One who existed before anything else existed” (pura aseet iti puruṣah). Second, it 
can mean, “One who completes and fulfills existence everywhere” (purayati iti puruṣah). This 
Ātman remains in the bodies of all living creatures as their individuality (jīva) and in all 
activities, physical, mental and intellectual, without himself involving but remaining as an 
observer or witness to all that happens (sākṣī).1514 As mentioned earlier, puruṣa in Sāṁkhya 
Philosophy is considered as ātman in Vedānta Philosophy. However, whether one calls it 
puruṣa or ātman, “it is the indispensable factor in the creation of a life”.1515 The body is the field 
(or kṣetra) and the knower is the Kṣetrajña. In other words, using Aristotelian category, the 
matter is kṣetra and the form or the soul functioning in it is Kṣetrajña.1516 
Yaska, a Sanskrit grammarian (ca. 6BCE-5BCE), in his work Nirukta, renders a further evidence 
to the meaning of the word puruṣah.1517 Here he gives an original interpretation and root 
meaning of the word puruṣah. It reads: 
Puruṣah (person) = puri-ṣādaḥ (one who sits in a city), or = puri-śayaḥ (one who sleeps in a 
city), or is derived from (the root) pṛ (to fill), i.e. he fills the interior, with reference to the 
inner soul. 
This entire (universe) is filled by that inner soul, to whom there is nothing anterior, nothing 
subsequent, than whom there is nothing more minute, nor more great, and immovable like a 
tree, who alone lives in heaven.1518 
Uma Shankar Sharma ‘Rishi’, Philosopher and Scholar of Sanskrit Language, comments that, 
when the individual (or vyakti) is targeted at as being filled (pūraya) in the interior of the body, 
then he may be referred to as puruṣa. Moreover, referring to the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, 
Sharma ‘Rishi’ draws out an example of puruṣa as, “Than whom there is naught else higher, 
than whom there is naught smaller, naught greater, the One stands like a tree established in 
                                                 
1513 Metaphorically, the ṛṣis or the great sages conceived the body as a fortress with nine gateways (navadvāre 
pure). The nine openings/gateways in the body are - pair of eyes, pair of ears, pair of nostrils, mouth, organs of 
procreation and excretion. Cf. BG, 5.13. Cf. Commentary No. 14 to Vishnu Sahasranaama Stanza 2, by 
CHINMAYANANDA, Vishnu Sahasranaama…, 21. Cf. also RAVI, Viṣṇu Sahasranāma…, 28. Note that the word 
puruṣah is in masculine gender and the corresponding masculine pronoun ‘he’ (ṣah) was used. 
1514 Cf. Commentary No. 14 & 15 to Vishnu Sahasranaama Stanza 2, by CHINMAYANANDA, Vishnu 
Sahasranaama…, 21. 
1515 RAVI, Viṣṇu Sahasranāma…, 29. 
1516 Cf. ibid., 30. 
1517 The author of Nirukta is Yaska. Nirukta is a technical treatise on etymology, philology and semantics. In 
interpreting the Veda, Nirukta attempts to explain the root and the meaning of words. See Lakshman SARUP, The 
Nighaṇṭu and the Nirukta. The Oldest Indian Treatise on Etymology, Philology, and Semantics. Critically edited 
from Original Manuscripts and Translated for the first time into English, with Introduction, Exegetical and 
Critical Notes, Three Indexes and Eight Appendices, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, Varanasi, Patna 1966, 5. In this 
work, which is divided into two, the Sanskrit text is found from pages 1-298. In the second part, once again, the 
introduction and English tr. and notes is found from pages 1-260. 
1518 Nirukta 2.3: “[…] puruṣaḥ puri-ṣādaḥ. puri-śayaḥ. pūrayater vā. pūrayaty antar ity antara puruṣam 
abhipretya.” See Lakshman SARUP, The Nighaṇṭu and the Nirukta …, op. cit., the original Skt. text at 45 and the 
English commentary at 23. Here Yaska refers to Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 3.9 (see next fn.1519 below). For a 
German commentary, see Rudolph ROTH (Hg.), Jâska’s Nirukta sammt den Nighaṇṭavas, Verlag der Dieterischen 
Buchhandlung, Göttingen 1852, Skt. Text 1-228. Erläuterung zum Nirukta 1-230. Here the original Skt. text at 41 
and the German commentary at 18. This was the first German work that became the editio principes of the Nirukta. 
See also a similar commentary by Uma Shankar SHARMA ‘RISHI’ (ed.), Nirukta of Yāska, Second Edition, 
Chowkhambha Vidya Bhawan, Varanasi, 1966, 39-40. 
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heaven. By Him, the Person [puruṣa], this whole world is filled”.1519 This is exactly what Yaska 
in his Nirukta had already quoted (see above). 
Having seen the etymological and scriptural background of the word puruṣa, one can raise the 
question here, namely, in which sense can one use the term puruṣa to the questions of the 
beginning of life? Perhaps, the metaphysical content of it might enlighten here. In the Sāṁkhya 
Kārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa1520, the puruṣa is argued through five arguments, which taken together, 
gives us an idea of the metaphysical content of this idea. It can be summarized as follows: 
1. The puruṣa in opposition to prakṛti (nature) is discriminating (vivekī) or conscious of 
differences, non-object (aviṣaya) and hence a subject, particular (asamanya) and hence the 
principle of individuation, conscious (cetana), but non-active or non-productive (aprasava-
dharmī). The characteristic role of the puruṣa is one of a witness (sāksī) of the activity, it itself 
not being an activity, remaining uninvolved and impartial. 
2. The puruṣa, which may be defined in terms of pour soi (being-for-itself), in opposition to the 
composite external reality that is not for itself but for another (parārtha), is both simple and an 
end in itself. 
3. The puruṣa is the abode, basis, or seat of all activity (adhiṣthāna1521). 
4. Although, puruṣa is the uninvolved term of references of all knowledge (as sāksī) and of all 
activity (as adhiṣthāna), yet it is the term of reference of all enjoyment (Bhoktṛbhāvāt). 
5. The puruṣa is the focus or transcendental purpose of all activity, the pure aloneness (kaivalya) 
which is the metaphysical explanation for the activity of the world or prakṛti. The puruṣa is the 
causa finalis of all (cf. 2 above) in whose presence the cosmic dance takes place. Thus, in Indian 
traditions, the abstract term values are often expressed as puruṣārthas1522 (namely, wealth 
[artha], desire or pleasure [kāma], duty [dharma] and liberation [mokṣa]), or so to say, the 
purpose or aim of the puruṣa. In legal and moral literature, the puruṣārthas give a holistic and 
organized vision of the area of values operative in all human activity, proceeding from wealth 
(artha) to liberation (mokṣa) while passing through pleasure (kāma) and duty (dharma).1523 
Deliberating on the theological understanding of the term puruṣa, one can affirm the following. 
As already mentioned, the macrocosmic man (Puruṣa; see Chapter 14.3 above) is the prototype 
of the microcosmic man (puruṣa). The Upaniṣads confirm this fact that the cosmic Puruṣa is 
very much person-centred, and becomes more evident in a hymn of Kathā Upaniṣad 3.10-11 
as well as in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 3.8: 
Higher than the senses are the object of sense. Higher than the objects of sense is the mind 
(manas); And higher than the mind is the intellect (buddhi). Higher than the intellect is the 
great Self (Ātman). Higher than the great is the unmanifest (avyakta). Higher than the 
                                                 
1519 Cf. ibid. Sharma ‘Rishi’ is quoting here Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 3.9 in Hindi. The English tr. is from 
Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 400. Addition by author. 
1520 See Chapter 14.4.2 above. 
1521 Skt. for a receptacle, place or situation. Cf. MWM, 138. 
1522 Skt. meaning any object of human pursuit; any of the four objects or aims of existence (viz. kāma, the 
gratification of desire; artha, acquirement of wealth; dharma, discharge of duty; moksha, final emancipation). Cf. 
MWM, 637. 
1523 Cf. GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 37-39. 
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unmanifest is the Person. Higher than the Person there is nothing at all. That is the goal. That 
is the highest course.1524 
I know this mighty Person (Purusha). Of the color of the sun, beyond darkness. Only by 
knowing Him does one pass over death. There is no other path for going there.1525 
The religious thinker of the Upaniṣads frees himself from the ritualistic conceptions and 
identifies with the Cosmic Puruṣa, first with the natural phenomena and then with the inmost 
Self of man.1526 There are eight different persons (puruṣas) identified with the physical bases.1527 
However, the ‘Upaniṣadic’ Puruṣa is above all these other puruṣas. The individual person 
(puruṣa) is composed of sixteen parts. These parts are compared to a tree and poetically 
identified with those of the tree.1528 The individual man (puruṣa) is identified with the self 
(ātman) which is composed of desire, and therefore determines his action and rebirth.1529 The 
term puruṣa is also used as a synonym of the supreme Self (ātman) as the ultimate ground of 
the manifold world and of the individual in the Praśna Upaniṣad: 
Truly, this seer, toucher, hearer, smeller, taster, thinker (mantr), conceiver (boddhṛ), doer, 
the conscious self (vijñāna-ātman), the person [puruṣa] – his resort is in the supreme 
imperishable Soul (Ātman, Self).1530 
Again, he who meditates on the highest Person (Purusha) with the three elements of the 
syllable Om [namely a + u + m], is united with brilliance (tejas) in the sun. As a snake is 
freed from its skin, even so, verily, is he freed from sin (pāpman). He is led by the Sāman 
chants to the world of Brahma. He beholds the Person that dwells in the body and that is 
higher than the highest living complex.1531 
The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad attests to the fact that Puruṣa is not only the ultimate ground of the 
objective world but also the animating principle of the subjective structure of man: 
He on whom the sky, the earth, and the atmosphere are woven, and the mind, together with 
all the life-breaths (prāṇa), him alone know as the one Soul (Ātman). Other words dismiss. 
He is the bridge to immortality.1532 
It is interesting to note that puruṣa in Sāṁkhya Philosophy is considered as ātman in Vedānta 
Philosophy. A very clear pronouncement of the word puruṣa as equivalent to ātman is 
employed in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 2.1-21533: 
                                                 
1524 Kathā Upaniṣad 3.10-11. Kathā Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 352. Cf. 
DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 122. 
1525 Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 3.8. Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 400. 
Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 122. 
1526 Cf. ibid. 
1527 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 3.9.11-18. Bṛihad-āraṇyaka Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, 
op. cit., 121-123. Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 122. 
1528 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 3.9.28, Bṛihad-āraṇyaka Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. 
cit., 126. Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 122. 
1529 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 4.3.7-9, Bṛihad-āraṇyaka Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, 
op. cit., 126. Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 122-123. 
1530 Praśna Upaniṣad 4.9. Praśna Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 387. Addition 
by author. Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 123. 
1531 Praśna Upaniṣad 5.5. Praśna Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 388. Addition 
by author. Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 123. 
1532 Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 2.2.5. Muṇḍaka Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 372. Cf. 
DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 123. 
1533 Cf. WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary..., 165. Cf. also DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 123. 
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1. This is the truth:– As, from a well-blazing fire, sparks by the thousand issue forth of like 
form, so from the Imperishable, my friend, beings manifold are produced, and thither also 
go. 
2. Heavenly (divya), formless (a-mūrtta) is the Person (Purusha). He is without and within, 
unborn, breathless (a-prāṇa), mindless (a-manas), pure (śubhra), higher than the high 
Imperishable.1534 
The first passage above speaks of the whole universe with its diverse modes and contents as 
well as the self that come out from that imperishable infinite Being. The self is essentially of 
the same nature as that of the puruṣa, even as the spark is the same as the fire. The difference 
lies only in magnitude and not in kind; one is infinite and the other is finite. However, unlike 
the fire spark, this self has but one common destiny, namely, the dissolution into puruṣa again. 
Here puruṣa or bráhman is indicated as both the material and efficient cause of the universe. 
Nevertheless, this is the creative or saguna (with qualities) aspect of bráhman, as the common 
origin of all life and existence. The second passage speaks of the nirguna (without qualities) or 
the transcendental absolute aspect of the bráhman. Here, the absolute state of bráhman is 
spoken of as superior to and beyond the saguna aspect of bráhman.1535 
The Kathā Upaniṣad further speaks of the Puruṣa as one who abides in the individual self 
(ātman): 
A Person of the measure of a thumb stands in the midst of one’s self (ātman), 
Lord of what has been and of what is to be, one does not shrink away from him. 
This, verily, is That! A Person of the measure of a thumb, like a light without a smoke, 
Lord of what has been and what is to be. He alone is today, and tomorrow too.1536 
From all that has been described above, in the Upaniṣads the term puruṣa is portrayed for many 
entities such as, “for the individual human person, Cosmic Person, the Personal Absolute and 
the impersonal Ground of the objective universe and of the human persons”.1537 However, one 
should be cautious not to translate the Sanskrit term puruṣa as individual or person. 
Nonetheless, since the term puruṣa has a wide spectrum of meanings and forms, it may be a 
useful concept in dealing with the issues related to the beginning of life, especially from a 
metaphysical and theological content of the term. 
14.4.3 Śarīra 
There is no single concept in the Upaniṣad to designate the body of the human being. 
Sometimes even the concept ātman is used in its place. In the Vedānta philosophy man is 
described as having five encasements or coverings or bodies (kósas1538), one within the other, 
so to say, as follows: 1) The outermost is the “body made of food” (anna-maya-kósa). 2) The 
“body made of vitality” (prāṇa-maya-kósa). 3) The “body made of mind” (mano-maya-kósa). 
4) The “body made of understanding” or wisdom or evaluation (vijñāna-maya-kósa). 5) The 
                                                 
1534 Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 2.1-2. Muṇḍaka Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 370. Cf. 
WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary..., 165. 
1535 Cf. Mundaka and Mandukya Upanishads: with Sanskrit Text, Paraphrase with word-for-word Literal 
Translation, English, Rendering and comments, tr. by Swami SHARVANANDA, Sri Ramakrishna Math, Mylapore, 
Madras 1920, 29-30. 
1536 Kathā Upaniṣad 4.12-13, Kathā Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 355. Cf. 
DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 124. 
1537 Ibid. 
1538 Skt. kósa means a cask, vessel for holding liquids, a sheath. Cf. MWM, 314. 
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“body made of bliss” (ānanda-maya-kósa).1539 These five encasements or kósas are further 
classified into three, called śarīras, which means “body” (in German „Körper“).1540 These three 
are: 1) The dense or gross body (sthūla1541 śarīra) is made of food (anna), 2) The subtle or fine 
body (sūkṣma1542 śarīra) is made of vitality (prāṇa), mind (manas) and understanding/wisdom/ 
evaluation (vijñāna), and 3) The causal body (kāraṇa1543 śarīra) made of bliss (ānanda).1544 The 
Gross or dense body (sthūla śarīra) includes the ten organs, five of which are sense or 
knowledge organs (jñāna-indriyas) and the other five action organs (karma- indriyas). The five 
sense organs are ears, skin, eyes, mouth and nose. The five action organs are legs, hands, mouth 
and the organs of excretion and generation.1545 The subtle body (sūkṣma śarīra) thus contains 
seventeen things in all – five organs of sense, five organs of action, five vital airs, mind and 
understanding.1546 The causal body (kāraṇa śarīra) is called so because it is the root from which 
all other “bodies” (named above) sprout. This body is also the residence of the “I-maker” 
(ahamkāra), which is the reflection of the “I” or self, an inseparable part of the Self which is 
bráhman.1547 
One cannot identify the body with the ātman. Despite this overwhelming distinction between 
the ātman as a purely spiritual self and the physical body of the human, yet there is a close bond 
between them, so close that sometimes the meanings of the names of the two are not sharply 
distinguished. Owing to this close affinity of the ātman with the body, the very use of the word 
“ātman as a reflexive pronoun in the singular” has emerged in the Upaniṣads.1548 
Even through successive incarnations, the “I” always remains the same and preserves the 
experience of the sameness through all erroneous notions of self.1549 While deliberating about 
the physiology of the Upaniṣad, Deussen distinguishes two types of bodies, namely the gross 
body and the fine or subtle body. The fine or subtle body is the carrier of psychological organs 
                                                 
1539 Cf. WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary..., 26. 
1540 The Skt. word śarīra (which comes from the root śṛī and means ‘that which is easily destroyed or 
dissolved’) means the body, the bodily frame, solid parts of the body, any solid body, one’s body, i.e., one’s own 
person, bodily strength, dead body. Cf. MWM, 1057.  
1541 The Skt. word sthūla stands for 1) Large, great, big, bulky, huge; 2) Fat, corpulent, stout; 3) Strong, 
powerful; 4) Thick, clumsy; 5) Gross, coarse, rough (fig. also); 6) Foolish, doltish, silly, ignorant; 7) Solid, dull, 
thick-headed; 8) Not exact; 9) In Philosophy: Material, tangible (opp. to sūkṣma or subtle). In combination with 
śarīram, it means the grosser or material and perishable body. Cf. APTE, Vol.3, 1724. Cf. MWM, 1266. 
1542 Skt. for subtle, minute, atomic, small, fine, thin, delicate, exact, precise accurate. Cf. APTE, Vol.3, 1696. 
1543 Skt. for cause, reason, the cause of anything, instrument, means; motive; origin, principle; a cause (in 
philosophy, i.e., that which is invariably antecedent to some product). Cf. MWM, 274. 
1544 Cf. WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary..., 26-27. 
1545 Cf. ibid., 28. Deussen clarifies about the ten organs as: „Den Organen des individuellen Atman entsprechen 
im Weltganzen die Naturkräfte (Naturgötter) als Organe des kosmische Atman“. “The organs of the individual 
Ātman correspond in the universe to the forces of nature (nature gods) as organs of the cosmic Ātman.” See 
DEUSSEN, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie…, 241. Tr. by author. 
1546 Cf. WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary..., 29.  
1547 Cf. ibid., 39. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 37-38. 
1548 Cf. ibid., 39. Cf. Jeannette M. VAN GELDER, Der Ātman in der Großen-Wald-Geheimlehre (Bṛhad-
Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣad), Mouton & Co., ‚S-Gravenhage 1957, 123. 
1549 Cf. WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary..., 39. 
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of the soul that accompanies it in their migrations until salvation. The soul at death releases the 
gross body like a mango from its stem.1550  
14.4.4 Jīva 
The next term that needs examination in this section is jīva, commonly translated in English as 
‘individual’. However, many Hindu scholars would deny attributing the English equivalent 
‘individual’ or ‘person’ to jīva. It certainly does not mean individual or person as understood 
today. Etymologically, it means a living being or even ‘life’. As the latter, it is sometimes used 
in the sense of a being with life or a living being (sajīva) as distinguished from a lifeless being 
or a non-living being (nirjīva). In this sense, all living beings – human as well as plants and 
animals – are jīvas. However, only human beings are considered as individuals or persons and 
not animals.1551 
Apte translates jīva  as: 1) The principle of life, the vital breath, life, soul; 2) The individual or 
personal soul enshrined in the human body and imparting to it life, motion and sensation (called 
jīvātman as opposed to paramātman, the Supreme Soul); 3) Life, existence; 4) A creature, living 
being; 5) Livelihood, profession.1552 Wood describes jīva as an individual soul. He explains 
about jīva as that which “makes a man conscious of his own consciousness, or conscious of 
himself, even without any definition or thought of himself or of others, or indeed of anything 
else at all.”1553  
Further, jīva is the organ of self-consciousness. His intellect or mind (manas or buddhi) makes 
him conscious of the world and other selves. However, even without their (manas or buddhi) 
functioning, jīva knows itself, just as “in the new born babe, which at first knows itself, then 
others, and then itself as one of the “others” – a mistake which will be corrected in course of 
Vedāntic learning”.1554 
Another important aspect of jīva can also derived based on its origin from the world-creating 
ātman.1555 In Chāṇdogya Upanishad 6.3.2, the word jīva ātman, which means “the individual 
soul” here, appears for the first time in comparison to the highest. However, in fact there is no 
such contrast here, because it is the only existing, world-creating Ātman that enters as jīva 
ātman into his created world.1556 
                                                 
1550 „Vom feinen Leib, welcher als Träger der psychischen Organe die Seele auf ihren Wanderungen bis zur 
Erlösung begleitet, ist zu unterscheiden der grobe Leib, den die Seele beim Tod loslässt wie die Mangofrucht ihren 
Stengel (Bṛih. 4.3.36).“ See DEUSSEN, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie…, 255. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 
38. The reference Deussen is making here, is in the context of soul at death described in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka 
Upaniṣad 4.3.36: “When he comes to weakness – whether he come to weakness through old age or through disease 
– this person frees himself from these limbs just as a mango, or a fig, or a berry releases itself from its bond; and 
he hastens again, according to the entrance and place of origin, back to life.” See Bṛihad-āraṇyaka Upanishad, in: 
The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 139. 
1551 Cf. PRASAD, A Conceptual-Analytic Study…, 125. 
1552 Cf. APTE, Vol. 2, 739. Cf. MWM, 422. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 39. 
1553 WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary..., 93. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 39. 
1554 Cf. WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary..., 93. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 39. 
1555 See Chapter 14.4.1 above. 
1556 Chāṇdogya Upanishad 6.3.2 reads: “That divinity [i.e. Being] bethought itself: ‘Come ! Let me enter these 
three divinities [i.e. heat, water, and food] with this living Soul ({jīva} ātman), and separate out name and form.” 
See Chāṇdogya Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 242. Addition {jīva} by author. The 
“name and form” is the Skt. idiom for ‘individuality’. Cf. ibid. at fn. 1. Cf. DEUSSEN, Allgemeine Geschichte der 
Philosophie…, 232-233. See SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 40. 
 Chapter 14: Classical Hindu Perspective I: Basic Notions 309 
 
 
 
As already indicated, jīva is also the name given to the human, who has survived death and 
reborn and therefore can be redeemed. A living human who will not be reborn again is termed 
as jīvanmukta.1557 According to Wood, jīvanmukta is described as:1558 
One who has reached liberation while still living in the world and still having a body. Though 
living in the waking state in the midst of the creations (vikshepas) of others, his mind never 
loses sight of Brahman, and never loses the joy of Brahman, and he is not bound, because he 
has no personal or egoistic desires and no emotional attachments to sense-objects […]. This 
man has no plans, it is said, about “I and mine,” or about the past or the future, and is always 
fair or impartial. His actions are determined as for the welfare of all beings (loka-sangraha), 
and thus are devoid of the bondage of karma.1559 
From the previously mentioned discussions, it becomes clear that neither a self (ātman), nor a 
body (śarīra) can be a moral agent. According to a modern Philosopher Rajendra Prasad, the 
jīva, being an embodied self (śasarīra ātman), a self in a body, has all the advantages and 
disadvantages of an embodied being. This jīva, equipped with a certain level of mental and 
bodily ability that is proper to a human being, can be called a moral being. It is to this human 
jīva (the human individual, as a member of a moral community), that moral or ethical predicates 
can be attributed.1560 
14.4.5 Vyakti 
In Sanskrit, the word vyakti (cf. The Bhagavad-Gītā 7.24) means specific appearance, 
distinctness, individuality, it is also a term used as an individual in opposition to jāti (species 
as opposed to individuals).1561 This word vyakti is set in contrast to another word avyakta (cf. 
The Bhagavad-Gītā 7.24), which means not manifest or unmanifest, unapparent, and indistinct. 
As used in masculine gender avyakta can also mean the Universal Spirit, the Supreme Being, 
bráhman.1562 The word vyakti is also used in Hindi. However, this is a modern coinage for both 
of the English terms ‘individual’ and ‘person’. This becomes obvious from the fact that the 
abstract noun of vyakti, namely, the term vyaktitva, is used as a synonym for both ‘individuality’ 
and ‘personality’.1563 
In The Bhagavad-Gītā 7.24, it is stated that only the unintelligent men who do not know 
perfectly the Supreme Being think that the Godhead was impersonal or unmanifest (avyaktam) 
before and has now assumed personality (vyaktim). Due to one’s small knowledge, one does 
not know His higher nature, which is imperishable and supreme.1564 In his introduction, Abhay 
Charanaravinda Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupāda, teacher and founder of International 
Society for Kṛṣṇa Consciousness, referring to this citation from The Bhagavad-Gītā, remarks 
that we are all individual living beings and have our individuality. Similarly, the Supreme 
                                                 
1557 The Skt. word mukta means absolved or emancipated from sin or worldly existence. The word is derived 
from muc meaning set free, liberate or deliver. Cf. APTE, Vol.2, 1273 & 1276. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 40. 
1558 Cf. ibid. 
1559 WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary..., 93-94. Cf. SEELE, „Das bist du!...“, 40. 
1560 Cf. PRASAD, A Conceptual-Analytic Study…, 126. 
1561 Cf. MWM, 1029. 
1562 Cf. MWM, 111. Cf. APTE, Vol.1, 271. 
1563 Cf. PRASAD, A Conceptual-Analytic Study…, 125. 
1564 BG 7.24 reads: “Fools think of Me as one unmanifest [before] who has reached [the stage of] manifestation: 
they know nothing of my higher state, the Changeless, All-Highest.” 
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Absolute Truth is also, in the final analysis, a person and the realization of the personality of 
Godhead is the realization of his transcendental features.1565 According to Zaehner’s 
commentary, the reference to ‘unmanifest’ (avyaktam) is also a term that is used for ‘primal, 
undifferentiated matter’ in the Sāṁkhya system (Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa 10-111566). It 
is from this matter that the intellect (buddhi), mind, ego, the senses, etc., proceed. In The 
Bhagavad-Gītā 2.25, the word avyakta appears for the first time. It is used in the sense of the 
individual self-in-itself. It refers to the puruṣa. As unmanifest, the concept is repeated again, as 
described earlier (in The Bhagavad-Gītā 7.24), and in ibid. 8.18-20.1567 
Thus, once again the problem with the usage of words in Sanskrit confronts one, namely, that 
there are words that are similar to one another and that are used by modern scholars for both 
person (puruṣa; here as unmanifest or avyakta) and individual (vyakti; here as manifest). 
Having seen the various nuances of the terms of person, self, individual, soul, life, etc., the next 
section will narrow down to the concept of person. 
14.5 THE CONCEPT OF PERSON 
In this section, the ideas of George Gispert-Sauch1568, a Spanish born contemporary Jesuit, 
Indologist and Philosopher, will be developed in order to derive the concept of the human 
person in Hindu Scriptures while simultaneously making a comparative study with the Western 
world. 
Gispert-Sauch notes that at the very outset, there is the methodological problem involved, 
namely, that the concept of ‘person’ comes from a Western philosophical tradition and there is 
no equivalent translation in the Indian language. Therefore, the problem is whether it is fair to 
approach the Indian tradition through a concept that is alien to it, which involves a risk of 
looking at or evaluating a philosophy constructed elsewhere. A solution to the problem is by 
studying the concept of man or human being in its various aspects as seen within the Indian 
tradition. De Smet made one such attempt. However, Gispert-Sauch finds that this solution has 
a risk of diffusing the focus of the study and introducing a very general discussion on the 
meaning of man. What is required is a detailed study of the exact meaning of the concept of 
person in the Indian and Western tradition.1569 Therefore, his discussion will be handled here. 
Before analyzing the approach of Gispert-Sauch, one basic model can be acknowledged. With 
few variations from early times in traditional and orthodox Hinduism, it is proposed that the 
human person is a composite of two essentially disparate but intimately conjoined principles – 
                                                 
1565 Cf. BG. “As It Is”, Complete Edition, Revised and Enlarged with original Sanskrit text Roman 
transliteration, English Equivalents, translation and elaborate purports, ed.by A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami  
PRABHUPĀDA, The Bhaktivedanta Book Trust, London et al. 1985, 14. German tr. of the book is Bhagavad-Gītā. 
Wie sie ist, hg. v. A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami PRABHUPĀDA, The Bhaktivedanta Book Trust, Hamburg 1974, 12. 
1566 Cf. Swami VIRUPAKSHANANDA (ed.), Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, Sāṁkhya Kārikā: with the Tattva Kaumudī of Śri 
Vācaspati Miśra with Sanskrit text of the Kārikā, transliteration and word-for-word meaning, and a free rendering 
into English of the Tattva Kaumudī with notes, Sri Ramakrishna Math, Mylapore, Madras 1995, 38-42. 
1567 See the commentary of Zaehner in The Bhagavad-Gītā, op. cit., 135, 253 & 266-267. 
1568 Cf. GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 27-44. 
1569 Cf. ibid., 28. Thumma is of the opinion that a person is a moral agent to whom moral praise and blame can 
be attached, which is not the case with the soul or ātman in Hinduism. Therefore, the concept of person is to be 
considered as a category by itself and differentiated from other beings. Seen from this point of view, the concept 
of person is very underdeveloped if not totally missing in Indian culture. See THUMMA, “Human Person…”; 251. 
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spirit (ātman or puruṣa) and matter (prakṛti). The locus of consciousness and bliss is the spirit, 
which is impervious to substantial change, while matter is essentially insentient and changeable. 
Spirit and matter together produce the distinctive individual. The union of the two brings in 
self-awareness that is characterized by the congenital illusion that fails to distinguish between 
the “real” self and the “false” self. In order to internalize the awareness of the distinction 
between real self and false self, liberation is important. Until this human goal of liberation is 
not attained, each of us repeatedly die and are physically reborn as a continuum of different 
personalities, determined by karma (i.e., meritorious and unmeritorious action). For every 
individual, this process of karma and rebirth is without beginning and continues indefinitely. It 
is only terminated by enlightenment, whereupon the individual soul is liberated from the wheel 
of rebirth.1570 Keeping this basic structure of the human person in mind, in this section, the 
research of Gispert-Sauch will be analyzed. 
Here the metaphysical concept of person will be dealt with and confined to the classical Hindu 
view. It was seen (Chapter 2.5.1) that a philosophical discussion on person starts in the Western 
tradition with Boethius’ definition: naturae rationalis individua substantia (individual 
substance of a rational nature )1571 and Thomas’: subsistens in rationali natura (a subsistent 
individual of a rational nature).1572 In these two formulations, three metaphysical concepts come 
into conjunction in dealing with the concept of person, namely, rationality, substance and 
individuality.1573 These three metaphysical concepts are described below from a Western 
understanding and contrasted with the philosophy of Hinduism. 
14.5.1. Rationality 
In Western metaphysics, only an intelligent being is a person. Only intelligent beings are subject 
of rights and duties from which it follows that they are liable to the protection of society and its 
judicial structures. The Scholastic tradition also held that consciousness is constitutive of 
personhood, but need not be the “rational” consciousness that is experienced by human beings. 
Angels too were perceived as person, but it was an intuitive kind of consciousness because they 
were super-rational. So also, the divine Reality, itself personal, is the pure act of knowledge or 
rather consciousness. This also brings in a sharp dichotomy between rational and irrational 
beings. Thus, rationality was considered as an essential element of the person.1574 
Hindu metaphysics also conceives of the basic substratum of the human being as rational (cit 
or manas) or preferably as conscious (caitanya1575), self-luminous (svayamjyotiṣṭva), “witness” 
(sākṣitva1576, as applied specially to the concept of Puruṣa), etc. Traditional Hindu metaphysics 
believes that consciousness is found in all beings. In the visible world, the basic distinction is 
                                                 
1570 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 52-53. 
1571 BOETHIUS, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, 3..., 85. 
1572 AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae I, 29, 3. 
1573 Cf. GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 30. See also Gilles EMERY, „Einheit und Vielheit in Gott. 
Trinitätslehre (S.th, I, qq.27-43)“, in: Andreas SPEER (Hg.), Thomas von Aquin: Die Summa Theologiae. Werk-
interpretation, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 2005, 77-97; 92. Emery writes: „Die Person wird also durch drei 
Kennzeichnen definiert: Unterschiedenheit (Individualität), Existieren durch sich selbst (Substanz) und freies 
Handeln durch sich selbst (Vernunftbegabtheit).“ Ibid. 
1574 Cf. GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 31-32. 
1575 Skt. for consciousness, intelligence, sensation, soul and spirit. Cf. MWM, 402. 
1576 Skt. meaning the office of any legal witness, evidence, testimony, attestation. Cf. MWM, 1198. 
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between cetana1577 vs. acetana1578 (conscious vs. non-conscious) beings. Cetana applies to all 
life, even animal existence. Although there are various degrees of consciousness, a sharp 
dichotomy between rational and irrational beings as in the Western thought is not to be found 
in Indian thinking. However, there is a continuum in the concept of person in the Indian 
thinking. To restrict the metaphysical concept of person to human beings would be 
philosophically unjustified. In connection with the dogma of reincarnation, which covers all 
living beings (or at least all sentient), this makes sense. In Hindu ethics, it stems from the 
primacy of ahiṁsā (non-injury) which extends to all living beings and consequently in 
vegetarianism which is characteristic of Indian orthodox spirituality.1579 
The above idea of the extension of “personhood” to all living beings, however, needs to be 
qualified, especially in Hindu law books. When it comes to the question dharma, there is no 
such concept with regard to animals except in a metaphorical sense. However, in the 
metaphysical perception that was dealt above, the duties (dharma) of human beings extend to 
one’s compassion to animals, feeding them and prohibit killing them.1580 
From what has been discussed above it can be concluded that rationality is an essential element 
of the person, a characteristic at the core of the human being, in his or her very ātman, which is 
different in its boundaries and outline when compared to Western thought. 
14.5.2 Substantiality 
The substantia of Western thought is seen as the support and the underpinning of the 
phenomena that we perceive. The Scholastics considered the substania as beings. A strong 
distinction was made in the primary mode by which the beings manifested, namely, inseitas 
(being in oneself or self -sufficiency) and aseitas (being from oneself or independence). 
Substance, according to Western Christian metaphysics, means in-oneself-ness and not from-
oneself-ness. That is to say, one can conceive of a substance as totally derived from existence 
– created and sustained into being by a Prime Cause – and yet operating at the level of creature 
as its centre of action and of being, or being in-itself, and thereby being the support or 
substratum of all passing accidents.1581 
This concept of substance, although it appears in the Indian tradition, is used with a different 
wording and with a different contour in comparison with the Western perception. The 
Upaniṣads describe about the pratiṣṭhā1582 (foundation) of beings. “The ultimate foundation is 
that on which all our experiences are established and which is itself not established on anything 
else.”1583 
However, the concept in Hinduism that is closest to the Western idea of substance is the ātman, 
the Self, the ultimate root of all existence, which the Upaniṣads proclaim to be the bráhman or 
underlying immanent cause of the ancient sacrificial universe, as mentioned earlier (Chapter 
                                                 
1577 Skt. meaning visible, conspicuous, conscious, sentient, intelligent. Cf. MWM, 397. 
1578 Skt. meaning without consciousness, inanimate; unconscious, insensible, senseless, fainting Cf. MWM, 9. 
1579 Cf. GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 31-32. 
1580 Cf. ibid., 32. 
1581 Cf. ibid., 34. 
1582 Skt. for ground, base, foundation, support. Cf. MWM, 671. 
1583 GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 33. 
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14.4.1). “This ātman which man experiences as the term of all his conscious life, is the 
substratum of all reality.”1584 
The Upaniṣads describe the ātman to be a correlational term that expresses the pole of 
subjectivity and interiority in comparison to what is more objective and external. Ātman is more 
enduring, subtle and which cannot be “objectified” but pervades as the underlying or inner 
cause and as the objective phenomena of our consciousness.1585 
On the one hand, the concept of ātman is close to but not identical with the substantia of ancient 
Western thought, namely as the support and the underpinning of the phenomena we perceive. 
Nevertheless, on the other hand, the concept of ātman is perceived different from the Western 
thought. Christian metaphysics makes a strong distinction between inseitas (being in oneself or 
self -sufficiency) and aseitas (being from oneself or independence). In Hindu metaphysics, the 
reality of in se is also a se, cause of its own existence, or rather eternal, self-explanatory qua 
existent.1586 Gispert-Sauch explains that the different apprehension stated above is because the 
Western tradition arrives at the concept of God through the model of efficient causality 
(creation). However, Hindu philosophy finds this explanation too external. Therefore, it holds 
for an immanentist position in its search for the ātman. In other words, Hindu metaphysics seeks 
rather the immanent cause or the substratum of existence that is permanent. The 
phenomenological being does not and cannot severe itself from the umbilical cord that feeds its 
existence. It is always in the womb, inhering in the source of its being. Apart from this source, 
it is absolutely nothing. In Hindu metaphysics, it would be a māyā1587 (illusion) if the being in 
oneself (inseitas) were conceived as distinct from being from oneself (aseitas). It would be a 
false superimposition.1588 
14.5.3 Individuation 
Integral to the idea of the person is also the fact that he/she must be an individual, singular or 
distinct. Western metaphysics divides the concept of person into two separate ideas, namely, 
internal (indivisum in se) and external distinction (divisum ab omni alio).1589 
Hindu Philosophy finds no problem in internal unity (akhaṇḍita1590), namely, the inner ultimate 
reality, the Self, as an unbroken and simple, perfectly one (ekam evā´dvitīyam1591). However, 
the question is whether it has frontiers or is separate from everything else. Hindu metaphysics 
affirms that the absolute reality is without a second, that is, advaita, meaning transcendent and 
of a nature eternally pure, awakened and free (expressed in one composite word: 
nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvarūpa). Hindu metaphysics also speaks of the person as not distinct 
from others, that is, it remains the soul of everything, intimately united to the universe, 
                                                 
1584 Ibid., 33. 
1585 Cf. ibid. 
1586 Cf. ibid., 34. 
1587 Skt. word that can variously mean art, wisdom, extraordinary or supernatural power (only in the earlier 
language of the Vedas); illusion unreality, deception, fraud, trick, sorcery, witchcraft, magic. Cf. MWM, 811.The 
concept of māyā being important will be dealt with later. 
1588 Cf. GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 34-35. 
1589 Cf. ibid., 35. 
1590 Skt. meaning unbroken, undivided, unimpaired. Cf. MWM, 4. 
1591 ekam = the same, one and the same, identical; evā = likeness, sameness of manner (thus); dvitīyam = 
second. In other words, the one without the second. Cf. MWM, 227; 232 & 506. 
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sarvātman1592, with which all things have a relation of tādātmya1593, “having That as its Self”.1594 
This relation is not reciprocal.1595 
In conclusion, taking into consideration the different contours and distinctive metaphysical 
content of the Hindu perception, one can affirm that the ancient concept of personhood that is 
found in the Western Tradition can be equivalently found in the idea of the Absolute Ultimate 
in the Hindu Tradition.1596 
14.6 SOCIAL ETHICS IN HINDUISM 
From the discussion above it becomes clear that religion and philosophy are closely bound to 
one another in Hinduism. Similarly, Hinduism is also bound to social system.1597 French 
Indologist Louis Renou remarks: “In some regards, it [Hinduism] is inseparable from 
philosophic speculations; in others, it is inseparable from social life”.1598 Therefore, it is 
necessary to see the social ethics of Hinduism that is relevant to the topic. 
Gispert-Sauch – apart from the metaphysical explanation of person, as described in the last 
section, in Hinduism –, gives a modern approach to the meaning of person in Hinduism. 
According to him, the human person is conceived more in terms of relationship, freedom, self-
transcendence and a subject of human rights and duties. Consequently, the human person is 
seen as the centre of moral responsibility. During the ancient Vedic times, man was seen as the 
focus of a complex set of relationships that made him an integral part of the complex universe, 
as a microcosm of the various worlds in existence. In the speculations of the Brāhmaṇas, the 
term bándhutās1599 relate the microcosm of man to the great world of the physical universe, 
consisting of the unseen world of gods, and to the sacred world of the sacrificial ritual. These 
worlds are correlated in which man is the sun and Viṣṇu1600, the sacrificial altar. Each organ and 
function of man’s physical and psychic complexity had its correlative, its bándhu, in the other 
universe. To discern these relationships is to approach salvation that culminates in the process 
of the great Upaniṣadic bandhutā, namely, where bráhman ═ ātman (as already mentioned in 
Chapter 14.4.1 above).1601 
                                                 
1592 Skt. meaning the whole person, the universal Soul, entire in person or nature. Cf. MWM, 1188. 
1593 Skt. meaning sameness or identity of nature or character with the other. Cf. MWM, 442. 
1594 For a brief description of this term, see Chapter 14.4.1, fn.1485 above. 
1595 Cf. GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 35.d 
1596 Cf. ibid., 35. 
1597 Cf. Louis DUMONT, Religion/Politics and History in India. Collected Papers in Indian Sociology. Le 
Monde d'outre-mer Passé et Présent. Série 1. Études. 34, Mouton Publishers, Paris/The Hague 1970, 37-38. 
1598 “A certains égards, il est inséparable de la spéculation philosophique; à d’autres, de la vie sociale.” See 
Louis RENOU, L’Hindouisme, Dixième édition revue et corrigée, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1991, 28. 
English tr. quoted from DUMONT, Religion/Politics and History in India…, 38, fn.10. Addition is by Dumont. See 
KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 288. 
1599 Skt. from the root bándhu meaning connection, relation, association, kinship, kindred. Along with the 
suffix –tā it meant connection, relation, kinship. Cf. MWM, 721. 
1600 The word Vishṇu comes from the Skt. root vish meaning all pervader or worker. Vishṇu is one of the 
principal Hindu deities. He is regarded in the later mythology as ‘the preserver’. Along with Brahmā ‘the creator’ 
and Śiva ‘the destroyer’, they constitute the Tri-mūrti or triad. Cf. MWM, 999. 
1601 GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 39. 
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Based on the above perception, Gispert-Sauch is of the opinion that it must have influenced the 
emergence of the duties pertaining to the caste system1602, namely, the varnāśramdharma.1603 
When dealing with the human dharma, the legal texts do not speak directly about the duties or 
rights of man, but of the functions of the castes and the states of life. The society exists prior to 
the individual, and he/she is born a member of the caste and is understood only within the 
multiple structures of relations that the caste embodies. As a member of the caste, man is the 
subject of personal relationships, obligations and responsibilities and therefore, man does not 
exist as an atomic individual.1604 
Thus an essential institution of Hinduism from the very beginning, based on the above 
relationship, has been the caste system or the caturvarṇa.1605 
The division into the four castes comes perhaps from the Puruṣa-Sūkta 10.90, which was 
already discussed (see Chapter 14.3, above). The Puruṣa-Sūkta hymn explains the formation of 
the castes from the dismemberment of the Puruṣa. It reads: 
11. When they divided Puruṣa how many portions did they make? What do 
they call his mouth, his arms? What do they call his thighs and feet? 
12. The Brāhman was his mouth, of both his arms was the Rājanya made. His 
thighs became the Vaiṣya, from his feet the Ṣúdra was produced.1606 
Broadly speaking it is a four-fold classification of people based originally on four types of 
human nature: 
Brahmin (spiritual-introvert, i.e., sattvik), Kshatriya (spiritual-extrovert, i.e., sattvik/rajasik), 
Vaishya (extrovert, guided by the constraint of inertia, i.e., rajasik/tamasik), and Shudra 
(guided by the principle of inertia, i.e., tamasik). Different duties in life have been assigned 
to each group depending on the nature of the people, which, to a large extent, is determined 
by the family environment. Teaching and priestly duties fall to the Brahmin, protection of 
the country and maintenance of justice to the Kshatriya, agriculture and commerce to the 
Vaishya, and the duty of assisting others to the Shudra.1607 
                                                 
1602 The origin of the word ‘caste’ is from Portuguese ‘casta’ meaning race, species or lineage. It inadequately 
translates two Indian words: varṇa (Skt. meaning colour of the face, especially good colour or complexion) and 
jāti (= birth). Varṇa stands for the four original divisions of humankind into classes, namely, Brāhmaṇas, 
Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas, and Śūdras. The Brāhmaṇas who belong to the highest class are the custodian of ritual and 
sacred word, teachers and advisors of society. The Kṣatriyas are the defenders and warriors. The Vaiśyas 
comprised of farmers and merchants. The Śūdras were considered the lowest among the class. They were a class 
of servants and menials. Each varṇa is further divided into jātis that are hierarchically ordered. Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, 
A Survey of Hinduism…, 289. Cf. MWM, 924. 
1603 For a brief description about the origin of the varnāśramdharma, see RAPPEL, Gemeinsame 
Weltverantwortung und globale Ethos…, 130-132. 
1604 Cf. GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 40. 
1605 Cf. DUMONT, Religion/Politics and History in India…, 38. Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 
289. The word catur is translated as ‘four’. Thus, caturvarṇa means the four varṇas or castes.  
1606 Ṛg Veda 10.90. From The Hymns of the Rigveda…, 519. Rājanya is the second or Kshatriya caste, the regal 
and military caste. See ibid., fn. 12. Cf. also KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 289. 
1607 Sitansu S. CHAKRAVARTI, Hinduism. A Way of Life, Motilal Banarasidas Publishers, Delhi/Madras/ 
Bangalore/Patna/Varanasi 1994, 24-25. Ṛg Veda dramatically explains the origin of humankind out of the sacrifice 
of the primaeval puruṣa and his dismemberment as: from his mouth originated the Brahmins, from his chest the 
Kshatriyas, from his belly the Vaiśyas and from his feet the Śūdras. Ṛg Veda 10.190. Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey 
of Hinduism..., 289. The investiture of boys of the upper three social classes (varṇas) through the ceremony of 
Upanayana (sacred thread), conferred on them the status of “twice-born” (dvija) and this “second birth” permitted 
them to hear the Veda and participate in sacrifices. Cf. HILTEBEITEL, “Hinduism…”, 3991. 
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The successive stage of life of a high-caste person was correlated to the caturvarga1608, that is, 
“the four aims/goals of life” (or the puruṣārtha), namely, dharma (moral law or the fulfillment 
of religious and ethical obligations), artha (material goods), kāma (sexual, emotional 
enjoyment or aesthetic satisfaction), and mokṣa (final liberation).1609 Dharma, artha and kāma 
form the ‘group of three’ (trivarga or trimārga). Mokṣa or total liberation was considered as 
the supreme goal (paramapuruṣārtha), which is not on a level with other goals (trivarga) but 
in fact, a goal of the other goals.1610 
The holistic idea of man that was discussed in the previous section is important here in 
opposition to his conception as a mere part. By his empirical limits, the Vedic man is not an 
insulated being but prolonged not only by his wife, children, cattle and pasturelands, but also 
by his very complementarity with the other varṇas and with gods themselves.1611 In other words, 
in early times, in the Vedic society, the ideal man is a householder integrated within the 
hierarchical system of his pastoral-agricultural society; who is essentially social and his society 
consists of a hierarchy, which includes the visible varṇas of men and the invisible gods. Thus, 
he stands as a hub of horizontal and vertical relationships of complementarity and reciprocity 
resulting in his wholesomeness and integration.1612 
The attraction to ascetic life as a Renouncer became strong in the Brahmanical society while 
trying to accommodate it to its own way by gradually developing the scheme of the 
caturāśramas.1613 As mentioned earlier, although the atomic individual does not exist, one can 
conceive of such an idea by a saṃnyāsī1614 (renouncer) within the scheme of caturāśramas.1615 
                                                 
1608 Skt. literally varga means a separate division, class, set; and caturvarga means a collection of 4 things. 
Here the four aims of life. Cf. MWM, 923. 
1609 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism..., 291. See Chapter 14.4.2 and fn.1522 above on puruṣārtha. 
1610 Cf. George M. SOARES-PRABHU, “The Christian Purusarthas. Meaning and Goals of Life in Jesus’ 
Teachings”, in: Jeev 67 (1982) 69-86; 69. George Soares-Prabhu was an Indian Jesuit Biblical Scholar and 
Theologian. 
1611 Cf. DE SMET, The Indian Understanding of Man…, 4. 
1612 Cf. ibid., 11. 
1613 Cf. ibid., 6. Cf. RAPPEL, Gemeinsame Weltverantwortung und globale Ethos…, 132. The caturāśrama 
consists of four stages of life: the brahmacarya or the student-hood, in which he learns the sacred texts, acquires 
necessary skills for ritual functions, disciplines himself and prepares for his future life. The stage terminates with 
the marriage of the student and he enters the second stage of life gṛahstya, the life of a householder, in which he 
enjoys life and does the duties associated with the care of the family while acquiring artha or material wealth. 
When his children grew to adulthood, he hands over his worldly business to his sons and retires to spiritual pursuits. 
Thus, he enters the next stage, vānaprasthya, i.e., life in the forest, preparing and devoting himself to receive 
mokṣa, for the end of life. Ideally, this stage is followed by an even more radical renunciation – saṃnyāsa, which 
is the life of a homeless ascetic, possessing nothing and desiring nothing but liberation from the body. Cf. 
Pandurang Vaman KANE, History of Dharmaśāstra (Ancient and Mediaeval Religious and Civil Law), Vol. 2, Part 
1, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1941, 416-417 & 420. Cf. Ibid., Vol. 2, Part 2, 930-975. Cf. 
KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism..., 291-292. Not all Hindus follow this sequence of stages in their lives. 
However, the structure that the caturāśrama suggests and the interests to be pursued according to the caturvarga 
scheme have deeply influenced the personal and social history of Hindus and Hinduism. Cf. ibid., 292. The 
caturāśrama is also known as āśramadharma. In comparison to varnāśramdharma, which divides the society in 
its social life, the āśramadharma with its four āśramas is seen as a chronological structure of the career of one’s 
life.  
1614 From Skt. root saṃnyāsa, is the state of putting or throwing down, laying aside, resignation, abandonment, 
renunciation of the world, profession of asceticism.  A saṃnyāsin is an ascetic or devotee who has renounced all 
earthly concerns and devotes himself to meditation of the scriptures. It could also mean a Brahmin in the fourth 
stage of life or āshrama. Cf. MWM, 1148. Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 371. 
1615 Cf. GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 40. 
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At the end of the Ṛg Vedic period, clear allusions to the houseless condition of some who 
practice asceticism (tapas) in various forms can be found. The one who practices asceticism 
(tapas) or the Renouncer (Saṃnyāsī) is deliberately the opposite of the Vedic householder. He 
is a detached atom, a self-isolating individual who withdraws himself from the rights and duties 
of his varṇa and status while setting himself completely outside the very structure and 
hierarchical framework of secular society.1616  
The Renouncer (Saṃnyāsī) also introduced a new ontology of man. First, the divine, 
cosmogenic forces of man as a sacrificer are replaced by physiological and psychological 
functions. The Renouncers are encouraged to adopt attitudes by giving attention to the three 
states of consciousness (waking, dreaming and sleeping) and through practice of yoga.1617 
Second, the Renouncer (Saṃnyāsī), more through his life than his teaching, introduces the 
dynamism of the intellect and will. On the one hand, the Renouncer tends to suppress desire in 
the form of greed, lust, envy etc. On the other hand, he is constantly sustained by a spiritual 
desire that burns like a flame until it is fulfilled by the perfect realization of truth, which makes 
man transcend himself.1618  
Third, the new ontology introduced by the renouncer’s personality is the doctrine of the five 
ātmans (the physical, the biological, the sentient, the conscious and the blissful). This is found 
in several Upaniṣads and especially described in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (3.1-6).1619 The five 
‘selves’ (kósas) that was described (Chapter 14.4.3, above), have each the next as its ātman, its 
soul or point of reference. Together they form a complex metaphysical whole. This transition 
from ātman to kósa can be seen as a philosophy of the authentic inner reality of the individual. 
The core of this teaching is that we are not just a self “made of” bliss, but bliss (ānandá) itself. 
Taittirīya Upaniṣad (3.6) acknowledges this fact, namely, “[…] bliss is Brahman, (because) 
from bliss these creatures are verily born; having been born, by bliss they live; and having 
departed, into bliss again they enter.”1620 Therefore, one can summarize that “Bliss (ānandá) is 
a characteristic Indian metaphysical concept, and it is placed at the heart of the personality […]. 
Ānandá is the very core of man and of the universe […].”1621 
Fourth, another new concept of man is introduced, namely, instead of being a dynamic 
conqueror through will power and concentration winning the Godhead, “he is now a receiver 
of divine grace, the beneficiary of a divine election”.1622 Further, the love of God communicated 
to man by God himself, is the supreme integrator of man.1623 Thus, through the transcendence, 
the human spirit attains immortality because of being favoured and blessed by its divine Lord 
and by which at least some of the renouncers become devotees. 
                                                 
1616 Cf. DE SMET, The Indian Understanding of Man…, 6-7. 
1617 Cf. ibid., 8. 
1618 Cf. ibid., 9. 
1619 Taittiriya Upanishad with Sanskrit Text, Paraphrases with word-for-word Literal Translation, English 
rendering and Comments, tr. by Swami SHARVANANDA, The Ramakrishna Math, Mylapore, Madras 1921, 100-
115. Cf. GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 41. 
1620 Quoted from SHARVANANDA, Taittiriya Upanishad…, 110. 
1621 GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 41. 
1622 Cf. DE SMET, The Indian Understanding of Man…, 10. 
1623 Cf. ibid., 11. 
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Thus, in summarizing the above successive views of man, one can stress some important aspects 
of his complex being. Man’s relatedness and openness can be enumerated in three directions: 
First, his social character (social, cosmic and divine) as complementarity with others. Second, 
his dynamism towards integration on all possible levels as a renouncer (his radical freedom 
which enables him to refuse and reject whatever he deems worthless and to accept and embrace 
what he finds excellent). Finally, his intrinsic worth as an end in himself proved by the fact that 
he is a desirable object of love (ista) for God Himself.1624 
14.7 THE CONCEPT OF REBIRTH 
Hinduism holds that humans are in a state of “fall” in their empirical existence. The beginning 
of the “fall” remains unanswered. However, the present life of a human being can be traced to 
its previous life, and so on ad infinitum. How does one solve the mystery of this infinite regress? 
Hinduism holds that although jīva (life) is anādi (beginning-less; without beginning), still life 
has an end, meaning that humans are not condemned to be in the state of fall forever. The 
bondage of this cycle can be terminated through the redemptive grace of God, by performing 
action (karma), devotion (bhakti) and pursuing knowledge (jñāna).1625 Thus, the association 
with the material component is important for the spirit so that the human being can overcome 
the bondage by living a purposive life as a moral agent and a spiritual being.1626 
Based on the above problem of the cycle of bondage, there is an important doctrine, which 
affects human personality, namely, the doctrine of rebirth. The human being’s life on earth is a 
result of unending succession of births always striving after liberation in order to recover the 
primordial, purely metaphysical oneness or bliss with the bráhman. In a certain sense, man is 
complete metaphysically insofar as he/she is completely one with the source, the Absolute. 
Nevertheless, in another sense, that is, psychologically, he/she is incomplete. Many forms are 
taken in order to achieve this liberation such as the fulfilling of the ancient dharma, or through 
the isolation of Yoga or the path of the Vedānta.1627 
All this is possible only if the birth or rebirth is as a human being. Therefore, human birth is 
preferable to others, in that it ushers in the possibility of salvation (mokṣa). For a “Western” 
mind, this poses a problem because of the belief in rebirth in Hinduism. The question for the 
Western thinking is how could the same soul be born in another? Therefore, the choice of a 
special term “person”, like in the West, to designate the status of the human being, is difficult 
to reconcile with, because of the possibility of the same soul being reborn in all sorts of bodies 
(i.e., not only humans, based on the karma).1628 
Returning back to the theme that was mentioned above, namely, liberation, it also means never 
to be born again. Once one has reached this beatific state (jīvanmukta, see 14.4.4 above), he/she 
draws near to God Himself, participates in His mode of being and enters into Him.1629  
                                                 
1624 Cf. ibid., 12. 
1625 These three ways or paths (literally “three ways” or trimārga) to liberation, namely, karma-, jñāna- and 
bhaktimārga. 
1626 Cf. BALASUBRAMANIAN, “The Origin of the World…”, 38.  
1627 Cf. GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 41-42. 
1628 Cf. DE SMET, “Materials toward an Indo-Western Understanding…”, 44. 
1629 Cf. The Bhagavad-Gītā, op. cit., 29. BG 8.16 reads: “The worlds right up to Brahmā’s realm [dissolve and] 
evolve again; but he who come right nigh to Me shall never be born again.” 
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Insofar as one hinders the achievement of the soul towards this liberation, one prevents the 
human soul in the course of the cycle of rebirth in two ways. First, the person who hinders is 
doing evil by preventing the human soul to partake in the cycle of rebirth; second, he/she is 
preventing the soul from liberation and therefore, not giving a chance to the other to strive 
towards liberation. It could be indicated here that this action of prevention or hindrance, for 
example, in the case of abortion, would amount to prevention of the soul from participating in 
the cycle of rebirth in order to be liberated. The process of liberation is also the 
acknowledgement of the immortality of the human soul. However, the human being needs to 
overcome the bondage of a cycle by living a purposive life as a moral agent and a spiritual 
being. To achieve this end or purpose, a being that is conceived in the mother’s womb need to 
live. This issue will be deliberated further when the topic of the beginning of human life will 
be taken up in the next Chapter. 
14.8 DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON 
Having laid down the foundational concepts, one can now deliberate on the theme of dignity of 
the human person. This section will deal with the research of De Smet in tracing out the dignity 
of the human person in Hindu Scriptures while making a comparative study with the Western 
world. 
As mentioned in Part I-III, the notion of dignity of the human person is defined through a 
reference to Kant (“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or 
in any other person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” [GMS IV, 
429]).1630 Thus, the dignity of human person is to be an end in himself/herself owing to his/her 
rational nature. It is for the same reason that the UDHR 1948 declared all human beings to be 
equal in dignity and rights in its very first article: “All human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.”1631 
Accordingly, rational nature and reason play an important role here, which marks a human 
being from other creatures. When the above notion of human reason in the Vedas is examined, 
one finds several hymns to Speech, to Thought or to the Mind. The verses on Mind, from the 
Vajaseniya Saṁhitā 34, 3-6, for example, reads: 
That which is wisdom, intellect, and firmness, immortal light which creatures have within 
them. That without which men can do no single action, may that, my mind, hanker after God 
and be moved by noble resolve. 
Whereby, coupled with immortal God, the past, present and future all are comprehended  
[…], may that, my mind, aim at salvation. 
Wherein the Richas, Samans, Yajur-verses and the Atharva veda, like spokes within a cart’s 
nave, are included, and all the knowledge of human beings is inwoven, may that, my mind, 
be actuated with the noble resolve of propagating the Vedas. 
                                                 
1630 KANT, „Die Metaphysik der Sitten“, in: Kants gesammelte Schriften; Band VI, op. cit., 429. English tr. 
from IDEM, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., 230. Cf. DE SMET, “Materials toward an Indo-
Western Understanding…; 39. 
1631 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Article 1. UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, “Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, 1948…”, 24. Cf. DE SMET, “Materials toward an Indo-Western Understanding…”, 39. 
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As a skilful charioteer drives with reins the fleet-foot horses, so does the mind control men. 
It dwells within the heart, is free from old age, drives men into sensuality, and is most rapid. 
May that, my mind, be moved by right intention.1632 
These verses above point out to the fact that thought or the Mind (manas) is the dynamic 
principle, which is the sovereign characteristic of man. It is not just a psychological but also a 
cosmic principle. 
As already mentioned in Part I, Chapter 2.2, the famous text of Sophocles in his Antigone makes 
it clear that it is the rational thought that makes man’s greatness. This is similar to the 
architectonic māyā (in the sense of art, wisdom, extraordinary or supernatural power) of the 
Vedas.1633 Similarly, the Protagoras and The Republic of Plato manifests the full complexity of 
the human excellence. This excellence is not just political or philosophical contemplation. 
Human dignity is fed on divine Excellence.1634 Hence, dignity is conferred on one who has 
human excellence, whether political, or philosophical or divine. However, according to 
Aristotle it is the dignity of political excellence, which confers on a citizen a share in the 
democratic government of the city. It excludes foreigners and slaves. In a similar way, in India, 
human excellence belongs to the one who belongs to one of the varṇas, especially the upper 
three castes and excludes aliens and outcasts.1635 
As mentioned earlier in Part I, Chapter 2.2, a universal notion of dignity appears with the Stoics. 
Their teachings moved away from social standing, or accomplishments that bestowed dignity. 
According to them, the estimable ἀξίος (axios = the worth or value of a thing; of person) are 
those who conform to nature of humanity and consequently to the great whole which makes the 
dignity ἀξία (axia) of a human person. The very fact that human beings possess reason bestows 
on them dignity. On this account, Christians could feel an affinity with the Stoics and made use 
of their philosophy. However, Christianity introduced a greater change in the notion of dignity, 
namely, that every human, free or slave, is a creature “in the image and likeness” of God. Every 
human being is assured of the salvation through Jesus Christ and equally worthy of a 
fundamental worthiness that the world cannot give.1636 
A similar change occurs in India with the apparition of the concepts of mokṣa and saṃnyāsa. 
As an antithesis to the three goals of man (dharma, artha and kāma), mokṣa was seen as a new 
value and demanded a renunciation to them. As already noted (Chapter 14.6 above), 
renunciation or saṃnyāsa sets a man in the margins of society. It excludes him from all his 
rights and duties towards it and paradoxically raises him to a new status of excellence, to eternal 
realities, to bráhman (or negatively nirvāṇa), immortality, perfect knowledge, transcendence 
of all that is finite. Therefore, a saṃnyāsin is venerated as a true individual, completely on his 
own, detached from varṇa and caste, indifferent to all differences of status; securing his 
                                                 
1632 The Yajur Veda, tr. by Devi CHAND, Published by Devi Chand, Hoshiarpur 1959, 321. It is to be noted that 
the Vajaseniya Saṁhitā is contained in the Yajurveda. Cf. DE SMET, “Materials toward an Indo-Western 
Understanding…”, 39-40. 
1633 Cf. ibid., 40. 
1634 Ibid., 41. 
1635 Cf. ibid., 40. 
1636 Cf. ibid., 40. 
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personality through a free option made with reference to a transcending aim. This teaching is 
found in the Upaniṣads.1637 
The Bhagavad-Gītā sets in a new motion. It raises bhakti1638 (devotion or love of God) to the 
religious level,1639 as the animating element of all relationship with the gods.1640 The goal of the 
Upaniṣadic saṃnyāsin is obtainable by everyone through bhakti. Bhagavad-Gītā thus brings in 
the dignity of the human person in the name of the bráhman manifested as Krishna, in such a 
way that the individual person is not cut off from its associations with others but is linked with 
them “for the fight of” secular life.1641 
From then on, in Hinduism, frequent assertions are made, namely, that human birth is preferable 
to others because it ushers in the possibility of salvation (mokṣa). However, since Hinduism 
believes in rebirth, therefore, as mentioned earlier (Chapter 14.7 above), “the belief in the 
possibility of the same soul being reborn in all sorts of bodies prevents the choice of a special 
term like in the West the term ‘person’ to designate the status of the human being”.1642 
On the contrary, Christian thinkers make use of the term ‘person’, which began to be used 
already in law courts. These thinkers define it in such a way that it will designate precisely the 
above-mentioned privileged status of the human. For example, Thomas writes: 
Among particular individuals, some have a more perfect existence than others. They are those 
that are masters of their own activity and act of themselves. Therefore, those singular rational 
substances receive the special name of person (Summa Theologiae I, 29,1). Person signifies 
what is noblest in the whole of nature (ibid., I, 29,2) [...]. Men are principles, not mere 
instruments. They are not made for anyone’s utility. Their actions have a personal value and 
are not simply from and for human nature (III Summa contra Gentiles, 111 sq.).1643 
The above teaching had already begun with Augustine. However, it was Thomas who directed 
more attention to intellectual consciousness and the various acts of the intellect and will of the 
human.1644 
Owing to the fact that the term “person”, as conceived in the secular world, does not exist in 
Sanskrit and Hinduism, one may think that India had in the past no awareness of the dignity of 
the human person. However, the facts that were deliberated above point to the conclusion that 
“India has known the reality of the dignity in a manner not unlike that of the West”.1645 
14.9 CONCLUSION 
Owing to its lengthy discussion of the basic concepts in Hinduism, it would not be fair to draw 
out a summary here. Instead, what is proposed is to make a few observations and derive certain 
implications for further analysis. 
                                                 
1637 Cf. ibid., 41-42. 
1638 The word bhakti has a variety of meanings like ‘loving devotion’, ‘to participate in something or someone 
through affection’ and God’s love for man. In the Bhagavad-Gītā, it means devotion and loyalty to Krishna, the 
personal God, trust in Him and love of Him. See The Bhagavad-Gītā, op. cit., 26 and 181. 
1639 Cf. DE SMET, “Materials toward an Indo-Western Understanding…”, 44. 
1640 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 200. 
1641 Cf. DE SMET, “Materials toward an Indo-Western Understanding…”, 44. 
1642 Cf. ibid., 44. 
1643 As quoted in ibid., 44-45. 
1644 Cf. ibid., 45. 
1645 Ibid., 46. 
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At the very outset, it must be acknowledged that in classical Hindu Scriptures one cannot 
directly find the concept of human dignity, because neither the concept “dignity” nor does the 
term “person”, as conceived in the “West” exist in them. The lack of these terms may be 
compared to the Christian Scriptures. The words “human dignity” or the concept “person” as 
conceived today is not found in them too. However, in Christian theology, these concepts have 
their deep roots and rich meaning based on the Christian Scriptures. Similarly, in classical 
Hinduism too, the awareness of the concept of the dignity of the human person can be derived 
from their Scriptures. 
Having discussed on the concepts of ātman, bráhman, puruṣa, the concept of person as 
understood in Hinduism and the social dimension of the human being, the whole question of 
human dignity could now be discussed. From the fact that ātman and bráhman, the human self 
and the Supreme Being, are not two but one and identical, yet distinct and separate, it follows 
that the human being is of divine origin and descent; that he/she is an image of the Primaeval 
Man (Puruṣa). In other words, being spiritual self (ātman), the individual human being is also 
an image of the divine (bráhman). This is expressed in the equation, ātman = bráhman. This is 
the sum and substance of the Upaniṣads and a novelty in Indian Philosophy. Ātman is also the 
highest goal of knowledge and as such the path to mokṣa (liberation). The nature of ātman is 
sat-cit-ānandá (being, consciousness and happiness), a synonym for bráhman. It acknowledges 
the fact of the immortality of the ātman. The puruṣa (individual or person) residing in the body 
(śarīra) is identified with the ātman (self), which is nothing other than the bráhman. This 
representation raises the individual human person in his/her spiritual nature to the summit of 
creation and acknowledges the intrinsic worth, as an end in himself/herself. 
These above ideas are somewhat similar to the Christian tradition, especially the spiritual 
nature, his/her share in the divine nature and the image of God likeness in human being. It may 
be recalled that this latter idea is the basis of human dignity in the Christian tradition. 
The basic model in traditional orthodox Hinduism is that the human person is a composite of 
two essentially disparate but intimately conjoined principles – spirit (ātman and puruṣa) and 
matter (prakṛti). Similar to the definition of Boethius and Thomas – who held for the three 
metaphysical concepts in a person, namely, rationality, substance and individuality –, Hindu 
metaphysics too have somewhat similar ideas. In addition to the three components of the person, 
Hindu metaphysics adds another notion, which is an important doctrine that affects human 
personality, namely, the doctrine of rebirth. 
Therefore, it is acknowledged that Hinduism too has ample reasons to admit that every human 
individual or person has inherent dignity. Hence, the next step is to see how one can apply the 
above findings to the question of the beginning of life in the field of Bioethics in classical 
Hinduism. This will be the next venture in the following Chapter.
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C H A P T E R  1 5  
CLASSICAL HINDU PERSPECTIVE II: 
BIOETHICS AND THE BEGINNING OF LIFE ISSUES 
15.1 INTRODUCTION 
Ethics is the science of moral values. In Hinduism, the Sanskrit word used for ethics is dharma. 
It signifies what upholds law, custom, and religion. It is analogous to the concept of ‘Natural 
Law’ in Christian ethics. However, dharma is not a static but dynamic notion; in that, it signifies 
activity, mobility and catalytic qualities.1646 The underlying essence of human dignity, respect 
and love for human beings are based on the principle of dharma. Its aim is to make all human 
beings good human beings. This is the essence and crux of Indian Philosophy. Dharma is also 
the basis of human rights.1647  
Bioethics consists of the moral principles, which guide medical professionals in their dealing 
with each other, their patients, society and the State. In India, since time immemorial, the rules 
and regulations for different social groups and the code of conduct for people belonging to 
various professions were framed in order to lead them to the highest spiritual culmination of 
their life, by following one’s duty or svadharma (literally, good dharma). The teaching of the 
Bhagavad-Gītā 18.45-46, makes this point clear:  
By [doing] the work that is proper to him [and] rejoicing [in the doing], a man succeeds, 
perfects himself. [Now] hear just how a man perfects himself by [doing and] rejoicing in his 
proper work. By dedicating the work that is proper [to his caste] to Him who is the source of 
the activity of all beings, by whom this whole universe was spun, a man attains perfection-
and-success.1648 
In other words, each individual attains a high state of perfection by rightly following one’s duty 
or svadharma, which includes also the medical professionals.1649 One can find some similarity 
here with the Hippocratic Oath. 
As mentioned earlier, the life of a Hindu has an axiological orientation towards the four 
puruṣārthas (see Chapter 14.6 above), namely, dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. Although 
mokṣa has its pride of place among all four goals, still all of them are valid as the goals of 
human endeavor in which morality plays a central role in the scheme. Morality (or dharma) is 
the controlling value in relation to wealth or power (artha), aesthetics or sex (kāma) and is the 
enabling value in relation to salvation (mokṣa). In other words, the field of bioethics would be 
controlled and enabled through ethical regulation (dharma).1650 
It was already discussed that Hinduism has been associated with the concept of caste system 
(see Chapter 14.6 above) which poses special problems in the application of human dignity and 
                                                 
1646 Cf. S. Cromwell CRAWFORD, Hindu Bioethics for the Twenty-First Century, State University of New York 
Press, Albany 2003, 11. Cf. also IDEM, Dilemmas of Life and Death. Hindu Ethics in North American Context, 
State University of New York Press, Albany 1995, 9-10. 
1647 Cf. Veeranna AIVALLI, “Human Rights Challenges in the 21st Century”, in: P. J. ALEXANDER (ed.), Policing 
India in the New Millennium, Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi 2002, 482-497; 483. 
1648 BG.18.45-46. Addition in the Original. Cf. Swami BRAHMESHANANDA, “Medical Ethics in Ancient India”, 
in: Prabuddha Bharata 97/4 (1992) 190-196; 190. 
1649 Cf. ibid. 
1650 Cf. Arvind SHARMA, “Hinduism and Cloning”, in: Vedanta Kesari 88 (2001) 62-64; 63. Cf. also IDEM, 
“The Hindu Tradition…”; 4. 
324 Part IV: An Attempt at a Dialogue with Hinduism  
 
 
consequently, human right. Klaus K. Klostermaier, a Research Scholar in Hinduism, Indian 
History and Culture, points out this fact when he remarks: 
The Brahmins did not articulate “human rights” but “caste rights,” which had the side effect 
that in the course of time, about one-fifth of the total population, as “outcastes,” had virtually 
no rights. They were treated worse than cattle, which even in legal theory ranked above 
them.1651 
If the caste system could play such a major role, then the enquiry is, Does this concept of caste 
also affect the birth of a human being and consequently, his/her dignity? Notwithstanding this 
problem, in the following sections, the view of Hinduism on procreation and the value and 
respect that an embryo possesses in this context will be discussed. Finally, the Hindu Medical 
System known as the Ayurveda system and its application in matters relating to the beginning 
of life will be discussed. 
15.2 PROCREATION AND EMBRYOLOGY OF THE HUMAN BEING 
Since the classical view on Hinduism is still being dealt, mention is to be made that it is in the 
Upaniṣadic period that procreation and embryology have been systematically developed in the 
Garbhopaniṣad. This text has three parts, namely, the first dealing with the gross developmental 
stages of an embryo, the second with factors responsible for male, female and impotency, and 
the third with the development anomalies of the foetus. Thus, one can assume that they already 
had a systematic knowledge of the early human development.1652 
Garbhopaniṣad explains that that an embryo (garbha1653) is formed through the fertilization of 
the male semen (śukra, i.e., the male seminal fluid) and female blood (śoṇiṭa, i.e., the female 
vital energy). The early development stage are marked with kalala (nodule, that is, after one 
night), budbuda (which means a bubble; after seven nights) and píṇḍa (a lump within a 
fortnight). The vertebral column becomes distinct in the fifth month and mouth, nose, eyes and 
ears are formed in the sixth month.1654 
Garbha Upaniṣad also clarifies that if the father’s seed is more predominant, it becomes a male 
and if the mother’s seed is more predominant, then it results in a female. However, the equality 
of both the characteristics gives rise to a hermaphrodite (napuṃsaka; i.e., neither male nor 
female).1655 
With regard to the anomalies and deformities of the foetus, the Garbhopaniṣad attributes its 
responsibility to the disturbed psychic condition present during the sexual indulgence. Twins, 
                                                 
1651 KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 296-297. Cf. Arvind SHARMA, Hindu Narratives on Human 
Rights?, ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, California 2010, 107. 
1652 Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 193. 
1653 Skt. word from the root grabh, which means the womb. It refers to the inside, the middle, interior of 
anything. It also means a foetus or embryo, child. Cf. MWM, 349. 
1654 Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 193. Cf. Garbha Upaniṣad, in: DEUSSEN, Sixty Upaniṣads of the 
Veda, op. cit., Part 2, 639-644; 642. Cf. Garbha-Upanishad, in: DERS., Sechzig Upanishad’s des Veda, op. cit., 
608. Cf. Garbha-Upanishaḍ, in: Thirty Minor Upanishaḍs, tr. by K. Nārayāṇasvāmi AIYAR, Theosophical Society, 
Madras 1914, 117. 
1655 Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 193. Cf. Garbha Upaniṣad, in: DEUSSEN, Sixty Upaniṣads of the 
Veda, op. cit., Part 2, 642. Cf. Garbha-Upanishad, in: DERS., Sechzig Upanishad’s des Veda, op. cit., 608. Cf. 
Garbha-Upanishaḍ, in: Thirty Minor Upanishaḍs, op. cit., 117-118. 
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for example, are said to be a deformity due to the interference of vāyú1656 (a factor responsible 
for cell division and fetal growth).1657 
Human procreation is seen by the Upanishads as beyond the biological sphere. The “Universal 
Self” is responsible for the generation of individual selves. The Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 
(6.4.22-24) explains that the production of an embryo is compared to the production of the fire 
out of the fire sticks of Aśvins.1658 A prayer of a father is recorded there in which he pleads that 
any mistake he has made in the performance of the sacrifice may not affect the newborn.1659 
Thus, one can conclude that for the traditional Hindu procreation is essential for the 
continuation of society and for one’s family. Vedic rituals reflect such expectation, where one 
prays for abundant and strong progeny, whether male or female. One of the major life aims of 
a Hindu is to procreate, and according to the central aspect of dharma, preserving and 
promoting life is important. In this context, it may be pointed out that the classical texts consider 
causing an abortion or miscarriage as a serious crime and sin.1660 
The Upaniṣad also teaches that the destiny of man is already in the seed of the father. The 
Aitreya Upaniṣad (2.1-6) describes the birth of a son as a continuation of the father. In other 
words, the father is born as the son. The depiction of this process is explained thus in the Aitreya 
Upaniṣad: 
In a person (puruṣa), verily, this one [Ātman]1661 becomes at first an embryo (garbha). That 
which is semen (retas), is the vigor (tejas) come together from all the limbs. In the self, 
indeed, one bears a self [ātman]. When he pours this in a woman, then he begets it. This is 
one’s first birth.1662 
It comes into self-becoming (ātma-bhūya) with the woman, just as a limb of her own. 
Therefore it injures her not. She nourishes this self of his that has come to her. 
She, being a nourisher, should be nourished. The woman bears him as an embryo. In the 
beginning, indeed, he nourishes the child [and] from birth onward. While he nourishes the 
child from birth onward, he thus nourishes his own self [ātman], for the continuation of these 
worlds; for thus are these worlds continued. This is one’s second birth.1663 
The above passage makes it stark clear that the ātman, which is in the body of the father, 
becomes semen. The father holds this ātman within his body and nourishes it. When he releases 
semen within the woman, the ātman is procreated in the form of an embryo and is born again.1664 
                                                 
1656 Skt. for wind, air, breath, the wind of the body, a vital air, in medicine it could mean the windy humour or 
any morbid affection of it. Cf. MWM, 942. 
1657 Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 193. 
1658 Aśvins are the name “of two divinities (who appear in the sky before the dawn in a golden carriage drawn 
by horses or birds; they bring treasures to men and avert misfortune and sickness; they are considered as the 
physicians of heaven)”. MWM, 116. 
1659 Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 193-194. 
1660 Cf. Werner MENSKI, “Hinduism”, in: Peggy MORGAN/Clive A. LAWTON (ed.), Ethical Issues in Six 
Religious Traditions, Second Edition, Edinburgh University Press Ltd., Edinburg 2007, 1-60; 35-36. 
1661 “That is, the Ātman.” Aitreya Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 298 at fn. 2. 
1662 “The words asya prathamaṁ janma may denote either ‘his (i.e. the Self’s) first birth’ or ‘a self’s first birth 
(as a particular individual).’ Either interpretation is possible according to pantheistic theory.” Aitreya Upanishad, 
in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 298 at fn.3. 
1663 Aitreya Upanishad 2.1-3. Aitreya Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 298-299. Cf. 
GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 194 and 204. 
1664 Cf. ibid., 204. 
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The Upaniṣads also portrays life (prāṇa; meaning the life breath) – which was expressed in the 
Vedas with an ecstatic attitude of joy and thankfulness for the gift of life – as a treasure and that 
we are this life. In the four Vedas, life (prāṇa) means the biological fact of movement, growth, 
and non-reflective consciousness. Prāṇa is that cosmic life present in all beings. It is the breath 
of the universe, which from God down to the particles of earth share it, and the same is the 
breath of men. The Praśna Upaniṣad develops a theory of prāṇa as the principle of life through 
a dialogue between the great master Pippalāda and his six students in the form of six questions 
posed by them.1665 Indian-Spanish Theologian Raimundo Panikkar summarizes these questions 
and states: 
Life is not that which gives form, but that which gives existence […] that life has its origin 
in the ātman, the Self, and that life is as it were the shadow of the ātman. It is not the ātman, 
but at the same time it is inseparable from it. It is its first manifestation.1666 
Therefore, it can be summarized that life (prāṇa) is not ātman and in the order of temporality, 
ātman comes before prāṇa. Prāṇa is the first manifestation of ātman. 
The conclusion to the above discussion is that life (prāṇa) was held in high esteem as the 
principle of potentialities united symbolically in a concentrated form. This positive attitude 
towards life continues even in the later writings, namely, the Anugītā.1667 The Anugītā describes 
a kind of mythical embryology. In proportion to one’s merits, a man, being incarnated, takes a 
body in the womb. The man, being an immaterial self: 
Within the womb of a woman, (he) obtains as the result of action a body good or else bad, 
made up of virile semen and blood. Owing to (his) subtlety and imperceptibility, though he 
obtains a body appertaining to the Brahman, he is not attached anywhere; hence is he the 
eternal Brahman. That is the seed of all beings, by that all creatures exist. That soul, entering 
all the limbs of the foetus, part by part, and dwelling in the seat of the life-wind, supports 
(them) with mind. Then the foetus, becoming possessed of consciousness, moves about its 
limbs. As liquefied iron being poured out assumes the form of the image, such you must 
know is the entrance of the soul into the foetus.1668 
Having discussed about procreation, its importance for the Hindus and the embryology in 
classical Hinduism, the next section will deal with the moral status of an embryo. 
15.3 MORAL STATUS OF AN EMBRYO 
It was already discussed in the last three Parts (I-III) that the questions regarding ethical 
regulations of the beginning of life, its nature and the moral status one attributes to it determines 
the right to life of an embryo and its biotechnical manipulation. These topics are contents of 
intense discussion in the West. In India, apart from Catholic Moral Theology, these issues are 
                                                 
1665 Cf. Raimundo PANIKKAR, The Vedic Experience, Mantramanjari. An Anthology of the Vedas for Modern 
Man and Contemporary Celebration, University of California Press, Berkley/Los Angeles 1977, 209. Cf. 
GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 194. 
1666 PANIKKAR, The Vedic Experience…, 209-210. Cf. Praśna Upaniṣad, 6.4 in The Thirteen Principal 
Upanishads, op. cit., 389. and Mundaka Upaniṣad 2.1&3, in: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 370-
371 & 374-377. 
1667 Cf. Germain GRISEZ, Abortion. The Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments, Corpus Books, New York 
and Cleveland 1970, 120. Anugītā is part of the epic of Mahābhārata. 
1668 Anugītā 3. See “The Bhagavadgītā with the Sanatsugātiyā and the Anugītā”, tr. by Kāsinath Trimbak 
TELANG, in: Friedrich Max MÜLLER (ed.), The Sacred Books of the East. Translated by Various Oriental Scholars, 
Vol. 8, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1882, 241-242. Cf. GRISEZ, Abortion..., 120. 
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not of a great concern and still lie below the surface in the public mind.1669 Given this context, 
it is all the more important to approach this topic from the Hinduism point of view in order to 
attempt a dialogue with them. In this section, the approach that Julius J. Lipner, a scholar in 
Hinduism of Indo-Czech origin, has taken will be analyzed.1670 While dealing with the moral 
status of an embryo1671, philosophical, historical, medical and other observations will also be 
taken into consideration. It must be noted that classical Hinduism in this respect is for the most 
part uncharted in a systematic way. Therefore, this section will focus on the concept of abortion, 
which will further help one to come to grips with the complex idea of the Hindu view of the 
moral status of an embryo.1672 In Sanskrit there is a distinction made between the terms for 
abortion (garbhahatyā1673 or garbhavadhá1674 and bhrūṇahatyā1675 or bhrūṇavadhá) and those 
for spontaneous miscarriage, which refers simply to a falling or emission of an embryo. 
Abortion was considered as a morally reprehensible killing (hatyā) rather than an ethically 
neutral evacuation, dislodging, or excision.1676 
The next section deals with the ṡruti and smṛti texts on abortion. Both the texts show a 
consistence stance of respect for human life, importantly for the life of the unborn.1677 
15.3.1 Moral Evaluation of Abortion in Ṡruti 
The earliest ṡruti texts attest to the fact that an embryo in the womb specially deserves 
protection and therefore, abortion is a morally intolerable act. Since an embryo because of its 
inviolability and physical vulnerability requires special protection, the deity invoked to as a 
“protector of the child-to-be” is Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu is known as the preserver of life.1678 A text from 
                                                 
1669 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 41. 
1670 Cf. ibid., 41-69. A major portion of similar arguments may also be found in the FABC Papers, No.120, 10-
13. 
1671 The term “embryo” is used here as in the previous chapters and will be used in the following chapters too. 
In Hindu texts there is no significant distinction intended between the terms “embryo” and “foetus”. Although they 
do not use the term “embryo”, yet the discussion pertains to the living human embryo as in those texts except 
where it is made clear to the contrary. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 61 at fn.2. 
1672 Cf. ibid., 41. Dignitas Personae for instance reminds, “that the category of abortion ‘is to be applied to the 
recent forms of intervention on human embryos which, although carried out for purposes legitimate in themselves, 
inevitably involve the killing of those embryos […]”. See DP III, 34. Emphasis in original. 
1673 The Skt. word hatyā means killing, slaying and slaughter. Thus, garbhahatyā stands for killing of an 
embryo. Cf. MWM, 1287. 
1674 Vadhá in Skt. stands for the act of striking or killing, slaughter, murder, death or destruction. Thus, 
garbhavadhá means killing or destruction of the embryo. Cf. MWM, 916. 
1675 Bhrūṇá in Skt. means an embryo. Thus, bhrūṇahatyā is the killing of an embryo in general. However, 
bhrūṇaghna is the proper word for one who procures abortion. Cf. MWM, 771. 
1676 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 42. 
1677 Cf. FABC Papers, No.120, 10. 
1678 Ṛg Veda Saṁhitā 7.36.9, where Viṣṇu is called as the viṣṇum niṣiktapām, which means “the guardian of 
the embryo”. See Ṛig-Veda-Sanhitá. A Collection of Ancient Hindú Hymns, Constituting the Fifth Ashṭaka, or 
Book, of the Ṛig-Veda: The oldest authority for the religious and social Institutions of the Hindús, tr. from the 
original Sanskrit by H. H., WILSON, ed. by E. B. COWELL, N. Trübner and Co., London 1866, 100. See also Ṛg 
Veda Saṁhitā 10.184.1, where Viṣṇu is regarded as viṣṇuryoniṃ kalpayatu, i.e., the one who, “construct[s] the 
womb”. Cf. Ṛig-Veda-Sanhitá. A Collection of Ancient Hindú Hymns, Constituting Part of the Seventh and the 
Eighth Ashṭaka of the Ṛig-Veda, tr. from the original Sanskrit by H. H. WILSON, ed. by W. F. WEBSTER, N. Trübner 
and Co., London 1888, 410. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 43 & fn.12. Cf. also FABC 
Papers, No.120, 10. 
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Atharva Veda too attests the same attitude towards the unborn child while reiterating that 
abortion (bhrūṇahatyā) is one of the most heinous crimes1679: 
Enter into the rays, into smoke, O sin; go into the vapours, and into the fog! Lose thyself on 
the foam of the river! Wipe off, O Pūshan, the misdeeds upon him that practiseth abortion 
[bhrūṇagni]!1680 
The Upanishads too disapprove of abortion. The Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 4.3.22 relegates to 
the slayer of an embryo to the despicable position in the society, namely, a thief.1681 As a 
conclusion to the text, Lipner is of the opinion that, “[…] abortion violated dharma – the socio-
religious order – in a most serious way. This implies that the living embryo enjoyed a special 
moral status in the eyes of the Hindu and was specially deserving of protection and respect”.1682 
Later Upaniṣads, like the Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad, implicitly stresses that abortion (bhrūṇahatyā) 
is a reprehensible killing, which is ranked alongside particularly heinous forms of murder.1683 
In Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad, abortionists are listed among offenders such as the violator of the 
guru’s bed, those who are unfaithful to their vow of chastity and the drunkard.1684 
15.3.2 Moral Evaluation of Abortion in Smṛti 
The smṛti tradition is sometimes explicit with regard to the view of the status of the unborn and 
the censure attached to abortion. The special respect shown in these texts pertains both to the 
special allowance given to the pregnant woman and also the explicit condemnation and 
punishment of those who procure abortion.1685 
The Law Book of Viṣṇu (Viṣṇudharmasūtra) protects the pregnant woman and the embryo 
directly. Killing of either of them was considered as a serious offence that a Hindu could 
commit. Viṣṇudharmasūtra 36.1 reads, “Killing a Kṣatriya or Vaiśya engaged in sacrifice, a 
menstruating woman, a pregnant woman […] (and) […] the embryo (even) of a stranger […] 
                                                 
1679 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 43. See also Atharva Veda 6.112.3. Cf. also FABC 
Papers, No.120, 10. 
1680 Atharva Veda 6.113.2. “Hymns of the Atharva-Veda. Together with Extracts from the Ritual Books and 
Commentaries”, tr. by Tope BLOOMFIELD, in: MÜLLER (ed.), The Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 42, op. cit., 165. 
Addition by author. The verse above is a repetition of Atharva Veda 6.112.3: “[…] Wipe off, O Pūshan, the 
misdeeds upon him that practiseth abortion! Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 43. 
1681 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 4.3.22: “There a father becomes not a father; a mother, not a mother; the worlds, 
not the worlds; the gods, not the gods; the Vedas, not the Vedas; a thief, not a thief. There the destroyer of an 
embryo [bhrūṇahā] becomes not the destroyer of an embryo; a Cāṇdāla [the son of a Śūdra father and a Brahman 
mother] is not a Cāṇdāla; a Paulkasa [the son of a Śūdra father and a Kshatriya mother] is not a Paulkasa; a 
mendicant is not a mendicant; an ascetic is not an ascetic. He is not followed by good, he is not followed by evil, 
for then he has passed beyond all sorrows of the heart.” Bṛihad-āraṇyaka Upanishad, in: The Thirteen Principal 
Upanishads, op. cit., 136-137. Commenting on this passage Lipner says that the Upaniṣad is referring here to a 
state of awareness in which the significant relationships and designations have no more meaning. This applies 
especially in the context to the one, who is a destroyer of an embryo, who in contrast to monks and ascetics, is 
relegated the vilest position of a thief. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 44. Cf. also FABC 
Papers, No.120, 10. 
1682 LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 44. Cf. also FABC Papers, No.120, 10. 
1683 Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad 3.1: “[…] So he who understands me – by no deed whatsoever of his is his world 
injured, not by stealing, not by killing an embryo, not by the murder of his mother, not by the murder of his father; 
if he has done any evil (pāpa), the dark color departs not from his face.” Kauṣītaki Upanishad, in: The Thirteen 
Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 321. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 44. 
1684 Cf. ibid. 
1685 Cf. ibid., 44-45. 
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is tantamount to killing a Brahmin.”1686 This same dharmasūtra also provides protection or 
respect for the pregnant woman: “Likewise, a ferry-man, or an official at a toll-office, who takes 
a fare or toll from a student, or Vānaprastha (hermit), or a Bhikshu (ascetic or religious 
mendicant), or a pregnant woman, or one about to visit a place of pilgrimage; And he shall 
restore it to them”.1687 Further, respect and protection for the pregnant woman is clearly stated 
in the Mahābhārata 13.107.50: “One must give way to the Brahmin, to cows, to kings, to the 
old, to one burdened by a load, to a pregnant woman and to the infirm”.1688 
The above examples show that “for the Hindus, pregnancy was a very special state and that the 
unborn had a (moral) status meriting protection.”1689 
The smṛti tradition is also noteworthy for it reprehensibility of abortion. The censure attached 
to this deed was indeed severe. The law book of Gautama (Gautamadharmasūtra, 6th century 
B.C) 21.9 prescribes that a woman loses her caste by committing abortion and by sexual 
connection with men of lower castes.1690 The law book of Āpastamba (Āpastambadharmasūtra, 
a century or two later after the Gautamadharmasūtra) makes a similar point.1691 Losing a caste 
was a terrible consequence for a Hindu and one of the ultimate socio-religious penalties one 
can think of in Hindu dharma.1692 
The law texts, for example, the Laws of Manu (Manusmṛti) prohibits offering of ancestral 
libations of water to one who has caused abortion.1693 Another law text, Yajñavalkyasmṛti 2.36 
imposes a heavy fine for the abortion of embryo of a female slave. A commentary well known 
as Mitākṣarā (11-12th C.E.) on Yajñavalkyasmṛti by Vijñāneśvara, makes injunctions for 
abortion carried out on other than those pertaining to female slaves and Brahmin women. The 
law books make a distinction between high and low caste and between slaves and nobles. 
Nevertheless, whatever be the social status of a person, abortion was considered morally as a 
heinous crime.1694 
                                                 
1686 As quoted in LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 45. Addition in original. Cf. also FABC 
Papers, No.120, 10. 
1687 Viṣṇudharmasūtra 5.132-133. See “Institutes of Vishnu”, tr. by Julius JOLLY, in: MÜLLER (ed.), The Sacred 
Books of the East, op. cit., Vol.7, 36. See also Manusmṛti 9.283. See “The Laws of Manu. Translated with extracts 
from seven commentaries” tr. by G. BÜHLER, in: MÜLLER (ed.), The Sacred Books of the East, op. cit., Vol.25, 
392. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 45. Cf. also FABC Papers, No.120, 10.  
1688 Cf. ibid., 11. Quotation from LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 45. 
1689 Ibid. 
1690 Gautamadharmasūtra 21.9: “A woman becomes an outcast by procuring abortion by connexion with a 
(man of) lower (caste) and (the like heinous crime).” See “The Sacred Laws of the Āryas: As Taught in the Schools 
of Āpastamba, Gautama, Vāsishtha and Baudhāyana, Part I: Āpastamba and Gautama”, tr. by BÜHLER, in: 
MÜLLER (ed.), The Sacred Books of the East, op. cit., Vol. 2, 277-278. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on 
Abortion…”, 45. Lipner gives the citation as Gautamadharmasūtra 3.3.9, which is perhaps incorrect. 
1691 Āpastambadharmasūtra 1.7.21.7-8: “(These are) stealing (gold), crimes […], homicide, neglect of the 
Vedas, causing abortion, incestuous connexion with relations born from the same womb as one’s mother or father 
[…].” See “The Sacred Laws of the Āryas…”, 73-74. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 
45-46. 
1692 Cf. ibid., 46. 
1693 Manusmṛti 5.89-90. See “The Laws of Manu…”, 184. Cf. FABC Papers, No.120, 10. Cf. LIPNER, “The 
Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 46. 
1694 Cf. ibid. Cf. also FABC Papers, No.120, 10. 
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The Mahābhārata, which was regarded as a representative of authoritative texts on dharma, 
shows evidences against the acceptability of abortion. Mahābhārata condemns abortion in four 
contexts: 
a. Mahābhārata 12.86.26 speaking of the safe conduct to be given to an envoy obligates the 
king thus: “If a king is intent upon the code of the (battle-) field but slays an envoy who 
speaks as he has been commanded – his ancestor incur (the crime of) abortion” (Mahābhārata 
12.20.8). 1695 
b. Abortion thwarted the great importance that was given to legitimate procreation. 
Mahābhārata 1.78.33 makes this clear: “He who does not accede, when importuned 
privately, to a willing and available woman, is called a killer of the embryo by those wise in 
matters of law”.1696 
c. In order to exalt the religious importance of the Mahābhārata, a reference to abortion was 
made (1.1.205): “There can be no doubt that the wise man, having heard this Veda of Kṛṣṇa 
(i.e., the Mahābhārata) would shed even the crime of abortion”.1697 
d. As a device to exalt the Brahmin, reference to abortion was used as we find in 
Mahābhārata 12.56.31-32: “O excellent one, the twice-born (i.e., Brahmins) must be 
protected. Even if they are grave offenders you should only banish them from your dominions 
(-harm them no further). Chief of all, you should show mercy to the transgressors among 
them, even for slaying a Brahmin, violating the guru’s bed, or killing an embryo.1698 
This last injunction is repeated once again, with a few modifications in Anugītā 36: “One who 
drinks spirituous liquors, one who kills a Brāhmaṇa, one who steals, one who destroys an 
embryo, one who violates the bed of his preceptor, is released from that sin only by penance 
well performed.” 1699 Here, the text suggests that the sin of abortion can be expiated through 
penance. Although Anugītā 3 (see Chapter 15.2 above) described an embryo as “the seed of all 
things”, the belief in the doctrine of reincarnation lessens the horror of abortion. Perhaps, the 
author here has left behind the sense of sacredness of the Vedas and adhered to the mentality of 
the Bhagavad-Gītā, which considers the body as mere clothing of the self. Thus, the self or 
ātman is not killed when the body is killed, because the true self is impassible.1700 
The above texts make it clear that abortion was reckoned as a serious wrong. In Hinduism, 
social and moral values are closely connected. Social injunctions, for example, have moral 
dimensions and moral injunctions have social consequences. Thus for example, social 
transgressions like drunkenness, incest and illicit mixing of castes, are listed along with 
abortion. Similarly, it is listed with vices on the moral dimension such as unchastity, thieving, 
violating the bed of one’s guru, killing, especially, one’s father or mother. Thus, one can 
conclude that in classical Hinduism, “the unborn […] were accorded a moral status deserving 
                                                 
1695 As quoted in LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 46. Addition in original. 
1696 As quoted in ibid., 47. See also Mahābhārata 1.78.32. 
1697 As quoted in LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 47. Addition by author. See also 
Mahābhārata 1.56.18. 
1698 As quoted in LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 47. Addition in original. 
1699 Anugītā 36. See “The Bhagavadgītā with the Sanatsugātiyā and the Anugītā…”, 389. Cf. GRISEZ, 
Abortion..., 120. These five sins are the cardinal sins in Hinduism and is known by the term “pañca mahā pātaka” 
(Five grave sins). Cf. MWM, 797. 
1700 “[…] the embodied (self) which is eternal, indestructible, and indefinable […] is not killed when the body 
is killed.” BG 2: 27. Text quoted from “The Bhagavadgītā with the Sanatsugātiyā and the Anugītā…”, 44-45. Cf. 
GRISEZ, Abortion..., 120-121. 
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a special protection and that abortion was generally reprehensible because thereby the integrity 
of the human person (of both victim and abortionist) was seriously violated”.1701 
In classical times, the status of the unborn and the question of abortion had both a moral and 
social significance. Procreation between different castes, which was called as varnṇasaṃkara 
(mixing of the caste), was unacceptable. This is referred to as “miscegenation”. One can speak 
of three kinds of issues resulting from sexual unions that were recognized in traditional Hindu 
society: 1. Endogamous marriage, which was a licit marriage between members of the same 
caste (within one’s own varṇa), 2. Anuloma (“with the grain”) intercaste marriage that was 
permissible in which the man belonged to the higher caste (anthropologically a hypergamous 
marriage), and 3. Pratiloma (“against the grain”) intercaste marriage that was considered as 
reprehensible in which the woman belonged to the higher caste.1702 The greater the disparity of 
caste between partners, the more disgraceful was the union and the offspring from that union. 
For example, the Cāṇḍāla (the child of a Brahmin mother and a Śūdra father) and Paulkasa 
(the child of a Kṣatriya mother and Śūdra father) were the most despised offspring. The reason 
is that due to miscegenation the offspring of pratiloma unions could result in new categories of 
outcastes. However, no Hindu texts recommended abortion in the case of pratiloma unions.1703 
15.4 THE BASIS FOR THE CLASSICAL VIEW 
Thus far, it has been demonstrated that the scriptural texts objected to the heinous crime of 
abortion. Several reasons are given as the basis for the above view on abortion and the moral 
status of the unborn. They are: 
15.4.1. Lack of Linguistic Evidence 
There has also been a tendency in the West to introduce linguistic terms such as “pre-embryo” 
in the context of the moral status of an embryo as mentioned earlier (see Chapter 4.2.1 and 5.4.2 
above) in order to distinguish the successive stages of development of a human being. However, 
it is to be pointed out that in classical Hindu view there is at no stage of pregnancy a distinction 
made between an embryo/foetus and designated by a term that would make it susceptible to 
abortion. Although the term brūhṇa (embryo/foetus) is used in Hindu texts only to express in 
connection with the reprehensible act of abortion, yet it is never used as a recognized term for 
designating a particular stage of development of an embryo. “Thus, there is no linguistic 
evidence to enforce a distinction positing different moral statuses in the unborn, or by 
implication, favouring abortion.”1704 
15.4.2 Karma and Rebirth 
It was already mentioned that the human person needs to be liberated from the cycle of karma 
and rebirth (see Chapter 14.7 above). According to traditional Hinduism, because of this belief 
in karma and rebirth, abortion was unacceptable. Abortion thwarted the unfolding of karma of 
                                                 
1701 LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 49. Cf. also FABC Papers, No.120, 11. 
1702 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 50-51. Cf. HILTEBEITEL, “Hinduism…”, 3996. A 
major implication of the prohibition of pratiloma marriage was to limit the Brāhmaṇa women to marriages with 
only Brāhmaṇa men. Cf. ibid. 
1703 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 50-51. Cf. Mahābhārata 6.23.40-44 
1704 LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 57.  
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both the unborn and those who procure it. Abortion unnaturally terminates the possibility of the 
karma of the unborn that could mature through its prenatal and postnatal experiences. Abortion 
gravely affects the liberation of a person’s destiny, while it was believed that it is as a human 
being that one could act most effectively to achieve this end.1705 
One could raise an objection here whether abortion was also a predetermined karma. The 
answer to the objection is that the Hindus maintained that the experience of free choice was not 
an illusion, that the law of karma did not abolish the laws of dharma (i.e., right living in 
accordance with freedom and responsibility). This means that procurement of a deliberate 
abortion as a free act violates dharma, and therefore reprehensible. Moreover, in Hindu tradition 
a real distinction was recognized between “timely” and “untimely” death. If abortion were 
considered as a premature death and as an effect of karma, then it would be against the free and 
responsible action needed by dharma. This would undermine the law of karma. It is to be noted 
that the decrees of karma and the freedom of dharma were not regarded as incompatible. 
Therefore, one can conclude that one cannot justify abortion as the instrument of karma when 
it is clearly condemned by dharma.1706 
15.4.3 The Sacrosanctity of an embryo 
The embryo in traditional Hindu view of life was considered sacrosanct because it was a potent 
symbol of a dominant motif – of birth, regeneration, new life and immortality. Hindu folklore 
also considered the primeval egg of creation as that from which the world of plurality emerges. 
In Mahābhārata 1.1.27-28 it is written, “When all this (universe) was (originally) darkness, 
unillumined, covered on all sides by obscurity, the Great Egg arose, the sole imperishable seed 
of creatures. They say that at the beginning of an age this is the great, divine cause, and that on 
which (it rests) is revealed as the true Light, the eternal Brahman.”1707 In the light of this 
symbolism, one can conclude about the sanctity attributed to an embryo and consecutively the 
condemnation of abortion. 
15.4.4 Social and Religious Reasons attributed to the Embryo 
Social and religious reasons may be adduced for safeguarding the life of an embryo and the 
condemnation of abortion. The reasons stem from the need to produce offspring, especially 
male offspring. This was necessitated in order to perpetuate the family, the community, to 
sustain social economic stability within the caste framework of a patriarchal society and for 
religious purposes. By religious purposes is meant those performances of the priestly and 
domestic ritual, especially the śrāddha1708 rite, which ensured that the deceased parents entered 
a satisfactory post-mortem existence.1709 One can see here that the need to produce offspring for 
these reasons articulates the attitude that the traditional Hindu society have towards women. 
                                                 
1705 Cf. ibid. Cf. also FABC Papers, No.120, 11-12. 
1706 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 57-58. Cf. also FABC Papers, No.120, 12. 
1707 As quoted in LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 58. Addition in original. 
1708 Skt. word derived from the root word śrád, which means faithful, true, loyal, believing. It also means 
relating to a śrāddha ceremony. This is a ceremony in honour and for the benefit of dead relatives observed with 
great strictness at various fixed periods and on occasions of rejoicing as well as mourning by the surviving 
relatives. It should be borne in mind that a śrāddha is not a funeral ceremony but a supplement to such a ceremony. 
Cf. MWM, 1095 & 1097. 
1709 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 58. 
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Women’s role was to be a wife and a mother, that is, child-bearer and child-rearers.1710 The law 
text of Manusmṛti reads: 
1. The husband, after conception by his wife, becomes an embryo and is born again of her; 
for that is the wifehood of a wife (gāyā), that he is born(gāyate) again by her.1711 
2. As the male is to whom a wife cleaves, even so is the son whom she brings forth; let him 
therefore carefully guard his wife, in order to keep his offspring pure.1712 
3. To be mothers were women created, and to be fathers men; religious rites, therefore, are 
ordained in the Veda to be performed (by the husband) together with the wife.1713 
Thus, in Hindu society begetting children is not just a duty of individual parents, but also a 
social duty, a demand of dharma to maintain numbers in society and its stability by perpetuating 
the line of the family. Hence, on the one hand, to carry out this duty, and on the other hand, 
avoidance of abortion, are not private matters, but demands of social dharma.1714 
15.4.5 Ahiṁsā as a Prolife Argument 
The principle of ahiṁsā (nonviolence or non-injury), as mentioned earlier (Chapter 13.5.1 
above), would also go against the practices of anti-life. Along with satya (truth), ahiṁsā (which 
was considered as a cardinal virtue) forms the basis for the religious culture of Hinduism. 
Ahiṁsā as a supreme virtue and guiding principle of life enters the mainline Hinduism owing 
to the influence of the two heterodox religions, Jainism and Buddhism. This virtue influences 
the Hindu ethos of respect for all life,1715 especially in its state of vulnerability, such as an 
embryo. Chāṇdogya Upaniṣad, considers ahiṁsā as a mode of life towards all beings (sárva 
bhutani). Ahiṁsā had a two-fold aspect: a negative and a positive. As a negative precept, it 
means avoiding violence in thought and deed. As a positive precept, it means being well 
disposed towards everyone in thought and deed. Since abortion, which was unacceptable from 
both precepts that resulted in injuring or destroying the seed of life, it went against the Hindu 
genius of reverence for all life and beings. This is a main feature of the rationale behind the 
concept of ahiṁsā.1716 
The five reasons enumerated above make it clear that Hinduism considers an embryo worthy 
of protection and abortion as a crime. This perspective on the embryo was viewed not only on 
a philosophical, moral, social or a religious level, but also from the level of medicine. One such 
strong evidence comes from the ancient medicine of Ayurveda. This will be dealt with in the 
next section. 
15.5 INDIAN MEDICAL SYSTEM: AYURVEDA 
The great Vedic seers and sages who produced India’s original systems of yoga and meditation 
were also responsible for an indigenous natural healing system in India, namely, the Ayurveda. 
Ayurveda is also one among the eighteen sacred systems of Hinduism, which was in practice 
                                                 
1710 Cf. ibid., 58-59. Cf. also FABC Papers, No.120, 12. 
1711 Manusmṛti 9.8. “The Laws of Manu…”, 329. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 59. 
1712 Manusmṛti 9.9. “The Laws of Manu…”, 329. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 59. 
1713 Manusmṛti 9.96. “The Laws of Manu…”, 344. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 
59. 
1714 Cf. ibid. Cf. also FABC Papers, No.120, 12. 
1715 Cf. KANNIYAKONIL, Fundamentals of Bioethics…, 343. Cf. MENSKI, “Hinduism…”, 37. 
1716 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 59. Cf. also FABC Papers, No.120, 12-13. 
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before 4000 BCE. The wisdom of Ayurveda grew and flourished until the first millennium 
A.D.1717 Thus, a reflection on the system will make sense here in order to understand how 
ancient medicine regarded human life at the beginning of its existence. The Caraka Saṁhitā 
and Suśruta Saṁhitā are the two main sources of Ayurveda. It is a medical system built on 
Vedic and non-Vedic literature, philosophy, science and religion and is sometimes regarded as 
the fifth Veda. It is more usually regarded as a supplementary Veda (upaveda); or considered 
as one of the four upavedas, i.e., having a Vedic foundation and as an offshoot of the Vedas, 
and therefore, it is a science of life that is eternal.1718 
Since Ayurveda is built on religious and philosophical traditions, it is therefore, sine qua non 
to contextualize Ayurveda in its religious and philosophical tradition.1719 The religious and 
philosophical understanding of the human individual was already discussed in the last Chapter. 
This section will devote mainly to the biological understanding of the human individual in 
Ayurveda, especially to matters pertaining to the beginning of human life. However, before 
reflecting on the biological understanding, a short description of Ayurveda will be appropriate. 
Indian medicine referred to as Ayurveda, finds no expression in the Vedas, Upanishads, 
Mahābhārata or Ramayana, nor in the Buddhist works in Pāli.1720 The term first appeared in 
Ashtadhyāyī (IV.2.60; IV.4.102), a work by Pānini around 700 BCE.1721  
Etymologically, the Sanskrit word Ayurveda is made of two words: āyuh, which signifies “life” 
and Veda, which refers to “a branch of learning” (vidyā-sthāna). Together then, Ayurveda 
means “the science or art of living”.1722 
The two earliest texts of the Ayurveda are Caraka Saṁhitā, which deals with inner medicine or 
therapeutics (kaya-cikitsa), and Suśruta Saṁhitā, which is dedicated to surgery (salya). Caraka 
(ca. 2nd Century BCE) and Suśruta (ca. 6th Century BCE), the physician and the surgeon, who 
represent them respectively, use the term Ayurveda to signify the entire corpus of the medical 
wisdom. The Sanskrit word Saṁhitā  means ‘compendium’. Caraka is considered the principal 
exponent of the medical system and the father of Ayurveda medicine.1723 The word used for 
ethics in Ayurveda literature was sadvṛtta: The etymological explanation of which means, “one 
                                                 
1717 Cf. David FRAWLEY, Ayurvedic Healing. 2nd Revised and Enlarged Edition, Lotus Press, Twin Lakes, 
Wisconsin 2000, 2 & 6. 
1718 Cf. Encyclopaedia of Indian Medicine, Vol.1 Historical Perspectives, ed. by S. K. Vidyalankara 
RAMACHANDRA RAO, Dr. V. Parameshvara Charitable Trust, Bangalore 1985, 4, Cf. Caraka Saṁhitā, Sūtrastāna 
30.27. Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā (Text with English Translation and Critical Exposition based on 
Cakrapāṇidatta’s Āyurveda Dipikā), Vol. 1. Sūtra Sthana, tr. by Ram Karan SHARMA/Vaidya Bhagwan DASH, 
Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi 1983, 601-602.Cf. also GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 180 and 
195.  
1719 Cf. Encyclopaedia of Indian Medicine, Vol.1 op. cit., 4. Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 180. 
1720 Cf. Encyclopaedia of Indian Medicine, Vol.1 op. cit., 31. 
1721 Jyotir MITRA, History of Indian Medicine. From Pre Mauryan to Kushāna period, The Jyotirālok 
Prasashan, Varanasi 1974, 4. Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 220. 
1722 Cf. Encyclopaedia of Indian Medicine..., 31. Cf. also Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 1, op. cit., xxi. 
1723 Encyclopaedia of Indian Medicine…, 44. The Caraka Saṁhitā is said to contain the substance of a 
comprehensive medical teaching given by the god Indra to a group of seers. One of the seers, namely, Ātreya 
Punarvasu, in turn committed the teaching to six disciples, among whom one was Agniveśa. He composed a 
treatise of the teaching. Caraka later became the authoritative redactor of Agniveśa’s text, and known today as 
Caraka Saṁhitā. It embodies the standard Hindu outlook of the classical period on the conception, nature, and 
development of the human foetus. See LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 66-67 at fn.52. 
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who is desirous of his own wellbeing should always perform noble acts with proper care”.1724 
Caraka advises that one who desires peace and happiness needs to observe the rules of right 
conduct diligently. Those who follow the ethical code gain mastery over the senses and obtain 
a healthy body.1725 It is in the Caraka Saṁhitā, Vimānasthāna that one can find an Oath of 
initiation, which predates the famous Hippocratic Oath by two centuries. Thus, already in 
ancient India there was a high level of professional ethics existing.1726 
The Caraka Saṁhitā is a compendium on therapeutic medicine and contains sections devoted 
to other seven branches. The scope of the treatise extends to ten specific topics (Sūtrastāna 
30.32), namely, 1) Śarīra = anatomy, 2) Vrtti = physiology, 3) Hetu = etiology, 4) Vyādhi = 
pathology, 5) Karma = treatment, 6) Kārya = objectives, 7) Kāla = the influence of age and 
seasons, 8) Kartr = physician, 9) Karana = medicines and appliances, 10) Vidhiviniśchaya = 
procedure and sequence.1727 
The above topics are further divided into eight sections. They are: i) Sūtrastāna which deals 
with general principles, philosophy, etc., ii) Nidānastāna which deals causes and diseases, iii) 
Vimānasthāna dealing with taste, nourishment, general pathology, etc., iv) Śārīrastāna that 
deals with anatomy and embryology, v) Indriyastāna deals with diagnosis and prognosis, vi) 
Cikitsāstāna which deals with treatment of diseases, vii) Kalpastāna deals with pharmacy, viii) 
Siddhistāna dealing with cure of diseases.1728 For the purposes of this research, the Sūtrastāna  
and Śārīrastāna, will be referred. 
The Suśruta Saṁhitā is a representative work of Indian surgery. The eight branches that are 
dealt with in Caraka Saṁhitā are also handled here, but the emphasis is on the śalya branch 
(surgery) which is described there in detail.1729 
Ayurveda is open in its attitude towards different philosophical systems. The first chapter of 
Śārīrastāna in the Caraka Saṁhitā, which deals with the development of the human body and 
its relation to the development of the universe, is based on the philosophical principles of 
Sāṁkhya and Yoga. The eighth chapter of Vimānasthāna in the Caraka Saṁhitā, which deals 
with the methods of debate and theory of development, is based on the Nyāya system of 
philosophy. In the first chapter of the Sūtrastāna, the Vaiśeṣika School of philosophy is used. 
Besides the two philosophies cited, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta have also contributed to Ayurveda. 
Mīmāṁsā holds that every soul or puruṣa is everlasting and travels through the cycle of birth 
and death. Ayurveda uses this law of karma to explain the incurability of certain diseases and 
teaches that they can be alleviated by spiritual or religious purification. The Vedānta view is 
accepted in Ayurveda, namely, that the inherent soul (ātman) is not free from all bonds of pain 
                                                 
1724 Caraka Saṁhitā, Sūtra Sthāna 8.17: “Tasmādātmahitam chikīrṣtā sarvena sarvam sarvadā smrtimāsthāya 
sadvṛttamanuṣteyam.” Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 1, op. cit., 170. Cf. BRAHMESHANANDA, “Medical 
Ethics…”, 190. 
1725 Caraka Saṁhitā, Sūtra Sthāna 8.17-18. Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 1, op. cit., 170-173. 
1726 For the text of the Oath of Initiation, see Caraka Saṁhitā, Vimānasthāna 8.3,7 & esp. 13-14. Cf. Agniveśa’s 
Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, 1977, op. cit., 222-225. Cf. “Oath of Hippocrates”, in: Warren Thomas REICH (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Vol.5, Macmillan Library Reference USA, New York 1995, 2632-2633. Cf. Mitchell 
G. WEISS, “Hinduism, Bioethics in”, in: Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Vol. 2, Macmillan Reference USA, 3rd Edition, 
New York 2004, 1146-1147. 
1727 Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 225. 
1728 Cf. ibid. 
1729 Cf. ibid., 226. 
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and pleasure and its ultimate union with the universal soul is attained through liberation. 
Ayurveda, similar to Vedānta, bases itself on the principle of self-knowledge and aims at self-
realization through the knowledge of the Divine Self in all beings.1730 
In this section, several topics that relate to the Bioethics in Ayurveda will be analyzed. They 
include the concept of the human person according to Caraka Saṁhitā, the question of 
ensoulment, the process of fertilization, the question of identical twins, as well as the 
prohibition of abortion in order to understand the moral status of an embryo. This will help to 
obtain a better picture on the respect and value accorded to an embryo in Hinduism from the 
point of view of Ayurveda. 
15.5.1 The Concept of Human Person in Caraka Saṁhitā 
Caraka Saṁhitā outlines the basic mode of human personhood. The integral outlook of the 
Hindus considered that a medical text also contained discussions on the nature of the human 
subject. According to Hindus, a physician is supposed to look integrally at the body with a 
spiritual perspective for an effective treatment.1731 
A person is constituted of six elements. This is explained in Caraka Saṁhitā Śārīrastāna 5.4: 
It says: “Puruṣa is nothing but the combination of the six dhātus [elements], viz. pṛthvī [earth], 
jala [water], tejas [fire], vāyu [air], ākāśa [ether] and Brahman the manifested one.”1732 Thus, 
the human person was seen a microcosmos of the macrocosmos, meaning that spirit and matter 
are not aliens or opposite to one another but parts of an integrated whole;1733 something similar 
to the Aristotelian Hylomorphism, which Thomas adapted into his philosophy. 
Conscious perception in an individual is due to the puruṣa, which integrates ātman, mind, 
senses and sense objects. Caraka Saṁhitā Śārīrastāna 1.39-42 explains this relation and the 
importance of puruṣa as a causative and integrative factor: 
If the Puruṣa were not there, knowledge, ignorance, truth or falsehood, the vedas, good or 
bad action, the agent of action and the agent of knowledge could not exist. There would be 
no support, happiness, misery, movement, immobility, speech, knowledge, scriptures, birth, 
death, bondage or salvation. So Puruṣa is recognized as a cause (of creation) by those well 
versed in the theory of causality. If Puruṣa is not recognized as a cause, the above would be 
left without a cause. There would be no consciousness, non [stet] there would be any utility 
of theirs.1734 
Three elements that are essential for life to come into being are the mind, soul (ātman) and the 
body. Caraka explains that these three are like a tripod, which constitute the substratum of 
everything. The combination of the three elements is puruṣa.1735 
Coming to the spiritual aspect of the human person, the Caraka Saṁhitā Śārīrastāna gives the 
following description about the essential nature of the spirit or ātman as an acceptable 
                                                 
1730 Cf. ibid., 235-239. 
1731 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 53. 
1732 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 5.4. English rendering from Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 415. 
Addition is by author. Cf. CRAWFORD, Dilemmas of Life…, 28. 
1733 Cf. ibid. 
1734 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 1.39-42. English tr. from Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 322. 
Addition and emphasis in original. Cf. CRAWFORD, Dilemmas of Life…, 28. 
1735 Cf. Caraka Saṁhitā, Sūtrastāna 1, 46-47. Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, op. cit., Vol. 1, 33. Cf. 
CRAWFORD, Dilemmas of Life…, 29. 
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evidence.1736 “Those who know the ātman say that it is action-less, self-dependent, sovereign, 
all-pervading, and omnipresent; that it has conscious control over the body (that is, is a 
kṣetrajña) and witnesses its doings.”1737 It is interesting to note here that this text also says, “The 
foetus is produced out of the Soul. The Antarātman (Soul inside the animal body) is the same 
as Garbhātman (Soul in the foetus). This is known as jīva or animated Soul. According to 
religious scriptures, this Soul is eternal.”1738 The inner self (antarātman) of the human person: 
[…] does not get afflicted by diseases. He does not undergo the process of aging. He does 
not succumb to death. He does not undergo diminution. He cannot be penetrated. He cannot 
be cut […]. He is omnipresent and omnipotent. He is invisible. He is without the beginning 
and end, and He is unchangeable.1739 
Commenting on this text, Sharma and Dash, two Sanskrit Scholars, explain that the term 
antarātman in the passage above “is used here in order to distinguish the Empirical soul as a 
causative factor of an embryo that is distinct from the physical self composed of six dhātus” 
(elements).1740 
The Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.8 explains about the Empirical Soul in these terms: 
By entering into the uterus, it (soul) gets combined with the sperm and the ovum thereby 
reproducing Himself in the form of a foetus. Thus the foetus takes the designation of Soul. 
Again, the question of birth of the Soul does not arise as it is beginningless. Therefore it is 
not correct to say that He produces the unborn foetus either Himself being born or being 
unborn. 
The same foetus during the course of time, attains the state of childhood, youth and old age. 
According to the state attained by Him, He is stated to be born in those states of life but with 
reference to the state of life ahead, He is considered to be unborn or in the process of taking 
birth. Therefore, he is both born and unborn simultaneously.1741 
The Empirical soul is never born because it is eternal. Although He is never born, yet He 
produces an embryo that was never born earlier. In other words, the same Soul subsequently 
transforms Himself into an embryo and in that stage, He can be said to have been born. 
Therefore, it is by the process of transformation into the various stages of embryo that the Soul 
in a way is born. This seems to be the theory of evolution according to the Sāṁkhya system of 
philosophy.1742 
It is also to be noted that the state of mere existence of sperm and ovum prior to the combination 
of the soul cannot be called as an embryo. The entitlement to the term embryo is only possible 
when the soul combines with the sperm and the ovum.1743 The implication here is that the human 
person comes into existence when the soul combines with the sperm and ovum. However, does 
                                                 
1736 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 53. 
1737 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śarīrastāna 1.5. The Sanskrit Text is found in Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. 
cit., 311. English tr. quoted from LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 53. 
1738 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.8. English rendering from Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 372. 
1739 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.8. English tr. from Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 1977, 372. 
Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 53.  
1740 English tr. from Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 373. Puruṣa comprises of six dhātus, namely, 
the five mahābhūtas (in their subtle form; the five mahābhūtas are ākāśa (ether), vāyu (air), agni (fire), jala (water) 
and pṛthvī (earth) whose attributes are sound, touch, vision, taste and smell respectively) and the elements of 
consciousness. Cf. ibid., 314. 
1741 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.8. English tr. from Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 372-373. 
1742 Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 373. 
1743 Cf. Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.8. Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 373.  
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it mean that independently the sperm, ovum and soul can produce an embryo? The answer is in 
the negative. The text from Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.9 explains this: 
Mother’s father and Soul independently cannot satisfy all the requirements for the formation 
of a foetus […]. It is only when these factors are added with the excellence of other factors, 
viz. mind, sense organs, sperm, ovum etc., depending upon the actions in the previous life, 
they have the capacity to manifest things by themselves.1744 
Besides the above factors, it is also important that there be “wholesomeness”1745 in the factors 
involved. That is to say, that an embryo is produced from out of the wholesomeness. In other 
words, there can neither be the sterility of the man or woman through the circulation of the three 
doṣas1746 nor by the intake of unwholesome things. Wholesomeness is a state of freedom from 
diseases, laziness and greed, but the presence of clarity of senses, excellence of voice and seeds 
and excessive sex vigor.1747 Even when all these factors are present, namely, ovum, sperm, 
unimpaired uterus and wholesomeness, while the coitus takes place during the period of 
fertilization, yet without the soul, an embryo cannot be produced.1748 
Another factor essential for the production of an embryo is rasa1749 (digestive product of the 
mother’s food). The manifestation of rasa is seen through growth of the body, continuity of the 
strength, satisfaction, plumpness and enthusiasm.1750 
Therefore, all the above factors, namely, mother (ovum), father (sperm), Soul (ātman), 
wholesomeness and rasa are responsible for the coming into being of the embryo.1751 
The important question here is, how does the Soul connects itself with the body? The answer is 
through the mind. The mind is responsible for uniting the jīvātman (animated soul) with the 
body, as a connecting link between.1752 
In the last analysis, in addition to what was said above, one can say that an embryo is a 
conglomeration of several factors, namely, mother (ovum), father (sperm), Soul, 
wholesomeness, rasa and mind. The mind serves as the connecting link.1753 Commenting on 
these factors, Sharma and Dash say that the six procreative factors can be classified into two 
                                                 
1744 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.9. English tr. from Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 374. The 
phrase “mother’s father” has been previously explained in Śārīrastāna 3.6 and 9. The phrase means from the 
mother’s ovum and the father’s sperm. 
1745 The Skt. word for wholesomeness is sātmya. It denotes what is agreeable to nature or natural constitution. 
In Caraka Saṁhitā it means wholesome or suitableness. The opposite of sātmya is asātmya, which means 
unwholesome. Cf. MWM, 1200 & 120. Wholesomeness is one of the factors responsible for the proper 
development of the foetus and does not include the wholesomeness of rasa (digestive product of mother’s food). 
Wholesomeness thus indicates the wholesomeness of other factors, such as vision, regimen, etc. Cf. Agniveśa’s 
Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 367. 
1746 Cf. Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.11. Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 376.The word doṣa 
means a fault or error, an Ayurvedic term for biological humour. The three doṣas are vāta, pitta and kapha. These 
three are the biological humours that are the root forces of our physical life. They more or less correspond to the 
humours of the Greek medicine, namely, wind, bile and phlegm. See GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 231-232. 
Cf. also FRAWLEY, Ayurvedic Healing…, 9. 
1747 Cf. Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.11. Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 376. 
1748 Cf. ibid. 
1749 Skt. word for sap or juice of plants, any liquid or fluid, a constituent fluid or essential juice of the body, 
serum, etc. Cf. MWM, 869. 
1750 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.12. Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 377. 
1751 Cf. Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.14. Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 380. 
1752 Cf. Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.13. Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 378. 
1753 Cf. Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.14 and 4.4. Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 380 & 387. 
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categories – the first category comprising of mother (ovum), father (sperm), mind and Soul and 
the second category consists of wholesomeness and rasa. The first category factors are 
responsible for initial formation of an embryo and the remaining two factors of the second 
category only help subsequently for the growth of an embryo.1754 
Certain objections to human personhood in Western thought were already discussed, namely, 
those who claim that a human person is present only if he/she is conscious. Consciousness for 
them is a criterion to attribute personhood to a being (Chapter 2.5 above). 
The Ayurveda system clearly argues with regard to the question whether the soul (ātman) 
possesses consciousness. Irrespective of whether the sense organs are present or are not yet 
fully developed, Ayurveda affirms that consciousness is always present. Caraka Saṁhitā, 
Śārīrastāna 3.18 answers thus: 
It is not that the Soul is endowed with consciousness only when He is possessed of sense 
organs and is devoid of consciousness otherwise. The soul can never be separated from the 
mind, and so, He is always endowed with consciousness.1755 
The implication here is that although in an embryo the sense organs are not developed, still the 
consciousness of the soul is present, namely, the inner consciousness. However, in the absence 
of the sense organs or their full functionality, the Soul is limited, i.e., with regard to actions 
which a fully developed foetus could perform or in comparison to an adult.1756 
Caraka also speaks of two bodies in this context: the gross body (sthūlaśarīra) and the subtle 
body (sūkṣmaśārīra) (See Chapter 14.4.3, above). In the scriptures (especially in Sāṁkhya), the 
gross body is described as the product of the subtle body. The subtle body consists of the soul, 
mind, ego, consciousness, and the five subtle principles (tanmātras). The subtle body can get 
out of the gross body. When the subtle body enters an individual there is life and when it exits, 
it results in the death of the individual; thus forming a link between two lives. The succession 
or continuity is due to the association of body and mind, whether of the gross or of the subtle 
body. The human person is conceived of on a still lower level as the gross body, senses, mind 
and the indwelling soul. The senses have a double role to play: either they establish contact 
with the outside world or they establish the link between body and soul. The living body is 
created out of the five inert gross elements: ether, air, fire, water and earth. The living body thus 
created serves as a dwelling place for the puruṣa. As a living being, the human person is called 
the person or puruṣa with six constituents, i.e., the five inert gross elements (i.e., the five 
mahābhūtas in their subtle form) and consciousness as the sixth element, namely, the Soul.1757 
Having seen the constitution of an embryo, Ayurveda also discusses the process of fertilization 
and the phenomenon of ensoulment. The next section will describe how these takes place. 
                                                 
1754 Cf. ibid., 380. 
1755 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.18. English tr. from Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 384. 
1756 Cf. Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.19. Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 384-385. 
1757 Cf. S. N. BHAVASAR/Gertrud KIEM, “Spirituality and Health (Ayurveda)”, in: Krishna SIVARAMAN (ed.), 
Hindu Spirituality. Vedas through Vedanta, The Crossroad Publishing Company, New York 1989, 338-357; 346. 
Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 313. Cf. also Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 1.16. Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka 
Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 314 and Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 4.6. Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. 
cit., 388. 
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15.5.2 Fertilization and Ensoulment 
It was mentioned in Parts I-III that there are Catholic moral theologians/ethicists and 
philosophers who distinguish between human beings and human persons. These moral 
theologians/ethicists/philosophers would approve of abortion of a human being but not a human 
person. Having already discussed (Chapter 13.5 above) about the concept of person in 
Hinduism and the various nuances the term could mean, the next consideration is whether 
classical Hinduism too had a distinction between human beings and human persons, what moral 
status was accorded to an embryo and consequently what are its implication for abortion. Within 
this context, the question of ensoulment will be dealt. 
First, the process of fertilization will be discussed in detail as has been described in the Caraka 
Saṁhitā and Suśruta Saṁhitā. Both these texts have detailed description of fertilization under 
the same name and section on Śārīrastāna. 
Although the Caraka Saṁhitā Śārīrastāna described what an embryo is in its third chapter, a 
definition was not given there. However, in the fourth chapter the precise definition of an 
embryo (garbha) is given as follows: “The union of sperm, ovum and the Soul in the womb is 
designated as embryo”.1758 
Suśruta Saṁhitā Śārīrastāna 3.2 describes the elements that are involved in the formation of 
an embryo: 
The male reproductive element (Śukra) is endowed with soma-guṇa (i.e. thermolytic 
properties) the female elements (Ārtava) presents the opposite property and is therefore Agni-
guṇa (i.e. thermogenetic properties). The principles of earth, water, fire, air and ether are also 
present in men in their subtle forms and contribute to the formation of the material parts by 
their molecular adjustment in the way of being useful to each other and in way of the 
assciating [stet] to each other in the formation of the body.1759 
Caraka Saṁhitā Śārīrastāna 4.6 goes further to explain how these five elements (mahābhūtas) 
that is, ākāśa (ether), vāyú (air), agni (fire), jala (water) and pṛthvī (earth), form the receptacle 
of consciousness for the sixth element, namely, the Soul. The text reads: 
The embryo is formed by the five mahābhūtas, viz. ākāśa, vāyú, agni, jala and pṛthvī and it 
serves as the receptacle of consciousness. Applying this principle, it represents the 
combination of five mahābhūtas and is also a receptacle of consciousness. In fact, the Soul 
(i.e. conscious element) constitutes the sixth dhātu (element) responsible for the formation 
of embryo.1760 
                                                 
1758 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 4.5. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 388. Sharma and Dash 
commenting on the above definition clarify the Skt. term Kukṣi which has been translated as “womb”. Kukṣi stands 
for the pelvis as a whole, but here it stands for only that part of the pelvis that is known as womb, which is the site 
of the formation of the embryo. Cf. also CRAWFORD, Dilemmas of Life…, 29. 
1759 Suśruta Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.2. English tr. from Suśruta Saṁhitā, op. cit., Vol.2, 155. Addition in 
original. 
1760 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 4.6. English tr. from Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 388. 
Addition in original. Commenting on the above text, Sharma and Dash say that the embryo is considered the 
receptacle of consciousness inasmuch as it is the sine qua non for the enjoyment of happiness and miseries by the 
soul who represents the pure consciousness. Cf. ibid. Here one can see that the Soul is the same as puruṣa 
constituted of six elements. See Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 1.16: “Puruṣa comprises six dhātus (elements), viz. 
five mahābhūtas (in their subtle form) and consciousness. Even the element of consciousness alone constitutes 
Puruṣa.” Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 314. Addition and emphasis in the original. 
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The process of conception in which the sperm of the man and the ovum of the woman unite is 
described in Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 4.7. The conception and the animation process by 
the soul is explained vividly in Suśruta Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.3 in these words: 
The local Vāyu (nerve-force) heightens or aggravates the heat generated by the friction of the 
sexual organs in an act of copulation. The Vāyu and heat thus aggravated tend to dislodge the 
semen from its sac or receptacle in a man which enters the uterus of a woman through the 
vaginal canal and there it mixes with the ovum (Ārtava) dislodged and secreted by similar 
causes. The combined ovum and semen are subsequently confined in the uterus 
(Garbhāsāya). After that, He who is known by the epithets of Self-conscious, impressioner 
(creator of sensations and perceptions), toucher, smeller, seer, hearer, taster, Self or Ego, 
creator, wanderer, witness, ordainer, speaker, though eternal, unmanifested and 
incomprehensible in his real nature, takes hold of the five subtle or essential material 
principles contributed by the united impregnating matter, assumes a subtle shape throughout, 
marked by the three fundamental qualities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, and led away by the 
Vāyu, lies confined in the uterus to be subsequently evolved out in the shape of a god, animal, 
or monster, as determined by his acts in the former existence.1761 
The above text explains the fertilization of the ovum and subsequently the soul (ātman) which 
takes hold of the fertilized ovum. The way the soul evolves depends on the karma of the 
person’s past life. It is to be noted that the soul (ātman) is omnipresent and as such, there is no 
question of the soul transmigrating from one body to another. However, when the soul comes 
in conglomeration with the mind, he/she forms an individual entity that transmigrates from one 
body that dies, to another body, which takes birth. Depending upon the karma, that is upon 
virtuous or sinful past acts, the soul takes birth in another suitable body for the sake of 
enjoyment of fruits of such action. Further, depending upon the past actions, the soul may enter 
into the body of any species, namely, human beings, animals etc.1762 
It was already mentioned (See Chapter 15.5.1 above) that Caraka distinguishes between the 
gross body and the subtle body. The sperm and the ovum after fertilization can manifest a gross 
body in the form of an embryo only when the subtle body (sūkṣmaśārīra) is associated with 
them. The association or combination of the subtle body with the sperm and ovum is 
conditioned by the actions in the past life. The characteristic features of the gross body, that is, 
both the physical and mental faculties of the individual, resemble those of the subtle body. 
Similarly, the subtle bhūtas (elements) that transmigrate through the Soul are identical in all 
individuals. Nevertheless, the psychic faculties are not the same. They depend on the rajas or 
tamas. Which of them dominates depends on the actions in the past life for the variations in the 
characteristic features of individuals.1763 
The union of the fertilized ovum with the soul (ātman) is even more elaborately described in 
Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 4.8. The soul is described in its manifold meanings: 
First of all the conscious element i.e. the Soul endowed with mental equipment unites with 
the mahābhūtas. He is known as Hetu (Concomitant Cause), kāraṇa (Non-constituent cause), 
                                                 
1761 Suśruta Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.3. English tr. from Suśruta Saṁhitā, op. cit., Vol.2, 156. Addition and 
emphasis in original. 
1762 Cf. Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 2.31-32. Cf. Commentary in Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 
361. 
1763 Cf. Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 2.31-36. Cf. Commentary in Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 
361. 
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Nimitta (Efficient Cause), Akṣara (the Indestructible one), Kartṛ (The Agent), Mantṛ (the 
Thinker), Veditā (the Knower), Boddhā (the Intelligent one), Draṣṭṛ (the Seer), Dhātṛ (the 
Supporter), Brahmā (the creator), Viśvakarman (the Builder of the Universe), Viśvakarman 
(the Builder of the universe), Viśvarūpa (the Prototype of the universe), Puruṣa (the supreme 
person), Prabhāva (the source of origin), Avyaya (the Immutable), Nitya (the Eternal), Guṇin 
(the Receptacle of mahābhūtas), Grahaṇa (One having capacity to unite with the 
mahābhūtas), Pradhāna (the Nature), Avyakta (the Unmanifested one), Jīva (the Animated 
one), Jña (the conscious one), Pudgala (the Ego), Cetanāvat (one having the power of 
sensation), Vibhu (Omnipresent), Bhūtātman (Empirical Soul), Indriyātman (Organic Soul) 
and Antarātman (Inner Soul).1764 
The various attributes of the soul exemplified here (as also in Suśruta Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.3 
above) shows that this medical text is also very philosophical in its approach while establishing 
the fact that it is the soul with its attributes which unites with the fertilized ovum; while leaving 
no doubt for any other. Mention is also made of the Puruṣa (the supreme person) here, which 
is the same as ātman. The implication is that the soul is already the Puruṣa (macrocosm) uniting 
with the puruṣa (the microcosm). In other words, the human person is present right from the 
beginning of human life. 
Therefore, the question in Ayurveda is not “when” exactly the soul descends into an embryo, 
but “how”.1765 The process will be now be analyzed. Having explained the attributes of the soul, 
the text (Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 4.8) continues with the actual unity of the soul with the 
fertilized ovum. It reads: 
The Soul, first of all, unites wiht [stet] ākāśa before uniting with the other bhūtas. This is like 
the creation of ākāśa by God after the period of deluge. As God, the indestructible one, 
equipped with the mind creates ākāśa first, and then the other bhūtas whose attributes are 
more and more manifested successively, so does the Soul, desirous of creating another body, 
first of all, unites with the ākāśa, and then with other four bhūtas whose attributes are more 
and more manifested successively. All this action (association of the Soul with the five 
mahābhūtas) takes place in a very short time.1766 
This text tells us how the soul unites with the fertilized ovum. There is no reference to when it 
actually takes place. The only hint given to us is that “all this action takes place in a very short 
time”. That is why, it was mentioned earlier that Ayurveda is not concerned with the time 
(when) but how the process of unity of the soul with the fertilized ovum takes place. S. 
Cromwell Crawford, a Hawaiian scholar of Comparative Religions and Ethicist, summarizing 
the phrase in the above quoted passage, namely, “takes place in a very short time”, says: 
                                                 
1764 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 4.8. English tr. from Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 390. 
Addition in original. 
1765 Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 371. 
1766 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 4.8. English tr. from Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 390. 
Addition in original. Commenting on the above text, translators Sharma and Dash say: “According to the Sāṁkhya 
system, the Nature (Prakṛti) and the Soul (Puruṣa) are the only two entities that survive in the deluge when all the 
manifestations of Creation revert to their latent states. After the period of deluge is over and the equilibrium of the 
Nature is disturbed […]. The first mahābhūta to be created in the process of evolution is ākāśa; thereafter come 
vāyu etc. which, comparatively speaking, have grosser forms. Similarly, the Soul, desirous of creating an embryo, 
first, unites with the ākāśa. His union with other grosser mahābhūtas follows. The union of the Soul with all the 
five mahābhūtas is, of course, completed in a very short time.” Ibid. 390-391. 
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In brief, the humanization of the individual takes place in the moment of conception and all 
future growth is only the actualization of conceptual potency.1767 
Crawford further states that if Caraka’s archaic formulation of scientific intuitionism is 
translated into modern medical idiom, then one can say that the new being receives its genetic 
code at conception. It is in this instance of the act of conception that hominization takes place. 
Therefore, a being with a human genetic code is indeed a human being. Thus, the modern Hindu 
believes that human life begins with conception. Moreover, it makes no sense to discriminate 
between different degrees of human potentiality, namely, “ensoulment”, “viability” and “brain 
waves”. From the moment of conception, it is a self-evolving being. Thus, the genetic 
components being complete at conception, Hinduism affirms the inviolability of the fetus and 
rejects abortion.1768 
The above discussion also helps one to understand why the ātman (see Chapter 15.5.1 above) 
in the human subject seems to manifest contrary characteristics, namely, “a limited agent, 
mortal, dependent upon bodily functions, changeable, and so on”1769. This false appearance and 
apparent characteristics of the ātman results from the ātman’s union with matter (śarīra, i.e., 
the body). In Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 6.4 it is stated that, “The body which is maintained 
in a state of equilibrium represents the conglomeration of factors derived from five mahābhūtas 
and this is the site of manifestation of consciousness”.1770 From this, one can assume that 
although the ātman is conscious in itself, the body is essential for its manifestation.1771 
Therefore, being limited in the body, the ātman manifests contrary characteristics.1772 
With regard to the ensoulment, a distinction is to be made between two traditions here, namely, 
the “major” tradition (owing to its apparently weightier authority) and the “minor” tradition 
(which relied on weaker evidence).1773 
In the major tradition, according to the Caraka Saṁhitā Śārīrastāna 3.3, the formation of an 
embryo is described under the section “Factors responsible for procreation”. It says: 
When a man with unimpaired sperm and a woman with unafflicted genital tract, ovum and 
uterine bed cohabit during the period of fertilization, the jīva (Soul) along with the mind 
descends into the zygote (combined form of the sperm and ovum) lodged inside the uterus. 
This results in the formation of the embryo […]. This occurs due to the combination of the 
factors derived from the following sources: - (1) Mother, (2) Father, (3) Soul, (4) 
Wholesomeness and (5) Rasa (digestive product of the mother’s food). Mind is also 
responsible for the transmigration of the Soul.1774 
                                                 
1767 S. Cromwell CRAWFORD, “Hindu Ethics for Modern Life”, in: IDEM, World Religions and Global Ethics, 
Paragon House, New York 1989, 5-35; 26. Cf. William A. YOUNG, The World’s Religions and Contemporary 
Issues, Prentice Hall. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1995, 127. 
1768 Cf. CRAWFORD, “Hindu Ethics…”, 26. 
1769 LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 53. 
1770 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 6.4. English tr. from Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 427. 
1771 Cf. commentary by Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 427. 
1772 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 53. 
1773 Cf. ibid. Cf. also FABC Papers, No.120, 11. 
1774 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.3 English tr. from Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 366-367. 
Addition in original. Commenting on the “period of fertilization” in the above passage, Sharma and Dash informs 
that, it starts from the day the woman menstruates. However, during the first three days of the menstruation, 
cohabitation is prohibited because it is inauspicious (Cf. Caraka Saṁhitā, Sūtrastāna 25.40; Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka 
Saṁhitā, op. cit., Vol. 1, 433.). Cf. English commentary in Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 367. Cf. 
LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 54. Cf. CRAWFORD, Dilemmas of Life…, 30. 
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From the above text one can conclude that conception coincides with the “descent” or presence 
of the spirit in the womb, meaning here that from the beginning onwards an embryo is the spirit-
matter composite constituting the human person. Thus, one cannot draw a distinction between 
human being before “ensoulment” and human person after “ensoulment”, and one cannot imply 
that abortion at some early stage of pregnancy would be permissible.1775 
In the minor tradition, in contrast to what is stated above, the soul unites with an embryo some 
time after conception. It seems, therefore, that in the minor tradition one can draw a distinction 
between human being (before “ensoulment”) and human person (after “ensoulment”). 
However, it is to be remembered that the minor tradition is hardly a recognized authority in 
such matters, such as in a minor Upaniṣad, namely, the Garbha Upaniṣad (ca. 2-3d CE?). 
According to the Garbha Upaniṣad, the soul and embryo unite in the seventh month after 
conception.1776 It reads: 
From the pairing at the time of the season there originates after one night a nodule, after seven 
nights a bubble, within a fortnight lump, within a month it becomes hard, after two months 
originates the head, after three months originate the parts of foot, in the fourth month ankles, 
belly and hips, in the fifth the vertebral column, in the sixth the mouth, the nose, the eyes, the 
ears, in the seventh the embryo is equipped with the soul [jiva], in the eighth it is complete 
in all parts.1777 
It is important to remember that neither the Garbha Upaniṣad nor the minor tradition explicitly 
draw a distinction between human being and human person, especially to allow abortion based 
on the time lapse between conception and ensoulment.1778 
In conclusion, both from the major and minor tradition, “the overriding evidence of the classical 
texts as a whole speaks in favour of according the status of human personhood to the unborn 
throughout pregnancy, with consequent implications for the (impermissibility of) abortion, 
except in extreme circumstances”.1779 Thus, both classical Hinduism and Ayurveda claim the 
protection of an embryo right from the moment of conception and accord a status to the embryo 
a respect from its inception owing to the presence of the ātman (soul) from that moment 
onwards. How does Ayurveda answer the intricate question of identical twins that poses a 
problem for the Western mind? The next section will deal with this problem. 
                                                 
1775 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 54. Cf. also FABC Papers, No.120, 11. 
1776 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 54. Cf. also FABC Papers, No.120, 11. 
1777 Garbha Upaniṣad, in: DEUSSEN, Sixty Upaniṣads of the Veda, op. cit., Part 2, 642. Cf. LIPNER, “The 
Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 54. On this citation, Lipner comments at fn.57 with regard to the phrase 
“(the foetus) is joined to the soul” (Skt. jīvena saṃyukto bhavati). Basing himself on the commentator Nārāyaṇa, 
who glosses this phrase as Jīvalingena (saṃyukto…), that is, is joined to the mark of the soul, namely, 
consciousness, Lipner is of the opinion that if such interpretation was correct, then the implication is not 
ensoulment, but consciousness that occurs in the seventh month. Ensoulment could have already taken place at 
conception. This means the minor tradition agrees with the major. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on 
Abortion…”, 54. Cf. also Garbha-Upanishaḍ, in: Thirty Minor Upanishaḍs, op. cit., 117. However, as said earlier, 
the soul and the consciousness cannot be separated and therefore, this explanation is wanting. 
1778 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 54. 
1779 LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 56. Cf. also FABC Papers, No.120, 11. By extreme 
circumstances is meant here that abortion is permissible as a last recourse when the life of both the mother and the 
embryo are in danger and only when it is clearly a question of weighing life against life. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical 
Hindu View on Abortion…”, 50. 
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15.5.3The Question of Identical Twins 
It was mentioned earlier that there are those who contend over the issue of monozygotic twins 
and propose a delayed animation. What does Ayurveda say about this issue? 
Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna speaks of various types of twins, namely, twins of male and 
female children, twins of female children, twins of male children, and multiple children.1780 
Caraka also explains why this takes place. He says: 
Dominance of ovum during the conception results in the procreation of a female child, and 
dominance of sperm, of a male child. During the process of union, the sperm and ovum 
undergo divisions and if one division of sperm dominates over one of the divisions of the 
ovum and another division of ovum dominates over the other division of sperm, then there is 
formation of twins – one male child and a female child. When both the divisions of the sperm 
dominate over both the divisions of the ovum, then there is a twin of male children. When 
both the divisions of ovum dominate over both the divisions of the sperm, then there is a twin 
of female children. 
When the excessively aggravated vāta brings about many divisions of the sperm and ovum, 
many children are born; their number depends upon the number of divisions. This is not under 
the control of the individual himself; this happens due to one’s action during previous life.1781 
As a commentary to the above text, Sharma and Dash explain that both the sperm and ovum 
have subtle forms. These subtle parts undergo unequal division due to karma of the past life of 
the individual and results in unequal development of foetus.1782 
Suśruta Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 2.39 gives a similar reason for the birth of twins and says, “A 
seed divided into two by the deranged Vāyu within the (cavity of the) uterus (Kukṣi) gives rise 
to the birth of twins, conditioned by the good or evil deeds of their prior existence.”1783 
Thus, Caraka attributes the birth of twins to the vāta and Suśruta to the vāyú. Both vāta and 
vāyú mean the same. However, it is to be noted that Caraka and Suśruta consider twins to be 
an abnormality. Interestingly, both consider that the individual so conceived is conditioned by 
the good or evil deeds of their past life. 
Coming to the question of the beginning of the human individual, the determining factor is the 
ātman along with the other elements, as already mentioned, in the formation of an embryo 
(garbha). Therefore, the question to be answered is, whether there can be two ātmans in the 
case of twins. 
Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.3 gives an answer to this question in the following manner: 
Ātman is not produced by another Ātman. If it is stated that Ātman produces Ātman the 
question may arise as to whether the Soul, born produces another Soul or an unborn one? 
Both these propositions are untenable. As the Soul already born is in existence there is no 
question of His producing Himself. As the Soul unborn is non-existent He cannot produce 
Himself. Therefore the proposition is untenable both ways. Let us consider the problem from 
                                                 
1780 Cf. Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 2.11. 
1781 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 2.12-14. English tr. from Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 354. 
The Skt. word vāta derived from the root vā, which means wind or air (and hence from which is derived the word 
vāyú, which in medicine means the windy humour or any morbid affection of it). Here it means the wind or air as 
one of the humours of the body or wind emitted from the body. Cf. MWM, 934 & 942. See also Chapter 15.2 at 
fn. 1656 above on vāyú. 
1782 Cf. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 355. 
1783 Suśruta Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 2.39. English tr. from Suśruta Saṁhitā, op. cit., Vol.2, 151. Addition in 
original. 
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another angle. If the Soul is capable of reproducing Himself, then how is it that He does not 
choose a desirable womb endowed with lordship, unrestrained movement, capacity to have 
forms as He pleases, luste [stet], strength, speed, complexion, mental faculties, compactness 
and having freedom from aging, disease and death? The Soul wants Himself to be like this 
or even better.1784 
Thus, from the above passage it is clear that the ātman cannot divide itself in the case of twins. 
According to Ayurveda, which follows the Upaniṣadic teachings, animation by the soul (ātman) 
is possible only in association with the body. The soul is universal and not particular and its 
ultimate destiny is to unite itself with the bráhman. The cycle of rebirth (karma) determines 
that the soul be reborn in a subtle body. Unless it is liberated, the process of being born in 
another body continues. However, once liberated from the cycle of rebirth it joins the fullness 
of bráhman. Therefore, in the case of a monozygotic twin, each of the body receives a soul and 
hence there is no problem posed in Ayurveda at the time of conception with regard to the 
question of identical twinning.1785 
15.5.4 Abortion 
It was already mentioned (see Chapter 15.3.1 at fn. 1678 above) that the deity invoked to protect 
the unborn is Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu is known as the preserver of life. In Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 
there is a mention about the deity Viṣṇu, who according to Ṛg Veda is invoked in the ceremonies 
prior to conception.1786 Moreover, the pregnant woman in her delicate condition is asked to be 
treated like a vessel brim-full of oil and that she should not be agitated in order to avoid a 
mishap.1787 The idea that emerges in these instances is that for the Hindus, pregnancy was a very 
special state and that the unborn had a moral status meriting protection.1788 
The only exception that was allowed in a situation in which abortion was permitted is found in 
a classical text in Ayurveda in the Suśruta Saṁhitā, Cikitsāstāna 15.3,5 & 10-11. In its section 
called “The Foetus Astray” (mūḍhgarbha), the eventuality of aborting the foetus is 
considered.1789 
The text in Suśruta Saṁhitā, Cikitsāstāna 15.2a clearly describes the care with which the 
garbha (embryo) should be handled: 
The extraction of a foetus […] is the most difficult of all surgical operations, inasmuch as 
actual contact or actual manipulation is the only means accessible to a surgeon […]. All 
surgical acts in respect of the foetus or the enceinte […] could not be done otherwise than by 
actual contact of the hand, avoiding injury to the pregnant woman and to the foetus […] all 
procedures should be carried out with utmost care.1790 
                                                 
1784 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 3.3. English tr. from Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 368-369. 
1785 Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 331-333. 
1786 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 8.11. The invocation in Ṛg Veda 10.184.1 reads: “[May Lord Viṣṇu prepare 
the womb; May Lord Tvastṛ make respective forms; May Lord Prajāpati spray the sperm; May Lord Dhātṛ protect 
your (wife’s) womb]”. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 469. Addition in original. Cf. LIPNER, “The 
Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 43. 
1787 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 8.22. The text reads, “A pregnant woman is to be treated very cautiously as 
if one is walking with a pot full of oil, in hand without letting a drop to fall.” English tr. from Agniveśa’s Caraka 
Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 478. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 45. 
1788 Cf. ibid. 
1789 Cf. ibid., 49. Cf. also FABC Papers, No.120, 11. 
1790 Suśruta Saṁhitā, Cikitsāstāna 15.2a. English tr. from Suśruta Saṁhitā, op. cit., Vol.2, 469. Cf. LIPNER, 
“The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 49.  
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The text further continues this gesture of care for an embryo: “Every care should be taken and 
no pains spared to bring a child alive into the world, which is not already dead in the womb”.1791 
Thus, the text leaves no doubt about the ideal that one should strive for, namely, the safety of 
both mother and the foetus. However, if the foetus is already dead (mṛte), then various 
manipulatory measures may be taken. However, surgical removal by applying instruments 
(śastra) should be the last resort.1792 
Another situation, in which the foetus cannot be safely delivered, is next considered. However, 
should this happen, removal by surgery is forbidden, but can be terminated: 
In case it is not possible to correct the mal presentation [Mūḍha-garbha] it is better to 
terminate [pātanaṃ] the pregnancy. In no case, however, time should not be lost, so that the 
mother’s life may not be put in danger.1793 
The above texts make it clear that abortion (pātanaṃ)1794 is the last recourse, only when it is 
clearly a question of weighing life against life – the life of the mother against the life of an 
embryo/foetus. The case described here is not a case in which dharma of respect for the unborn 
is neglected but rather, a case in which one has the duty to save the life of both the mother and 
an embryo; however, it may happen that both cannot be saved. In that case, abortion is 
permissible as a last resort to save the life of the mother. It is to be noted here that in all these 
texts, the lives of both, the mother and an embryo/foetus, are accorded the greatest respect and 
protection.1795 
15.6 CONCLUSION 
For the traditional Hindu, reproduction is also seen as essential for the continuation of society 
and for one’s family. One of the major life aims of a Hindu is to procreate, and according to the 
central aspect of dharma, preserving and promoting life is important. Thus, abortion or 
miscarriage is considered as a serious crime and sin. Seen from another angle, abortion hinders 
the achievement of the soul towards liberation by preventing the human soul to either enter or 
exit out of the cycle of rebirth.  
It is within this background of abortion that the moral status of an embryo or the unborn was 
discussed. Abortion was considered as a morally reprehensible killing (hatyā) rather than an 
ethically neutral evacuation, dislodging, or excision. To study the moral status of an embryo, 
philosophical, historical, medical and other observations were also necessary. The earliest Ṡruti 
texts attest to the fact that an embryo in the womb is specially deserving of protection and 
therefore, abortion is a morally intolerable act. An embryo, owing to its inviolability and 
                                                 
1791 Suśruta Saṁhitā, Cikitsāstāna 15.2. English tr. from Suśruta Saṁhitā, op. cit., Vol.2, 470. 
1792 Cf. Suśruta Saṁhitā, Cikitsāstāna 15.6-7. Cf. Suśruta Saṁhitā, op. cit., Vol.2, 471-472. The text also warns 
the physician not to be negligent: “An intelligent physician should not waste a single moment in drawing out the 
foetus, as soon as it would be found to be dead in the womb, since neglect in such cases leads to the instantaneous 
death of the mother, like an animal dying of suffocation.” Suśruta Saṁhitā, Cikitsāstāna 15.12. English tr. from 
Suśruta Saṁhitā, op. cit., Vol.2, 473. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 49. 
1793 Suśruta Saṁhitā, Cikitsāstāna 15.9. English tr. from Suśruta Saṁhitā, op. cit., Vol.2, 472. Addition in 
italics by author. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 49-50.  
1794 The Skt. term used here pātana means causing the fall of the foetus or abortion. Cf. MWM, 616. However, 
it is not the same as bhrūṇahatyā, which is the proper word for abortion or slaying the embryo. Here the term 
pātana indicates that recourse to this procedure is used only in extreme circumstances. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical 
Hindu View on Abortion…”, 66 at fn.47. 
1795 Cf. ibid., 50. Cf. also FABC Papers, No.120, 11. 
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physical vulnerability requires special protection. The Upanishads too disapprove of abortion. 
The Smṛti tradition is more explicit with regard to the view of the status of the unborn and the 
censure attached to abortion. The special respect shown in these texts pertains both to the special 
allowance given to the pregnant woman and also the explicit condemnation and punishment of 
those who procure abortion. The Mahābhārata too show evidences against the acceptability of 
abortion. In classical times, the status of the unborn and the question of abortion had both a 
moral and social significance. Although the classical texts object to the marriage between 
different castes, yet when a child is conceived through the marriage between two different 
castes, no Hindu texts would ever-recommended abortion in such unions. These facts point to 
the fact regarding the respect and value given to an embryo. 
Having analyzed the classical orthodox Hindu Sanskrit texts from a historical and philosophical 
point of view on the moral status of the embryo, the prohibition of abortion as a criterion – the 
only known intervention to the growing embryo known at that time – that restores reverence of 
life for human life was deliberated, especially the vulnerable life of an embryo. 
Based on the Hindu model of human personhood (that was already considered in Chapter 13.5 
above) the moral status of the unborn irrespective of the stage of development in the womb was 
analyzed. There is no analogous literature in classical Hinduism that makes a distinction 
between human being and human person as found in some Western discussions that permits 
abortion. That is to say, de facto, Hindu tradition has always accorded personal moral status to 
an embryo or foetus throughout pregnancy. Other reasons in support of the moral status would 
were also considered.1796 
To elaborate the above point from a medical view, the ancient Medical system of Ayurveda 
was considered (which came later and after the classical period). The two main sources of 
Ayurveda are the Caraka Saṁhitā and Suśruta Saṁhitā. 
The formation of an embryo is a complex phenomenon involving several factors that 
conglomerate together to form it, namely, the semen, the ovum, wholesomeness, the nutritive 
and digestive material of the mother (rasa), and the soul. Ayurveda fixes the question on the 
beginning of the human individual as the time of conception. The presence of the ātman is 
indispensable and plays an important role right from the first instance in the formation of the 
human individual. 
The analysis of Chapter 13 above led to the fact that the ātman (self) residing in the body 
(śarīra) is identified with the bráhman raising the individual human person in his/her spiritual 
nature. This fact acknowledges the intrinsic worth of the individual and thereby his/her dignity. 
The present Chapter 15 confirms the idea both in the ṡruti and smṛti tradition. Moreover, 
Ayurveda endorses the same fact from a medical and philosophical point of view. These views 
continues to be carried forward in the modern view on Hinduism, especially from a new Hindu 
theological perspective. This will be the topic of discussion in the next Chapter.
                                                 
1796 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 60. 
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C H A P T E R  1 6  
NEW THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES IN HINDUISM: 
VEDĀNTA SYSTEM 
16.1. INTRODUCTION 
The six systems of Hindu philosophy (see Chapter 14.2.2., above) were already mentioned. Of 
the six schools, two are rooted (Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta) primarily in the Vedic ṡruti tradition. 
They are sometimes called as smārta schools. Just like smṛti, they develop smārta orthodox 
theological ideas based directly on ṡruti. Of the smārta schools, the Mīmāṁsā has dharma as 
its proper subject rooted in the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas. The Vedānta school, on the other 
hand, focusses on the Upaniṣads. These two darśanas (philosophies) are the ones that come 
closest to the idea of theology as developed in the West.  
While the Mīmāṁsā, the “old theology”, uses Mīmāṁsā Sūtra of Jaimini1797 (ca. 300-100 BCE) 
as its basic textbook and is most concerned with ritual traditions1798, the “new theology” in 
Hinduism stems from the Vedānta system of philosophy. The foundational Vedānta is 
Bādarāyaṇa’s Vedānta Sūtra, also called as Brahma Sūtra1799 (c.300-100 BCE). It is an exegesis 
of various Upaniṣadic passages in aphoristic style work easily susceptible to divergent 
interpretations.1800 The schools of Vedānta are represented by Śaṅkarācārya1801, who is 
considered the great exponent of non-dualism (advaita), Rāmānuja, the famous exponent of 
qualified non-dualism (viśiṣṭādvaita) and Madhva, the illustrious defender of dualism 
(dvaita).1802 A common point of reference in these different systems within Vedānta makes use 
of the relationship between the absolute supreme bráhman and the individual jīvātman 
(Animated Soul). “Non-duality” (advaita) implies the ultimate identity of bráhman and ātman; 
“qualified non-duality” (viśiṣṭādvaita) maintains a crucial differentiation as well as a 
fundamental identity; and “duality” (dvaita) maintains an ultimate diversity of bráhman and 
ātman.1803 These three Vedānta systems will be dealt with in this Chapter. 
16.2 ŚAṄKARĀCĀRYA’S ADVAITA VEDĀNTA 
Śaṅkarācārya (788-820 C.E.) or popularly known as Adi Shankara or simply Śaṅkarā, is 
acclaimed as the “new theologian” of Hinduism, as the oldest and extant complete commentator 
on the Brahma Sūtra and the great Advaitin.1804 He was born in Kāladī, Kerala. He became a 
saṃnyāsī at the age of eighteen. He was a vigorous champion entrusted with the task of bringing 
                                                 
1797 The ancient Indian sage Jaimini was a great philosopher of the Mīmāṁsā school of Indian philosophy. He 
was the disciple of the great sage Veda-Vyāsa. Jaimini composed the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra. Cf. “The Mimamsa Sutras 
of Jaimini”, in: B. D. BASU (ed.), The Sacred Books of the Hindus, tr. by Pandit Mohan Lal SANDAL, Vol. 27, Part 
I, Sudhindre Nath Vasu at the Panini Office, Allahabad 1923. 
1798 Cf. HILTEBEITEL, “Hinduism…”, 3997.Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 351.  
1799 The composer of the Brahma Sūtra or Vedānta Sūtra is attributed to the ancient Indian sage Bādarāyaṇa. 
Cf. BĀDARĀYAṆA, Brahma Sūtras. Text, Word-to-Word Meaning, Translation and Commentary, tr. by Swami 
SIVANANDA, The Divine Life Society, Uttarakhand, Himalayas 20084. 
1800 Cf. HILTEBEITEL, “Hinduism…”, 3997. 
1801 The term ācārya used after a proper noun refers to a well-renowned teacher. 
1802 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 355. 
1803 Cf. ibid. 
1804 Cf. ibid., 355 & 357. The word Advaitin refers to one who held for the theory of Advaita. 
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unity of Hinduism over and against intra-Hindu divisions as well as the inroads of Buddhism 
and Jainism. 
In contrast to the Sāṁkhya system of philosophy, which assigns a separate but full reality to 
both spirit (puruṣa) and matter (prakṛti), advaita (which means “non-dual”) Vedānta asserts 
that the absolute reality or absolute truth (paramārthika), namely bráhman, is non-dual. The 
world that is around us (saṁsāra) has merely a functional reality. The world is only a 
transformation (pariṇāma) or a mere appearance (vivarta) that arises from bráhman.1805 
Śaṅkarā constructed his Advaita Vedānta based on the principles of Gauḍapāda, his guru’s guru, 
in his Kārikā to the Māṇḍukya Upanishad.1806 In it, he clarifies his epistemological position that 
all human subject-object knowledge is distorted by adhyāsa (superimposition), which falsifies 
knowledge so that the subject is unable to find objective truth.1807 His argumentation is that 
lower views of reality must be rejected because they are contradicted or “sublated” by higher 
experiences of the real. In the last analysis, all dichotomous formulations must be abandoned 
in order to make way for the non-dual experience of the self (ātman) as bráhman. The world of 
appearance is sustained by ignorance (avidyā). Avidyā or ignorance “superimposes” (adhyāsa) 
limitations on reality. Illusion or fabrication (māyā) in itself is neither real nor unreal and is 
indescribable in terms of being or nonbeing. As long as bráhman is not experienced, it appears 
(māyā) real. However, it is empirically real relative to things that can be shown false from the 
standpoint of empirical observation.1808 He gives the example of a traveler who mistakes a piece 
of rope on the road for a snake, or vice versa. He questions all sense perception as possibly 
misleading, due to preconceived, superimposed ideas. While this may be so, the existence of 
the doubter remains a fact. The subject remains in spite of no objective perception at all. The 
subject needs no proof because it precedes every proof as its inherent condition. The subject is 
distinct as well independent from all objects.1809 Thus, māyā is said to be more mysterious and 
unknowable than bráhman himself.1810 Ātman, which is pure consciousness, remains even after 
manas (rational thought) has passed away. After removal of the ignorance (avidyā), the self or 
ātman, which is the essence of consciousness (cit), experiences bráhman as identical with the 
essence of being (sat). This experience ends in a bliss (ānandá). The experience is thus 
expressed in the term sat-cit-ānandá (the unity of being, consciousness and bliss; see Chapter 
14.4.1 above).1811 Ātman is bráhman, that is, the self of a person is identical with the ground of 
all being, the bráhman. However, bráhman is invisible, impervious to any sense or mind 
perception, and not identical with any one particular thing. Śaṅkarā introduced his most 
controversial distinction between bráhman saguṇa (the Supreme with attributes or the 
anthropomorphic qualified Godhead1812) and bráhman nirguṇa (the Supreme without attributes 
                                                 
1805 David N. LORENZEN, “Śaṅkara”, in: JONES (ed.), Encyclopedia of Religion, op. cit., Vol. 12, 8104-8106; 
8105. 
1806 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 355 & 357. Cf. HILTEBEITEL, “Hinduism…”, 4003. 
1807 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 357. 
1808 Cf. HILTEBEITEL, “Hinduism…”, 4003. 
1809 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 357. 
1810 Cf. HILTEBEITEL, “Hinduism…”, 4003. 
1811 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 357. Cf. HILTEBEITEL, “Hinduism…”, 4003. D. N., 
LORENZEN, “Śaṅkara…”, 8105. 
1812 Cf. Richard V. DE SMET, “Towards an Indian View of the Person”, in: Margaret CHATTERJEE (ed.), 
Contemporary Indian Philosophy, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London 1974, 51-75; 54. 
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or the quality-less Absolute equivalent to the Deus simplex of Christian theology1813). In other 
words, the distinction between the personal and impersonal bráhman,1814 or, the Īśvara (God) 
of religious tradition and the Absolute (bráhman) unqualified reality, is a no-thing. Īśvara is 
only a temporary manifestation of the creator bráhman as long as creation lasts.1815 
16.2.1 The Concept of Person 
Earlier it was mentioned (see Chapter 14.5, above) that in the two formulations of Thomas, 
three metaphysical concepts come into conjunction in dealing with the concept of person, 
namely, rationality, substance, individuality. With regard to rationality, Śaṅkarā is of the 
opinion that the root of all being, of being qua being, fundamentally belongs to the nature of 
consciousness. Therefore, ātman/bráhman himself is the universal substratum and final 
subjectivity of all things, which is knowledge (jñānam).1816 Śaṅkarā states this fact: “Pure 
consciousness is ātman […]. whereas the objects betray their own form, consciousness never 
fails”.1817 In India, the western idea of the rationality qua rationality would perhaps be relegated 
to the structures of the buddhi (intelligence), the manas (mind) or other internal faculties, which 
are directly derived from the material or bodily pole of the human being. All these are 
considered to be of a lower strata of intelligence and therefore of being. In spite of this fact, the 
consciousness of the spirit shines through the buddhi in all forms of rational activity, which is 
nothing other than the reflection of the innermost core, the pure ātman.1818 
It is also interesting to note that the aforementioned proposition of the Upaniṣadic teaching (see 
Chapter 14.4.1, above), namely, tat tvam asi (That art thou) is interpreted by Śaṅkarā to affirm 
the absolute identity of bráhman and the individual self. That is to say, that for the Advaitins1819 
there is no difference between the “that” (bráhman) and the “thou” (ātman). The individual self 
or ātman is bráhman in association with a particular psychical apparatus and a particular 
physical body. In other words, “that” is Pure Consciousness and “thou” too is Pure 
                                                 
1813 Cf. ibid., 54. 
1814 A word of caution is here necessary due to the possible confusion that could arise out of the traditional use 
of the English language in the explanation of Indian concepts. The Vedāntic Bráhman is considered by many 
Indian and foreign scholars to mean either as “impersonal” or non-personal. Originally, the expression 
“impersonal” was an imperfect translation of the traditional affirmation that the Absolute of itself is nirguṇa, that 
is, without qualities, as distinguished from the “personal” expression of the Absolute, the saguṇa, that is, with 
qualities. The translation of nirguṇa as “impersonal” is unfortunate because the word merely denies Bráhman the 
bonds of prakṛti or nature. Bráhman of itself is obviously beyond the limits of matter, and therefore not only 
nirguṇa but also without form (nirākāra). See Cf. GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 29-30. 
1815 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 357. Cf. DE SMET, “Towards an Indian View of the 
Person…”, 54. De Smet commenting on this issue between Hindus and Christians on the Absolute and God says: 
“Today it is practically impossible to convince the Hindus that the personal God of Christianity is really the 
Absolute and as a rule the non-dualists among them consider that the Christians have inherited only an 
anthropomorphic conception of the Deity.” DE SMET, “Towards an Indian View of the Person…”, 54. 
1816 Cf. GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 31. 
1817 ŚAṄKARĀ, Praśnopaniṣadbhāṣya, 6.2 as quoted in Richard V. DE SMET, “Persona, Anima, Atman”, in: 
Philosophical Quarterly 30/4 (1958) 251-260; 258. See GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 31. 
1818 Cf. ibid., 31. Gispert-Sauch is of the opinion that Western metaphysics would basically agree with the 
above valuation of rationality, namely, that the consciousness which is constitutive of personhood need not be the 
“rational” consciousness that one experiences. For example, angels too are perceived as persons insofar as they 
are understood to possess a super-rational, intuitive kind of consciousness or the divine Reality, itself personal, is 
the pure act of knowledge or rather consciousness. Cf. ibid. 
1819 That is, the follower of the advaita system of philosophy. 
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Consciousness, which is associated with the psychophysical organism. To say it in another way: 
the “thou” is the “that” temporarily limited.1820 
With regard to the individuation (see Chapter 14.5.3, above), which is a concept integral to the 
idea of person; a person must be an individual, singular or distinct. According to Śaṅkarā, the 
self or ātman is unbroken (akhaṇḍita) and simple, perfectly one (ekam evā’dvitīyam). In one 
sense, the absolutely reality is without a second, advaita, transcendent. In another sense, it is 
not distinct from others, because it remains the soul of everything, intimately united to the 
universe, sarvātman (literally, soul of everything). Śaṅkarā affirms this fact in his Brahma Sūtra 
Bhāṣya when he says, “in spite of the non-otherness of cause and effect, it is the effect which 
has its ātman in the cause, but not the cause in the effect”.1821 Based on the facts that were 
analyzed, one can affirm that the ancient concept of personhood can be equivalently found as 
in the West in the idea of the Absolute Ultimate, the bráhman/ātman.1822 
If the Absolute Ultimate Self or bráhman/ātman is identical with the jīvātman (individual 
animated soul), how can one acknowledge that there is place for more than one person, or 
whether the personality of the Self leaves place for other persons? In other words, are the 
individual human beings (jīvātman) also persons? In what way can the content of the concept 
be applied to individual men and women?1823 
According to Śaṅkarā, the human (jīva) is a fragment of the Divine in the universe and human 
life is a part (amsa) or ray of the Divine life in the universe. Śaṅkarā employs two terms to 
denote the empirical self or the individual human being: jīva and puruṣa. Jīva – which is derived 
from the root jiv (to breathe), which signifies the being that breathes and refers to the biological 
aspect. Puruṣa, which is derived from purisaya meaning ‘that which is derived from the citadel 
of the heart’, indicates the soul, or the psychic dimension of the human.1824 Although Śaṅkarā 
rejects the theory, that jīva is only one (ekajīvavada), yet he accepts the plurality of selves in 
the phenomenal level. According to him, the individual ego, which is determined by bodily 
organism (jīva) and psychic conditions (puruṣa), is a complex structure and as it were forms 
the centre of individual experiences. What determines the principle of individuation, according 
to Śaṅkarā, is the internal organ known differently as mind (manas), understanding (buddhi), 
self-sense (ahamkāra) etc. On the one hand, the Universal Self or the Ultimate Consciousness 
is formed due to the internal organ that differs from individual to individual, which is 
particularized into manifold individual consciousness. On the other hand, the individual self 
owing to its intelligence as its unifying principle and the faculty of memory, preserves its 
continuity.1825 
                                                 
1820 Cf. ORGAN, Hinduism…, 281. 
1821 As quoted in DE SMET, “Persona, Anima, Atman…”, 259-260. See GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of 
Person…”, 35. 
1822 Cf. ibid., 35. 
1823 Cf. ibid., 35-36. 
1824 Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 2.5.18: sa vā ayam puruṣah sarvāsu pūrshu puriṣayah, meaning “he on account 
of his dwelling in all bodies is called Puruṣa”. See ŚAṄKARĀCĀRYA, The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad with the 
Commentary, tr. by Swami MĀDHAVĀNANDA, Advaita Ashrama, Almora, Himalayas, 1950, 401. 
1825 Cf. Thomas KULANGARA, “The Value of Human Life in the Hindu Traditions”, in: Jeev 31 (2001) 397-
408; 403. 
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According to Śaṅkarā, the complex structure of the individual self is made of five layers: 1) the 
material body (anna), 2) the principle of breath that regulates all conscious activities (prāṇa), 
3) mind or principle of conscious activities (manas), 4) intelligence which is the seat of ego or 
individuality (buddhi or vijñāna) and 5) the principle of universal consciousness (ātman, which 
corresponds to bliss or ānanda). These five layers serve as a background for the whole 
structure.1826 
It was already mentioned that the self of the individual casts off the gross physical body at death 
(see 14.4.3 and 15.5.1, above). The subtle body, which is made up of transparent elements and 
vital forces continues as a permanent factor of the jīva during the course of transmigration. The 
individual self (puruṣa), owing to its spiritual nature, is neither a doer nor an enjoyer. However, 
due to its ignorance (avidyā) and its consequent association with the adjuncts of the internal 
organ and reasoning or intelligence (buddhi or vijñāna), appears to be a doer and an enjoyer. 
Likewise, the soul is falsely said to be atomic. In fact, the jīva by nature is infinite and all 
pervading. Conclusively, the individuation of the ātman into a plurality of selves is only an 
appearance. 
Therefore, according to pure Advaita of Śaṅkarā, the question of the plurality of individuals can 
make sense only at the phenomenological level, as the individual remains an individual only at 
this level. The individual is a person insofar as it is the manifestation of the Absolute ātman – 
it is a vyakti (an individual; a “manifestation”) which in this world acquires her/his proper 
characteristics, namely, the “gender” (here vyakti used in the grammatical sense) because it is 
an “adornment” (vyakti) of Reality. All these leads one to think of the original meaning of 
person in the Greek sense as πρόσωπον, a mask.1827 
16.2.2 The Dignity of the Human Person 
As already seen (Chapter 14.4, above), the question that is often posed in India with regard to 
the human person is: Who am I? According to Śaṅkarā this question could be answered in its 
depth when one has recourse to Ṡruti. Śaṅkarā answers the question, “who am I?” by saying 
that the ground of the self is the supreme Ātman, which is none other than bráhman itself. 
However, by acknowledging this fact the very importance and dignity of the finite self goes 
into the background.1828 
Moreover, both in Śaṅkarā and in Thomas one finds a clear notion of the human self in its 
intellectual dynamism, range and goal. For Śaṅkarā, the desire to know is innate in the self and 
extends unto the bráhman and its goal is an intellectual penetration (avagati) into the divine 
Essence itself. Śaṅkarā affirms this fact in his Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya I.1.1: 
The direct object of the desire of knowing Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā) is a knowledge 
culminating in an intellectual penetration (avagati paryantam jñānam), desires having 
reference to fruits. Knowledge, indeed, constitutes the means (pramāna) through which the 
Brahman is desired to be intellectually penetrated into (avagatam iṣṭam). For this penetration 
of the Brahman is the end of man (brahmāvagati hi purnṣārthaḥ) since it extirpates 
                                                 
1826 See Taittirīya Upanishad 2,1. The text has been quoted in Chapter 14.4.1, above. Cf. KULANGARA, “The 
Value of Human Life…”, 404. 
1827 Cf. GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 36. 
1828 Cf. DE SMET, “Materials toward an Indo-Western Understanding…”, 45. 
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completely that which is bad, namely, nescience etc., which are the seeds of the entire 
saṁsāra.1829 
Śaṅkarā further clarifies that the knowledge is able to make the discernment between ignorance 
and bráhman through experience: “The knowledge that discerns the Brahman and discards 
nescience terminates in experience (anubhava + avasānam)”.1830 
As noted earlier (Chapter 16.2.1), the individual self (puruṣa) has intelligence as its unifying 
principle and the faculty of memory as that which preserves its continuity. The self in itself is 
only a changing formation and lacks any substantiality. Both the jīva (microcosm) and the 
universe (macrocosm) are in fact expressions of the objectification of the Universal Self and 
lack any substantiality. However, the human self has some uniqueness by the very fact that the 
human self in itself has the nature that seeks to transcend itself consciously by mental and 
spiritual effort.1831 
The above statements is similar to Thomas when he acknowledges that  happiness is derived 
not by one’s own unaided power but through a knowledge whereby we know God and our 
desire leads us to the very essence of God.1832 Thus, in order to see the divine essence, the 
intellect must see it through the divine essence itself, such that in that vision of the divine 
essence, the object and medium of vision are the same.1833 
Śaṅkarā’s acknowledgement of the existence of such dynamism in man bestows on him an 
excellence and a dignity that surpasses all others. However, the consequence that flows from 
this dynamism is abundantly developed by Thomas, which need not be elaborated here.1834 
One can observe that in the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, except in the advaita 
Vedānta of Śaṅkarā, a strong current of realism is acknowledged in which the reality and the 
perennial value of life of the individual self is upheld. The Advaita School definitely accords 
great value to life and regard it as sacred and eternal. In other words, the dignity of the individual 
is acknowledged. However, according to Śaṅkarā the individuality of self is a product of 
ignorance. Human personality has only an empirical value. The self is to be assimilated by the 
highest intuition regarding the non-dual reality of bráhman.1835 When this unity among sentient 
creatures is understood as one and that the distinctions are only external and artificial, then the 
virtues of universal goodwill, love, compassion etc. will find their real meaning.1836 
16.3. RĀMĀNUJA’S VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA VEDĀNTA 
Rāmānuja (1137) lived until the ripe age of 120. He was the head of the great temple-
monastery of Śrīraṅgam in South India. He is considered as the famous exponent of 
Viśiṣṭādvaita. He gave a theistic interpretation of the Brahma Sūtra. For him the reality that is 
                                                 
1829 As quoted in ibid., 45. Additions in original. 
1830 As quoted in ibid., 45. Additions in original. 
1831 Cf. KULANGARA, “The Value of Human Life…”, 403. 
1832 Cf. AQUINAS, Summa Contra Gentiles. Book Three: Providence, op. cit., 50. Cf. DE SMET, “Materials 
toward an Indo-Western Understanding…”, 46. 
1833 Cf. AQUINAS, Summa Contra Gentiles. Book Three: Providence, op. cit., 51. Cf. DE SMET, “Materials 
toward an Indo-Western Understanding…”, 46. 
1834 Cf. ibid., 46. 
1835 Cf. KULANGARA, “The Value of Human Life…”, 407. 
1836 Cf. Kedar Nath TIWARI, Classical Indian Ethical Thought. A Philosophical study of Hindu, Jaina and 
Bauddha Morals, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1998, 62. 
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tiered is ultimately one. Just like Śaṅkarā so also for Rāmānuja, reality is one and not two; but 
the One is internally complex (viśiṣṭā) and not simple as Śaṅkarā maintained. Bráhman consists 
of three reals: the unconscious universe of matter (prakṛti), the multiplicity of individual 
conscious living beings – jīvātman, and the transcendent bráhman. Being a Vaiṣṇava 
Vedāntin,1837 for Rāmānuja bráhman is identical with Īśvara, who is the same as Viṣṇu. In a 
qualified way, creation is the body of bráhman.1838 
Rāmānuja lived at a time when Hinduism was firmly established, Buddhism had almost 
disappeared and Jainism was concentrated in relatively small areas of western India. The inter-
Hindu controversy during this time dealt with two levels. On the first level, with regard to 
religion, the main opponents for Rāmānuja were the Śaivites (followers of Śiva). On the second 
level, in the area of philosophy, the opponents were the Advaitins (followers of the advaita 
system of philosophy).1839 
Rāmānuja wrote massive polemics against Śaṅkarā while finding fault with his distinction 
between saguṇa and nirguṇa bráhman and his presupposition of adhyāsa (superimposition). 
Īśvara was himself considered the saguṇa bráhman, who is the creator, the lord of prakṛti as 
well as jīvas (individual souls) and having infinite number of supreme auspicious qualities, 
above whom there is none else. He is eternal, immutable, omnipresent, having a most perfect 
body full of sattva, radiant, full of beauty, youthful, strong and devoid of rajas and tamas. He 
is antaryāmi1840, the inner ruler of all.1841 Thus, Rāmānuja, while maintaining the absolute 
supremacy of bráhman, rejected the doctrine of māyā and admitted the reality of the world and 
of individual souls (jīvas).1842 
With regard to the passages in the Upaniṣad that speak of a nirguṇa bráhman, Rāmānuja 
interpreted them as “absence of inauspicious qualities” rather than having absolutely no 
qualities. According to him, the individual souls or jīvas are of three kinds: nityamuktas (i.e., 
those who have always been free), muktas (those in time have become free) and baddhas (those 
who are still bound).1843 
16.3.1 The Concept of Person 
For Rāmānuja, reality is not a bare identity but a determinate whole with internal differences 
that are real. Bráhman is a synthetic whole. In the wholeness of bráhman both the plurality of 
individual souls (jīvas) and of the material world (prakṛti) find their place as real moments or 
modes. Hence, for Rāmānuja the individual soul (jīva) is a real and distinct mode or part of the 
Supreme. The soul existed from all eternity in bráhman as a mode, as a unique individual being, 
while retaining its essential qualities. However, the soul is different from the body to which it 
is attached during the period of its bondage in the cycle of rebirth (saṁsāra). The body – which 
                                                 
1837 The term Vaiṣṇava or Vaiṣṇavites is used for the followers of the deity Viṣṇu. Thus, a Vaiṣṇava Vedāntin 
is a follower of Viṣṇu who expounds the Vedānta. 
1838 Cf. ORGAN, Hinduism…, 281. Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 359. 
1839 Cf. ibid.  
1840 The Skt. word antaryāmin could mean ‘checking or regulating the internal feelings’ or the soul itself. Cf. 
MWM, 43. 
1841 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 359 & 361. 
1842 Cf. John MCKENZIE, Hindu Ethics. A Historical and Critical Essay, Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 
New Delhi 19712, 159. 
1843 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 361. 
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belongs to the prakṛti – serves as an instrument or vehicle, as a psychophysical organism, until 
its liberation. The soul, being imperceptible and indestructible, maintains its identity through 
the process of births and deaths. In contrast to the grossness of the material world, the soul is a 
subtle entity and resides in the lotus of the heart. Above all, being endowed with intelligence 
and self-consciousness, the soul is a knower. Even though the soul is dissociated from the 
psychophysical organism provided by the prakṛti, its cognitive function is preserved. The 
essential nature of the soul is consciousness. For Rāmānuja, consciousness is both the innermost 
real nature (svarūpa) of the self and an eternal attribute. In comparison to Śaṅkarā who 
identifies consciousness of the soul with bráhman, Rāmānuja holds that the self – both finite 
and Divine – is not pure intelligence but a knowing agent with the attribute of consciousness. 
This is because the knower and the known are distinct.1844 
For Rāmānuja, with regard to the Upaniṣadic teaching tat tvam asi (That art thou), there is an 
affirmation of relationship of identity – a peculiar kind of relationship. For every relationship 
to take place, there must be at least two relate or two things to partake of a relationship. 
Therefore, the “that” and the “thou” can only be identical in one sense; namely, their non-
duality (advaita) must be modified (viśiṣṭā). Even in their identical relationship, the two entities 
must be different. Here a difference between Śaṅkarā and Rāmānuja can be seen. For Śaṅkarā 
tat tvam asi means that the two are really one, no matter how different they may appear. 
Nevertheless, for Rāmānuja tat tvam asi means that the two are sufficiently different to be 
identified as “that” and “thou”. What is an apparent difference for Śaṅkarā is a real difference 
for Rāmānuja.1845 
Rāmānuja also uncompromisingly defends the abiding nature and value of the individuality of 
finite souls. The finite self is essentially a self-conscious subject, an eternal self, distinct from 
both bráhman and prakṛti. The personal identity of the soul comes both from the fact that it is 
able to be aware that it exists (‘I-awareness’) and is self-conscious. They also attest to the 
ontological reality of the finite self. This fundamental ‘I-awareness’ of the human cannot be 
sublimated by any other superior knowledge. The ‘I-awareness’ persists throughout the earthly 
existence as well as in the state of release of the soul. The realization of the distinction between 
one’s basic self-identity and one’s empirical self-identity is what is involved in enlightenment 
(jñāna). To achieve this, the material component that constitute the soul’s embodiment is 
necessary. The liberated soul continues to exist as individual person.1846 
Thus, in the qualified advaita of Rāmānuja one can see a more consistent ontologically rich 
reality of the human person. He uses expressions that a Western reader would qualify as 
pantheistic. The relation between soul and God may be expressed in different ways: as part, 
whole; as supported, and supporter; as mode and possessor of modes; as one of body and soul 
or in an inverse order, namely, of lord and vassal. Even more metaphysically and dynamic 
description is that of subsidiarity and principal.1847 
                                                 
1844 Cf. KULANGARA, “The Value of Human Life…”, 406. 
1845 Cf. ORGAN, Hinduism…, 28-2821. 
1846 Cf. KULANGARA, “The Value of Human Life…”, 406. Cf. “The Vedānta Sūtras with commentary by 
Rāmānuja”, tr. by George THIBAUT, in: MÜLLER (ed.), The Sacred Books of the East, op. cit., Part III, Vol. 48, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1904, 69-72. 
1847 Cf. GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 36. 
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God possesses not only the metaphysical qualities of all-powerfulness etc. but also the highly 
esteemed moral qualities like forgiveness, compassion, straightforwardness, gentleness, 
tenderness, etc. Human beings in turn should inculcate and cultivate these moral qualities for 
the benefit of the ignorant, the poor, the weak etc. In other words, man’s greater moral virtue is 
to imitate God’s moral qualities in practice and behaviour. To imitate God results in the greatest 
devotion to Him.1848 
It is from the above imitation of God that Rāmānuja introduced the concept of devotion (bhakti 
or upāsanā), which throws in a new perspective in the Indian understanding of the human 
person. The human person stands in immediate and intimate relationship of love with God. In 
his Vedānta Sūtras (I.1.1.), Rāmānuja explains that upāsanā consists of abstention (viveka), 
freeness of mind (vimoka), repetition (abhyāsa), works (kriyā), virtuous conduct (kalyāna), 
freedom from dejection (anavaṣāda) and absence of exultation (anuddharṣa).1849 The personal 
identity of the human person includes both oneness with the supreme Person, the Puruṣotama 
and distinctiveness. In other words, the human person is a person-in-relation. This comes closer 
to the modern Western idea of a human person being defined in terms of relationship. In another 
sense, the relationship extends to other fellow human persons insofar as one is a member of the 
satsanga (a gathering of religious-minded seeking the truth), the order that one freely joins, or 
the sampradāya (a religious tradition or sect), belonging to one’s family or caste.1850 De Smet 
commenting on the relationship status of the human person says, “Thus the Indian mind 
discovers that the I-Thou relationship can endure beyond even the highest transcendence. The 
fullest integration of man, his integration with the personal Absolute, is possible without 
loss”.1851 
16.3.2 The Dignity of the Human Person 
Rāmānuja is also of the same opinion as Śaṅkarā when he comes to the concept of the person. 
For him too, the ground of the self is the supreme ātman, that is, the bráhman itself. Although 
this fact tends to decrease the importance and dignity of the finite self1852, yet insofar as 
Rāmānuja maintains the non-duality of reality, while giving a theistic framework in which 
human personality and life have an abiding value, the dignity of the self is maintained.1853 It is 
to be remembered that the ātman in one person and the ātman in another are equal in dignity 
and perfection. However, this equality, which is derived from the fact of having the same origin 
                                                 
1848 Cf. TIWARI, Classical Indian Ethical Thought…, 62-63. 
1849 Cf. “Vedānta Sūtras with commentary by Rāmānuja”, op. cit., 17. Cf. TIWARI, Classical Indian Ethical 
Thought…, 63. The definition of all these terms are also given by Rāmānuja: Abstention (viveka) means keeping 
the body clean from all food, impure either owing to species (such as flesh of certain animals), or abode or 
accidental cause (such as food into which a hair or the like has fallen). Freeness of mind (vimoka) means absence 
of attachment to desires. By ‘works’ (kriyā) is understood the performance, according to one’s ability, of the five 
great sacrifices. By virtuous conduct (kalyāna) are meant truthfulness, honesty, kindness, liberality, gentleness, 
absence of covetousness. Freedom from dejection (anavaṣāda) means highness of spirit and cheerfulness. Absence 
of exultation (anuddharṣa) means absence of over great satisfaction, which stands in the way of meditation. Cf. 
ibid. 
1850 Cf. GISPERT-SAUCH, “The Concept of Person…”, 42. 
1851 Cf. DE SMET, The Indian Understanding of Man…, 12. 
1852 Cf. ibid., 45. 
1853 Cf. KULANGARA, “The Value of Human Life…”, 406. 
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from bráhman, goes often unrecognized and one treats the other not an end in themselves but 
as a means for the realization of its own selfish ends.1854 
For Rāmānuja, bráhman is the master, the principal, while finite persons (i.e., human persons) 
are his servants, his accessories. This master-servant relationship (derived from Bṛihadārnyaka 
Upaniṣad 4.4.221855) portrays the point of our existence, namely, to magnify bráhman by 
acknowledging our existence, by recognizing our lowly place relative to him. It is further 
amplified by our life of devoted service. It is from this master-servant relationship that one 
ultimately derives the value and dignity as persons.1856 
The presence of God in the world is beautifully depicted by Rāmānuja by the term 
antaryāmin.1857 As the antaryāmin, “God is also within us as a person trying to enter into 
fellowship with our own person”.1858 This shows that God is present within the soul, sustaining 
and guiding it in an active fellowship between the willing soul and indwelling God. God also 
identifies with the soul by way of condescension. As an absolute God, he descends to earth as 
an avatāra1859 to provide aid for humanity. To a soul that surrenders, there is a complete sense 
of familiarity and intimacy between it and God. The divine descent is for the benefit and moral 
uplift of the world.1860 Therefore, “to a soul that surrenders entirely to God there is no 
condescension and no familiarity which God will not grant, provided however it remains 
consonant with divine and human dignity.”1861 Thus, Rāmānuja finds the identification of the 
ātman and bráhman as the cause of the inherent dignity of the human person. 
With regard to the caste-system, Rāmānuja asserts that its distinction do not touch the nature of 
the soul. The distinction in the caste belong to the bodies and determine the individual’s duty 
towards the society.1862 
According to Rāmānuja, for the purpose of social stability and maintenance of order, the 
concept of justice was ingrained in human mind as an internal moral principle. Thus, one can 
see the notion of equality in Rāmānuja by which he meant that the recognition of rights for 
oneself implies a reciprocal acknowledgement in the other. In other words, it means to treat 
others as my equal. The concept of justice and equality are traceable in the emotions of the 
mind, expressed as pity and love. It is in this way that one recognizes human dignity in the other 
                                                 
1854 Cf. Pierre JOHANNS, “A Synopsis of to Christ through the Vedanta. Part II. Ramanuja”, in: Light of the 
East Series No. 7, Secretariate of the “Light of the East”, Calcutta 1931, 1-47; 20. Here, one finds that Pierre 
Johanns, a Jesuit of Belgian origin and an Indologist, is using the terms of Kant (who regarded a human person as 
an end in himself/herself and must be treated so) and applying it to the ātman. 
1855 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.22: “In the space within the heart lies the ruler of all, the lord of all, the king 
of all […]. He is the lord of all, the overlord of beings, the protector of beings.” Bṛihad-āraṇyaka Upanishad, in: 
The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, op. cit., 143. 
1856 Cf. Julius J. LIPNER, The Face of Truth. A Study of Meaning and Metaphysics in the Vedāntic Theology of 
Rāmānuja, State University of New York Press, Albany1986, 132-133. 
1857 Cf. Sean DOYLE, Synthesizing the Vedanta. The Theology of Pierre Johanns S.J., Peter Lang AG, Bern 
2006, 217. 
1858 JOHANNS, “A Synopsis of to Christ through the Vedanta…”, 34. Cf. DOYLE, Synthesizing the Vedanta…, 
217. 
1859 Skt. word meaning descent, descent of a deity or incarnation in general. Cf. APTE, Vol.1, 245. 
1860 Cf. DOYLE, Synthesizing the Vedanta…, 217. Cf. JOHANNS, “A Synopsis of to Christ through the 
Vedanta…”, 37. 
1861 Ibid., 39. Cf. DOYLE, Synthesizing the Vedanta…, 217-218. 
1862 Cf. Abha SINGH, “Social Philosophy of Rāmānuja. Its Modern Relevance”, in: Indian Philosophical 
Quarterly 28/4 (2001) 491-498; 495. 
 Chapter 16: New Theological Perspectives in Hinduism: Vedānta System 359 
 
 
 
and feels compassion towards the distressed. Further, the human dignity in human beings 
follows from the fact that they are divine. This urges one to give equal platform or equal 
opportunity to all and treat them with respect.1863 
16.4 MADHVA’S DVAITA VEDĀNTA 
Madhva (1238-1317 CE) born in Udipi, Karnataka, is a Dvaita Vedāntin. He disagreed with the 
Advaita interpretation of Vedānta given by his teacher. He took a missionary tour engaging 
Jains, Buddhists and Advaitins in discussion and defeating them. Although his ideas are closer 
to Rāmānuja than to Śaṅkarā, he goes a step further toward uncompromising Dvaita.1864 Dvaita, 
in contrast to the Advaita of Śaṅkarā, holds bráhman as a personal God, independent of all other 
things and different from them. For Madhva, just like Rāmānuja, the God or Īśvara is the same 
as Viṣṇu. He is absolute having infinite number of excellent qualities and a spiritual body. Viṣṇu 
possesses transcendent attributes of creation, preservation, dissolution, control, enlightenment, 
obscuration, bondage, and release and is the cause of all causes. Each individual self (jīvātman) 
is by nature a reflection of God. Nevertheless, unfortunately, no one is aware of this until one 
reads the scriptures and comes to understand his real nature. Having done so, he undertakes 
fervent devotion to the Lord, who in turn bestows grace on him in an appropriate manner, 
according to one’s capacity. After that, the devotee abides in a state of servitude to God forever 
resulting in his liberation.1865 
His whole idea is developed on the presupposition based on the five differences (pañca bheda) 
between īśvara and jīvātman, between prakṛti and īśvara and between individual jīvas and the 
various inanimate objects. These differences are real and not illusory.1866 Each individual jīva 
has a spiritual self-consciousness with the nature of sat-cit-ānanda, although it may be hidden 
for the duration of one’s bodily life. In this sense, the ātman can be said to be a mirror image 
of God. The ātman is completely dependent on God in all its actions.1867 
16.4.1 The Concept of Person 
Madhva too acknowledges that the ground of the self is the supreme ātman, or the bráhman 
itself.1868 Bráhman is the One Independent Source of all reality, consciousness and activity 
found in the individual selves. In other words, there is a total dependence of the individual on 
bráhman for its existence. As mentioned above, the individual self (jīvātman) is by nature a 
reflection of God. Madhva uses the term Bimba-Pratibimbahāva1869 (i.e., in the symbolic sense 
of metaphysical dependence of the jīva on bráhman) basing himself on a significant passage 
                                                 
1863 Cf. ibid., 497. 
1864 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 363. For a German rendering of Madhva see Helmuth von 
GLASENAPP, Madhva’s Philosophie des Vishnu-Glaubens. Mit einer Einleitung über Madhva und seine Schule. 
Ein Beitrag zur Sektengeschichte des Hinduismus, Kurt Schröder, Bonn und Leipzig 1923, 14-75. 
1865 Cf. Karl H. POTTER, “Madhva”, in: JONES (ed.), Encyclopedia of Religion, op. cit., Vol. 8, 5550-5551; 
5551. 
1866 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 365. Cf. also HILTEBEITEL, “Hinduism…”, 4005. 
1867 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 365. 
1868 Cf. DE SMET, The Indian Understanding of Man…, 45. 
1869 The Skt. word bimba means image, shadow, reflected or represented form and the word pratibimba means 
a reflection, reflected image. The combination of bimba-pratibimba means object of comparison and that with 
which it is compared. Cf. MWM, 662 & 731.  
360 Part IV: An Attempt at a Dialogue with Hinduism  
 
 
from Ṛg Veda 6.47.18 to signify the relation between God and Soul.1870 A similar text appears 
also in Bṛihadārnyaka Upaniṣad 2.5.19.1871 The coeternity of this relationship between jīva and 
bráhman is confirmed by Madhva based on a text in The Bhagavad-Gītā 2.12, which 
emphasizes the dependence of jīva on bráhman for his existence, consciousness and activity.1872 
For Madhva this relation is a sacred and an inviolable relation. This relationship is in contrast 
to the one portrayed by Śaṅkarā. For Śaṅkarā, the jīva is a false appearance or projection of 
bráhman due to avidyā (ignorance). According to Madhva, the relation is not a false relation, 
which the jīvas are to be ashamed of or should try to shake off. On the contrary, the relation is 
truest, most beautiful permanent bond with the Supreme Being.1873 
16.4.2 The Dignity of the Human Person 
Although for Madhva the ground of the finite self is bráhman, yet Madhva reasonably justifies 
the self by exalting the inner witness namely, the sākṣin (see Chapter 14.4.2 and 14.5.1, above), 
which is man’s own consciousness.1874 In this manner, Madhva attributes a divine image to the 
self or jīvātman. Insofar as the jīva or soul depends on an intrinsic relation 
(nirupādhikasambandha) with the bráhman, which is an essential and eternal metaphysical 
dependence,1875 it bestows on the individual a certain dignity. In this way, the ideas of Madhva 
can be compared to the Biblical idea of man made in the image of God. One could conclude 
from these reflections that Madhva also knew the concept of dignity, perhaps in its own 
distinctiveness that ennobles a person above everything else. 
16.5 CONCLUSION 
In this Chapter three different personalities, namely, Śaṅkarā, Rāmānuja and Madhva, as 
representatives of the new Hindu theological system were analyzed. Their views on the concept 
of human person and human dignity were examined. According to the new theological 
perspective of Vedānta system, one finds that the human being has been regarded as the highest 
in creation, not from the fact of his/her rationality, but because of the spiritual nature present in 
him/her. The status accorded to human beings is because of a soul (ātman) in him/her, which is 
his/her essence. According to Śaṅkarā, Rāmānuja, or Madhva, it is because of the presence of 
ātman and insofar as bráhman himself is the ground of the finite self, the human being is 
attributed with sacredness, or more aptly portrayed as the divine. In the nature of his/her soul, 
the basic reality of bráhman or God is shared. For Rāmānuja, the soul in the human being is 
                                                 
1870 Madhva derives the term Bimba-Pratibimbahāva from Ṛg Veda 6.47.18: “rūpaṃ-rūpaṃ pratirūpo babhūva 
tadasya rūpaṃ praticakṣaṇāya”. “With reference to each form of Jīva, He (the Lord) becomes the original Form. 
His Form is for this one (the Jīva) to perceive.” English text quoted from B. N. K. SHARMA, Philosophy of Śrī 
Madhvācārya, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi et al. 1986, 306 at fn.1. Please note that the author Sharma in his book 
has quoted this verse as Ṛg Veda 7.47.18. This is a wrong citation of the text. It should be Ṛg Veda 6.47.18. 
1871 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.5.19. “‘He (the Lord) became like unto every form, and this is meant to reveal 
the (true) form of him (the Ātman) […].’”. English tr. from “The Upanishads. Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upanishad”, tr. by 
MÜLLER, in: IDEM (ed.), The Sacred Books of the East, op. cit., Part II, Vol. 15, 117. Addition in original. Italics 
by author. 
1872 BG 2:12 reads: “Never was there a time when I was not, nor you, nor yet these princes, nor will there be a 
time when we shall cease to be, – all of us hereafter.” Cf. SHARMA, Philosophy of Śrī Madhvācārya, 306. 
1873 Cf. ibid., 306-307. 
1874 Cf. DE SMET, The Indian Understanding of Man…, 45. 
1875 Cf. SHARMA, Philosophy of Śrī Madhvācārya…, 310. 
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God’s spark in him/her.1876 The identification of the ātman and bráhman is for him that which 
causes a familiarity and intimacy between the two resulting in the inherent dignity of the human 
person. 
According to Śaṅkarā, the human self has some uniqueness by the very fact that the human self 
has the nature that seeks to transcend itself consciously by mental and spiritual effort. The 
existence of such dynamism in the human being bestows on him/her an excellence and a dignity 
that surpasses all others. The Advaita School thus definitely accords greater value to life and 
regard it as sacred and eternal. However, this statement requires a qualification. The distinction 
between individuals is only external. Human personality has only an empirical value. When the 
self assimilates in the non-dual reality of bráhman, all differences vanish. When this unity 
among sentient creatures is understood as one, the apparent distinctions are only external and 
artificial. 
For Rāmānuja, besides what is described above, the ātman in each person bestow equal dignity 
and perfection to each one and impels one to treat the other as an end in himself/herself. This 
idea is close to Kant. 
For Madhva, the ātman is distinct from the bráhman. The ātman is a divine image or reflection 
of bráhman and there exists an intrinsic and essential relation as well a metaphysical 
dependence between them. They result in the dignity proper to human beings. These ideas are 
comparable to the Biblical idea of man made in the image of God. 
Having discussed these three great personalities as representatives of the new theological Hindu 
perspectives, the contemporary Hindu view on human dignity will be discussed in the next 
Chapter 17.
                                                 
1876 Cf. TIWARI, Classical Indian Ethical Thought…, 36-37. Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 203-204.  
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C H A P T E R  1 7  
CONTEMPORARY HINDU VIEW AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
17.1 INTRODUCTION 
The contemporary view of Hinduism stems from the 19th century Hindu Renaissance and 
consists of a series of challenges and responses to them from within and without. Within 
Hinduism, there was the struggle to cling tenaciously, on the one side to tradition, and on the 
other side, to keep abreast with times. The outside challenge came from Buddhism and Jainism. 
The response in both these cases was creative. However, the reaction to the challenge posed by 
Islam was almost totally negative and defensive, resulting in withdrawal, closing doors to 
changes, hardening of customs and beliefs. In spite of these struggles, Hinduism did not decay 
nor corrupt and the momentum of Hindu reforms that began in the early nineteenth century 
continued. The reformers tried first to rid Hinduism of practices that were considered inhuman 
and cruel, like burning of widows and female infanticide. Others wanted the caste system to be 
abolished, especially the disrespect shown to people outside the caste system. Improving social 
standing and education of women became a major issue. These changes and reforms appeared 
as an impact of new social consciousness coming from the influence of Christianity and as a 
response to accusation by Western missionaries.1877 
Only a few important reformers will be named in the following sections who are considered as 
important to the topic on human dignity. It is to be noted that all these reformers, although they 
stem from a religious Hindu background, had a great influence both in the political and social 
field. 
17.2 RĀM MOHAN ROY 
Rām Mohan Roy (1772-1833), the founder of the Brahmo Samaj, was a significant modern 
Hindu reformer and was often called “the Father of Modern India”. He was born in Burdwan 
district of West Bengal, near Calcutta to a wealthy orthodox Brahmin family. His aim was to 
purify Hinduism by returning to the Upaniṣads. In his Upaniṣadic studies, the saguna aspects 
of bráhman impressed him, while concluding that the Upaniṣads present monotheism rather 
than the abstract monism of Śaṅkarā.1878 
The turning point of the life of Roy occurred in 1811 when as a young boy he witnessed the 
satī1879 of his sister-in-law. Satī was the practice of burning of widows (not always voluntary) 
on their husband’s funeral pyres. Roy vehemently opposed this cruel custom and succeeded in 
convincing the British government that satī was not part of original and pure Hindu dharma. 
The anti-satī law was finally passed on 4 December 1829.1880  
Roy devoted his energies to the social cause of the improvement of the lot of the Hindu women 
by working for the educational opportunities for girls, for the abolition of female infanticide, 
for the elimination of child marriage and polygamy, for removal of the stigma on widowhood, 
                                                 
1877 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 413. 
1878 Cf. ibid., 414. Cf. ORGAN, Hinduism…, 338. 
1879 Skt. a good and virtuous or faithful wife who burns herself with her husband’s corpse. Cf. MWM, 1135. 
1880 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 415. Cf. ORGAN, Hinduism…, 339. 
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and for legal equality for women and men.1881 Roy’s approach was centred on the human being 
rather than God. This was a new approach to human reason and human dignity.1882 
Commenting on the role of Roy in restoring the dignity of man, the former President of India, 
Sarvepalli Rādhākrishnan said, “Raja Rammohan Roy was a believer in human freedom, 
freedom in every sense of the term. He tried to emancipate the human mind from superstition, 
from obscurantism, for everything that lowers the dignity of man”.1883 Roy stood for the ideal 
that his fellow human beings may manifest their inherent dignity. Rādhākrishnan attests to these 
facts of Roy in these words: 
A truly religious man, if he is authentically religious, will feel that every human being has 
the dignity, has the spark of Divine. Everyone is a fragment of that impersonal Brahman, the 
Universe. You must help everyone to discard all things which prevent his inward life from 
manifesting itself.1884 
The Mughal ruler at that time, Akbar II conferred on him the title of “Raja”, which means king. 
Roy’s service to humankind was not only known in India but also abroad. In November 1830, 
he travelled to England and spoke on Indian affairs before a committee of the House of 
Commons on the need to assist the agricultural workers of India. There is no doubt, why the 
British Philosopher Jeremy Bentham once remarked about him as an “intensely admired and 
dearly beloved collaborator in the service of mankind”.1885 
Roy also published a small booklet titled: The Precepts of Jesus: The Guide to Peace and 
Happiness. This booklet was an abstract of the four Gospels containing only the moral precepts 
while omitting the divinity of Jesus. This led to the estrangement both from his Hindu friends 
and from the Christian missionaries. While the Hindus accused him of canvassing for 
Christianity, the Christians objected to his Hinduizing of Christianity.1886 Nevertheless, Roy’s 
admiration for the Christian religion was well attested in his letter to the Reverend Henry Ware, 
an American clergyman: “I presume to think that Christianity, if properly inculcated, has a 
greater tendency to improve the moral, and political state of mankind, than any other known 
religious system”.1887 
Although the reformers of Hinduism did not embrace Christianity, yet they considerably made 
use of Christian ethics.1888 Roy would himself acknowledge: “ […] the consequences of my long 
and uninterrupted researches into religious truth has been that I found the doctrines of Christ 
                                                 
1881 Cf. ibid., 341. Cf. Arun, RAY, National Human Rights Commission of India. Formation, Functioning and 
Future Prospects, Khama Publisher, New Delhi 2004, 61. 
1882 Cf. ibid. 
1883 Sarvepalli RADHAKRISHNAN, Living with a Purpose, Orient Paperbacks, New Delhi 1977, 2006, 47. 
1884 Ibid., 49. 
1885 ORGAN, Hinduism…, 342. 
1886 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 414-415. Cf. ORGAN, Hinduism…, 340. In a letter dated 5th 
September 1830 Roy commented on the Christian controversy in these words: “I regret only that the followers of 
Jesus, in general, should have paid much greater attention to inquire after his nature than to the observance of his 
commandments”. ORGAN, Hinduism…, 340. 
1887 As quoted in ibid., 340. The quotation may also be found in G. N. SHARMA/Moin SHAKIR, Politics and 
Society. Ram Mohan Roy to Nehru, Parimal Prakashan, Aurangabad 1983, 26 
1888 Cf. SHARMA/SHAKIR, Politics and Society…, 17. The authors mention a prominent exception to this fact, 
namely Pandita Ramabai who founded the Seva Sadan. Cf. ibid. at fn.2. 
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more conducive to moral principles and better adopted for the use of rational beings, than any 
other which have come to my knowledge”.1889 
On 20 August 1828, Roy and a group of his friends formed the Brahmo Samaj (One God 
Society), which combines the ideals of Hinduism and Christianity, and came to be known 
among the Englishmen as “The Theistic Church of India”. Roy’s intent was to revive 
monotheism in India based on the Vedānta.1890 
The Brahmo Samaj was an answer for the emergence of a pure religion with the monotheistic 
emphasis that rests on two basic supports, namely, faith in a single creative Divine Being of 
infinitively benevolent Nature and belief in the immortal nature of the souls of human beings. 
Roy believed that these basic tenets frees the individual from degrading ritualism and customs 
that he found in Hinduism. These tenets freed one to honour the Divine through service to 
fellow humans.1891 In practice, the Brahmo Samaj attempted in the purification of Hindu society 
by removing abuses as well as going back to first principles through combining what was 
worthy from the West. Its first principle was reason exemplified in the philosophical treatises 
of the Upaniṣads. From the West it borrowed the principle of human dignity as well as the 
ethical system expressed in the Sermon on the Mount.1892 According to Roy, “Vedānta could be 
shown to teach a kind of ancient monotheism that rejected polytheism and idolatry while 
inculcating a fundamental respect for the dignity of all human beings”.1893 
Thus, whether Roy tried for religious and educational reform or women’s emancipation, or in 
the establishment of Brahmo Samaj, he always stood steadfast in the attainment of human 
dignity and freedom of fellow human beings.1894  
Roy also raised his voice against the caste system. Speaking against caste system, he wrote in 
an article, “We have been subjected to such insults for about nine centuries and the cause has 
been our excess in civilisation as well as our division into castes which has been the source of 
want of unity among us”.1895 In order to combat the caste system he encouraged inter-caste 
marriage.1896 A greater opposition to caste system and the rightful place of dignity would come 
from another reformer, Swāmī Vivekānanda, which will be treated in the following section. 
17.3 SWĀMĪ VIVEKĀNANDA 
Among the best-known Hindu reform movements is the Ramakrishna Mission founded by 
Swāmī Vivekānanda (1863-1902). He was a disciple of Rāmakrishna Paramahaṁsa (1834-
1886).1897 Although Rāmakrishna held on to the philosophy of Śaṅkarā, yet his Vedāntism was 
considerably modified and practically oriented being influenced by the tender character of Jesus 
                                                 
1889 As quoted in SHARMA/SHAKIR, Politics and Society…, 17 and 26. 
1890 Cf. ORGAN, Hinduism…, 342. 
1891 Cf. Philip H. ASHBY, Modern Trends in Hinduism, Columbia University Press, New York and London 
1974, 31. 
1892 Cf. M. G. AGRAWAL, Freedom Fighters of India, Isha Books, Delhi 2008, 17. 
1893 Brian A. HATCHER, “Contemporary Hindu Thought”, in: Robin RINEHART (ed.), Contemporary Hinduism. 
Ritual, Culture and Practice, ABC-CLIO Inc., California et al. 2004, 179-211; 189. 
1894 Cf. B. SUGUNA, Women’s Movements, Discovery Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi 2009, 93. 
1895 As quoted in N. JAYAPALAN, Indian Political Thinkers. Modern Indian Political Thought, Atlantic 
Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi 2003, 17. 
1896 Cf. ibid. 
1897 Cf. KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 417. Cf. also MCKENZIE, Hindu Ethics…, 199-200. 
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and by the Prophet Mohammed. For Rāmakrishna, God was unknowable in essence, yet who 
manifested Himself in everyone and in everything.1898 He held that divinity dwelt in human 
beings. He said, “Man is like a pillow-case. The colour of one may be red, another blue, another 
black, but all contain the same cotton. So it is with man – one is beautiful, one is black, another 
is holy, a fourth wicked; but the Divine dwells in them all.”1899 He considered that the creature 
should be regarded as God Himself and be served with a devout heart instead of posing to dole 
out mercy. For Rāmakrishna, service to humankind was worship to God.1900 According to him, 
what hinders one from the unity with God is man himself: “God is in all men, but all men are 
not in God; that is the reason why they suffer”.1901 This distinction was familiar to the student 
of Vedānta. One of Rāmakrishna’s students who continued and defended this line of thought 
was Narendranath Datta, who would eventually become Swāmī Vivekānanda. He was a brilliant 
dynamic person who became the spokesperson for modern Hinduism both in India and in the 
West.1902 
After the death of his master Rāmakrishna, Vivekānanda organized the Rāmakrishna Order of 
Monks. Some of the monks of this Order wanted to be solely engaged in spiritual exercises and 
studies to which Vivekānanda responded saying that it was Rāmakrishna’s belief that service 
to man was worship to God.1903 
Vivekānanda wanted to adopt Western methods so that he might bring India in line with the 
more progressive nations of the West. In 1893, he attended the Parliament of Religions held in 
Chicago. On 19 September 1893, he made his famous speech before American audiences. In 
his speech, he said: 
Ye are the Children of God, the sharers of immortal bliss, holy and perfect beings. Ye 
divinities on earth – sinners! It is a sin to call a man so; it is a standing libel on human nature. 
Come up, O lions, and shake off the delusion that you are sheep; you are souls immortal, 
spirits free, blest and eternal.1904 
During his last address at the Parliament on 27 September 1893, speaking in the context of 
religious unity, he said: 
The Christian is not to become a Hindu or a Buddhist, nor a Hindu or a Buddhist to become 
a Christian. But each must assimilate the spirit of the others and yet preserve his individuality 
and grow according to his own law of growth.1905 
After the Parliament, Vivekānanda founded the Vedānta Society in New York in 1894. When 
he returned to India, he formed the Ramakrishna Mission on 1 May 1897. The Ramakrishna 
Mission has been engaged in a wide variety of charitable, missionary, and educational activities 
                                                 
1898 Cf. ibid., 199. 
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1900 Cf. ORGAN, Hinduism…, 353. 
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Parliament on 19th September, 1893”, in: CWV 1 (1998) 6-20; 11. Cf. MCKENZIE, Hindu Ethics…, 201. Cf. also 
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through its hospitals, dispensaries, orphanages, schools and colleges. The Mission remains as 
one of the most active agencies of social service in India.1906 
Swāmī Vivekānanda continued what Roy had begun, namely, the effort to redefine Vedānta as 
a rational and socially responsible theology under the rubric of “Practical Vedānta” or 
sometimes known also as neo-Vedānta or synthetic Vedānta.1907 Being a true Vedāntin, 
Vivekānanda considered that the different schools of Vedānta, namely, Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita 
and Dvaita are all different expressions of the Vedānta. They help one to realize the higher 
ideals of life, namely, that the ultimate goal of life is the wonderful unity with the creator. For 
him, man is the divine and the manifestation of God.1908 Thus, for him the central meaning and 
the crux of the message of neo-Vedānta was “oneness”.1909 Vivekananda rejected all unreal 
manifoldness and held for absolute “oneness”. He stated, “‘I and the whole universe are one; I 
and Brahman are one’”.1910 This ultimately leads to the realization, “The Self is the essence of 
this universe, the essence of all souls; He is the essence of your own life, nay, ‘Thou art 
That’”.1911 For Vivekānanda, the Self is the ātman. However, according to him, ātman “cannot 
be translated by the word soul or mind, so the word Atman is used, or, as Western philosophers 
have designated it, by the word Self”.1912 The Self or ātman, according to Vivekānanda is 
indestructible, is beyond death, because it is “immaterial” and “immortal”.1913 He also held that 
the human self is absolute and indivisible; it is not a part of bráhman, but really is the infinite 
bráhman.1914 Therefore, his thesis was that “There is another way of looking at the truth […] 
the Hindu way […]. The Atman, Self, is the same as Brahman, the Lord. This self is all that is; 
It is the only reality”.1915 
Vivekānanda’s social philosophy is derived from the neo-Vedānta conception of God as the 
one divine principle. The very fact of oneness leads to social action. Therefore, his social 
philosophy was one of practical nature. The most important idea of neo-Vedānta is that the one 
divine spirit resides in everything so that a sense of solidarity prevails in the universe. The 
divine “oneness” is capable of including everyone without making any distinction, because God 
resides in everyone and this awareness is created in him or her due to the sameness of spirit of 
God. Further, the feeling of oneness when accepted internally is expressed externally that all 
                                                 
1906 Cf. ibid.. 
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1915 VIVEKĀNANDA, “Buddha’s Message to the World (Delivered in San Francisco, on March 18, 1900)”, in: 
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life is of the same value, which leads one to social concern. This can be expressed in the ideal 
that Vivekānanda held1916: 
Do not injure another. Love everyone as your own self, because the whole universe is one. 
In injuring another, I am injuring myself; in loving another, I am loving myself. From this 
also springs that principle of Advaita morality which has been summed up in one word – self-
abnegation.1917 
The social concern of Vivekānanda, which is also the ideal of Vedānta, led him to assert, “[…] 
that if you cannot worship your brother man, the manifestation of God, how can you worship a 
God who is unmanifested?”1918 Vivekānanda also discovered an ethical implication in the 
Advaita Vedānta. His argument was:  
If a man realizes his identity with Brahman, which is the all-powerful Absolute, then he must 
feel that the compass of his potentialities is just as unlimited as Brahman itself. This will give 
him boundless self-confidence and irresistible power. He will thus become capable of 
working efficiently for the spiritual recovery of India, and this will bring about a national 
reconstruction.1919 
Thus, Vivekānanda emphasized on the Vedāntic identification of man and God in order to raise 
the dignity of man in the world. Therefore, he declared, “This human body is the greatest body 
in the universe, and a human being the greatest being. Man is higher than all animals, than all 
angels; none is greater than man.”1920 Vivekānanda believed that Vedānta invests human 
personality with sacredness and dignity unknown to other religions.1921 He also believed that 
since a nation is composed of individuals, noble virtues like manliness, a sense of human dignity 
and honour needs to be cultivated in them.1922 Overall, Vivekānanda glorified Hinduism and 
asserted, “No religion on earth preaches the dignity of humanity in such a lofty strain as 
Hinduism”.1923 
Vivekānanda believed that there is no place for the caste system in Hinduism. He was of the 
opinion that the Varnaṣram or caste system – which is nothing but a social plan of division of 
labour – was misused and misinterpreted. According to him, the original concept of Varnaṣram 
existed in order to provide equal opportunity to the people of all castes to rise higher and attain 
the best self, and never as a barrier to social progress.1924 Vivekānanda said, “Caste is good. That 
is the only natural way of solving life. Man must form themselves into groups and you cannot 
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get rid of it. Wherever you go there will be caste.”1925 Caste helps one in performing one’s duty 
efficiently in social life. However, in India, the caste system has become a barrier for social 
progress because it forms the basis of separation and not of unity in social life. Vivekānanda 
was shocked to find that the Vedas that spoke of the equality as the basis of society was 
misinterpreted and that casteism had become a source of inequalities.1926  
Vivekānanda’s Practical Vedānta furthered the democratizing vision of Roy and yoked the 
Vedānta in energizing the people of India to face the tasks of social uplift and national 
integration. Vedānta for Vivekānanda was a “man making religion” which would not only 
eradicate “don’t touch me-ism” of caste prejudice but also would strengthen India in its quest 
for national self-definition. In the last analysis, this was the primary aim of neo-Hinduism, 
namely a concern for nationalism.1927 
Vivekānanda’s ethics was a social ethic which pertained to issues of a social nature rather than 
individual issues like abortion, euthanasia etc. which are moral problems having social 
ramifications. Thus, his social ethics and socialism aimed at the removal of poverty, restoration 
of human dignity, provision of secular and spiritual knowledge for all people.1928 To this end, 
Vivekānanda’s contribution to India at a time of political submission and spiritual immaturity, 
when everything seemed hopeless can be summed up in these words: “Vivekananda was the 
lover of all those who had suffered through the injustice of others, and he tried his best to restore 
them to a sense of human dignity […].”1929 
Vivekānanda also adhered to the principle of ahiṁsā.1930 For him, ahiṁsā is not just not injuring 
others by thoughts words or deeds. For him, it was a duty that was obligatory on all of us in 
relation to all beings. Vivekananda states: 
As with some, it does not simply mean the non-injuring of human beings and mercilessness 
towards the lower animals; nor, as with some others, does it mean the protecting of cats and 
dogs and feeding of ants with sugar – with liberty to injure brother-man in every horrible 
way! It is remarkable that almost every good idea in this world can be carried to a disgusting 
extreme. A good practice carried to an extreme and worked in accordance with the letter of 
the law becomes a positive evil […]. The test of Ahimsa is absence of jealousy […]. 
Therefore we must always remember that external practices have value only as helps to 
develop internal purity.1931 
From his idea of ahiṁsā, one can assume that any injury that would result in the death of an 
embryo for whatever means would not be acceptable. The idea of ahiṁsā became even more 
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prominent and brought to light by Mahatma Gandhi. He was a reformer who stood for the 
dignity of man. This will be discussed in the next section. 
17.4 MAHATMA GANDHI 
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948) well known as the “Father of the Nation” was a 
political leader, social reformer and religious visionary of modern India. His reputation as a 
champion against social and economic discrimination spread wide upon his return to India in 
1915 after twenty-one years in England and Africa. He was equally known also as a religious 
reformer who encouraged the growth of a reformed, liberal Hinduism in India. In the West, he 
is known as a representative of a universal faith.1932 
His father Karamchand Gandhi and his mother Putlibai named him Mohandas. According to 
the Indian custom – adding the name of the father and his clan name – he came to be called 
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Mohandas grew up in a home steeped in Vaishnavism (worship 
of the Hindu god Viṣṇu) with a strong tinge of Jainism, a morally rigorous religion, whose chief 
tenets are non-violence and the belief that everything in the universe is eternal. The strongest 
religious influence of Mohandas was the piety of his mother.1933 His mother was also a follower 
of a popular Gujarati Prānāmi cult. This was a cult which was influenced by Islam and which 
rejected all images of God while advocating a direct link with the divine, unmediated by priests 
and ritual. Gandhi accepted this Protestant form of Hinduism as normative throughout his 
life.1934 Jains and Muslims who frequented his family household also influenced him. 
Mohandas was just a mediocre student at school. At the age of 13, during his studies in the high 
school, he was married to Kasturbai. In 1888, Mohandas’ family decided to send him to England 
to study law. Before he left for England, his mother demanded from him three vows: abstention 
from women, wine and meat.1935 During the three years he spent in England, his main 
preoccupation was with personal and moral issues rather than with academic ambitions. 
Mohandas returned to India after qualifying as a barrister. Since his experience as a lawyer in 
India was not so encouraging, he left for South Africa in 1893 to plead for an Indian Muslim 
firm.1936 
While he was in England, at the age of nineteen, he was exposed to Christianity and read the 
Bible. He also encountered the Theosophists and Fabian Socialists. These forms of Western 
spirituality too made a deep impression on Gandhi that motivated him to find parallels in the 
Hindu tradition. In 1893, when he was employed as a lawyer in South Africa, he was impressed 
by a Trappist monastery. He then set up ashrams (religious retreat centres) in South Africa.1937 
Several factors, as seen above, influenced Gandhi. However, one can enumerate three decisive 
factors. First, his own Hindu tradition convinced him of ahiṁsā. Ahiṁsā was a core concept for 
the Buddhists, Jains, and so to Vaishnavites (worshippers of God Viṣṇu) Hindus to which sect 
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Gandhi belonged. Second, Hindu scriptures also influenced him. Gandhi explains this in his 
own words, “I must unclaim any intention of straining the meaning of Hinduism or the Gita to 
suit any preconceived notions of mine. My notions were an outcome of a study of the Gita, 
Ramayana, Mahabharata, Upanishads, etc.”1938 The third influence was the New Testament. 
Gandhi was profoundly moved by Christ’s words in the Sermon on the Mount. He was touched 
by Christ’s message of human compassion, renunciation and forgiveness. He affirmed this 
when he said, “But the New Testament produced a different impression, especially the Sermon 
on the Mount which went straight to my heart.”1939 
Scriptures of other religions like Buddhism, Zoroastrianism and Islam were among those that 
helped him in his quest for truth. Among the modern writers that most influenced him, was a 
Christian writer, Leo Tolstoy, especially the works, Anna Karenina and War and Peace. The 
writings of Thoreau and Ruskin too had a great impact on him. Mohandas’ own life and teaching 
were “the product of a series of experiments that he carried on in the light of these many and 
varied influences.”1940 
On his return to India in 1915, he met the Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore, joined the growing 
nationalist movement and immediately plunged into action on behalf of the Indian National 
Congress and its struggle for India’s Independence. Tagore designated Gandhi a mahatma, or 
“great soul”.1941 From then on, he became known as “Mahatma Gandhi”. 
17.4.1 The Cardinal Virtues 
Gandhi began to unify the message of Bhagavad-Gītā and the Sermon on the Mount. He 
considered that the messages in them are all firmly rooted in the Indian religious tradition.1942 
In Indian Ethics, there is the mention of five cardinal virtues that one should practice: Ahiṁsā 
(nonviolence), Satya (truthfulness), Asteya (Non-Stealing), Aparigraha (Non-acceptance or 
Non-possession) and Brahmacarya (Chastity). Gandhi accepted all these but added his own 
ideas and some other virtues too.1943 His ideas can be summarized as follows: 
1. Satya (“truthfulness”) that he equated to God. The implication is that morality 
and spirituality are ultimately the same. 
2. Ahiṁsā (“nonviolence”), which was already an ancient Indian concept that 
prohibits violence, was given a broader meaning encompassing any form of 
coercion or denigration. 
3. Tapasya (“renunciation”), which he considered as an asceticism that is closely 
connected with social and political involvements.  
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4. Swaraj (“self-rule”) that meant not only a freedom from the British but also 
referring to an ideal of personal integrity. He linked it to the notion of finding 
one’s inner self.1944 
Besides these concepts, Gandhi also held for the Hindu notion of karma and dharma.1945 For 
Gandhi, dharma was considered as a value equal to moksha because he interpreted dharma as 
being the same as moksha.1946 
However, his writings show that he had very little to do with the emblematic Hinduism which 
includes anthropomorphic deities and the involvement of Brahmanical priests. His emphasis 
was rather on social ethics as an integral part of the faith.1947 
In the last analysis, although Gandhi did not systematize the above ideas, yet when taken 
together, they form a coherent theological position. The cardinal virtues of satya and ahiṁsā 
will be discussed below, which is interesting because Gandhi held that these two are the only 
remedy to the agonizing problems of humanity of every generation.1948 
In the following sections, two of the cardinal virtues that have a significance to this research, 
namely Satya or Truth-God and ahiṁsā will be discussed. 
17.4.1.1 Satya or Truth-God 
There are thousands of definitions for God, and Gandhi accepted all these definitions, but he 
personally preferred to define Him as Truth, because God alone is real. God alone IS. As 
mentioned above, Gandhi was preoccupied with the quest for truth. When writing in English, 
he capitalizes the term Truth. Satya is the word that he used for Truth. The primary meaning of 
Satya – derived from the Sanskrit term in the Hindu tradition, namely, sat – is “to be”, “to 
exist”. For Gandhi, “Truth in the sense of being, does not connote change. Changelessness is 
part of the Indian and Gandhian definition of Truth and God and Being.”1949 Gandhi after a 
continuous and relentless search after truth also modified “God is Truth” and concluded, “Truth 
is God”.1950 He himself attests that it just occurred to him that “Truth is God”. He describes, 
“When such things occur to me, they spring straight from the heart as if they were original 
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intuitions. For me, these truths have the certainty of a personal experience”.1951 Thus, Gandhi 
identified Reality with God and God with Truth.1952 Truth-God for him meant the ultimate 
reality, the Supreme Being, Spirit, Self (Ātman). It is all pervading, all embracing, personal and 
impersonal, immanent and transcendent, the ultimate end of man’s life. Gandhi also realized 
that Truth-God could not be found outside man but only in man.1953 
For Gandhi, “[…] God is Truth and Love; God is ethics and morality”1954 and therefore, the 
ontological meaning of Truth is never divorced from the moral meaning, in fact, there is hardly 
any transition from the ontological to the moral meaning.1955 Absolute Truth or Truth-God was 
the ultimate foundation or the core of Gandhi’s life, teaching and activities.1956 
Gandhi speaking about truth says: 
For me truth is the sovereign principle, which includes numerous other principles. This truth 
is not only truthfulness in word, but truthfulness in thought also, and not only the relative 
truth of our conception, but the Absolute Truth, the Eternal Principle, that is God […]. Truth 
resides in every human heart, and one has to search for it there, and to be guided by truth as 
one sees it. But no one has a right to coerce others to act according to his own view of truth.1957  
He always believed that, “Truth alone will endure, all the rest will be swept away before the 
tide of time. I must, therefore, continue to bear testimony to Truth even if I am forsaken by all. 
Mine may today be a voice in the wilderness, but it will be heard when all other voices are 
silenced, if it is the voice of Truth.”1958 Each individual is to do this for the highest purpose of 
life, that is, to follow truth as a matter of principle. The service of truth is achieved through 
love.1959 
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Gandhi’s faith in “Truth-God” translated in terms of action was satyagraha. Satyagraha is an 
active side of non-violence.1960 The way and means to the Absolute Truth was satyagraha, 
which itself was a relative truth. In other words, satyagraha is “non-violence applied to practical 
life, in order to rectify some wrong, vindicate some right, redress some grievance.”1961 For 
Gandhi, satyagraha meant, “Truth-force” and also “a relentless search for truth and a 
determination to reach truth.”1962 Hence, the search for truth had a wider dimension for Gandhi, 
namely, “Satyagraha then would constitute the exploration, experimentation, discovery and 
realization” of God as Truth.”1963 Gandhi distinguished satyagraha from passive resistance, 
“While passive resistance has been used as a political weapon of expediency, the Gandhian 
satyagraha is a moral weapon based on the superiority of Truth-force or soul-force over 
physical force.”1964 Satyagraha was Gandhi’s well-known strategy against the Colonial 
Government in South Africa and against the British Rule in India. Following his victorious 
campaign against them, world leaders, both religious and political, have presented Gandhi as a 
model to be imitated.1965 
Thus, the instrument that Gandhi used to proclaim Satya or Truth-God was through satyagraha 
and ahiṁsā. This will be the next topic of discussion. 
17.4.1.2 Ahiṁsā 
According to Gandhi, the most distinctive and the largest contribution of Hinduism to India’s 
culture is the doctrine of ahiṁsā.1966 “Ahiṁsā was invoked in the Mahabharata to condemn 
cruel practices, to point to the futile destructiveness of worldly existence, to underline the 
sanctity of all life and to proclaim the dignity and the redeemability even of anti-social 
delinquents.”1967 Ahiṁsā paramo dharma (ahiṁsā is the highest law) is an axiom that has 
entered into the ethical formulations of Hinduism and Jainism from ancient Indian folklore.1968 
Gandhi’s mission was to teach, “God is Truth” by example and precept through the matchless 
weapon of satyagraha and ahiṁsā.1969 For Gandhi, the cardinal virtue of Ahiṁsā has a wider 
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meaning than the literal sense of non-injury. Ahiṁsā, which is generally translated as non-
violence, though having a negative connotation, has an absolutely positive meaning in 
Gandhian thought. “Perhaps the word ‘non-violence’ is an inadequate rendering of ahiṁsā 
which itself is an incomplete connotation of all it is used for conveying. A better rendering 
would be love or good will”.1970 Although for Gandhi, the word ahiṁsā when translated as ‘non-
violence’ conveys a negative meaning using the negative particle “non”, yet it is not a negative 
force.1971 Positively ahiṁsā conveys a universal love, which is an “all-embracing reality”. Since 
Gandhi knew the Pauline meaning of love and was aware that in English the word “Love” could 
have other connotations, he was hesitant to use the word “Love”. Gandhi did not dispute the 
definition of God as love. He said, “It is very difficult to understand “God is love” (because of 
a variety of meanings of love) but I have never found a double meaning in connection with 
Truth, and not even atheists have denied the necessity or power of Truth”.1972 The word “Truth” 
for Gandhi was unambiguous. Therefore he writes, “Rather seeing the unambiguity of Truth in 
the perspective of every individual beholder, be he theist or atheist, he preferred Truth rather 
than love as the definition of God.”1973 
Gandhi held that: “Not to hurt any living thing is no doubt a part of ahiṁsā. Nevertheless, it is 
its least expression. The principle of ahiṁsā is violated by every evil thought, by undue haste, 
by lying, by hatred, by wishing ill to anybody”.1974 Therefore, Gandhi urged his followers not 
only to abstain from hurting anybody but also to actively love everybody.1975 Gandhi, while 
keeping the writings of St. Paul in his first letter to the Corinthians in mind, writes, “Ahiṁsā 
means love in the Pauline sense, and yet something more than the “love” defined by St. Paul, 
although I know St. Paul’s beautiful definition is good enough for all practical purposes”.1976 
He goes a step further than St. Paul to include the whole creation in understanding universal 
love. Therefore, he says, “Ahiṁsā means something more than the “love” defined by St. Paul 
[…]. It includes the whole creation, and not only human […]. It does not express negative force, 
but a force superior to all the forces put together.”1977 
Thus, the virtue of Ahiṁsā, which was advocated and revitalized by Gandhi, promoted 
reverence for all life forms, which includes also life forms such as embryo. In Chāṇdogya 
Upaniṣad, ahiṁsā is associated with and depicted as a mode of behaviour towards all beings. 
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Ahiṁsā, as discussed above, has a double aspect: a negative and a positive aspect. In its negative 
aspect, it meant not to desire injury to others or any living being. As a positive aspect, it entails 
a positive well disposition towards all, in thought and deed. In this regard, abortion meant 
injuring or destroying the seed of life, a physical violence to the point of death, which was 
unacceptable to the Hindu genius of reverence for all life.1978 
Thus, Gandhi’s effective weapon to spread Satya or Truth-God was ahiṁsā and satyagraha. 
Through them, the respect for life and protection of life is assured. Gandhi would 
instrumentalize his theory and put it into practice through his social involvement and political 
mission. These two topics will be handled in the following sections. 
17.4.2 Gandhi’s Social Involvement 
Gandhi realized that India is truly and deeply spiritual, intensely religious and a land of dharma 
(religion, duty) and nīti (morals).1979 “Gandhi believed that if India stuck to truth and achieved 
independence through non-violent means, she would be in a position to teach new lessons to 
the world.”1980 Through his life of simplicity, sincerity, sympathy, love and understanding, he 
showed the world the true meaning of human life and he insisted by word and example on 
Truth, which is none other than God himself, and ahiṁsā which he declared as the universal 
law of love.1981 
Within the Indian society, he dreamt of bringing into existence a Sarvodaya society, that is, “a 
society based on the principle of achieving the prosperity of all sections of society”, wherein 
there would be a casteless and classless society with a view to “wipe out all privileges and 
distinctions of high and low based on birth”.1982 His central theme after his retirement in 1933 
was the campaign to uplift the untouchables (harijans – “the people of God”).1983 Gandhi, who 
held that Truth is God, translated it in practical terms as social service. Religion and politics 
were inseparable for him. Mark Juergensmeyer, an American scholar and sociologist, sums up 
Gandhi’s position in these words: 
Gandhi’s innovations include the use of the concept of truth as a basis for moral and political 
action, the equation of nonviolence with the Christian notion of selfless love, the broadening 
of the concept of karmayoga to include social service and political action, the redefinition of 
untouchability and the elevation of untouchables’ tasks, and the hope for a more perfect world 
even in this present age of darkness (kaliyuga).1984 
Gandhi was well aware of the fact of poverty in India. Besides, he was also aware of the vast 
work force in India. Therefore, he was in favour of “the full employment of the available 
manpower to the fullest possible extent by starting village industries, on a country-wide 
scale.”1985 On his part, Gandhi showed his solidarity with the lowly and he equated himself with 
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the poor masses of India. He identified himself by deliberately reducing his standard of living 
to that of the poorest and lowliest. That is the reason that Amrit Kaur, a Gandhian and social 
activist, could acknowledge: “Gandhiji has the enviable capacity of being able to put himself 
into the shoes of another person, more especially when that person is the underdog”.1986 
Gandhi also worked towards the emancipation of women. His long-time English friend and 
collaborator C. F. Andrews commented on him over his deep concern for women in these 
words:  
I passionately desire the utmost freedom for our women. I detest child marriages. I shudder 
to see a child widow […]. I deplore the criminal indifference of parents who keep their 
daughters utterly ignorant and illiterate, and bring them up solely for the purpose of marrying 
them off to some young man of means.1987 
Gandhi also vehemently condemned child marriages in the following words: “This custom of 
child marriage is both a moral as well as a physical evil. For it undermines our morals and 
induces physical degeneration”.1988 Thus, Gandhi’s social involvement strived to restore human 
dignity. 
17.4.3 Gandhi’s Political Mission 
It was in South Africa that Gandhi began to experience racial prejudices. “There he saw and 
experienced in person the inhuman treatment which the white men meted out to the coloured 
people. He made up his mind to fight at all cost against oppression and racial discrimination; 
but it was to be a moral, non-violent fight.”1989 He was aware that his own motherland, India, 
was under the oppression of the British. 
Along with his political activities, Gandhi also worked hard to establish Hindu-Muslim unity 
and to improve the condition of the backward classes of India. He announced a satyagraha 
struggle against the British government in 1919. “Satyagraha”, for Gandhi meant, “as a method 
of direct action for settling conflicts, assumes various forms in accordance with the situations. 
The most important ones which Gandhi employed were: Non-cooperation, Civil Disobedience, 
and Fasting.”1990 
Tolerance and genuinely religious spirit lay behind the great merit of Gandhi, which manifested 
in his love of God and service to humankind.1991 He gave a religious interpretation of human 
existence for the service that he rendered to humanity. He found his service to humanity in 
politics, which for him was a religious duty. In his own words:  
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To see the universal and all-pervading spirit of Truth face to face one must be able to love all 
the meanest of creation as oneself. And a man who aspires after that cannot afford to keep 
out of any field of life. That is why my devotion to Truth has drawn me into the field of 
politics; and I can say without the slightest hesitation, and yet in all humility, that those who 
say that religion has nothing to do with politics do not know what religion means.1992 
India won its independence on 15 August 1947. Thereafter, India was partitioned into two 
domains: India and Pakistan. It was one of the greatest disappointments of Gandhi's life that 
Indian freedom was realized without Indian unity. When partition of the subcontinent was 
accepted - against his advice, he threw himself heart and soul into the task of healing the scars 
of the communal conflict, toured the riot-torn areas in Bengal and Bihar, admonished the 
enthusiast, consoled the victims, and tried to rehabilitate the refugees. In the atmosphere of that 
period, surcharged with suspicion and hatred, this was a difficult and heart-breaking task. 
Partisans of both the communities blamed Gandhi. However, he did not know that the partition 
would become the cause of his death. 
Gandhi had said, “I am not afraid to die in my mission, if that is to be my fate.”1993 Gandhi really 
meant what he said. On 30 January 1948, while he was on his way to his evening prayer meeting 
in Delhi, Nathuram Godse, a young Hindu fanatic, shot him down. Commenting on his death 
Merton said: 
“A man ends by becoming what he thinks,” Gandhi said, “and it will be the same for India if 
she remains firmly attached to Truth by means of Love (satyagraha).” But he himself 
recognized that politically his battle had really been lost. Without complacency, without self-
pity, he faced the truth that there was only one thing left. He must lay down his life for India, 
and he was in fact killed by a brother “whom he had failed to convince.”1994 
Thus, Gandhi, who practiced what he preached through his political mission, raised the dignity 
of human persons with a heavy price of his life. What was his idea of human dignity? 
17.4.4 Human Dignity according to Gandhi 
Gandhi’s whole life and work was centred on the human person. What was the understanding 
of a human person according to him? At the outset, it must acknowledged that Gandhi has not 
given a theory of human dignity. Rarely does the phrase “human dignity” occur in his 
writings.1995 However, his dedicated life and service on behalf of the poor, the oppressed, and 
women, as discussed above, shows the respect and value that he set on the human person and 
as a fearless advocate of the dignity of the human person. It is in weaker part of the society that 
he saw that the human person was stripped and denied of his/her basic dignity and sacred value. 
Thus, one can only interpret his concept of human dignity based on the implicit reference he 
makes to human dignity in his writings and in the light of his deeds, which were religiously 
coloured.1996 
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Gandhi’s very idea of man was shattered during his stay for a year in South Africa. He 
discovered that “[…] as a man and as an Indian he had no rights. More correctly, he discovered 
that he had no rights as a man, because he was an Indian”.1997 Perhaps, this explains why Gandhi 
plunged himself into liberating action when one looks at the pressing need of liberation of what 
he had experienced, both for the oppressed and oppressor.1998 
From a philosophical understanding of the concept of human dignity, in its scope and meaning, 
there are two areas of emphases: areas of worth (i.e. dignity as worth – which defines the moral-
spiritual centrality of personhood) and one’s sense of dignity. The dictionary definition of worth 
is “value”. These words capture in some way the aspects of dignity, but not nearly its totality. 
For Kant, “inner worth” or dignity – possessed only by human beings – is not to be confused 
with value, which is always relative and reflects a good that can substitute as its equivalent. 
However, dignity has no price or relative value and is not substitutable. By virtue of dignity – 
as Kant defined – human beings belong to the realm of ends and therefore capable of as well as 
entitled to certain moral action.1999 In this definition of Kant there seems to be a limitation that 
is remedied by Gandhi.2000 An explanation follows. 
Taking the thoughts of Kant, many have adopted the expression “humans should be treated as 
ends, not as means”. Kant himself, who focused on ends, took the following position: 
When […] universal goodwill has become a principle for you, to which you always 
subordinate your actions, then love for the suffering still remains, but it has now been 
transformed from a higher standpoint into the true relation of your whole duty […]. As soon 
as this feeling has attained its proper universality, it is sublime, but at the same time colder. 
For it is not possible to fill our hearts with tender sympathy for every man and to be bathed 
in sorrow at the distress of every stranger.2001 
The above passage shows that Kant is shifting his emphasis from humans to the abstract sphere 
of universal good. In doing so, he seems to have been willing to overlook individuals or treat 
them as means to the “common good”.2002 
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Although Gandhi agreed with Kant on the issue of worth, yet he saw the problem of emphasis 
on ends. According to Gandhi, human dignity can be accorded its proper moral standing only 
if means and ends are regarded as the same.2003 In his words: 
Means and end are convertible terms in my philosophy of life. They say ‘means are after all 
means’. I would say ‘means are after all everything’. As the means so the end. There is no 
wall of separation between means and end. Indeed the Creator has given us control (and that 
too very limited) over means, none over the end. Realization of the goal is in exact proportion 
to that of the means. This is a proposition that admits of no exception.2004 
Thus, one can see that one who embraces the Gandhian position does not run the risk of 
becoming “colder” on encountering suffering. It is in this sense, that Gandhi in dealing with 
“means and ends” acknowledged, “I am more concerned in preventing the brutalization of 
human nature than in the prevention of the sufferings of my own people”.2005 In fact, Gandhi 
was very committed to the relieving of suffering. Here he meant to say that his effort entailed 
more, namely, the prevention of brutalization of human nature itself. He found such 
brutalization takes place both in the perpetrators and the victims of that suffering. Therefore, he 
held, “One cannot violate the dignity of another person without doing violence to one’s 
own.”2006 
One can move from the above philosophical understanding to a theological understanding of 
the concept of human dignity in Gandhi. This will be discussed below. It was already noted that 
Rāmānuja and Rām Mohan Roy attested to the fact that the human being is a spark of the 
Divine.2007 Gandhi expressed this view of man’s relationship with Truth-God through relation 
between sparks and fire, rays and the sun, threads and the spider, drops and the ocean. Through 
his deeds and words, Gandhi affirmed that the dignity of man does not originate from birth, 
caste, race, colour, occupation, education, creed and religion. In other words, it is not from what 
man/woman has, but from what he/she is. This fact is derived from the origin and nature of the 
spirit of ātman within him/her that makes his/her nature essential divine, as a part of God 
himself.2008 
The manifestation of the Truth-God is seen more clearly in living beings as compared to non-
living and in the case of human beings more so than in other living beings. Truth-God is also 
present in his fullness in every human being. In other words, the human being is the abode of 
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God, his dwelling place and temple, because “man alone is made in the image of God”.2009 From 
this acknowledgement, one can conclude, “according to Gandhi, the privilege and dignity of 
man lies in the fact that man alone is made in the image of God, he alone is born to realize 
Truth-God, the source of his soul, dwelling within him”.2010  
Owing to the spark of the Divine in man/woman, human nature is essentially good and divine. 
Given this fact, however, Gandhi admitted, on the one hand, that because of animosity in 
man/woman, he/she could be violent. On the other hand, he refused to admit that human being’s 
natural tendency is downward or evil. With this conviction, he was deeply concerned about 
preventing brutalization of the human being. He strongly believed that nature is the same in all 
human beings, endowed with the same rights and dignity. This being the case, neither tradition 
nor religious sanction, nor any power or authority on earth can justify contempt of any human 
person. The inviolable dignity to which the human person is entitled comes from the spirit 
within and claims a permanent respect. It is in this respect that Gandhi detects ahiṁsā as the 
law of the human person’s very being. His vision of ahiṁsā was a deeply enriched religious 
postulate. Ahiṁsā according to him was born of Truth, and Truth is God. He saw that Truth and 
ahiṁsā are inseparable and inviolable, mutually inclusive, two sides of one coin. The worth and 
meaning of Ahiṁsā’ are derived from Truth-God.2011 For Gandhi ahiṁsā is the means and Truth 
is the end. In order that means be means, it must be within our reach, and therefore, ahiṁsā is 
the supreme duty. If one takes care of the means, then one is bound to reach the end eventually. 
According to Gandhi, the quest for Truth, which is God himself, should not be given up.2012 
Gandhi also believed that the application of ahiṁsā, either in the individual or in the social or 
political field, must include its inviolable and inherent connection with Truth. One must 
therefore see the weapon of ahiṁsā, within this context of an inseparable connection with 
Truth-God, which he used against the British to gain India’s freedom. The moment one awakens 
to the spirit within, one cannot be violent. Thus, according to Gandhi, human dignity consists 
in obeying the call and relying on the strength of the spirit within.2013 
Gandhi’s involvement with the society was already mentioned. For him, the individual comes 
before all else. In other words, the individual is the unit, the centre, the foundation of society. 
The individual has a soul and not the society. The society is soulless machine. In order that the 
society remain in a healthy state, it needs to recognize and preserve the inherent dignity of each 
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human individual. Society too, which is composed of individuals, depends on the supreme value 
of the individual person. If this value is not recognized, the society too loses its real value.2014 
From a moral point of view, Gandhi was a staunch defender of human freedom and conscience. 
God endows the human person with freedom and no power or authority can deprive him/her of 
the privilege. According to Gandhi, one cannot conceive morality without personal liberty. 
Man/woman is moral, because he/she is responsible, which is rooted in his/her personal 
freedom. Therefore, according to his view, listening, obeying and acting according to one’s 
conscience is the key to good moral life, which forms the ultimate moral guide of his/her 
freedom and final judge of the righteousness of his/her every deed and thought. The dignity of 
the human person is guaranteed, affirmed and consists in the exercise of the freedom of 
conscience.2015 
Gandhi also seeks and finds that it is in religion that the ultimate realization of human 
personhood is achieved. In religion one’s inherent and restless inner longing and yearning of 
the human soul seeks and leads to a transforming union with God. Religion for him is the vital 
core of man/woman’s being and personality, which inspires him/her in all activities. One who 
is religious, truly man/woman of God, is one whose whole being, thought, word and action is 
permeated by one’s longing for God.2016 
Therefore, in order to understand Gandhi’s idea of human dignity one has to follow the basic 
pattern of his conception of human reality. Gandhi’s idea of human reality can be represented 
through the following diagram of concentric circles. The concentric circles in the figure below 
helps one to see how Gandhi’s ideas of ahiṁsā, morality, religion and the phenomenal world 
are intrinsically connected with each other and how Truth-God unites and holds together the 
whole of Gandhi’s thought. The ultimate foundation of the structure of his thinking revolves 
around the concept of Truth-God. Thus, placing Truth-God at the centre of the circle, one can 
form concentric circles of ahiṁsā, morality, religion and the phenomenal world around it.2017 
Thus, for Gandhi Truth-God is at the very core of one’s being. Ahiṁsā, morality, and religion 
are constitutive elements of one’s life. One ceases to be human without these elements. 
Therefore, Gandhi’s view of human person rests on religious structures as shown below2018: 
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It is in the phenomenal world that one lives and acts. Here his/her basic dignity is secured and 
guaranteed by the recognition of his/her fundamental rights, namely, justice, liberty, equality 
and fraternity. According to Gandhi, these rights are inherent in the divine law and must be 
recognized in human laws.2019 Without these basic human rights, human life cannot be human. 
Therefore, Gandhi took up the cause and fought for the rights on behalf of the poor and the 
oppressed in South Africa and India. Throughout his life Gandhi struggled to achieve these 
rights for them and ultimately for the self-respect and dignity of the human person.2020 
Commenting on Gandhi’s view on human dignity, Doongdoong, asserts, “This human dignity, 
secured and guaranteed by the recognition of the fundamental human rights, is to be perfected 
and raised to a higher level by the full operation of morality and religion: this is how Gandhi 
sees the dignity of the human person”.2021 
Although Gandhi was not a participant in the sessions of the Human Rights Commission of the 
United Nations during 1947, and therefore did not have any direct influence on the formulation 
of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), yet his words did have an effect. By 
1940, Mahatma Gandhi had become an internationally well-known figure. The impact of his 
words and ideas had already influenced the whole world. When asked by Julian Huxley, the 
then Director General of UNESCO, to give his opinion concerning the project of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, before it was adopted in 1948, Gandhi declared: 
I learnt from my illiterate but wise mother that all rights to be deserved and preserved came 
from duty well done. Thus, the very right to live accrues to us only when we do the duty of 
citizenship of the world. From this one fundamental statement, perhaps it is easy enough to 
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define the duties of Man and of Woman and correlate every right to some corresponding duty 
to be first performed.2022 
Gandhi showed the correlation between right and dharma, in the sense of duty. In other words, 
the above understanding can be situated in the context of dharma as the sense of duty. That is 
to say, the right of one person invokes the obligation of others to recognize and respect it. The 
effect of Gandhi’s intervention, perhaps, is seen in the reference made to duties in Article 29 of 
the Universal Declaration, “Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and 
full development of his personality is possible”.2023 One can also see here the shift in emphasis 
from individual to communal dimension of dharma. This is a major transformation in Hinduism 
wrought by Gandhi through precept and practice.2024 
UNESCO took the task of gathering into a book, the views and texts of those who exercised 
moral influence on the experts who drafted the Declaration. Gandhi’s above comment has been 
given the pride of place as the first article in this volume. The first article of the Universal 
Declaration, namely, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood”, reflects exactly Gandhi’s stance and action in this regard.2025 
Gandhi thus became conscious that his mission was addressed not only to a particular group or 
persons but also to the whole humanity. Two instances illustrate this fact. Tolstoy once wrote 
to Gandhi appreciating him for what he was doing (that is, Satyagraha) in Transvaal and that it 
had a universal significance.2026 One of the greatest admirers of Gandhi was Albert Einstein, 
who saw in Gandhi’s non-violence a possible antidote to the massive violence unleashed by the 
fission of the atom.2027 The appreciation of Gandhi’s work was not outdated. It is attested even 
after his death. For instance, Gandhi’s contribution to raising the dignity of human beings was 
well appreciated by Pope John Paul II when he made his first visit to India in 1986. He praised 
Gandhi and promoted his teaching as a model for India and the world: 
Mahatma Gandhi taught that if all men and women, whatever the differences between them, 
cling to the truth, with respect for the unique dignity of every human being, a new world 
order – a civilisation of love – can be achieved. Today we hear him still pleading with the 
world: ‘Conquer hate by love, untruth by truth, violence by self-suffering.’2028 
                                                 
2022 Robert TRAER, Faith in Human Rights, Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C. 1991, 131-132. 
See Arvind SHARMA, Hinduism and Human Rights. A Conceptual Approach, Oxford University Press, New Delhi 
2003, 17. 
2023 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Article 29 § 1. See UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, “Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948…”; 28. Cf. VITHAYATHIL, Mahatma Gandhi…, 217. 
2024 Cf. SHARMA, Hinduism and Human Rights…, 19. 
2025 Cf. UNESCO, Autour de la Nouvelle Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l’Homme, Sagittaire, Paris 
1949. Gandhi had given a short comment emphasizing on fulfilling one’s duties. Rights derive from duties well 
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connects the violation of moral principles with corresponding action. He says: “if a person has violated a moral 
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VITHAYATHIL, Mahatma Gandhi…, 217 & 219. 
2026 Cf. DIWAKAR, Gandhi’s Triple Message…, 32.  
2027 Cf. Dale HOIBERG, “Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand”, in: Students’ Britannica, Vol.2, Encyclopaedia 
Britannica (India) Private Limited, Hong Kong 2000, 150. 
2028 “Tribute to the Monument of Gandhi, New Delhi, 1 February 1986”, in: Francesco GIOIA (ed.), 
Interreligious dialogue. The official teaching of the Catholic Church (1963–1995), Pauline Books and Media, 
Boston 1994, 309. Cf. GANERI, “Catholicism and Hinduism…”, 127. 
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For Gandhi, more than the emphasis he laid on the formulation of human rights, was his effort 
to uphold the truth that the creative purpose of God is reflected in every human face as the 
ultimate source of the “inherent dignity”.2029 
17.4.5 Gandhi’s Respect for life and Ahiṁsā 
The topic on ahiṁsā was already dealt (see Chapter 17.4.1.2 above). It also has a corresponding 
bearing on respect for life. Ahiṁsā, according to Gandhi, entails sensitivity for all life. In 
Hinduism, the norm of ahiṁsā is based on the doctrine that holds the unity of all life. Gandhi 
thus declared, “The duty of not killing animals generally and, therefore, protecting them must 
be accepted as an indisputable fact.”2030 However, Gandhi, who esteemed the worth and 
sacredness of human life in preference to other living creatures, said: 
My non-violence is not merely kindness to all the living creatures. The emphasis laid on the 
sacredness of subhuman life in Jainism is understandable. But that can never mean that one 
is to be kind to this life, in preference to human life. While writing about the sacredness of 
such life, I take it that the sacredness of human life has been taken for granted. The former 
has been over-emphasized. And, while putting into practice, the idea has undergone 
distortion.2031 
The above passage implicitly means that Gandhi, being a practical person, knew that it is 
impossible to avoid all violence completely. He did favour the benevolent taking of the life of 
suffering animals, provided the intention was pure and selfless, for example, it is better to take 
the life of a rabid dog, than to confine them in a certain place allowing them a slow death. 
However, in the case of taking of human life, Gandhi was cautious.2032 He said: 
Should my child be attacked by rabies and there was no hopeful remedy to relieve his agony, 
I should consider it my duty to take his life. Fatalism has its limits. We leave things to Fate 
after exhausting all the remedies. One of the remedies, and the final one to relieve the agony 
of a tortured child, is to take his life.2033 
In other cases with regard to animals, such as when they become a threat to the well-being of 
humans, one could do away with them. Nevertheless, when it was a question of human beings, 
Gandhi asserted, “Such killing becomes a duty. The question may arise as to why this rule 
should not apply to human beings. It cannot because, however bad, they are as we are. Unlike 
the animal, man has been given the faculty of reason.”2034 
Ahiṁsā, as Gandhi understood, is a condition and exercise of human dignity.2035 It was already 
mentioned that the virtue of Ahiṁsā in a positive way promoted reverence for all life forms, 
which includes also an embryo. Therefore, one can interpret, from what was deliberated above 
                                                 
2029 Cf. VITHAYATHIL, Mahatma Gandhi…, 222-223. 
2030 GANDHI, “Cow Protection. Young India, 11.11.1926”, in: CWG 32 (1969) 26-28; 27. Cf. VITHAYATHIL, 
Mahatma Gandhi…, 26. 
2031 GANDHI, “Religion v. No Religion. Harijan, 9.6.1946”, in: CWG 84 (1981) 230-231; 231. Cf. Dinanath 
Gopal TENDULKAR, Mahatma. Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Vol. 7, Jhaveri & Tendulkar, Bombay 
1953, 152; Cf. VITHAYATHIL, Mahatma Gandhi…, 26. 
2032 Cf. ibid., 26-27. 
2033 GANDHI, “Is this Humanity? – VI [November 14, 1926]. Young India, 18.11.1926”, in: CWG 32 (1969) 
40-43; 42. Cf. VITHAYATHIL, Mahatma Gandhi…, 27. 
2034 GANDHI, “The Monkey Nuisance. Harijan, 5.5.1946”, in: CWG 84 (1981) 62; Cf. VITHAYATHIL, Mahatma 
Gandhi…, 27. 
2035 Cf. DOONGDOONG, “The Dignity of Man…”, 67. 
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that destruction of an embryo, for whatever purpose, defeats the very condition and exercise of 
human dignity. 
When a young man questioned Gandhi with regard to abortion, he strongly objected it and said, 
“It seems to me clear as daylight that abortion would be a crime”.2036 In another case, when a 
man approached him with regard to his ailing baby, Gandhi firmly asserted that it is not 
legitimate to take the life of a suffering baby for selfish motives. In Gandhi’s words: 
There would be no warrant for taking the life of the baby even if all the doctors in the world 
were to pronounce the case to be hopeless because it would always be possible for its father 
to nurse it [...]. It is only when every possible avenue of service however small is closed and 
the last ray of hope of the patient surviving seems extinct that one is justified in putting him 
out of pain, and then too only if one is completely free from the taint of selfish feeling […]. 
Largeness of the family or one’s pecuniary difficulty can never serve as a justification for 
putting an end to the life of an ailing patient and I have not the slightest doubt that in the 
present instance, it is the bounden duty of the father to lavish all his love and care on his 
suffering baby.2037 
Taking the life of another person against his/her will violates the principle of ahiṁsā. However, 
Gandhi held the theory that if all the following conditions are fulfilled, one can warrant the 
taking of life from the point of ahiṁsā: 
1. The disease from which the patient is suffering should be incurable. 
2. All concerned have despaired the life of the patient. 
3. The case should be beyond all help or service. 
4. It should be impossible for the patient in question to express his or its wish. 
So long as even one of these conditions remains unfulfilled, the taking of life from the point 
of view of ahiṁsā cannot be justified.2038 
Although Gandhi agreed that violence is preferable to cowardice2039, yet he reiterated that non-
violence or ahiṁsā is infinitely superior.2040 The dignity of the human person requires that one 
try to obey this higher law of the spirit. Therefore, he said, “The moment he awakes to the spirit 
within he cannot remain violent. Either he progresses towards ahiṁsā or rushes to his doom”.2041 
In the last analysis, one can affirm about Gandhi that the concept of Truth-God that he held 
raises the dignity of the human person and the concept of ahiṁsā protects the very dignity of 
the person.  
Gandhi’s inspiration and hard work to set new values based on human dignity and rights of 
every individual will go a long way in the decision making processes, perhaps even in the field 
of Bioethics pertaining to beginning and end of life issues. As Gandhi declared:  
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[…] only Truth quenches untruth; Love quenches anger; self-suffering quenches violence. 
This eternal rule is a rule not for saints only, but for all. Those who observe it may be few 
but they are the salt of the earth, it is they who keep the society together, not those who sin 
against light and truth”.2042 
Gandhi’s ideals, inspired and influenced by his life and actions, had a tremendous influence on 
the immediate framers of the Constitution of India, which came into existence in 1950.2043 
17.5 SARVEPALLI RĀDHĀKRISHNAN 
Sarvepalli Rādhākrishnan was born on 5 September 1888, in Tiruttani, Tamil Nadu. He was 
educated in Madras Christian College in South India. He became the first Vice President of 
India (1952–1962) and subsequently elected as the second President of India (1962–1967). 
Rādhākrishnan may be described as the “unofficial successor and torch-bearer of Neo-
Hinduism”2044 began by Swāmī Vivekānanda and “the most impressive figure of twentieth 
century neo-Hinduism”.2045 He was well read in Eastern and Western philosophical and religious 
literature. He could be described as an excellent example of a living bridge between the East 
and the West.2046 Klostermaier describes him as: 
[…] a successful diplomat and politician, a prolific writer and an excellent speaker, he seems 
to embody what all are looking for: purified, spiritualized, non-sectarian Hinduism, the 
“religion of the spirit” and “the world religion of the future,” a valid and final answer to all 
the great questions of our time. As president of India he served, in an eminent way, as the 
“conscience of the nation,” and wherever he spoke he stressed the importance of spirituality, 
regardless of his audience. More than any other representative of the Indian intelligentsia, 
Dr. Radhakrishnan took up also the concrete problems of India, attempting to contribute a 
religious dimension to their solution.2047 
In a short volume, titled The Hindu View of Life (originally delivered as a series of lectures at 
Oxford in 1926), Rādhākrishnan equates Vedānta to Hinduism. One finds in this book his 
perspective, which was thoroughly informed by classical Vedāntic metaphysics and neo-
Vedāntic ethics.2048 
For Rādhākrishnan, the central claim of Hinduism is that it is fundamentally a religion of 
experience. He wrote, “Religion is not the acceptance of academic abstractions or the 
celebration of ceremonies, but a kind of life or experience”.2049 The experience itself was 
considered self-validating. It meant that there was no further authority needed to certify its 
validity. The genius of Vedānta is that it identified the self-validating essence of religious 
experience. Vedānta entailed the core of all that can be found in other sacred scriptures. He 
claimed, “The Vedanta is not a religion, but religion itself in its most universal and deepest 
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significance”.2050 This assertion was an ultimate assertion of independence for Hindus living 
under the British rule and subject to Christian claim of superiority. Unlike Mohan Roy who 
conveyed that Hinduism is not simply one valid religious path, Rādhākrishnan asserted that it 
is in fact the very core of religion.2051 
17.5.1 Concept of Human Person 
Rādhākrishnan being a philosopher and a spiritual person wanted always to give a philosophical 
answer but with a spiritual slant. According to him, philosophical enterprise must not only 
provide rational verification and analysis but also give a profound and transforming insight into 
the spiritual content of existence in its personal and historical dimensions. This is even more 
necessary as an antidote to the dehumanizing values increasingly predominant in Western 
civilization. The unique strength of the Vedānta was its validation of personal spiritual striving 
for deeper penetration into the meaning of life itself.2052 
Therefore, before proceeding to the concept of human person in Rādhākrishnan, it is to be seen 
how he visualized and believed in God. Rādhākrishnan, basing himself on the Upaniṣads, 
comments that the bráhman and ātman are one: 
The two, the objective and the subjective, the Brahman and the Ātman, the cosmic and the 
psychical principles, are looked upon as identical. Brahman is Ātman.2053 “He who is this 
Brahman in man, and who is that in the sun, those are one.”2054 
For Rādhākrishnan who follows Śaṅkarā’s version of Vedānta, bráhman is the Absolute God. 
He uses the personal pronoun “He” in spite of the impersonal nature of bráhman. This usage 
may be due to the influence of Christianity on him. Rādhākrishnan also acknowledged that 
bráhman could be described only in negative terms. There is however no question of 
Agnosticism in him.2055 He admits that, “if somewhere in ourselves we did not know with 
absolute certainty that God is, we would not live”.2056 In this way, he sees the quest in us for the 
divine and connects the human with the divine. However, one may ask the question as to 
wherein is found this quest in man? As an answer, Rādhākrishnan does not treat man merely as 
a worldly being or a creature but as essentially a divine being, a spark of God. Although 
Rādhākrishnan recognizes the empirical self in man is subject to change, pleasure and pain, yet 
he acknowledges that the ātman in man remains the same because it is universal and real.2057 
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Although man, according to Rādhākrishnan, is essentially a spiritual being, who is ultimately 
identical with the Absolute in some way and to some degree, yet man is a complex being 
belonging to both the infinite and the finite order, the divine and the human. Thus, 
Rādhākrishnan in his doctrine of the relation between the Absolute and the empirical world 
justifies metaphysically man’s highest spiritual aspirations for identity with the ultimate as well 
the significance of his ethical conduct in the empirical world.2058 
Besides, Rādhākrishnan also notes that among the finite objects the individual self has the 
highest reality. Its nature is close to that of the absolute, though not the absolute itself. The finite 
self is as it were a reflection of the universe. Rādhākrishnan commenting on the Upaniṣad 
explains this tension caused by the different elements in man. He says,  
The whole world is the process of the finite striving to become infinite, and this tension is 
found in the individual self. According to the Taittirīya the several elements of the cosmos 
are found in the nature of the individual. In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (vi. II. 3 and 4) fire, 
water and earth are said to constitute the jīvātman or the individual soul, together with the 
principle of the infinite.2059 
Further, speaking about God and the self, Rādhākrishnan writes, “There is in the self of man, 
at the very centre of his being, something deeper than the intellect, which is akin to the 
Supreme”.2060 He also acknowledges that the non-empirical self (ātman) is identical with the 
bráhman. In full accordance with the Advaita Vedānta, he writes, “The true and ultimate 
condition of the human being is the divine status”.2061 He loosely employs the Christological 
term to express this identity between the true self (ātman) and the divine bráhman. He says, 
“The consubstantiality of the spirit in man and God is the conviction fundamental to all spiritual 
wisdom.”2062 
Elsewhere, Rādhākrishnan makes it clear that: 
“I am Brahman” (aham brahmāsmi) does not mean direct identity of the active self with the 
ultimate Brahman, but only identity of the real self when the false imposition is removed. 
The ethical problems arise, because there is the constant struggle between the infinite 
character of the soul and the finite dress in which it has clothed itself.”2063 
D’Costa explains the stand of Rādhākrishnan on the identity between the ātman (the real self) 
and bráhman in these words: 
For Radhakrishnan’s ontological assumptions in this claim are that finally, all created persons 
are not in any sense real, for in the ultimate liberative state there is no such thing as relations, 
nor persons, but only pure consciousness of pure being, intelligence and joy—satcitānanda—
all analogically understood. To put it crudely there is no distinction between God and 
creation, for in a final ontological sense, there is no creation.2064 
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The real self (ātman) being a timeless being, in its highest insight becomes aware not only of 
its own existence but also of the omnipresent spirit of which it is. Having affirmed this fact, 
Rādhākrishnan goes on to say, “We belong to the real and the real is mirrored in us. The great 
text of the Upaniṣad affirms it – Tat tvam asi (That art Thou). It is a simple statement of an 
experienced fact”.2065 This once again confirms Rādhākrishnan’s belief that Hinduism is 
fundamentally a religion of experience. 
During the celebration of the Birthday of Mahāvīra on 5 April 1955, in New Delhi, 
Rādhākrishnan, while speaking about the popularity of the Upaniṣads and the affirmation of tat 
tvam asi, said: 
The great statement by which the Upaniṣads are known to the world is tat tvam asi – that art 
thou. The potential divinity of the human soul is asserted thereby. We are called upon to 
understand that the soul is not to be confused with the body which can be broken, or the mind 
which can be moulded, but it is something which is superior to the relics of the body or the 
fluctuations of the mind – something which each individual has, which is unseizable, so to 
say, which cannot be merely objectified. The human being is not something thrown off, as it 
were, in a cosmic whirl. As a spirit he is lifted above the natural and the social world. Unless 
we are able to realize the inwardness of the human self, the principle of subjectivity, we lose 
ourselves.2066 
Rādhākrishnan thus makes a clear statement about the importance of the soul or ātman of the 
human person, which cannot be just ignored or thrown off or annihilated, but that which must 
be respected per se. 
It is also interesting to note that he tries to substantiate the identity of the ātman with bráhman 
brought about in a spiritual experience with evidences from the Bible. He says, “The Biblical 
text, ‘So God created man in his own image; in the image of God created he him,’ asserts that 
in the soul of man is contained the true revelation of God. ‘The spirit of man is the candle of 
the Lord.’”2067 He further refers to the statements that Jesus made: “‘I and my Father are one,’ 
‘All that the Father hath are mine,’ is the way in which Jesus expressed the same profound 
truth”.2068 His argument is that these statements are not of one chosen individual’s (he means to 
say, Jesus) relation with God but of every self (that is, every ātman) with God. Jesus ambition 
in life was to make known and pass on to all men and women what he himself had experienced, 
seen and known.2069 
It must also be noted that Rādhākrishnan described man not only as an essentially spiritual 
being, he/she is also a creature of this world. It is here that Rādhākrishnan introduced the 
                                                 
2065 RADHAKRISHNAN, An Idealist View of Life…, 103-104. Addition in original. Italics by author. Cf. JAMES, 
“Bonhoeffer, Radhakrishnan…”, 137. 
2066 Sarvepalli RADHAKRISHNAN, Occasional Speeches and Writings. October 1952 January 1956, The 
Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi 1956, 221. Mahāvīra 
was the founder of Jainism. He was the one who gave the central tenets of the religion. 
2067 RADHAKRISHNAN, An Idealist View of Life…, 104. In his footnote here, Rādhākrishnan cites Genesis 1,27 
and Proverbs 20,27 respectively. 
2068 RADHAKRISHNAN, An Idealist View of Life…, 104. 
2069 Cf. ibid. According to the author’s opinion, it seems that Rādhākrishnan is mixing up with the Trinitarian 
experience within the Godhead with human beings. He seems to consider only Jesus’ human nature without 
reference to his divine nature. He also seems to equate the relation of Jesus to God the Father as same as that of 
every individual self to God. 
390 Part IV: An Attempt at a Dialogue with Hinduism  
 
 
doctrine of māyā. It reminds that the empirical world is not the ultimate and the order of 
transcendent and the order of empirical are closely related.2070 
Rādhākrishnan uses the term puruṣa for person. The highest category that one can use of the 
human person is that of self-conscious personality. Concerning God, he describes Him as 
perfect personality (uttamapuruṣa). He analyses the concept of human personality and states 
that, “it includes cognition, emotion, and will”. When these functions are viewed in God, then 
He is “the supreme knower, the great lover, and the perfect will”.2071 
Thus, for Rādhākrishnan the human person is always spoken of in the context and realm of 
God. It can be acknowledged that Rādhākrishnan attributed to the human person the spiritual 
qualities without ignoring the empirical. 
17.5.2 Human Dignity 
It was mentioned that according to Rādhākrishnan there is a tension between the finite self and 
the infinite. However, what confers dignity on the self of man is the indwelling of the infinite 
within the finite. He explains:  
The reality of the self is the infinite; the unreality which is to be got rid of is the finite. The 
finite individual loses whatever reality he possesses if the indwelling spirit is removed. It is 
the presence of the infinite that confers dignity on the self of man. The individual self derives 
its being and draws its sustenance from the universal life.2072 
The respect for human person is derived from the inherent worth in a person. Rādhākrishnan 
acknowledges this fact, “The Hindu theory that every human being, every group and every 
nation has an individuality worthy of reverence is slowly gaining ground”.2073 Rādhākrishnan 
believes that in the Hindu tradition every person has an individuality worthy of reverence, and 
calls for the fostering of the spiritual development of the individual. Hinduism therefore “insists 
on the development of one’s intellectual conscience and sensibility to truth”.2074 
It was mentioned that for Hinduism, religion is an experience. For Rādhākrishnan, religion “is 
insight into the nature of reality (darsana), or experience of reality (anubhava). This experience 
is not an emotional thrill, or a subjective fancy, but is the response of the whole personality, the 
integrated self to the central reality”.2075 Because of darsana and anubhava, one can speak of 
the respect for human person.2076 
Rādhākrishnan attributed a new significance to the “the four aims/goals of life” (or the 
puruṣārtha). He brings the sacred into the field of the secular. He acknowledges:  
[…] a recognition of spiritual realities not by abstention from the world, but by bringing to 
its life, its business (artha) and its pleasure (kāma), the controlling power of spiritual faith. 
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Life is one and in it there is no distinction of sacred and secular. Bhakti and mukti are not 
opposed. Dharma. artha and kāma go together.2077  
This new secularism dominates Hindu life and thought today. Commenting on the secularism 
in India today, which follows the neo-Hinduism as envisaged by Rādhākrishnan, Emmanuel E. 
James, an Indian Research scholar and theologian, writess that secularism: 
[…] gives significance to the world of things as contributing to the individual and collective 
welfare of man in this present moment in history, as a desirable and worthwhile end to be 
purposefully realized. This kind of secularism recognizes material values; it gives worth and 
dignity to human person; it places importance on all purposive endeavour to realize a just 
social order and, above all, it points to the need to take this present moment in world-life 
seriously.2078 
Rādhākrishnan also brings in the idea of dignity in the realm of the four stages of life: 
āśramadharma. He says this institution is one of the central features of Hinduism that attempts 
to fill the whole life of the individual with the power of spirit. The stage of brahmacarya 
consists of a life of rigorous chastity as a preparation for married life. One enters into the second 
stage of life gṛahstya, the householder, through the religious sacrament of marriage, which is a 
form of divine service. Rādhākrishnan describes what follows next: 
After the individual realises to the full the warmth and glow of human love and family 
affection, through marriage and parenthood, he is called upon to free himself slowly from 
attachment to home and family in order that he might realise his dignity as a citizen of the 
universe.2079 
Rādhākrishnan glorifies this stage of saṃnyāsī and describes them: “They are the ambassadors 
of God on earth, witnessing to the beauty of holiness, the power of humility, the joy of poverty 
and the freedom of service”.2080 The stage of the Renouncer (Saṃnyāsī) for Rādhākrishnan is 
the stage where one realizes one’s inner worth and dignity to its full. He states this clearly – 
always in relation to God – when he says, “The sannyāsin is above all rules, caste and society. 
This symbolises the infinite dignity of man, who can strip himself of all externals, even wife 
and children, and be self-sufficient in the solitude of the desert if he has his God with him”.2081 
With regard to karma and human dignity, Rādhākrishnan is of the view that the theory of karma 
is very valuable in life and conduct. Whatever happens in this life is a result of our past doings. 
However, one can shape the future. It is in his/her power. He affirms: “Karma inspires hope for 
the future and resignation to the past. It makes men feel that the things of the world, its fortunes 
and failures, do not touch the dignity of the soul”.2082 By this statement, Rādhākrishnan confirms 
the way Hinduism understood dignity as that which is inherent in the soul, which is ultimately 
eternal and inviolable. 
Various instances can be mentioned in the teachings of Rādhākrishnan where he emphasized 
the need to recognize and respect the dignity of human person. 
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For instance, recognizing the value of the Declaration of Human Rights, Rādhākrishnan (on the 
occasion of the United Nations Day, 24 October 1953, in a Broadcast from All India Radio) 
cautioned, “If the Declaration of Human Rights is not to lose its meaning, if it is not to be 
dismissed as a mere scrap of paper, the United Nations should not compromise with its own 
ideals”.2083 In the same speech Rādhākrishnan (while referring to the tremendous changes that 
is occurring in the world and the revolution that is happening in the hearts of people), made his 
vision concrete in these words:  
We must recreate and re-enact a vision of the world based on the elements of reverence, order 
and human dignity, without which no society can be held together. The new world of which 
the United Nations is a symbol may seem to be a dream but it is better than the nightmare 
world in which we live.2084 
On another occasion, on 15 November 1955, while proposing a toast to Hatta, the Vice-
President of Indonesia, emphasizing the Independence of India and Indonesia, which showed a 
striking similarity, spoke of the freedom and human dignity that Gandhi envisioned. 
Rādhākrishnan said, “Gandhiji said that we wanted freedom for the sake of the millions of India, 
to give them food, clothes, homes and more than all, a sense of human dignity and self-
respect”.2085 
Similarly, during an Inaugural Address at the Indian History Congress, Waltair, 29 December 
1953, Rādhākrishnan recalled the sense of inevitability about historical sequence that had taken 
place as the result of the free will of humans. He then suggested what one must do to strive for 
peace2086. This occasion makes clear the faith he had in human dignity. He said: 
Man must take charge of events on a worldwide scale. He should cease to be a helpless, 
mechanical puppet and become a wakeful, responsible, truly creative being. Where freedom 
is absent, history is fate. As people who possess faith in human dignity, we must not passively 
wait for a world order of peace but we must strive actively to bring the nations into the ways 
of peace […]. It must bring into proper focus the great heroes who have stressed the dignity 
and the brotherhood of man. 2087 
As mentioned earlier, Rādhākrishnan as a head of State, “served, in an eminent way, as the 
‘conscience of the nation’ and wherever he spoke he stressed the importance of spirituality, 
regardless of his audience”.2088 A striking example can be seen during an Inaugural Address at 
the UNESCO Round Table Conference, on the theme of “Teaching of Social Sciences in South 
Asia”, held on 15 February 1954. Rādhākrishnan said, “Man is not body and mind alone. He 
has, in addition, the spiritual dimension”.2089 In the same Inaugural Address, while emphasizing 
the need to make the world safe for peace, Rādhākrishnan said, “To make the world safe for 
peace, our conscience must grow and our comprehension of human dignity must increase”.2090 
One can only comprehend from this statement the importance that he attributed to human 
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dignity while calling for a comprehension of the term, perhaps groping to find the inner meaning 
of what human dignity entails. 
Rādhākrishnan was also the Chairman of the Executive Board of UNESCO (1948) and later 
became the President, General Conference of UNESCO, from 1952 to 1954. In his Presidential 
Address, he strongly reiterated that, “If our professions about the dignity of the individual are 
to be taken seriously, we must do away with all sorts of discriminatory practices”.2091 
Rādhākrishnan’s statement once again reaffirms his faith in the dignity of the human person 
and the ways and means by which it can be implemented. 
On another occasion, during the celebration of the Birthday of Mahāvīra on 5 April 1955, in 
New Delhi, he recalled the teachings of the Upaniṣads, namely, ātmānaṃ viddhi, that is, know 
thyself. There is nothing greater in this world than knowing oneself, than possessing of one’s 
soul. Different writers have attested to the fact that the true man is one who uses all possessions 
of the world in order to realize the innate dignity of the soul. Rādhākrishnan gave the example 
of Mahāvīra, who is a man who renounced the things of the world without being entangled in 
the bonds of matter but one who was able to realize the inward dignity of his own self.2092 By 
this Rādhākrishnan wishes to inform us that dignity is something innate to the soul. 
17.5.3 Caste System: 
Rādhākrishnan favoured caste system because of the in-built code and tradition it entails. His 
view was that: “Each caste has its social purpose and function, its own code and tradition […]. 
The serenity of the teacher, the heroism of the warrior, the honesty of the business man, the 
patience and the energy of the worker all contribute to social growth. Each has its own 
perfection”.2093 It is interesting to note here that Rādhākrishnan connects each of the caste to a 
moral virtue. In other words, one’s duty in life (dharma) leads to the classification of the 
varnāśramdharma. Dharma entails an inclusive, functional and practical division for a better 
living on earth. However, due to egocentric and selfish nature of humans, the original motive 
was forgotten, which eventually led to abuse and its consequences.2094 
Still holding on to his view of caste driven society, Rādhākrishnan pointed out in 1926: “It is 
not true that all men are born equal in every way, and everyone is equally fit to govern the 
country or till the ground”.2095 However, all said and done, at the end of his long career in 1950, 
he declared, “If democracy is to be seriously implemented, then caste and untouchability should 
go”.2096 His opinion was that “caste” should be based on worth and not on birth.2097 
Thus, Rādhākrishnan’s idea of caste system evolved so that he began to reprimand it. This is 
made clear in his Inaugural Address, during a “Seminar on Casteism and the Removal of 
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Untouchability” held on 26 September 1955. While referring to the Mahābhārata, he 
categorically stated that casteism is a crime. He said: 
It is evident that the practice of untouchability is anti-social and a violation of the principles 
of dharma. The State has decided to remove the discriminations resulting from the practice 
of untouchability by making them criminal. It is not consistent with the modern trends of 
politics or the principles of religion. It is a social crime and the sooner we get rid of it the 
better for the good name of our country and for our national solidarity.2098 
He also connected the theme of casteism with the concept of dignity. Although it is necessary 
to give special opportunities to weaker sections of the society to help them forge ahead, yet 
mere material rehabilitation of the submerged people is not sufficient. Therefore, he said, “we 
must give them a sense of human status and dignity”:2099 In this way, he sought to regain the 
status and the dignity of those who were plagued by casteism. 
17.6 CONCLUSION 
Great Reformers of Hindu Renaissance like Rām Mohan Roy, Swāmī Vivekānanda, Mahatma 
Gandhi and Sarvepalli Rādhākrishnan formed part of the discussion in the above topic. 
Roy wanted to purify Hinduism by returning to the Upaniṣads. He strived towards the 
emancipation of the weaker class of the society and women. The Brahmo Samaj he formed 
envisioned a pure religion with the monotheistic emphasis that rests on two basic supports, 
namely, faith in a single creative Divine and belief in the immortal nature of the souls of human 
beings. The Brahmo Samaj borrowed the principle of human dignity from the West as well as 
the ethical system expressed in the Sermon on the Mount. Roy believed that Vedānta stood for 
monotheism and inculcated a fundamental respect for the dignity of all human beings. He 
believed that everyone is a fragment of that impersonal bráhman. Every human being has 
dignity and is the spark of the Divine. 
Vivekānanda believed that “No religion on earth preaches the dignity of humanity in such a 
lofty strain as Hinduism”. Vivekānanda organized the Rāmakrishna Order of Monks to carry 
his master’s vision, namely, that divinity dwelt in human beings. The Ramakrishna Mission 
that he founded in 1897 is engaged in charitable and educational works and remains as one of 
the most active agencies of social service in India. His social philosophy is derived from the 
neo-Vedānta conception of God as one divine principle. According to him, the ethical 
implication in the Advaita Vedānta is that, if one realizes one’s identity with bráhman, then one 
must also feel the compass of his potentialities just as unlimited as bráhman is. Vivekānanda 
emphasized the Vedāntic identification of man and God in order to raise the dignity of man in 
the world. 
Gandhi unified the message of Bhagavad-Gītā and the Sermon on the Mount. His two main 
outcomes of this unification was the cardinal virtue of Ahiṁsā (nonviolence) and Satya 
(truthfulness) among others. Satya is the word that he used for Truth. After a continuous and 
relentless search after truth, he also modified “God is Truth” and concluded “Truth is God”. 
Non-violence or ahiṁsā was the most distinctive and the largest contribution of Hinduism to 
India’s culture. The virtue of Ahiṁsā promoted reverence for all life forms, even embryos. In 
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this regard, abortion meant injuring or destroying the seed of life, which was unacceptable to 
the Hindu genius of reverence for all life. 
It must however be acknowledged that Gandhi has not given a theory of human dignity. 
However, he held that human dignity could be accorded its proper moral standing only if means 
and ends are regarded as the same. Through his deeds and words, Gandhi affirmed that the 
dignity of man is not from what man/woman has, but from what he/she is, from his/her inner 
worth. This fact is derived from the origin and nature of the spirit of ātman within him/her that 
makes his/her nature essential divine, as a part of God, or as a spark of the Divine. The spirit 
within claims a permanent respect. He also believed that the privilege and dignity of man lies 
in the fact that man alone is made in the image of God.  
Rādhākrishnan, who has been described as the “unofficial successor and torch-bearer of Neo-
Hinduism” as well as “the most impressive figure of twentieth century Neo-Hinduism”, held 
that man is not merely a worldly being or a creature but essentially a divine being, a spark of 
God. He held that “The true and ultimate condition of the human being is the divine status” and 
therefore one can acknowledge “That art Thou” (tat tvam asi). Rādhākrishnan uses the term 
puruṣa for person and the indwelling of the infinite within the finite confers dignity on the self 
of man. Rādhākrishnan also brings in the idea of dignity in the realm of the four stages of life: 
āśramadharma and glorifies the stage of the Renouncer (Saṃnyāsī) which symbolizes the 
infinite dignity of man. He connects karma to human dignity. Karma makes one feel that the 
things of the world, its fortunes and failures, cannot touch the dignity of the soul. The dignity 
of the soul is eternal because soul is eternal and inviolable.  
Having deliberated on the modern Reformers of Hinduism and their influential teaching with 
regard to the dignity of the human person, the focus will now turn on the beginning of life issues 
in modern India. How does modern India, in a milieu of plurality of religions and multi-cultural 
context answer questions pertaining to the beginning of life in the field of Bioethics?
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BEGINNING OF LIFE ISSUES: 
CONTEMPORARY PRAXIS IN INDIA TODAY 
18.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although India is known to be a religious country, influenced mainly by Hinduism and steeped 
in Vedic and Upaniṣadic teachings, yet in reality and practice there seems to be a lacuna 
between teaching and practice when it comes to issues pertaining to the beginning of life. The 
value and respect for human life is found wanting in modern India, which in turn reflects on the 
stand that is lacking to acknowledge the inherent dignity of human persons. Given this 
background, this Chapter discusses on the Hindu Praxis on Bioethics and certain questions 
pertaining to Bioethics. The Chapter will also analyze the legal implications of Bioethical 
decisions in Indian context. The Chapter will conclude with an excursus on the Constitution of 
India, which upholds human dignity. 
18.2 HINDU PRAXIS ON BIOETHICS 
In spite of being current issues of debate, , with regard to interventions at the beginning of life 
from a Hindu perspective, discussions on recent development in the field of biomedicine is still 
undeveloped,.2100 Prakash N. Desai, a Hindu Physician, writes about the present situation in 
India faced by a Hindu bioethicist. He says: 
An organized body of knowledge for the ethical resolution of conflicts inherent in modern 
medicine is yet to be formulated in India. Given the diversity of belief and practice this task 
is overwhelming. But in the day-to-day life of Hindus, folk history is an important source of 
inspiration and moral examples. Ancient myths are renewed and reshaped, and as in the 
Hindu use of history, they become answers to philosophical and psychological dilemmas. It 
cannot be overemphasized that without an authoritative book or prophet to interpret ethical 
conduct for all Hindus at different times, the mythologies of ancestors serve as examples, and 
a single proper course does not exist.2101 
Limited by this body of knowledge, in the next section, the modern biomedical interventions 
on an embryo and its acceptability in modern Hinduism from the point of view of prominent 
scholars of Hinduism will be discussed. 
18.2.1 Abortion and Sex-Selection 
Although we have already seen (especially in Chapters 15.3.1-15.3.2 and 15.5.4 above) that in 
Hinduism abortion is frowned in the scriptural texts, yet there is a contrast between theory and 
practice. On the one hand, in order to curb the population and on the other hand, as a family 
planning and welfare measure, abortion has been legalized in 1971 by the Government of 
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India.2102 The law provides for termination of medical pregnancy with certain restrictions.2103 
However, they can be interpreted liberally.2104 One can only interpret that this stance taken by 
the Government of India over abortion is from a secular perspective and in no way reflects the 
religious traditions that India has inherited. 
Personal opinions of Hindus with regard to abortion are varied. Nevertheless, “many Hindus 
are disturbed by the use of elective abortion as birth control”.2105 Another such opinion is the 
use of abortion that could be welcome in the interest of the mother’s survival or her mental 
health. However, unacceptable would be the case when abortion is sought in order to avoid the 
possibility of a deformed or unhealthy child (causing no danger to the mother). In addition, 
abortion would also be unacceptable in cases where it is procured as a remedy either for 
contraceptive failure or to ensure maintenance of a standard of life for those already living. 
Moreover, in all these cases, abortion for valid reasons require the consent of both the mother 
and her husband.2106 
Another opinion aired by Desai would be appropriate to be mentioned here. The moral 
evaluation of abortion in ṡruti and smṛti tradition was already discussed (see Chapter 15.3, 
15.3.1 and 15.3.2 above). The arguments used were chiefly that of Lipner. He bases himself on 
ancient authorities condemning abortion. However, according to Desai, the ancient is history 
and has no bearing in the modern India. Desai criticizes Lipner saying, “[…] he ignores the 
contextual nature of Hindu ethics, its reliance on conduct and local tradition, and the advocacy 
that preceded and followed the enactment of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act. Most 
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importantly, he fails to see the distinction in ancient medical texts between the moral status of 
the unborn and that of a woman resorting to abortion”.2107 Desai’s own conclusion is: 
Absolutist interpretation of scriptural injunctions does not have the force in modern India 
which it does elsewhere. Indian independence and the subsequent secular democratic 
tradition required abrogation of many religious strictures, untouchability and women’s rights 
foremost among them.2108 
Indian Anthropologist Veena Das is of the opinion that one should shift the emphasis in the 
discussion on abortion from rights and utility to a consideration of virtue.2109 
Added to the above diverse opinions there is another factor that needs to be considered. The 
legalization of abortion had encouraged the phenomenon of gender bias and the practice of sex 
selection in India.2110 Male progeny is hailed and prized in India, compared to the female.2111 
Moreover, India is pre-dominantly a patriarchal country. Besides its patriarchal mentality, 
social, cultural and religious factors determine the idea that family line runs through male 
representative. Besides, the mind-set of the large sections of the society is gender-biased. This 
has contributed to the secondary status of women in India. Therefore, there is a strong desire to 
avoid the birth of a female child. This has resulted in a sharp decline on the Child Sex Ratio 
(CSR).2112 This is a matter of a great concern to India, because it is harmful to the society having 
socio-economic, demographic and cultural implications.2113 
Although it is difficult to determine when exactly in the development of Hindu tradition the 
lawgivers gave a greater value to the lives of men than to those of women, yet it is certain in 
the Laws of Manu that women were regarded with apprehension. This is reflected in the 
restrictive code of conduct that was formulated by not allowing independence for women.2114 
Laws of Manu declared:  
In childhood a female must be subject to her father, in youth to her husband, when her lord 
is dead to her sons; a woman must never be independent.2115 
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Her father protects (her) in childhood, her husband protects (her) in youth, and her sons 
protect (her) in old age; a woman is never fit for independence.2116 
This shows the mentality regarding the place of women in Hindu society. A statistic shows the 
enormity of the practice of sex selection: “One authoritative study said 78,000 female fetuses 
were aborted from 1978 to 1983 nationwide following sex-discrimination test”.2117  
According to Anubha Rastogi, an attorney in Mumbai, adhering to such techniques and 
practices “are considered discriminatory to the female sex and not conducive to the dignity of 
women”.2118  With regard to gender bias sex-selection, the Constitution of India is clear in its 
Article 51A (e), which reads, “It shall be the duty of every citizen of India – […] (e) to renounce 
practices derogatory to the dignity of women.”2119 Therefore, sex selection is against the spirit 
of the Constitution of India.2120 
Considering this grim picture, Hindu religious leaders oppose abortion because it interferes 
with child’s karmic development. They also consider abortion for sex selection and the 
preference for male children as immoral, which amounts to infanticide.2121 
18.2.2 New Reproductive Technologies  
Modern Hinduism would have no difficulty in accepting new reproductive technologies, such 
as in vitro fertilization.2122 Nevertheless, Hindu Bioethics would consider the possible harm that 
is involved in such procedure, such as the hormone therapy, the surgical laparoscopy, the risks 
involved in extra-corporeal management of the egg, sperm and embryo, the limited rate of 
success, the high emotional and financial costs, and above all the wishes and the rights of the 
couple.2123 In all such situations, the Hindus are guided by religion. For example, the Laws of 
Manu prescribes, “To be mothers were women created, and to be fathers men; religious rites, 
therefore are ordained in the Veda to be performed (by the husband) together with the wife”.2124 
Besides, there are ample examples in the sacred literature that vouch to the fact that there have 
been figures known to metamorphose themselves into various animal forms in order to enjoy 
the joys of sex. Hinduism did have the practice of a widow marrying the brother of her deceased 
husband (niyoga;2125 the levirate). This practice could be considered as an ancient form of 
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22, 1988 as quoted in CRAWFORD, Hindu Bioethics…, 142. Cf. also IDEM, Dilemmas of Life…, 34. Cf. SHARMA, 
“The Hindu Traditions…”, 7. 
2118 Cf. Anubha RASTOGI, Claiming Dignity. Reproductive Rights & the Law, Human Rights Law Network 
(HRLN), New Delhi 2009, 128. 
2119 The Constitution of India…, 92. 
2120 Cf. RASTOGI, Claiming Dignity…, 134. 
2121 Cf. YOUNG, The World’s Religions…, 127-128. Cf. SHARMA, “The Hindu Traditions…”, 7. 
2122 Cf. ibid. Cf. also CRAWFORD, Hindu Bioethics…, 116. 
2123 Cf. ibid. 
2124 Manu 9.96. “The Laws of Manu…”, 344. Addition in the original. Cf. CRAWFORD, Hindu Bioethics…, 116. 
2125 The purpose of niyoga “was the impregnation of a wife of an impotent or dead man so that his family may 
be preserved and he may have sons to offer oblations for the welfare of his soul in the next world.” CRAWFORD, 
Hindu Bioethics…, 117. 
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artificial insemination. Besides, there are Hindu lore that describe babies born in jars2126 
anticipating modern procedures of in vitro fertilization. Although Hindu practice may resist to 
modern technologies, yet the desire and the value attached to progeny might open the possibility 
and acceptability of such procedures.2127  
18.2.3 Genetics 
In order to assess the Hindu view on genetics, the role played by the doctrine of reincarnation 
is crucial and significant. While genetics deals with the biological continuity of an individual 
life, Hinduism sees life as a spiritual continuity, spiritual here denoting the philosophical 
adjectival form of the concept of self or ātman. This spiritual continuity is expressed through 
the concept of saṁsāra (see Chapter 14.3 at fn. 1417 above). It corresponds in a spiritual sense 
to that of genes. However, saṁsāras are not biological but psychic in nature. Therefore, Arvind 
Sharma, a scholar of Comparative Religion, is of the opinion that, “[…] since the nature of 
reincarnation is determined by one’s karma, it might be permissible to argue that in Hinduism 
the genetic endowment one obtains could be viewed as the outcome of one’s karma”2128. The 
conclusion is that any form of genetic determinism is reductive and therefore Hinduism would 
strongly resist it. The spiritual would be considered “higher” than the genes, which are 
themselves “lower”. Perhaps, genes may be considered as only one factor among a complex of 
other spiritual factors, which affect the outcomes in life.2129  
On the other hand, two reasons for fostering genetic engineering can be enumerated. First, the 
basic Hindu ethical stance is that nature cannot be totally controlled but may be manipulated 
for the greater good and individual advancement.2130 Second, the emphasis on conscious 
decision-making (the four aims/goals of life or the puruṣārthas, see Chapter 14.6 above), which 
disposes one favouring experimentation in general, would encourage genetic engineering and 
experimentation. Moreover, in principle, there are no Hindu objections to any of the 
reproductive manipulations, because they perceive Nature and man as one interlinked whole. 
When it is a case of an individual, then the determining factor would be whether any such 
manipulation served private and/or public interest in terms of promoting dharma. Therefore, a 
childless couple seeking a child through new technological advancement would not violate the 
Hindu ethical principle, although adoption remains a possibility.2131 However, in all these ethical 
protocols, the chief consideration would be whether and to what extent the experiments in 
genetics involve wanton destruction of human life and to what extent it involves cruelty to any 
form of life.2132 
                                                 
2126 William BUCK, Mahabharata, The Regents of the University of California, University of California Press, 
USA 1981, 33-34. Here there is a description of the hundred sons and a daughter born to Gandhari the wife of 
Kuru King Dhritarashtra from a hard ball of flesh. This ball of flesh was divided into several pieces and placed in 
one hundred and one bronze jars filled with clear butter. After two years when they were opened, one every day 
for hundred and one days, hundred sons and a daughter were born. Cf. ibid. 
2127 SHARMA, “The Hindu Traditions…”, 7. 
2128 Ibid., 8. 
2129 Cf. ibid. 
2130 Cf. MENSKI, “Hinduism…”, 35. 
2131 Cf. ibid. 
2132 SHARMA, “The Hindu Traditions…”, 8. 
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Insofar as Gene Therapy and Genetic Screening techniques are used as preventive medicine, 
they are acceptable in Hinduism.2133 According to Crawford, with regard to therapeutic 
possibilities, Hindu Bioethics is on the side of progress. Yet the acceptance of a particular type 
of treatment depends on several reasons. He enumerates them:2134 
First, Hindu Bioethics supports treatment based on the principle of beneficence.2135 If Gene 
therapy is the only hope for a particular cure, then Hindus see no threat in accepting it.2136 
Second, Hindu Bioethics has no problem with self-improvement, as long as a clear notion of 
the nature of the self that is to be improved is known. The Bhagavad-Gītā would vouchsafe for 
it2137: “Let a man lift himself by himself; let him not degrade himself; for the Self alone is the 
friend of the self [person] and the Self alone is the enemy of the self.”2138 One can infer from 
this passage that the Bhagavad-Gītā is informing us that divinity in all its richness resides within 
the ordinary self. The Self can work on behalf of us (friend) or against us (enemy), depending 
on how much it is part of our consciousness.2139 
Third, from the point of view of medicine, Hindu Bioethics relies on the principle of non-
maleficence. If Somatic Cell enhancement, for example, threatens human values owing to our 
limited knowledge, then it is a risk to be avoided.2140 
Fourth, with regard to enhancement engineering Hindu Bioethics would respond with reference 
to the principle of consequentialism. This is understandable to the Indian mind, which interprets 
that everything works on the principle of karma.2141 
Fifth, based on the spiritual heritage, Hindu Bioethics appeals to the principle of justice. All life 
come from one universal source, the Paramātman. Therefore, all individuals are equal and 
raises the question of social fairness. Thus, insofar as genetic engineering works within this 
principle of justice, it is acceptable.2142 
Sixth, when the question of fairness is resolved, the next question would be to see if the 
enhancement engineering is medically sound. The Āyurvedic view is that health must be 
understood in terms of the principle of balance. If genetic engineering adversely affects in one 
area, this balance may be lost in other areas.2143 
                                                 
2133 Cf. ibid. 
2134 Cf. CRAWFORD, Hindu Bioethics…, 154. 
2135 This and the other three principles enumerated by Crawford in this and the next section may have their 
analogical derivation from two Philosophers Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress. They were the first to 
introduce the four principles in the field of biomedical ethics, namely, the principles of respect for autonomy, 
nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice. See Tom L. BEAUCHAMP/James F. CHILDRESS, Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics. Sixth Edition, Oxford University Press, New York 2009, 12-13. The principles themselves are enumerated 
in detail in Chapters 4-7, Cf. ibid. 99-287. 
2136 Cf. CRAWFORD, Hindu Bioethics…, 152. 
2137 Cf. ibid., 154. 
2138 Bhagavad-Gītā 6.5. The Bhagavad-Gītā, tr. by Sarvepalli RADHAKRISHNAN, Allen and Unwin, London 
1928, 189. Cf. CRAWFORD, Hindu Bioethics…, 154. 
2139 Cf. ibid. 
2140 Cf. ibid., 155. 
2141 Cf. ibid., 155. 
2142 Cf. ibid., 156. 
2143 Cf. ibid. 
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Seventh, Hindu Bioethics approach is pluralistic. It values diversity and finds richness in 
individuality ordained by Nature. A homogenized society with overriding traits and values 
would be unacceptable.2144 
Eight, Hindu Bioethics is inclusive in its approach toward humans and other forms of being.2145 
18.2.4 Cloning 
With regard to cloning, the Hindu approach is more accommodating.2146 The mythic lore of 
Hinduism has such stories that are analogous to cloning.2147 In spite of this fact, the editors of 
an international Journal Hinduism Today, acknowledged, “[…] there is really no easily found 
scripture directly addressing the practice of cloning […] endorsements or objections to cloning 
are necessarily based upon induction and extrapolation.”2148 In a survey of seven Hindu leaders 
conducted by Hinduism Today, the common opinion was against the idea of cloning.2149 The 
reply of the Editor of Hinduism Today to President Clinton and the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission (NABC) was: 
Hinduism neither condones nor condemns the march of science. If done with divine intent 
and consciousness, it may benefit; and if done in the service of selfishness, greed and power, 
it may bring severe karmic consequences. The simple rule is this: Let dharma – the law of 
good conduct and harmony with the universe and its many forces and creatures – be the guide 
for all such explorations.2150 
According to Sharma, Hinduism would be opposed on moral grounds to egoistic or spare-part 
cloning of other creatures.2151 Cloning further creates interesting issues for the doctrine of karma 
and the concept of ātman.2152 According to Christian view, the soul is created at conception. On 
the other hand, Hindu view holds that the God-created soul inhabits the body. Therefore, the 
question would arise as to what kind of soul would inhabit in a cloned body.2153 However, since 
                                                 
2144 Cf. ibid. 
2145 Cf. ibid. 
2146 Cf. SHARMA, “The Hindu Traditions…”, 8. Sharma was consulted by the President Clinton’s National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) regarding human cloning. 
2147 Cf. Arvind SHARMA, “Hinduism and Cloning”, in: Vedanta Kesari 88 (2001) 62-64; 62 or IDEM, “Hinduism 
and Cloning”, in: Ecumenism 142 (2001) 27-29; 27. The story is told about the encounter of the Great Goddess 
with the Demon Raktabija. The demon had the power to recreate himself in his entirety from a single drop of 
blood, as it fell on the ground. In order to overpower this demon, who could clone himself, the Goddess had to lap 
up all of his blood before it fell to the ground with an extraordinary protrusion of her tongue. Cf. SHARMA, 
“Hinduism and Cloning…”, 62. There are also other examples of asexual procreation found in the Hindu literature. 
For example, the creation of Lord Ganesha from the skin of his mother, Lord Murugan from the spark of Lord 
Shiva’s third eye, Kunti’s conception of the Pandavas through mantras (sacred formulas) offered to God. See 
“Playing God?”, in: Hinduism Today (June 1997) 22-25; 24. 
2148 Ibid. 
2149 Cf. ibid., 24-25. 
2150 EDITOR, “A Hindu Perspective. For the President, Mr. Bill Clinton”, in: In-Depth Issues: Hinduism Today 
April 1, 1997. See http://www.hinduismtoday.com/modules/smartsection/makepdf.php?itemid=5043, accessed on 
02.07.2014. Italics by author. See also EDITORIAL, “Swami, Bill Clinton Has a Question”, in: Hinduism Today, 
op. cit., 8-9; 9.  
2151 Cf. SHARMA, “The Hindu Traditions…”, 8. 
2152 Cf. IDEM, “Hinduism and Cloning…”, 62-63. Cf. IDEM, “The Hindu Traditions…”, 8. 
2153 “Cf. Playing God?”, in: Hinduism Today…, 24- 
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the body is distinct from ātman or the self/soul, it is beyond the reach of material science and 
cannot be harmed by cloning.2154 
According to Crawford, the view of Hindu Bioethics on cloning stands between a prohibitive 
stance and permissive stance. Three principles govern the discussion on cloning: 
Nonmaleficence, Beneficence and Autonomy. The principle of nonmaleficence, which is derived 
from ahiṁsā, would concern about “the safety of fetuses and/or potential children whose 
wellbeing must not be sacrificed on some high altar of promoting a greater social and scientific 
good”.2155 Current scientific evidence makes it clear that a high risk of failure rates is involved 
in producing a clone. Therefore, Hindu Bioethics, based on nonmaleficence, concludes that 
cloning is morally unacceptable. According to the principle of beneficence, the primary welfare 
of the patient is the top priority for a medical practitioner. Cloning could be seen here as an 
alternate way necessitated by circumstances instead of being challenged as a substitute to 
nature’s way of procreation. Hindu Bioethics thus is sensitive to circumstance and therefore, 
opposed to branding it as intrinsically wrong. “The genius of Hindu ethics is that it allows for 
a dharma in extremis. Its strength is autoplasticity.”2156 Further, following the principle of 
autonomy, according to Patañjalis’s karma doctrine, each of us are free agents. Autonomy plays 
an important role in the context of right priorities. The principle of autonomy affirms 
procreative rights, including the right to self-replication. Hindu Bioethics, following the 
principle of autonomy, endorses the respect for human individuality, provided no harm is 
inflicted on children reproduced. Nevertheless, owing to the safety assurance factor being 
unavailable at this time in cloning procedures, Hindu ethics is cautious in permitting cloning 
based solely on autonomy. Thus, one can see that the principle of autonomy in Hindu ethics is 
regulated by the other two principles, namely, the principle of nonmaleficence or ahiṁsā and 
the principle of beneficence. Ahiṁsā, being the highest virtue takes precedence over other 
values.2157 
In all the Bioethical discussions that was discussed above, the question often appears about 
“Playing God”. Ayurveda gives rational explanations in this regard. First, suffering is a part of 
life. That is to say, whatever be the perfect will of God for humans, biological perfection is not 
among them. Second, the primary motive of medicine is amelioration of suffering, which is the 
noblest of all human aspirations. Third, genetic engineering proves to be a powerful way of 
removing suffering. Fourth, the basic goal of genetic engineering is to alleviate suffering. Fifth, 
based on the above reasons, it would be adharmic for a rational person not to pursue genetic 
research.2158 
18.3 BIOETHICS IN THE SECULAR CONTEXT OF INDIA 
Having seen Hindu Bioethics, the secular Bioethics and its legal implication in India will be 
discussed. Due to the British influence on India, the Ayurveda system with its sources through 
                                                 
2154 NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, “Cloning Human Beings. Religious Perspectives on 
Human Cloning”, Commissioned paper by Courtney S., CAMPBELL, Department of Philosophy, Oregon State 
University, 1997, D1-D64; D26. 
2155 CRAWFORD, Hindu Bioethics…, 163. 
2156 Ibid., 164. 
2157 Cf. ibid., 165. 
2158 Cf. ibid., 165-166. 
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Caraka Saṁhitā and Suśruta Saṁhitā and other indigenous system in India lost their impact. 
Being a secular State, India brought in its own set of Code of Ethics for Medical Practitioners 
in 19562159, which is similar to Nuremburg Code and Helsinki Declaration.  
India is advancing at a fast pace in global clinical research and trials. Thus, a need was felt in 
the 1980s to draft national codes and guidelines. The Central Ethics Committee on Human 
Research (CECHR) of the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) drafted the “Ethical 
Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human Subjects (2000)” and further amended through 
“The Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human Participants (2006)”.2160 
There exists two categories of Ethics Committee (EC), namely, the Institutional Ethics 
Committee, which is comparable to Institutional Review Boards (IRB) in the developed 
countries and Independent Ethics Committee (IEC).2161 In a study conducted by ICMR, it was 
found that there were no legal experts on most of the ECs. A survey conducted by ICMR 
showed 200 institutions with functional ECs in India. However, the Bulletin report of the World 
Health Organization (WHO) reported that there are less than 40 ECs in India.2162 
Confining ourselves to the area of Bioethics pertaining to the beginning of life issues, described 
below are some of the State recognized regulations. They are mentioned for two reasons: 1. In 
order to show to what extent the respect and dignity of the human person is accorded in them. 
2. To show how these State regulations (in spite of influences from other religions, as 
enumerated earlier, especially through Hinduism) do not necessarily reflect in practice the 
religious sentiment. 
18.3.1 Pre-conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques 
Prenatal diagnostic techniques like amniocentesis and ultrasonography, though useful in 
detecting genetic or chromosomal disorders or congenital malformations or sex linked 
disorders, are often used on a large scale to detect the sex of the foetus and consequently to 
                                                 
2159 MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE, The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, Act 102 of 1956, The Gazette of 
India, The Controller of Publications, Delhi 30 December 1956. Due to the progress of medical education in India, 
the said Act of 1956 was repealed and a new one was enacted and further modified in 1964, 1993 and 2001. 
2160 INDIAN COUNCIL OF MEDICAL RESEARCH, Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human Subjects, 
Director-General Indian Council of Medical Research, New Delhi 2000, Foreword 2 and INDIAN COUNCIL OF 
MEDICAL RESEARCH, Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human Participants, Director-General 
Indian Council of Medical Research, New Delhi 2006, Foreword vi. Cf. Nigel J. DENT/Anand KRISHAN, “Ethics 
Committees in India”, in: The Quality Assurance Journal 11/2 (2008) 143-150; 143-144. The Central Ethics 
Committee on Human Research (CECHR) was constituted mostly of members from the medical profession, except 
for the Chairman of the Committee who was a Former Chief Justice of India and Chairperson of National Human 
Rights Commission, few scientists and educationists. Interestingly there were no representatives from among 
philosophers, scholars/experts/theologians. 
2161 Cf. DENT/KRISHAN, “Ethics Committees in India…”, 144-145. “An EC is an independent body constituted 
of medical/scientific professionals and non-medical/non-scientific members, whose responsibility is to ensure the 
protection of the rights, safety and well being of human subjects involved in a trial.” Ibid., 144. One of the 
responsibilities of the Independent Ethical Committee (IEC) is to protect the dignity, rights and well-being of the 
potential research participants. The IEC should be composed of a chairperson, 1-2 basic medical scientists, 1-2 
clinicians, a legal expert, a social scientist or representative of a NGO, a philosopher/ethicist/theologian, a 
layperson from the community and a member secretary. Cf. ibid., 146-147. An example of the IEC is the one in 
Mumbai. It is interesting to note that on their board they have a chairperson, a member secretary, seven medical 
professionals, two librarians, a community development officer and one theologian from the Evangelical Church. 
See http://www.iecindia.org/iec_members.htm, accessed on 10 October 2013. 
2162 Cf. Rashmi KADAM/Shashikant KARANDIKAR, “Ethics committees in India. Facing the Challenges!”, in: 
Perspectives in Clinical Research 3/2 (2012) 50-56. 
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terminate the pregnancy of a female foetus. Such techniques (as discussed in Chapter 18.2.1) 
are also used to select the sex of the child before conception in in vitro fertilization.2163 
Social activists noticed in the 1980s that amniocentesis tests were conducted in some clinics to 
determine the sex of the foetus and resulted in subsequent termination of pregnancy when the 
foetus was found to be a female. Thereafter, the Indian Parliament enacted the Pre-Natal 
Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act on 20 September 1994.2164 
The Act provides for: 
 the regulation of the use of pre-natal diagnostic techniques for the purpose of 
detecting genetic or metabolic disorders or chromosomal abnormalities or certain 
congenital mal-formations or sex linked disorders; and 
 the prevention of the misuse of such techniques for the purpose of pre-natal sex 
determination leading to female feticide.2165 
A Bill was introduced in 2002 in the Parliament of India by the then Minister of Health and 
Family Welfare Shatrughan Sinha. The Bill condemns the practices and techniques that are 
considered discriminatory to the female sex and not conducive to the dignity of the women.2166 
The Act and the previously mentioned Bill respect the dignity of women and consequently the 
female foetus. Although abortion is allowed in India, yet one cannot selectively choose to 
eliminate the female foetus, which affects the dignity and status of women.2167 
18.3.2 Medical Intervention on Human Subjects 
The “Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human Subjects (2000)” deals with issues 
such as Genome-Mapping, Genetic Recombinant Engineering, Stem Cell Research, Human 
cloning etc. The Ethical Guidelines speaks on the issue of the respect for embryos.2168 
With regard to the general ethical guidelines, the above Guidelines (2000) specifies: 
All the research involving human subjects should be conducted in accordance with the four 
basic ethical principles, namely autonomy (respect for person/subject) beneficence, non-
maleficence (do no harm) and justice.2169 
                                                 
2163 Cf. RASTOGI, Claiming Dignity…, 128. 
2164 MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE, Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) 
Act 1994, Act No.57 of 1994, The Gazette of India, The Controller of Publications, New Delhi 20 September 1994. 
Cf. PNDT DIVISION MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE, Annual Report…, v. 
2165 PNDT DIVISION MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE, Annual Report…, 8. The above Act was 
further modified in 1996 in order to make it more comprehensive and was renamed as “Pre-conception and Pre-
Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PNDT)”. Cf. ibid.  
2166 Cf. The Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Amendment Bill, 2002. 
This was a Bill to amend further the Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act, 
1994, New Delhi 19th July 2002. See http://indiacode.nic.in/incodis/whatsnew/prenatal.htm, accessed on 
02.07.2014. Further amendment to the Act was made on 17 January 2003. See MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE, 
Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Amendment Act, 2002, Act No. 14 of 
2003, The Gazette of India, The Controller of Publications, New Delhi 17 January 2003. Once again, an 
Amendment of Rules on 14 February 2003 was issued. See MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE, Pre-Natal Diagnostic 
Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Amendment Rules 2003, Extraordinary Part II- Section 3-Sub-
section (i), The Gazette of India, The Controller of Publications, New Delhi, 14 February 2003. 
2167 Cf. The Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (57 
of 1994) along with The Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 
1996, Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi 2011, 1. Cf. also RASTOGI, Claiming Dignity…, 134. 
2168 INDIAN COUNCIL OF MEDICAL RESEARCH, Ethical Guidelines 2000, op. cit., Foreword 2. 
2169 ibid., 17. 
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With regard to Prenatal Diagnosis, the Guidelines (2000) says: 
This should be performed only for reasons relevant to the health of the foetus or the mother. 
Prenatal diagnosis should not be performed solely to select the sex of the child (in the absence 
of an X-linked disorder). Sex selection, whether for male or female, denigrates the 
fundamental personhood of those yet to be born, and has the power to harm societies by 
unbalancing sex ratios.2170 
In the above statements, the document repeats what has already been said in the Pre-conception 
and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994. However, The 
Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human Subjects (2000) acknowledges the fact 
about the personhood of the unborn and makes an important contribution when it remarks about 
“the fundamental personhood of those yet to be born”. 
Consistent with the above statement, the said Guidelines (2000) when dealing with Assisted 
Reproductive Techniques, stipulates: 
[…] respect for the embryo’s moral status can be shown by careful regulation of conditions 
of research, safeguards against commercial exploitation of embryo research, and limiting the 
time within which research can be done to 14 days i.e. when the primitive streak appears. 
This restriction is in keeping with the policy in several nations that permit research with 
embryos. At this time, the development of nervous system begins and the embryo begins to 
become a distinct individual.2171 
The above statement has been made in order to fall in line with several other nations with regard 
to research on embryos. Nevertheless, the use of the phrase “the respect for the embryo’s moral 
status” is a positive breakthrough in according respect to the embryo. 
With regard to cloning, the Guidelines (2000) says:  
[…] since its safety, success, utility and ethical acceptability is not yet established, research 
on cloning with intent to produce an identical human being, as of today, is prohibited”.2172  
This statement does not speak anything about the fundamental personhood or moral status or 
the dignity of the cloned human being. All one can conclude here is that the document agrees 
                                                 
2170 Ibid., 48. 
2171 INDIAN COUNCIL OF MEDICAL RESEARCH, Ethical Guidelines 2000, op. cit., 47. Perhaps, the Ethical 
Guidelines is referring to the Warnock Committee Report that recommended that in the case of in vitro fertilization 
research on embryos might not be conducted beyond fourteen days after fertilization. See DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURITY, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, London 1984, 66. The Chairman of the Committee was Dame Mary Warnock. This 
report is now referred to as “The Warnock Report 1984”.The Warnock report formed the basis for the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. See PARLIAMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008 (c.22), Part I, Amendments of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, UK 2008, 
4. 
2172 INDIAN COUNCIL OF MEDICAL RESEARCH, Ethical Guidelines 2000, op. cit., 48. 
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with the Instruments of other countries2173 of the same nature and fall back on the argument that 
“ethical acceptability is not yet established”. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) that carried out a multinational study on the problem 
of infertility places the incidence in India between 10 and 15%.2174 Since there was neither 
proper guideline nor legislation with regard to the practice of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (ART) in India, the Indian Council of Medical Research brought out a separate 
document named “National Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision and Regulation of ART 
Clinics in India (2005)” under the auspices of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 
Government of India.2175 The said National Guidelines (2005) makes neither the mention about 
the respect for embryos nor the question of its dignity. 
After the publication of “The Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human Subjects” 
(2000), there followed a number of developments in science and technology. The ICMR then 
drafted guidelines under the title: “The Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human 
Participants” (2006).2176 
With regard to stem cell research in the section on “Permissible Research Areas”, the 
Guidelines (2006) allows for the in vitro studies on already established cell lines from any type 
of stem cell namely, embryonic or fetal/adult stem cells. In its section on “Restricted Areas of 
Research”, it specifies the restriction of generating, namely, the creation of a zygote by IVF, 
Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer or any other method with the specific aim of deriving a human 
embryonic stem cell line for any purpose. In its section on “Prohibited Areas of Research”, it 
prohibits any research related to reproductive cloning and the transfer of human blastocysts 
generated by somatic cell nuclear transfer into a human or non-human uterus.2177 
On the question that involves human embryonic stem cells, the Guidelines (2006) makes several 
regulations. Scientists whose research involves human embryonic stem cells should work 
closely with monitoring/regulatory bodies, demonstrate respect for autonomy and privacy of 
those who donate gametes, blastocysts, embryos or somatic cells for somatic cell nuclear 
transfer, and be sensitive to public concerns about research that involves human embryos.2178 
                                                 
2173 By the term “Instrument of other countries”, is meant the first International Statement on the ethics of 
medical research using human subjects namely, the Nuremberg Code 1947, The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948, which concern about rights of human beings being subjected to involuntary maltreatment, the efforts 
of the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in 1964 at Helsinki, the World 
Medical Association which formulated general principles and specific guidelines on use of human subjects in 
medical research, known as the Helsinki Declaration; the Proposed International Guidelines for Biomedical 
Research involving Human Subjects 1982 issued by WHO and CIOMS; the subsequent document of the CIOMS 
that brought out the ‘International Guidelines for Ethical Review in Epidemiological studies’ in 1991, the 
‘International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research involving Human Subjects’ in 1993, UNESCO’s “The 
Universal Declaration on Human Genome and Human Rights” (1997), “The International Declaration on Human 
Gene Data” (2003) and “Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights” (2005). Cf. INDIAN COUNCIL OF 
MEDICAL RESEARCH, Ethical Guidelines 2000, op. cit., 7.  
2174 Patrick J. ROWE/Ekaterina Michailovna VIKHLYAEVA, Diagnosis and treatment of infertility, Hans Huber 
Publishers, Toronto/Stuttgart 1988, 60-62. Cf. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA: MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND FAMILY 
WELFARE, National Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision and Regulation of ART Clinics in India, Indian 
Council of Medical Research, National Academy of Medical Sciences, New Delhi 2005, Foreword ix. 
2175 INDIAN COUNCIL OF MEDICAL RESEARCH, National Guidelines for Accreditation…, Foreword ix-x. 
2176 Cf. IDEM, Ethical Guidelines 2006, op. cit., Foreword vi. 
2177 Cf. ibid., 92-93. 
2178 Cf. ibid., 95-96. 
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The above statement on human embryonic stem cell speaks of the respect for autonomy of the 
donors. There is no mention about the respect for an embryo itself. 
Having discussed on the legal aspects pertaining to the field of Bioethics in the secular context 
of India, an excursus on the Constitution of India will be appropriate, which will highlight the 
importance give to dignity and the right to life enforced in it. 
18.4 EXCURSUS: THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 
At the very outset, it must be made clear that India is a secular Nation. A common 
misunderstanding among the Western countries is that the rule and Government in India is by 
Hindus owing to their majority and therefore, laws are made by them. Although there have been 
influences from the religion, yet India is a secular State and it owes its secularism to the 
religious Reformers. It must also be noted that India does not have a state religion unlike some 
other countries. 
However, in the same breath one must acknowledge that the Ancient Indian Culture, influenced 
especially by Hinduism, which “could withstand and flourish amidst ‘foreign’ ideologies, both 
social and religious, speaks volumes of its eclecticism”.2179 The fundamental principles of 
modern day philosophy of human rights was already emphasized from time past as evidenced 
by Ṛg Veda: “No one is superior or inferior. All are brother. All should strive for the interest of 
all and should progress collectively.”2180 Again, in Atharva Veda Sāmmanasya Sūkta the 
following verse is written with regard to charms designed to secure harmony: 
All have equal rights in articles of food and water. The yoke of the chariot of life is placed 
equally on the shoulders of all. All should live together with harmony supporting one another 
like the spokes of a wheel of the chariot connecting its rim and the hub.2181 
These Vedic texts forcefully declare the equality among human beings. The above verse makes 
it clear that no spoke of a wheel is superior to the other; no individual can claim to be superior 
to the other. Equality among all demands that each strive for the happiness of the other.2182 
It is no wonder why from time immemorial Indians have called their culture as ‘human culture’ 
(māṇav dharma)! Thus, no one can refute the fact that human dignity had universal appeal in 
Indian culture. The culture itself tried to be so comprehensive to suit the needs of every human 
being, irrespective of age, colour, sex or caste.2183 
Thus, one can see that religion did have some influence on the Constitution. However, since 
India is a secular State, the nature of its Constitution too is secular. Commenting on the 
secularism in the Constitution of India, Rādhākrishnan said: 
                                                 
2179 JOSHI, “The Right to Equality…”, 83. 
2180 “ajyeṣṭhāso akaniṣṭhāsa ete sam bhrātaro vāvṛdhuḥ saubhaghāya”. Ṛg Veda 5.60.5. English tr. from JOSHI, 
“The Right to Equality…”, 83. Cf. also Sunil DESHTA/Lalit DADWAL, “Genesis of Human Rights in India”, in: T. 
S. N. SASTRY, (ed.), India and Human Rights Reflections, Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi 2005, 35-47; 
37. 
2181 Atharva Veda 3.30.6: “Samāni prapā saha voannabhāgha samāne yoktre saha vo yunajmi. Samyachognim 
saparyatārā nābhimivābhitah.” “Hymns of the Atharva-Veda…”, op. cit., 134 & 361-362. English tr. from 
DESHTA/DADWAL, “Genesis of Human Rights…”, 46 at fn.8. 
2182 Cf. ibid., 37. 
2183 Cf. JOSHI, “The Right to Equality…”, 83. Cf. also DESHTA/DADWAL, “Genesis of Human Rights…”, 40. 
This fact is reflected in the working definition of human dignity in this research. See Chapter 1.4 above. 
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It may appear somewhat strange that our Government should be secular one while our culture 
is rooted in spiritual values.  Secularism here does not mean irreligion or atheism or even 
stress on material comforts. It proclaims that it lays stress on the universality of spiritual 
values which may be attained by a variety of ways.2184 
Thus, the Constitution of India enshrines the crux of secularism.2185 In spite of Hinduism being 
the largest religion in India, the Constitution has its own secular origin. A study on the 
Constitution of India will enlighten on the value that the concept of human dignity finds in it. 
Before a study of the Constitution of India is done, three personalities needs to be mentioned, 
whose influence among others have shaped the Constitution of India. 
First, stands the contribution of Roy to the modern Renaissance movement and the impact he 
had in the enactment of the Indian Constitution. The human rights advocate Raj Kumar, aptly 
describes Roy in these words: “The Indian Constitution is the end-product of the modern reform 
movement inaugurated by Raja Rām Mohan Roy.”2186 Roy’s influence can be seen today not 
only in the Preamble of the Indian Constitution which guarantees the dignity of the individual, 
but also Article 21 that assures the right of every individual to live with human dignity.2187 
Second, is the contribution of Gandhi in the visualization of the Constitution of India. At the 
very core of the Indian Constitution lays the essence of Gandhi’s dream in the form of social 
justice and social democracy. On the 50th Anniversary of the Republic of India, President K. R. 
Narayanan referred to Gandhi and his dream of the Constitution of India. In his address, 
Narayanan said, “Mahatma Gandhi had visualized the new Constitution of India in terms of 
universal values applied to the specific and special conditions of India.”2188 As early as 1931, 
when a Reuter correspondent questioned Gandhi (on his way to London as a representative of 
nationalist India, to the Second Round Table Conference) as to what sort of a Constitution he 
envisaged, he expressed: 
I shall strive for a constitution which will release India from all thralldom and patronage, and 
give her, if need be, the right to sin. I shall work for an India in which the poorest shall feel 
that it is their country, in whose making they have an effective voice; an India in which there 
shall be no high class and low class of people; an India in which all communities shall live 
in perfect harmony. There can be no room in such an India for the curse of untouchability, or 
the curse of the intoxicating drinks and drugs. Women will enjoy the same rights as men.2189 
                                                 
2184 Sarvepalli RADHAKRISHNAN, “Foreword”, in: Abid S. HUSAIN, The National Culture of India, Asia 
Publishing House, Bombay 19612, vii-viii; vii. Cf. DEVASAHAYAM, Human Dignity in Indian Secularism…, 129. 
2185 The Webster’s Third International Dictionary defines secularism as a “system of social ethics based upon 
a doctrine that ethical standards and conduct should be determined exclusively with reference to the present life 
and social well-being without reference to religion”. See The Webster’s Third International Dictionary, Vol.2, 
Springfield, Massachusetts 1966, 2053. For a detailed understanding on secularism with particular reference to 
India, see DEVASAHAYAM, Human Dignity in Indian Secularism…, op. cit. 
2186 Raj KUMAR, Encyclopaedia of Untouchables. Ancient, Medieval and Modern, Kalpaz Publications, Delhi 
2008, 437. 
2187 Cf. UNITED NATIONS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL BAR 
ASSOCIATION, Human Rights in the Administration of Justice. A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors 
and Lawyers, Professional Training Series No.9, United Nations, New York/Geneva 2003, 746. 
2188 K. R. NARAYANAN, Address on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Republic of India from the 
Central Hall of Parliament, Government of India, Press Information Bureau, 27th January, 2000. 
2189 Cf. ibid. Quotation from GANDHI, “Statement to Reuter. September 3, 1931”, in: CWG 47 (1971) 388-389. 
Cf. DOONGDOONG, The Dignity of Man…, 19-20. 
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The third personality to be considered is Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891-1956). Among the 
social Reformers, he can be undoubtedly ranked with the greatest leaders of modern India. He 
obtained his doctoral degree from the University of Columbia. Well-versed both in Indian and 
Western traditions, he fought against the system of Hindu injustice of untouchability and caste 
system.2190 Thus, one can truly acclaim about Ambedkar as the one who raised the 
“untouchables from dust to dignity ‘manuski’, which means human dignity”.2191 He was well 
known as the “modern Manu”, the ‘chief Architect’ and the ‘Father of the Indian 
Constitution’.2192 The key words and the philosophy of Ambedkar can be derived from his own 
words: “Positively, my social philosophy may be said to be enshrined in three words: liberty, 
equality and fraternity. Let no one, however, say that I have borrowed my philosophy from the 
French Revolution. I have not.”2193 The Government of India honoured Ambedkar, the architect 
of the Indian Constitution, by bestowing on him India’s highest civilian award the ‘Bharat 
Ratna’, on 14 April 1990, posthumously.2194 
One can observe that behind the fundamental rights envisioned in the Constitution of India, 
namely, justice, freedom, equality and fraternity, there lays Gandhi’s noble and convinced ideas 
and inspirations, as mentioned in the statement above2195 and those of Roy and Ambedkar.  
It is also interesting to note that the Constitution of India speaks of both rights and duties to 
citizens, especially the emphasis given to duty in Indian tradition of dharma.2196 
The Constitution of India was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 26 November 1949. It 
became fully applicable since 26 January 1950. 
The Indian Constitution gives an adequate treatment and importance to the concept of human 
dignity, by its very mention in the Preamble. The “right to life” and its extension, which 
includes the right to live with human dignity, is dealt with in Article 21 of the Constitution. The 
following sections will deal with them. 
18.4.1 The Preamble to the Constitution 
The Preamble to the Constitution of India, 1949, ensures the dignity of the individual. The 
value of human dignity is constitutive of the constitutional vision of India, because of its explicit 
reference in the Preamble of the Constitution.2197 
The Preamble reads:  
                                                 
2190 Cf. SHARMA/SHAKIR, Politics and Society…, 248-249. Cf. RAJKUMAR, Encyclopaedia of Untouchables…, 
436. 
2191 Ambedkar often used the Marathi word ‘manuski’ in his speeches, which when translated in English means 
‘humanness’ or ‘humanity’. The word serves to evoke feelings of self-respect and human attitudes towards another. 
Cf. H. C. SADANGI, Emancipation of Dalits and Freedom Struggle, Isha Books, Delhi 2008, 275. 
2192 Cf. S. G. BHAT, Bharat Ratna Dr. B. R. Ambedkar and the Indian Constitution, Journal Society, Dr. 
Ambedkar Govt. Law College, Pondicherry 2001, 118. Cf. SHARMA/SHAKIR, Politics and Society…, 275. 
2193 B. R. AMBEDKAR, “My Personal Philosophy. All-India Radio Broadcast of Speech on October 3, 1954”, 
in: Modernisation of Buddhism. Contributions of Ambedkar and Dalai Lama-XIV (History, Religion, Social 
Sciences), Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi 2002, 205 at Appendix I. Cf. RAJKUMAR, Encyclopaedia of 
Untouchables…, 437. 
2194 Cf. S. N. MISHRA, Socio-Economic and Political Vision of B. R. Ambedkar, Concept Publishing Company 
Pvt.  Ltd., New Delhi 2010, 45.  
2195 Cf. DOONGDOONG, The Dignity of Man…, 19.. 
2196 Cf. SOOSAI, Human Dignity and Human Rights ...., op. cit., 14. 
2197 Cf. DEVASAHAYAM, Human Dignity in Indian Secularism…, 12, at fn.50. 
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WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a 
SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its 
citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, 
faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all 
FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the 
Nation; IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of  November, 1949, 
do HEREBY ADOPT; ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.2198 
The age-old Indian culture that was referred above, is enshrined in the three words of the 
Constitution, namely, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. It is interesting to note that it was not a 
mere accident that the Constitution of India bears an unmistakable imprint of the UDHR 1948 
in almost all of its provisions. The concern for human dignity is the coveted theme of the 
Constitution expressed vividly above in the Preamble. Both the ideals as well as the inspiration 
of the Indian people have been enshrined in the Preamble.2199 
The nation-state of India was thus constituted as a multi-religious, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic 
and multi-linguistic civilization. To India’s diversity, especially religious diversity, the 
founders of modern India saw secularism as an appropriate and relevant answer. It is in this 
culture, which esteems diversity, that the value of human dignity is embedded. The framers of 
the Constitution of India ensured that respect for diversity in the political community is an 
affirmation of human dignity.2200 
There have been attempts to establish a Christian view on the foundation of human dignity in 
the international instruments and Constitutions.2201 Although, one cannot establish similar 
stance with regard to the Constitution of India, the Catholic Church in India through its apex 
body, the Catholic Bishop’s Conference of India (CBCI) has taken a historical decision in 
support of Indian Secularism. Therefore, one can raise a question here, “[…] why should the 
Indian Church support the Indian form of secularism enshrined in the Indian Constitution?”2202 
The answer is simply: 
[...] It is the respect for human dignity that constitutes the ultimate reason for the Indian 
Church to support the Indian secularism as enshrined in the secular provision of the 
Constitution. Human dignity is central to Indian secularism and to Christian theology of 
human person […]. The dignity of the human person as moral subject is central to Indian 
Constitution’s secular provisions and its allied articles that respect diversity in the civil 
society.2203 
In concrete terms, it means that the Indian Constitution provides safeguard to the evil of 
violating the inalienable worth and dignity of the human person. This is in accordance with the 
Christian theology, which holds that human persons are made in the image of God and endowed 
with intrinsic inviolable dignity and inalienable rights. Thus, the CBCI has granted recognition 
of the Indian secularism engraved in the Indian Constitution.2204 
                                                 
2198 Durga Das, BASU, Constitutional Law of India, Prentice-Hall of India Private Ltd., New Delhi 19916, 1. 
Emphasis in Original. 
2199 Cf. JOSHI, “The Right to Equality…”, 83-84. 
2200 Cf. DEVASAHAYAM, Human Dignity in Indian Secularism…, 12. 
2201 Cf. KUSUMALAYAM, Human Rights..., 180. 
2202 DEVASAHAYAM, Human Dignity in Indian Secularism…, 482. 
2203 Ibid. 
2204 Cf. ibid. 
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18.4.2 Article 21 of the Constitution 
Article 21, which appears in Part III that deals with the Fundamental Rights of the Constitution 
of India 1949, reads: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except 
according to procedure established by law.”2205 Accordingly, this Article 21 speaks of the “right 
to life”. A study on this Article will help us observe how the Supreme Court while dealing with 
different cases gradually developed the concept of human dignity embedded in it. 
The Chairperson, Rajasthan State Human Rights Commission and Former Chief Justice of 
Madras & Karnataka High Court, N. K. Jain explains the extent of Article 21, which includes 
various rights to life.  
First among them is the right to live with human dignity. The Supreme Court of India gave this 
interpretation in a case involving Francis Coralie Mullin vs. Administrator, Union Territory of 
Delhi (AIR 1981 SC 746). With this interpretation given to Article 21, the door was made open 
for various kinds of rights, which will have to be read into the right to life with human dignity.2206 
Second, the Supreme Court in a case involving Vikram Deo Singh Tomar vs. State of Bihar 
(AIR 1988 SC 1782) further highlighted the quality of life consistent with human personality. 
The Supreme Court, 
[…] has emphasized that India is a welfare state and the Indian Constitution lays special 
emphasis on the protection and well being of the weaker section of the society including 
women and children. Article 21 envisages a quality of life consistent with his human 
personality. “the right to live in human dignity is the fundamental right of every Indian 
citizen.”2207 
Third, the right to life in Article 21 of the Constitution of India was given an extensive 
interpretation by the Supreme Court of India in another writ petition case involving Consumer 
Education & Research Centre and Others vs. Union of India and Others (AIR 1995, SC 922). 
While making a mention to the UDHR 1948, Article 1, the Supreme Court stated in this case2208: 
The jurisprudence of personhood or philosophy of the right to life envisaged under Article 
21, enlarges its sweep to encompass human personality in its full blossom […] to sustain the 
dignity of person and to live a life with dignity and equality.2209 
Fourth, the Supreme Court further gave an explanation to the expression “life” in Article 21 as 
follows:  
The expression ‘life’ assured in Article 21 of the Constitution does not connote mere animal 
existence or continued drudgery through life. It has a much wider meaning which includes 
right to livelihood, better standard of living, hygienic conditions in the workplace and leisure 
[...]. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the 
easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of 
livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its 
effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live, leave aside 
                                                 
2205 See The Constitution of India…, 46. 
2206 Cf. N. K. JAIN, Article-21 of the Constitution of India, Human Rights Article-21, Legal Literacy & 
Awareness Series 7, Rajasthan Human Rights Commission, Jaipur 2006, 4. Cf. The Constitution of India…, 54. 
2207 JAIN, Article-21 of the Constitution of India…, 23. 
2208 JOSHI, “The Right to Equality…”, 95. 
2209 UN: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, 
Human Rights in the Administration of Justice…, 746. The quotations are taken from SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 
Consumer Education & Research Centre and Others vs. Union of India and Others, 27 January 1995, in: 1995 
All India Reports 922/Supreme Court Cases (3) 42, New Delhi 1995, 640-663; 658. 
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what makes life liveable. The right to life with human dignity encompasses within its fold, 
some of the finer facets of human civilisation which makes life worth living. The expanded 
connotation of life would mean the tradition and cultural heritage of the persons 
concerned.2210 
The extent of Article 21 goes even further than the legal dimensions enumerated above to 
philosophical and religious allusions implicit in it. Parvinrai Mulwantrai Bakshi in his 
commentary on the Constitution of India explains this scope of Article 21: 
“Life”, in article, 21 is not merely the physical act of breathing. This has been recognised by 
the courts. In fact, as philosophers tell us, life is lived at many levels. The Rig Veda 
[110.177.2], gives a subtle description of the mundane activity of speech. The soul (which, 
in the Rig Veda, is compared to a bird soaring high in the heavens), inspires or fills up the 
mind with speech. The “Gandharva” (the mind) carries it to the heart; and then, the luminous 
inspired speech takes shape, in words that can be heard. One can pursue this imagery further. 
While the external mundane activities of life have their own place, they are the manifestations 
of an inner, unseen, unperceived activity – which, indeed is the real “life” that a human being 
lives. It is true that judicial decisions on article 21 do not embark upon such an analysis in 
depth. But they do take note of the width of the right to life.2211 
From all that was discussed above, it is clear that the Constitution of India has a well-defined 
stand on human dignity, both in its Preamble and in its interpretation of Article 21. 
Nevertheless, whether the concept of human dignity – enshrined in the Constitution of India 
and interpreted by the Apex Court of India – can be effectively used in Bioethical discussions 
is a matter to be debated. 
For example, one may raise a valid question here: Does the Preamble (which assures the dignity 
of the individual) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India (that provides a right to live with 
human dignity) also protect the life of the unborn and safeguard its dignity? An illustration 
would explain the problem involved here. Does the right to abortion overrule the right of the 
unborn? In the secular field, it is believed by some that every mother has a right to abortion and 
this should prevail over the right of an unborn. One can thus see an anomaly here. Although 
Article 21 provides for the right of life and the Supreme Court of India’s interpretation of the 
Article speaks of the sustainment of the dignity of person and to live a life with dignity and 
equality, yet in theory and practice, the right of the life of an unborn does not prevail over the 
right of the mother. This is made evident by the promulgation of legalization of abortion, 
namely, The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971. It may be observed that in this Act, 
there is neither a mention of dignity, nor a mention of respect, either for the mother or for the 
growing embryo in her. 
18.5 CONCLUSION 
The modern Hindu views on abortion is varied. When abortion follows an “unwanted” 
pregnancy, for whatever reasons, the developing embryo is also treated as “unwanted”. 
In principle, with regard to new reproductive technologies, modern Hinduism would have no 
difficulty in accepting them. Practices such as in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination have 
                                                 
2210 The quotations is from SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, Consumer Education & Research Centre…, 658-659. 
Cf. also JAIN, Article-21 of the Constitution of India…, 17 and JOSHI, “The Right to Equality…”, 96. 
2211 The Constitution of India…, 55. Addition and emphasis in the original. 
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roots in Hindu Scriptures and therefore, owing to the value attached to progeny, it might open 
the possibility and acceptability of such procedures. 
Hindu view on genetics stems from the belief in the spiritual continuity of the self or ātman. 
The spiritual continuity or saṁsāra is of a psychic nature and correspond in a spiritual sense to 
genes. Therefore, the genetic outcome one inherits is based on the karma of a person. 
Procedures such as Gene Therapy and Genetic Screening techniques, insofar as they are used 
as preventive medicine, are acceptable in Hinduism. Hinduism would however, be opposed on 
moral grounds to egoistic or spare-part cloning of other creatures for selfish motives. The 
guiding principle in these explorations is dharma. 
In the secular context, Bioethics does not reflect anything pertaining to any religion. Abortion 
has been legalized in India since 1971. The sad situation prevailing even today following the 
enactment of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 is sex selection. Being a 
patriarchal society, Hinduism favours sons more than daughters. This has resulted in a low child 
sex ratio. It is harmful to the society by causing social instability. 
The “Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act 1994” 
safeguards the respect and the dignity of women and consequently, the female foetus. 
The “Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human Subjects (2000)” and its 
subsequent revision, “The Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human Participants” 
(2006) acknowledges the fundamental personhood of the unborn. 
The discussion above brings the importance of the question behind the excursus of the 
Constitution of India. There are two instances in the Indian Constitution that places importance 
to the concept of human dignity, namely, the Preamble to the Constitution and Article 21 of the 
Constitution.
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PART IV 
Conclusion 
Hinduism is philosophies, religious beliefs and practices of over 80% of the Indian population. 
There is neither an organized formal teaching authority nor an organized body of knowledge. 
Philosophy and religion are so intermingled that one can perhaps say that Hinduism is not a 
religion but a philosophy of life. In the classical Hindu Scriptures, one cannot directly find the 
concept of human dignity. However, the values contained in the concept can be derived using 
their Scriptures. 
Although in Western thought there is distinction between God, human beings and the world, 
there is no such distinction in the classical Hindu Scriptures between the Supreme Being 
(bráhman), the human beings or the nature. The human being, whose individual self (puruṣa) 
is the ātman is part or identical to the bráhman. The Vedānta system of Philosophy discusses 
how the ātman or self is part or identical to the Universal Self or bráhman. 
What is the theological explanation for inherent human dignity? The advaita and the 
viśiṣṭādvaita system hold that the ātman and bráhman, the human self and the Supreme Being, 
are not two but one and identical. Therefore, it follows that the human being is of divine origin 
and descent. The ātman can also be described as an image of the Primaeval Man (Puruṣa or 
Manu), which is the prototype of the microcosmic man (the individual human being). In other 
words, being a spiritual self (ātman), the individual human being is also an image of the divine 
(bráhman). This is expressed in the equation, ātman = bráhman. The nature of ātman is sat-cit-
ānandá (being, consciousness and happiness). It is a synonym for bráhman. If one adopts the 
dvaita system, then ātman and bráhman are distinct and separate. Yet ātman depends on the 
bráhman for its existence. Each individual jīva or ātman has a spiritual self-consciousness with 
the nature of sat-cit-ānanda. In this sense, the ātman can be said to be a mirror image of the 
Supreme Being, the bráhman. Thus, whether one follows the advaita, viśiṣṭādvaita or dvaita, 
the individual self, which is variously designated as ātman, jīva or puruṣa, is an image of the 
Supreme Being or the bráhman. In this sense, one can see some similarities between the 
Christian Scriptures and the Hindu Scriptures, both of which acclaims that the human being is 
made in the image of God. Therefore, just as the concept of the inherent human dignity from a 
Christian theological point of view is based on the image and likeness of God, so too for 
Hinduism, insofar as ātman is the image of bráhman, the individual self has inherent dignity. 
The difference between the two lies in the fact that while Christianity asserts that the human 
being and the soul is a created being, Hinduism holds that the ātman is not created but as part 
or identical with bráhman, which inhabits the body as though wearing a clothing. 
What ethical status has the human person? The ethical life is guarded by the four goals of life 
(the puruṣārthas), namely, dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. Ethics is to do with actions that 
are either good or evil. The Sanskrit word used for ethics is dharma. Its aim is to make all 
human beings lead a good and a right life, which is the essence and crux of Indian Philosophy. 
Dharma is also the basis of human rights. The teaching of the Bhagavad-Gītā clarifies that an 
individual attains a high state of perfection by rightly following one’s duty or svadharma 
(literally good dharma), which includes also the medical professionals. As an antithesis to the 
three goals of man (dharma, artha and kāma), mokṣa was seen as a new value and demanded a 
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renunciation to them through saṃnyāsa. Moreover, the concept of bhakti (devotion or love of 
God) introduced by the Bhagavad-Gītā, raises one to the religious level that confers the special 
status given to the human person, which is an acknowledgment of her/his human dignity. 
What social status has the human person? In Vedic times, the human being was seen as the 
focus of a complex set of relationships that made her/him an integral part of the complex 
universe. It is in this system of relationships that varnāśramdharma (the duties pertaining to the 
caste system) emerges. The human relatedness and openness can be enumerated in three 
directions. First, her/his social character was considered as complementarity with others. 
Second, her/his dynamism pointed towards an integration on all possible levels as a renouncer 
(Saṃnyāsī) and finally, her/his intrinsic worth oriented towards an end in herself/himself. This 
is proved by the fact that she/he is a desirable object of love (ista) for God Himself. 
What is the philosophical explanation for human dignity? The Western understanding of human 
dignity, following Kant, is that it is inherent in human persons through human excellence and 
consequently, one cannot use persons as a means but an end in themselves. Human excellence 
is rooted in his/her rationality. In Hinduism, the concepts of rationality and its importance as a 
human excellence – along with the concepts of mokṣa, saṃnyāsa and bhakti – point to the fact 
that these are inherent in human beings, which is due to the dignity proper to her/him. However, 
more than the human excellence or the rationality of human being, it is the spiritual nature 
(understood here in a philosophical sense), owing to the ātman inhabiting her/him, which 
regards her/him as the highest in creation. This is due to the dignity inherent in the human 
person. Thus, the concept of human dignity in Hinduism is in some way similar to that of the 
West. 
Who ultimately is a human person? The term that comes close to the concept of person in the 
West is the term puruṣa (individual or person). Etymologically, puruṣa means to reside inside 
something. Thus, puruṣa that resides in the body (śarīra) is identified with the ātman (self), 
which is nothing other than the bráhman. This representation raises the individual human 
person in his/her spiritual nature to the summit of creation and acknowledges the intrinsic 
worth, as an end in himself/herself. Therefore, human person as a puruṣa acknowledges the 
intrinsic dignity of the human person. 
The main problem for the Western mind posed by Hinduism is the doctrine of rebirth and 
reincarnation, which presupposes the theory of karma. This results in the ātman reappearing in 
all forms until it is liberated (mokṣa) from the cycle of rebirth. Because the same soul is reborn 
in all sorts of bodies, the choice of a special term such as “person” in the West to designate the 
status of the human being becomes difficult. 
In summary, it can be said that in the classical Hindu belief – which stresses on the karma and 
the cycle of rebirth – individual historical existence is not so significant. Therefore, there is no 
serious concern with regard to the dignity or the personhood of humans. Nevertheless, the 
inherent respect and value of each person is asserted in all the texts – both in classical Hinduism 
and in Ayurveda. Thus, although the term “human dignity” does not exist in classical Hinduism, 
the meaning inherent in it is acknowledged. 
The classical Hindu view saw man as a part of the universe in the natural order, and as part of 
the Ātman (Puruṣa) in the ontological order. Because of the theory of karma and rebirth, the 
human being is taken beyond the sphere of one’s life. Therefore, the human individual does not 
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begin, does not die definitively. There is a passage of birth and death, until one is finally 
liberated (jīvanmukta) from the earthly reality to be united with the Ultimate Ātman, namely, 
the bráhman. Thus, every human individual is a human person from the very moment of the 
beginning of its existence and irrespective of the stage of development. The dignity of the 
human individual is not conferred by an external element, rather, the human individual owns it 
by his/her very nature.2212 Is not this what Reiter acknowledges?: 
Human dignity pre-exists with existence of man and is not awarded (Zuerkenntnis), but 
acknowledged (Anerkenntnis). The dignity is intrinsic to the existence of man, “coextensive” 
with his life, it is not divisible, in no phase of his life is he without it. The temporal sequence 
of the phases of the life of a subject (embryo, foetus, child, adult) should not be reinterpreted 
into a series of different subjects.2213 
The final goal of every human person would be the striving of the human soul (ātman) to be 
liberated and finally to be joined with the Eternal Soul (Ātman) so that aham brahmāsmi (I am 
bráhman), tat tvam asi (that art thou), becomes an actuality. The divine image of sat-cit-ānandá 
in human beings reflects the all Eternal Being, the Supreme Being, the Eternal Self, which is 
the bráhman. This again is close to the idea of the image of God likeness in human beings in 
the Christian Tradition. 
Thus, from a philosophical and a religious perspective there are some similarities between the 
Western and the Indian thought, although their approaches are different. One cannot attempt 
for a univocal merger of the two, which would result in injustice to both. One need to appreciate 
what is common, while respecting the differences2214 in an attempt towards a dialogue between 
them. 
What role does procreation play in the life of a Hindu? One of the major life aims of a Hindu is 
to procreate, and according to the central aspect of dharma, preserving and promoting life is 
important. Thus, for the traditional Hindu reproduction was essential for the continuation of 
society and for one’s family. The reasons stem from the need to produce offspring, especially 
male offspring, in order to perpetuate the family, the community, to sustain social economic 
stability within the caste framework of a patriarchal society and for religious purposes. 
The Upanishads see human procreation beyond its biological sphere. That is to say, the 
“Universal Self” (Puruṣa/Ātman) is responsible for the generation of individual selves 
(puruṣa/ātman). The Upanishads portrays life (prāṇa) as a treasure. Life is existence and not 
form. Life has its origin in the atman, the Self. However, life is not the atman, but at the same 
time, life is inseparable from ātman as its first manifestation. The discovery of life leads to 
immortality. The Ātman carries the ātman within and when a man releases his seed within the 
woman, the Ātman is born again as ātman.  
                                                 
2212 Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 359. 
2213 “Die Würde des Menschen ist mit seiner Existenz gegeben und Gegenstand nicht einer Zuerkenntnis, 
sondern Anerkenntnis. Die Würde ist der Existenz eines Menschen immanent, dem Leben eines Menschen 
„koextensiv“, sie ist nicht teilbar, in keiner Phase seines Lebens ist der Mensch ohne sie.  Die zeitliche Folge von 
Lebensphasen eines Subjekts (Embryo, Fetus, Kind, Erwachsener) darf nicht in eine Aufeinanderfolge 
verschiedener Subjekte umgedeutet werden.“ REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz…“, 135. Tr. by 
author. 
2214 Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 358. 
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What is the moral status of an embryo? In classical Hinduism, it is within the background of 
abortion that one can deliberate about the moral status of an embryo. Abortion was considered 
as a morally reprehensible killing (hatyā) rather than an ethically neutral evacuation, dislodging, 
or excision. Thus, abortion or miscarriage is considered as a serious crime and sin. Abortion 
hinders the achievement of the soul towards liberation by preventing the human soul to either 
enter or exit out of the cycle of rebirth. The prohibition of abortion, when considered as a 
criterion, restores reverence of life, especially the vulnerable life of an embryo. 
Does the concept of caste (actually the high caste Brahmins developed caste rights and not 
human rights) have a say to the right of life of an unborn? From the earliest times, especially 
during the classical period, both in canonical and collaborative orthodox Hindu literature, 
abortion at any stage of pregnancy was morally condemned as violating the personal integrity 
of the unborn, except in extreme cases when it pertains to the question of preserving the 
mother’s life. There is no other consideration, social or otherwise, which have been allowed to 
override this viewpoint, and this includes every caste.2215 Although the classical texts object to 
the marriage between different castes, yet when a child is conceived through the marriage 
between two different castes, no Hindu texts would ever-recommended abortion in such unions. 
Moreover, the principle of ahiṁsā (nonviolence or non-injury) would also go against the 
practices of anti-life. Thus, one can say that de facto Hindu tradition has always accorded 
personal moral status to an embryo/foetus throughout pregnancy. 
How does one medically affirm in classical Hinduism regarding the ontological status of an 
embryo? Ayurveda, the ancient medicine of the Hindus provides an answer to the ontological 
status of an embryo. The two main sources of Ayurveda are the Caraka Saṁhitā and Suśruta 
Saṁhitā. 
The above sources, answers the question as to how exactly the soul/self/ātman descends into 
an embryo (see Chapter 15.5.2 and 15.5.3 above). According to Hindu scriptures the soul is 
eternal. The soul/ātman is the one that produces an embryo, which was never born before. In 
other words, the same soul/ātman informs a new embryo. It is in this way that the soul/ātman 
can be said to have been born. The animated ātman or soul is known as jīva. However, the 
soul/ātman cannot be animated without combining with other elements. An embryo is a 
conglomeration of several factors, namely, mother (ovum), father (sperm), soul, 
wholesomeness, rasa (the digestive matter derived from the mother as nutrition) and mind. The 
mind serves as the connecting link between the body and the soul/ātman. Ayurveda also 
answers the question about the consciousness of an embryo. Ayurveda holds that the soul is 
endowed with consciousness even before it possesses sense organs. The soul can never be 
separated from the mind, and so, it is always endowed with consciousness, although, from a 
functionality perspective, the soul is limited with regard to actions that it is capable of when 
compared to a fully grown foetus. 
In Ayurveda, conception coincides with the “descent”/presence/inhabitation of the spirit in the 
womb. It means that from the beginning onwards an embryo is the spirit-matter composite 
constituting the human person. In other words, from the beginning, that is, from the moment of 
                                                 
2215 Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 60. 
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conception a human person is constituted. Therefore, one cannot draw a distinction between 
human being before “ensoulment” and human person after “ensoulment”: 
Traditional Hindu medical texts emphasize that the jiva, the individual abode of 
consciousness, is present from the moment of conception onwards through the process of 
foetal growth. These texts note no significant break or leap forward in this growth which 
would lead one to conclude that some qualitative change had taken place equivalent to the 
distinction suggested by some modern ethicists from human being to human person.2216 
To repeat what has already been affirmed, “In brief, the hominization of the individual takes 
place in the moment of conception and all future growth is only the actualization of conceptual 
potency.”2217 The genetic components are complete at conception, and therefore, Hinduism 
affirms the inviolability of the fetus. Consequently, abortion at some early stage of pregnancy 
would not be permissible. 
Therefore, the question in Ayurveda is not “when” exactly the soul descends into an embryo, 
but “how”. Ayurveda provides a precise definition of an embryo (garbha): After the ovum and 
sperm fertilize, the soul (ātman) takes hold of the fertilized ovum. The way the soul evolves 
depends on the karma of the person’s past life. The text explains elaborately how this happens. 
However, there is no reference to when it actually takes place. The only hint given to us is that 
“all this action takes place in a very short time”. That is the reason why it was mentioned that 
Ayurveda is not concerned with the time (when exactly) but how the process of unity of the 
soul with the fertilized ovum takes place. 
Taking this discussion further, from a medical-physiological-philosophical point of view (i.e. 
Ayurveda), insofar as the soul/self/ātman inhabits the body from the beginning of life, 
essentially and integrally with consciousness as part and parcel of the soul/self/ātman, one can 
allude that inherent dignity is present from the moment of conception. 
Thus, there is absolutely no possibility of a delayed animation. The reason is that in conception 
both material and non-material elements unite to form a unique entity. Ayurveda treats the 
human individual not in terms of matter and form or soul and body (Platonic thought), but as 
an integral whole.2218 Therefore, one can say that Ayurveda as a medical system is based on a 
holistic psychosomatic model of integration. 
Difficult questions in modern embryology, for example, identical twinning, poses no problem 
in Ayurveda. The omnipresent, non-created, ever-existing soul/ātman determines itself in 
which individual it would enter within the framework of a species, based on the karma of one’s 
previous life. Therefore, when it comes to the question of identical twinning, each garbha 
(embryo) receives its own soul, based on the karma of the past life. 
Ayurveda too is against abortion. Abortion is allowed only when it is clearly a question of 
weighing life against life – the life of the mother against the life of an embryo/foetus. When it 
happens that both cannot be saved, abortion is permissible as a last resort to save the life of the 
mother. It is to be noted here that in all these texts, the lives of both, the mother and the 
                                                 
2216 Harold G. COWARD, “Introduction”, in: IDEM et al. (ed.), Hindu Ethics. Purity, op. cit., 1-7; 4. Addition by 
author. Harold Coward is referring to Lipner’s article. Cf. LIPNER, “The Classical Hindu View on Abortion…”, 
53-54. 
2217 CRAWFORD, “Hindu Ethics…”, 26. Cf. YOUNG, The World’s Religions…, 127. 
2218 Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 308 & 332-333. 
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embryo/foetus, are accorded the greatest respect. Once again, these facts prove the respect due 
to an embryo. 
It is astounding to see how the insights of Ayurveda, which was written before the beginning 
of the Christian era, could already answer the challenges posed by modern day biology. Being 
primitive and using the philosophy of their time, the thrust laid on the respect and value of each 
human being needs to be appreciated, which perhaps the modern science seems to have 
neglected. The integral psychosomatic approach of Ayurveda using philosophy, religion, 
cosmology, psychology etc., is perhaps what is missing in today’s medical world. 
Turning now to new theological perspectives, the three systems of Vedānta Philosophy, namely, 
non-dualism (advaita), qualified non-dualism (viśiṣṭādvaita) and dualism (dvaita) are 
represented by Śaṅkarā, Rāmānuja and Madhva. 
For Śaṅkarā and Rāmānuja, God and human individuals are not two and for Madhva they are 
not one either. They are distinct and not separate! For Śaṅkarā and Rāmānuja, the ground of the 
self (ātman) is the bráhman. In a way, this tends to decrease the importance and dignity of the 
finite self. However, Madhva asserts it by exalting the inner witness (sākṣin) or man’s 
consciousness. These facts point to the conclusion that Śaṅkarā, Rāmānuja and Madhva had 
known the reality of the dignity of human person akin to the development of the concept in the 
West,2219 and in some way parallel to the Biblical “image of God likeness in human beings”. 
From what was discussed about Śaṅkarā, two things become clear in the discussion in the field 
of Bioethics. First, that an embryo, insofar as it has the ātman right from the beginning, is a 
person. Second, based on the fact of that consciousness is present in an embryo, because of the 
ātman in it right from the beginning (see Chapter 15.5.1, above); one can acknowledge that an 
embryo is a person. Ayurveda further confirmed this fact. However, according to Śaṅkarā, the 
presence of the individual self (puruṣa) is only a product of ignorance and has no substantial 
value. For him, it is an illusion, a spiritual ignorance or fabrication (māyā). However, what is 
valuable in the human embryo is the Universal Self, i.e., bráhman, which is the fundamental 
substratum of the individual self (puruṣa) and consciousness. Consequently, the value of the 
individual self is due to the presence of bráhman. However, one does not recognize this fact. 
All that can be said here is that the appearance of bráhman, as manifold jīvas, is a mystery.2220 
For Śaṅkarā, life (jīva) in an embryo is prior to the senses. The life (jīva) in an embryo regulates 
the development of the fertilized ovum. If it were not so, the ovum would putrefy. The senses 
with their apparatus develop out of the ovum subsequently. This life (jīva) is the same as puruṣa, 
which is another term employed by Śaṅkarā for the individual self. Therefore, one can observe 
here too that an embryo is a person from the beginning.2221 
From the deliberation on Rāmānuja, one can imply, as in Śaṅkarā, that the soul or the ātman 
with its integral consciousness is present right from the beginning of life. For Rāmānuja the self 
or the ātman that once informs the body, exists as an individual person and continues its 
existence until its realization with the bráhman as one and yet distinct but real. For Śaṅkarā 
ātman and bráhman are one and not distinct. For Rāmānuja, the soul in the human being is 
                                                 
2219 Cf. DE SMET, “Materials toward an Indo-Western Understanding…”, 46. 
2220 Cf. KULANGARA, “The Value of Human Life…”, 404-405. 
2221 Cf. ŚAṄKARĀ, Śārīraka-Bhāṣya, Chapter II, Pāda 4, Sūtra 9. Cf. Brajendranath SEAL, The Positive Sciences 
of the Ancient Hindus, Moti Lal Banarsi Dass, Delhi 1991, 243. See GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 327. 
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God’s spark in him/her.2222 The gracious condescension of God through pervading immanence 
and divine descent in man raises the man to his/her dignity. The identification of the ātman and 
bráhman is for Rāmānuja that which causes a familiarity and intimacy between the two and the 
ground for the inherent dignity of the human person. 
Moreover, based on the above implication of Rāmānuja, one can extend the argument to an 
embryo. It can be acknowledged that an embryo is qualified to be a person, endowed with 
intrinsic dignity from the beginning of life and persists to exist as an individual person in its 
lifetime on earth and even after it is liberated. Second, insofar as one recognizes the human 
dignity in an embryo, owing to its divinity, it is worthy of being given an equal platform and 
opportunity as other human individuals and to be treated with respect, so that it may have an 
opportunity to realize its liberation (moksha). 
Madhva’s attribution of a divine image to the self or jīvātman, its intrinsic relation with the 
bráhman, which is an essential and eternal metaphysical dependence for existence, 
consciousness and activity, and yet very distinct, bestows on a human individual a certain 
dignity. The dignity that is intrinsic to the individual can be extended even to an embryo as in 
the previous arguments, especially when compared to the Biblical idea of man made in the 
image of God. 
Given the fact that the term “human dignity” has gained its importance in the Twentieth 
Century, Śaṅkarā, Rāmānuja, or Madhva may not have used the term as it is meant today. 
Nevertheless, in their own way, while treating the subject of God and human being through 
their philosophical concepts, have ennobled and exalted the individual person as having a 
dignity beyond comparison. 
The metaphysical principle of equality of human beings can be seen in the realm of spirituality 
and mysticism in Hinduism. In Christianity, every human is an image of God. In Hinduism, 
both classical and modern, it was observed that ātman or the self is not different from bráhman. 
This implies an equality of humans in both the religions, although one may not be able to 
observe it. 
How does one see classical Hinduism interpreted by the Reformers of Hindu Renaissance in 
the twentieth century? Some of the influential persons who shaped the history of modern India 
and promoted human dignity are Roy, Vivekānanda, Gandhi and Rādhākrishnan. 
Roy’s aim was to purify Hinduism by returning to the Upaniṣads. He tried to emancipate the 
human mind from superstition, from obscurantism, for everything that lowers the dignity of 
man. He put this into practice by working for the social cause of the improvement of the lot of 
the Hindu women, promoting educational opportunities for girls, standing for the abolition of 
female infanticide, for the elimination of child marriage and polygamy, for removal of the 
stigma on widowhood, as well as for legal equality between women and men. In order to combat 
the caste system he encouraged inter-caste marriage. The Brahmo Samaj (One God Society) 
that he formed combined the ideals of Hinduism and Christianity. From the West, the Brahmo 
Samaj borrowed the principle of human dignity as well as the ethical system expressed in the 
Sermon on the Mount. Roy believed that Vedānta stood for monotheism and inculcated a 
fundamental respect for the dignity of all human beings. He believed that everyone is a fragment 
                                                 
2222 Cf. TIWARI, Classical Indian Ethical Thought…, 36-37. Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 203-204.  
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of that impersonal bráhman. Every human being has dignity and is the spark of the Divine. His 
contribution to Hindu Reformism could be said to result in the end product, namely, the Indian 
Constitution. 
Vivekānanda held that divinity dwelt in human beings. He considered that the creature should 
be regarded as God Himself and be served with a devout heart instead of posing to dole out 
mercy, because service to humankind was worship to God. For him the central meaning and the 
crux of the message of neo-vedānta was “oneness”. The ethical implication in the Advaita 
Vedānta according to him was the realization of self’s identity with bráhman, which is the all-
powerful Absolute. This realization leads further to acknowledge one’s compass of 
potentialities, which is just as unlimited as bráhman is. Vivekānanda emphasized the Vedāntic 
identification of man and God in order to raise the dignity of man in the world. However, 
Vivekānanda was shocked to find that the Vedas, which spoke of equality as the basis of society, 
were misinterpreted and that casteism had become a source of inequalities. Although he did not 
deal with individual issues of abortion or euthanasia, yet his social ethics and socialism were 
aimed at the removal of poverty, restoration of human dignity, provision of secular and spiritual 
knowledge for all people. 
Gandhi, the “Father of the Nation” was a religious reformer who encouraged the growth of a 
reformed, liberal Hinduism in India. Gandhi unified the message of Bhagavad-Gītā and the 
Sermon on the Mount. His two main outcomes of this unification was the cardinal virtue of 
ahiṁsā (nonviolence) and satya (truthfulness) among others. He also held for the Hindu notion 
of karma and dharma. Satya is the word that he used for Truth. After a continuous and relentless 
search after truth, he proclaimed, “God is Truth” and concluded, “Truth is God”. His faith in 
“Truth-God” put in terms of action was satyagraha. Satyagraha is an active side of ahiṁsā. 
Ahiṁsā was the most distinctive and the largest contribution of Hinduism to India’s culture. 
The virtue of ahiṁsā promoted reverence for all life forms, including an embryo. In this regard, 
abortion meant injuring or destroying the seed of life, a physical violence to the point of death, 
which was unacceptable to the Hindu genius of reverence for all life. 
Although Gandhi’s whole life and work was centred on the human person, yet one must 
acknowledge that Gandhi has not given a theory of human dignity. However, the value that he 
set on the human person attests to the fact that he was a fearless advocate of the dignity of the 
human person. Through his deeds and words, Gandhi affirmed that the dignity of man does not 
originate from birth, caste, race, colour, occupation, education, creed and religion. This fact is 
derived from the origin and nature of the spirit of ātman within him/her that makes his/her 
nature essential divine, as a part of God himself, and just like Rāmānuja and Roy, he too attested 
to the fact that the human being is a spark of the Divine. According to Gandhi, the privilege and 
dignity of man lies in the fact that man alone is made in the image of God, he alone is born to 
realize Truth-God. The inviolable dignity to which the human person is entitled comes from the 
spirit within and claims a permanent respect. Human dignity consists insofar as one obeys the 
call and relies on the strength of the spirit within. He also held that the dignity of the human 
person is guaranteed, affirmed and consisted in the exercise of the freedom of conscience. 
The basic dignity of man and woman is secured and guaranteed by the recognition of her/his 
fundamental rights, namely, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. According to Gandhi, these 
rights are inherent in the divine law and must be recognized in human laws. These words are 
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enshrined in the Constitution of India that was promulgated in 1950, two years after his death. 
Gandhi did have an influence on the formulation of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(1948), though not directly, but through his words. 
Rādhākrishnan, is the “unofficial successor and torch-bearer of Neo-Hinduism” as well as “the 
most impressive figure of twentieth century Neo-Hinduism”. He equated Vedānta to Hinduism. 
For him the central claim of Hinduism is that it is fundamentally a religion of experience. He 
based himself on the Upaniṣads and commented that the bráhman and ātman are one. He sees 
the quest in us for the divine and connects the human with the divine. Rādhākrishnan does not 
treat man merely as a worldly being or a creature but as essentially a divine being, a spark of 
God. Hence, he acknowledges that there is in the self of man, at the very centre of his being, 
something deeper than the intellect, which is akin to the Supreme. This implies the importance 
of the soul or ātman of the human person, which cannot be just ignored or thrown, off or 
annihilated, but that which must be respected per se. He also tried to substantiate the identity 
of the ātman with bráhman with evidences from the Bible. 
Rādhākrishnan uses the term puruṣa for person, which is a self-conscious personality that 
includes cognition, emotion, and will. What confers dignity on the self of man is the indwelling 
of the infinite within the finite. He believed that in the Hindu tradition every person has 
individuality worthy of reverence, and calls for the fostering of the spiritual development of the 
individual. The dignity of the soul is eternal because soul is eternal and therefore inviolable. He 
emphasized that beyond material help to the submerged people, a sense of human status and 
dignity has to be instilled in them. 
In the last analysis, the theme that runs through Roy, Vivekānanda, Gandhi and Rādhākrishnan, 
is the sacredness of life, meaning that God dwells in the human and therefore he/she is also 
divine. The human person is a “spark of the divine” so that the culmination of the concept aham 
brahmāsmi or tat tvam asi could be realized in them. This corresponds in some way to the image 
of God and likeness in the human being as envisaged in the Christian point of view. However, 
one notices that in Hinduism, especially in the empirical and social realm, there is no ethical 
equality of persons due to caste system.2223 Therefore, one also needs to reckon with negative 
aspects of caste system and the patriarchal system that shows an exaggerated desire for sons 
more than daughters that diminish the very concept of being human, exaggerated respect for 
cow worship and protection to the neglect of greater and due respect for human dignity and 
respect for human life. Reformers have struggled to correct some of these negative aspects.2224 
Hindu Renaissance Reformers wanted to change these negative traits by giving a renewed 
meaning that confers dignity on all human beings. Although some of them, like Vivekānanda, 
Gandhi and Rādhākrishnan wanted the caste system to be left as it is or by sidelining it, they 
strived to bring equality, worth and dignity among all Indians. Their view can be extended even 
to the beginning of life. 
Turning to modern Hinduism, one can raise the question regarding the issues pertaining to the 
beginning of life. How does modern Hinduism perceive them? Let us first take the instance of 
abortion. In cases of avoiding the possibility of a deformed or unhealthy child, or as a remedy 
                                                 
2223 Cf. THUMMA, “Human Person…”, 249-250. 
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for contraceptive failure, or for reasons that affects the standard of living, abortion would be 
unacceptable to Hindus. Abortion would be acceptable in cases where the growing embryo is a 
threat to the mother. While some would emphasize that an absolutist interpretation of scripture 
play no longer a central role, others would interpret any discussion on abortion should be based 
on virtue and not on rights and utility. Since Hinduism is embedded in a patriarchal mentality, 
social, cultural and religious factors determine the idea that family line runs through male 
representative. Several cases of female foeticide have been reported until today. However, 
Hindu religious leaders consider abortion used for the sake of sex selection and the preference 
for male children to be immoral amounting to infanticide. 
Hindu view on genetics stems from the belief in the spiritual continuity of the self or ātman. 
The spiritual continuity or saṁsāra is of a psychic nature and correspond in a spiritual sense to 
genes. Therefore, the genetic outcome one inherits is based on the karma of a person. 
Consequently, genetic determinism is unacceptable to Hindus. However, the basic Hindu 
ethical stance is that one cannot totally control nature. However, it may be manipulated for the 
greater good and individual advancement. In all such technological interventions, the decisive 
factor is whether it leads to the destruction of human life or to what extent it involves cruelty to 
any form of life, which is unacceptable. Procedures such as Gene Therapy and Genetic 
Screening techniques, insofar as they are used as preventive medicine, are acceptable in 
Hinduism. Hindu Bioethics bases itself on the principle of beneficence, self-improvement, 
principle of non-maleficence, principle of consequentialism or karma, principle of justice and 
principle of balance. In applying these principles, Hindu Bioethics favours plurality, namely, 
diversity and richness in individuality ordained by Nature. Hindu Bioethics approach to cloning 
is accommodative. Hinduism would however, be opposed on moral grounds to egoistic or 
spare-part cloning of other creatures for selfish motives. If the basic goal of medicine is to 
alleviate suffering, then it is welcome. 
In the secular context, religion does not play a great role in bioethical discussions. For example, 
abortion has been legalized in India following the enactment of the Medical Termination of 
Pregnancy Act, 1971. However, the sad situation is that it has also encouraged sex selection. 
This mentality stems from gender-bias and the secondary status given to women in India, even 
to female foetuses. It has resulted in a sharp decline on the Child Sex Ratio (CSR) that could 
cause social instability and has become a serious concern in India. 
Bioethical decisions in modern India poses several sensitive and difficult problems. When it is 
a question pertaining to the beginning of life, the dilemma often confronted is whether one 
could experiment, destroy embryos in the name of scientific advancement or throwaway excess 
of them from what are cryopreserved in the process of in vitro fertilization, etc. In India, there 
are Independent Ethics Committee (IEC) that follow the guidelines of the Indian Council of 
Medical Research (ICMR) to approve clinical trials and research on human subjects. 
The “Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act 1994” 
safeguards the respect and the dignity of women and consequently, the female foetus. Although, 
abortion is allowed in India, yet one cannot selectively choose to eliminate the female foetus, 
which affects the dignity and status of women. This is a praiseworthy step taken by the 
Government of India in promoting the dignity of the unborn female foetus. 
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The “Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human Subjects (2000)” acknowledges 
the fundamental personhood of the unborn. Similarly, the inclusion of the phrase in its Ethical 
Guidelines, namely, “the respect for the embryo’s moral status”, is a positive breakthrough in 
according respect to an embryo. With regard to the human embryonic stem cell research, the 
Ethical Guidelines speaks of the respect for autonomy of the donors. There is no mention about 
the respect for an embryo itself. 
India is a secular country and its Constitution too is secular, which assures and provides 
safeguard to the evil of violating the inalienable worth and dignity of the human person. It is in 
this secular culture, which esteems diversity, that the value of human dignity is embedded. The 
framers of the Constitution of India ensured that respect for diversity in the political community 
is an affirmation of human dignity. The CBCI has recognized that the Constitution of India, 
owing to its secular nature, provides safeguard to the evil of violating the inalienable worth and 
dignity of the human person. This falls in accordance with the Christian theology that holds 
human persons as made in the image of God and therefore endowed with inviolable dignity and 
inalienable rights. 
In the Preamble to the Constitution is enshrined the words: “assuring the dignity of the 
individual”. By this phrase, the Constitution assures everything that is entailed in the concept 
of the dignity of the human person. The concern for human dignity thus became the coveted 
theme of the Constitution of India expressed vividly in the Preamble. By its explicit reference 
in the unity in diversity of the Indian culture, human dignity is embedded as a constitutive value 
in the Preamble. 
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 states: “No person shall be deprived of his life 
[…].” The right to life in Article 21 encompasses human personality in its full blossom, to 
sustain the dignity of person and assures a life with dignity and equality. Thus, Article 21 
provides the right to live with human dignity. The right to life with human dignity encompasses 
within its fold, some of the finer facets of human civilization, which makes life worth living.  
What ramifications does the Constitution have in praxis in the field of secular Bioethics? In 
2004, a woman named Switi Kotecha, who was seven months pregnant, died in a car accident 
along with her husband and her father-in-law. Her mother-in-law, Kanta Kotecha, filed a claim 
of Insurance for the couple, her husband and the unborn child. The United India Insurance 
Company Ltd. refused to pay compensation for the unborn child. However, the Consumer Court 
of Maharashtra State overruled the insurance company’s decision. The highest civil court of 
Mumbai declared in 2007 in an unprecedented verdict that the unborn child is a living person, 
because the term “human foetus” implies an organism that is alive and growing. Therefore, an 
unborn child is considered as a living being and be entitled to personhood. Cardinal Oswald 
Gracias of Mumbai, who is the president of the CBCI, welcomed this decision.2225 
Thus, the secular field of Bioethics has taken steps to safeguard the inviolable dignity and worth 
of the unborn. The question now remains for an Indian Catholic Moral Theologian. How far 
can she/he apply the Constitution of India, which engrains human dignity, in a manner similar 
                                                 
2225 Jehangir B. GAI, “Unborn child is a living person”, in: Times of India 5th March 2007. See at: 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2007-03-05/india/27877954_1_unborn-child-kanta-kotecha-foetus, 
accessed on 13-10-13. Cf. Anto AKKARA, “Court Declares foetus a living person”, in: The Tablet 17 March 2007, 
32. See at: http://archive.thetablet.co.uk/article/17th-march-2007/33/india, accessed on 19.11.13. 
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to the German Moral Theologians in their bioethical discussions? This research informs that 
the application of the rich heritage of Hinduism and the value and worth that it places on human 
person and thereby her/his dignity in dilemmas confronting the beginning of life has still a long 
way to go in Indian Catholic Moral Theology. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
“Human Dignity is inviolable” (Grundgesetz Art. I, 1). So begins the highest principle of 
respect for human dignity that is enshrined in the Preamble of the German Constitution. The 
affirmation is becoming all the more important and pertinent in our contemporary society and 
in particular in the field of Bioethics. The importance attributed to the question of human dignity 
from the beginning of life has gained significant relevance and application in German Moral 
Theology. Following this impetus, this research has investigated the question posed in the 
General Introduction, namely, how can one construct a foundation of human dignity as a moral 
principle, which is acceptable universally, so that the inviolability of human life be assured 
from the very beginning of its existence? In order to probe into the question, two different 
perspectives, namely, German Moral Theological and Indian Moral Theological were handled, 
in order to see whether the inviolable dignity of the human person is still relevant in our modern 
society. Historically speaking, the concept of the dignity of the human person evolved from a 
Stoic Philosophy, refined by Medieval Theologian and Philosopher Thomas, English 
Philosophers Hobbes and Locke, crowned by German Philosopher Kant, and defended by 
contemporary Philosophers such as Spaemann and others. The outcome of their contribution 
has been absorbed and applied in Bioethics. The concept in Indian Moral Theology basically 
depends for its entirety on the Philosophy borrowed from the so-called “western” culture. In 
other words, Germany and India, although miles apart, as representatives of West and East 
respectively, reflect basically the development of Roman, Anglo-Saxon, European and German 
culture. However, the question still remained whether a universal claim of human dignity can 
be guaranteed. Therefore, in order to explore this possibility and the development of the concept 
of human dignity and its application in Bioethics in a very different culture and religion, an 
attempt was made to dialogue with Hinduism. 
In this investigation, the aim was to first assess why German Moral Theology gives so much 
importance to the dignity of the human person and uses the concept as a normative principle in 
the field of Bioethics. The findings suggest that, in general and with a few exceptions, German 
Moral Theology establishes the intrinsic worth of a human person in a systematic manner and 
grounds a normative basis for the dignity of the human person right from the moment of 
conception. 
In order to arrive systematically at the above conclusion, a working definition of human dignity 
was proposed that includes autonomy and reason based on the foundations of human dignity as 
envisaged by Kant and theological argument, namely, that human beings are created in the 
image of God. The definition read as: independent of the sex, origin, country, society, class, 
caste, profession, religion, culture or family every human individual, because of being human 
and made in the image of God has an inviolable intrinsic worth owing to his/her autonomy and 
endowed with reason which is recognized throughout one’s human life and respected but not 
granted; that cannot be lost, taken away, or damaged but can be disrespected and assaulted and 
is therefore subject to being defended and protected by human rights. 
In the above definition, human dignity is seen to be rooted in being human, i.e., it bases on 
specific characteristics. At least two hurdles can be foreseen. The first is the question of who is 
a human being? Does the human genetic code suffice to qualify as a human being? 
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Alternatively, does it depend on certain characteristics or a certain constitution to qualify and 
if so, should the actual exercise of the capacities or potential presence of them be sufficient?2226  
The second hurdle is with regard to its plausibility. Those who neither believe in the existence 
of God nor accept the notion of the image of God would reject this approach. Others who try to 
accord a special dignity to the human race per se reject this approach in the name of racism or 
sexism (Singer). Thus, every approach to human dignity finally rests on some form of an 
anthropological creed. Their plausibility therefore needs assessment.2227 Answers to these two 
hurdles will become clearer in the following paragraphs. 
Therefore, after having derived the above definition, it was necessary to see how German Moral 
Theology in particular establishes the human dignity of a human person in the field of Bioethics. 
Besides others, two important factors emerged, which play a major role in bioethical decision 
in Germany. The first is the influence of Kant and the second, the historically and 
philosophically influenced and shaped contours of Grundgesetz. These two facts contribute to 
the important role that human dignity plays in Bioethics from a philosophical and ethical-legal 
point of view. Why is such an approach adopted? It is because of the pluralistic milieu in which 
they live, German Moral Theologians makes ample use of the legal forum as well as 
philosophical arguments that appeal to all, especially in order to address people of all 
nationalities, religions and cultures. 
Since human dignity is a secular concept, is it not constitutive that it be based on secular reasons 
alone? A secular reason does not disagree with the religious foundation or put religious truths 
in jeopardy; in fact, they complement one another. Thus from a theological perspective, the 
religious reason enhances and connects the privileged status of people with their background 
and their transcendent future. It is in their creation as human persons by God that they are 
justified for the ultimate ground of their personal dignity. This special dignity is further 
enhanced by the fact of liberating action of Jesus who becomes the Saviour of the rejected, 
abandoned, downtrodden, helpless and the insignificant people. The triple-compound proximity 
of humans to God – the Creator God’s image in humans, God made man as a brother in Jesus, 
God’s intervention in perfecting a new man through Jesus – is theologically speaking, the final 
legitimation of human dignity and has its culmination in the eschatology. 
The evidences in this research also suggest that the concept of human dignity alone does not 
suffice to answer questions in the field of bioethics. The centrality of the concept of human 
person too plays a major role. The understanding of the concept of person is more important 
during the early developmental stage of the human being than the concept of human dignity 
itself.2228 Therefore, it was necessary to understand – parallel to the concept of human dignity – 
the notion of the human person. 
The concept of human person evolved and gained importance rather late in a similar vein as the 
concept of human dignity. The term “person” has become a cause of disagreement among some 
philosophers and more so in the field of Bioethics. Although, some hold that not all human 
                                                 
2226 John F. KILNER, “Human Dignity”, in: Stephen G. POST (ed.), Encyclopedia of Bioethics, 3rd Edition, Vol. 
2, Macmillan Reference/Thomson Gale, New York 2004, 1193-1200; 1197. 
2227 Cf. ibid. 
2228 Cf. HILPERT, „Die Idee der Menschenwürde…“, 52. See Chapter 9.2 at fn.924 above. 
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individuals are human persons, while others hold that all human persons are human individuals, 
it was argued that every human individual is necessarily a human person.  
Some philosophers use the concept of person as a genuinely practical attributive term to 
earmark the moral status of a human being: Following Kant – for whom a person is a moral 
being – one is attributed personhood insofar as he/she has the capacity as a moral agent. The 
normative understanding of the concept of person and one’s obligatory moral behaviour 
towards another is essential in order to apply it to bioethical questions, especially to issues 
related to the beginning of life. Since it belongs to human beings the moral capacity to act 
(owing to the body-soul unity), one must have respect for the dignity of his/her person even 
though the full expression of self-consciousness and rationality, and its explicit expression of 
the will is not clear at the beginning of one’s existence. 
Hence, the working definition of human dignity described above becomes problematic. If 
autonomy and reason are included as constitutive of human dignity, then at the beginning of 
life when these characteristics are not yet manifested, human dignity cannot be acknowledged. 
However, one cannot deny that these characteristics are not potentially present. Particularly, 
according to the arguments of Spaemann, a person does not begin his/her existence after the 
human being, nor does he/she end his/her existence before the human being. The one criterion 
for personality is the biological membership of the human race (See Chapter 2.5.3 above). It is 
only a question of time when the characteristics will be manifested. 
From a systematic theological perspective, the image of God likeness in the human person from 
the beginning of life and God’s call better explains to us that human dignity is to be recognized 
from that moment onwards and consequently a claim to the right to life. 
Since the concept of person belongs to a philosophical category and the concept of human 
dignity to the political, legal, anthropological and theological category, these two concepts 
needs to be kept apart. Modern ethics associates the general prohibition on killing with the 
moral status of human being as a person. Therefore, when dealing with an embryo as a human 
being, giving it a status that is morally relevant becomes essential in order to protect it. 
Consequently, the moral status of the human being as an adult person and the moral status of 
an embryo needed deliberation. 
Various sciences like biological, philosophical, anthropological and legal, per se and without 
reference to one another, cannot solve the above problem of the personhood of an embryo. It is 
necessary that all these sciences be taken in an integrated way to solve the problem. Based on 
this wisdom, the Catholic Church draws the conclusions from various sciences in order to take 
a position. The official position held by the Church and the German Legislators is the one that 
favours Karyogamy, as the beginning of a person. This position is termed by some as a 
“zygotist” position. The life of a human person begins with the moment of fertilization. The 
fusion of sperm and ovum, as non-persons, result in zygote that is a person and thereafter the 
process is a continuous one. With the coming into being of the zygote as a new human person 
there is a radical break from its sources. The radical break results in a person from non-persons. 
In other words, in the merging of two organelles, namely sperm and ovum, there results a new 
being, having a specific genetic structure that constitutes a human person. The resulting human 
person is both a biological organism as well as in the personal sense. From here on one could 
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date the spiritual soul of human person. It is in this spirit that the German legislature decided 
the Embryo Protection Act of 1990. 
It was also necessary to demonstrate differing opinions with regard to the individuation of the 
embryo from a historical perspective, in order to determine when the human person is ensouled. 
However, there is no one theory that is acceptable by all. The question of ensoulment remains 
unanswered and left open. Nevertheless, it must be stated here that the time of ensoulment does 
not play an important role when compared to the role of right to life and human dignity from 
the moment of its conception. In other words, from the beginning of life, an embryo is worthy 
of human dignity, has the right to life and therefore worthy of protection. The Catholic Church, 
although is aware of such debates regarding the exact moment when the zygote becomes a 
human person, has in the last analysis stood the ground and continues to teach that it is from 
the moment of conception that the journey of a human person begins. 
In Germany, six different positions are held with regard to the beginning of the moral status of 
the human embryo.2229 However, a majority of Moral Theologians hold on to the above theory 
that right from the moment of conception the fertilized ovum which is a human being, is 
absolutely worthy of intrinsic human dignity. The arguments put forward by those who hold 
this position are: the fact of the belongingness to the human species (Speziesargument), that 
human development is continuous (Kontinuumsargument), that there exists an identity between 
an embryo and a new born (Identitätsargument) and the potentiality that is present from the 
beginning of life, which characterizes it as a self-existent being (Potentialitätsargument). These 
four arguments together are the so-called SCIP argument, an abbreviation for species, 
continuous, identity and potential. These arguments must be understood in the sense that all of 
them are dependent on one another. Taken together, these arguments prove that right from the 
beginning of its existence, a human embryo is worthy of dignity. 
The most obvious result to emerge from the research is that the single-celled zygote is an 
individual organism. From conception onwards, the zygote takes on human characteristics and 
therefore must be assumed that personhood exists right after fertilization. Human life is personal 
life from its beginning. There is not a single significant feature during the development that 
could be stated as a separate beginning of individuation. The earliest possible moment of the 
anthropogenesis in the personal sense is the conception, i.e. “after” the fusion of egg and sperm. 
Personhood constitutes the essence and the dignity of human life. 
The terms such as “sanctity of life” and “reverence for life” have also been promoted and 
attempts have been made to identify them with human dignity. The concept of sanctity of life 
remains a useful and meaningful concept insofar as the protection of life in its weakest forms 
such as an embryo is concerned. However, the term “sanctity of life” does not provide direct 
and immediate help for the debate on normative ethics in bioethical issues. They are helpful 
and useful insofar as they provide a policy framework within which the debate on ethical 
standards can be extended. In the contemporary discussion, the term is actually used in the sense 
of “inviolability” or “untouchability” of human life (Unantastbarkeit des Lebens). Perhaps, a 
better term could be “sacredness of life”. 
                                                 
2229 Cf. REITER, „Bioethik…“, 15-17. See Chapter 5.2 at fn.599 above. 
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The two ideas of sacredness of life and human dignity intersect each other in the course of 
history repeatedly. One can observe that the two terms, namely, “sacredness of life” and 
“dignity” are brought together in play in Dignitas Personae.2230 Both these value terms are 
threatened in the present, especially when it comes to the question of prohibition on killing and 
euthanasia debate. Perhaps, due to the esteem given to human biological life, the idea of the 
sacredness of life could better preserve the esteem and integrity of physical vitality than the 
idea of the image of God itself.2231 
The significant findings to emerge from this study from an Indian Perspective shows that there 
are no major conflicts in the understanding of the human person and human dignity. Both, in 
Germany and India, the philosophical and theological foundations of human dignity are the 
same. From an Indian perspective, at the very outset it was said that it is imperative to make 
human dignity the universal key to moral interpretation, because there is no other value greater 
than human person is. However, the context in India is different from that of Germany. 
Violations of human dignity are very high in India. That speaks of the approach to the question 
of human dignity. Therefore, it is important to note here that the Western approach to human 
rights differs from the Eastern approach. “Generally speaking, the Asians have a holistic way 
of thinking which is distinct from the European individualistic way of thinking. Therefore, 
Asian people put higher value on holistic happiness and the welfare of the whole group or nation 
to which they belong rather than on their individual human rights.”2232 
The results of this research also support the idea that the evils enumerated above needs to be 
addressed by Moral Theologians in India. In such circumstances, it is inadequate to have an 
ethical approach, which is based on the dignity of the human person that is merely 
individualistic. The modern understanding of human rights was based on the theory of natural 
law and an appeal to reason. Indian Moral Theology uses a more person-oriented approach as 
well as a communitarian one. This is attested by Wilfred who argues that an Asian approach 
would be more spiritual in the sense of a movement away from the world of the self toward the 
world of the other, in order to participate in the suffering of the other and not cause harm to the 
other, something akin to ahiṁsā.2233 
Although, in India the concept of human dignity is acknowledged in the field of Bioethics, their 
application is not widely used as it is used in Germany. Nonetheless, in secular fields, especially 
in cases of suicide and euthanasia, appeals to human rights and human dignity have been raised. 
Campos suggests that the approach of Indian ethicists to human rights, which is seen from the 
perspective of the victims, is both social and communitarian, with a preferential option for the 
rights of the powerless.2234 In a milieu of Pluralism, as in an Asian context, that presents a 
challenge to theological ethics, he suggests that: 
                                                 
2230 “The respect for the individual human being, which reason requires, is further enhanced and strengthened 
in the light of these truths of faith: thus, we see that there is no contradiction between the affirmation of the dignity 
and the affirmation of the sacredness of human life.” DP 1,7. 
2231 Cf. BARANZKE, „Heiligkeit des Lebens…“, 109-110. 
2232 Hyakudai SAKAMOTO, “The Foundations of a Possible Asian Bioethics”, in: Ren-Zong QIU (ed.), Bioethics. 
Asian Perspectives. A Quest for Moral Diversity, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston 2004, 45-48; 
47. 
2233 Cf. CAMPOS, “Doing Christian Ethics in India’s ...”, 88. 
2234 Cf. ibid. 
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The most common approach is to resort to the natural law or to appeal to the humanum in its 
relational and responsible dimensions or to seek common ground in dialogue on the basis of 
shared human values and universal human rights. Dialogue is vital. We have much to learn, 
for example, from the teachings of Jainism and Buddhism about inward purity in ethical 
action and the ways of peaceful coexistence with all people and indeed with all creation.2235 
Therefore, considering their majority as the largest religion in India, this study ventured to 
attempt at a dialogue with Hinduism, All the texts, both in classical Hinduism and Ayurveda, 
point out to the fact that every person is endowed with respect and value. It was found that 
although in Hinduism the term “human dignity” in general does not exist, the meaning inherent 
in it is acknowledged. Vivekānanda glorified Hinduism and asserted, “No religion on earth 
preaches the dignity of humanity in such a lofty strain as Hinduism”.2236 Indian Legalists, such 
as Sunil Deshta and Lalit Dadwal, too acknowledge this fact. They write: 
It may be recalled that from time immemorial Indians have called their culture by the name 
of ‘human culture’ (Manav Dharam/Manav Samriti). No gain saying the fact that human 
dignity had universal appeal and Indian culture had tried to be so comprehensive as to suit 
the needs of every human being, irrespective of age, colour, sex or caste.2237 
It is to be noted that the above fact of a comprehensive inclusion of every human being, 
irrespective of age, colour, sex or caste has been taken into account and is reflected in the 
working definition of human dignity. 
Hinduism considers that the final goal of every human person would be the striving of the 
human soul (ātman) to be liberated and finally to be joined with the Eternal Soul (Ātman). The 
divine image in human beings reflects the All Eternal Being, the Bráhman.2238 This again is 
close to the idea of the image of God likeness in human beings in the Christian Tradition. 
Similar to the definition of Boethius and Thomas, who held for the three metaphysical concepts 
in a person, namely, rationality, substance and individuality, Hindu metaphysics too have 
somewhat similar ideas. The Western rationality corresponds to the Hinduism namely, rational 
(cit), or conscious (caitanya), self-luminous (svayamjyotiṣṭva) and “witness” (sākṣitva, as 
applied specially to the concept of Puruṣa). The concept in Hinduism, which is closest to the 
Western idea of substance, is the ātman, the Self, the ultimate root of all existence. With regard 
to individuality, Hindu metaphysics affirms that the absolute reality is without a second, that is, 
advaita, meaning transcendent and of a nature eternally pure, awakened and free 
(nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvarūpa). In another sense, it speaks of the person as not distinct 
from others, that is, it remains the soul of everything, intimately united to the universe 
(sarvātman). Besides, the three components of the person, Hindu metaphysics add another 
notion, which is an important doctrine that affects human personality, namely, the doctrine of 
rebirth. The fact that Hinduism believes in rebirth that presupposes the theory of karma, which 
results in the ātman re-appearing in all forms is a main obstacle for the “Western” mind. This 
difficulty, namely, the possibility of the same soul being reborn in all sorts of bodies, prevents 
the choice of such a special term as “person” to designate the status of the human. 
                                                 
2235 Ibid., 89. 
2236 ROLLAND, The Life of Vivekananda…, 70. Cf. BHUYAN, Swami Vivekananda…, 18. 
2237 DESHTA/DADWAL, “Genesis of Human Rights…”, 40. Cf. JOSHI, “The Right to Equality…”, 83.  
2238 Cf. DHAVAMONY, Classical Hinduism…, 117 & 135. See also KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 
365. 
 General Conclusion 433 
 
 
 
It was also shown that Hinduism was concerned about the well-being and health of a person 
that is enshrined in the medical system of the Hindus, namely, the ancient Ayurveda system. 
This medical system itself was influenced by religion as any other system in the world. The 
religious influence dictated over the ethical behaviour of a person in his/her daily life.  
One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study of the Ayurvedic system was 
the moral status of an embryo. According to Ayurveda, an embryo is produced from the Soul 
(ātman). The antarātman (Soul inside the animal body) is the same as Garbhātman (Soul in the 
foetus). This is known as jīva or animated Soul. According to religious scriptures, this Soul is 
eternal. The soul is the one that produces an embryo, which was never born earlier. In other 
words, the same Soul subsequently transforms itself into an embryo and in this way, the Soul 
can be said to have been born. Therefore, it is by the process of transformation into the various 
stages of embryo that the Soul in a way is born. However, the soul cannot achieve this without 
combining with other elements. The embryo is a conglomeration of several factors, namely, 
mother (ovum), father (sperm), Soul, wholesomeness, rasa (the digestive matter derived from 
the mother as nutrition) and mind. The mind serves as the connecting link between the body 
and the soul. Ayurveda also answers the question about the consciousness of the embryo. 
Ayurveda holds that the Soul is endowed with consciousness even when it does not possess 
sense organs. The soul can never be separated from the mind, and so, it is always endowed with 
consciousness, although from a functionality perspective the Soul is limited with regard to 
actions that it is capable of as in a fully-grown foetus. However, many of the modern Anglo-
Saxon and European philosophers deny the fact of the presence of consciousness in an embryo. 
Classical Hinduism and Ayurveda are clear in this regard. Consciousness cannot be separated 
from the soul. 
In Ayurveda, conception coincides with the “descent” or presence of the spirit in the womb, 
meaning that from the beginning onwards the embryo is the spirit-matter composite constituting 
the human person. Thus, one cannot draw a distinction between human being before 
“ensoulment” and human person after “ensoulment”. The implication is that abortion at some 
early stage of pregnancy would not be permissible. 
Therefore, the question in Ayurveda is not “when” exactly the soul descends into the embryo, 
but “how”. The precise definition of the embryo (garbha) attest to this fact: “The union of 
sperm, ovum and the Soul in the womb is designated as embryo”.2239 After the ovum and sperm 
fertilize, the soul (ātman) takes hold of the fertilized ovum. The way the soul evolves depends 
on the karma of the person’s past life. The text explains elaborately how this happens in a very 
short span of time.2240  However, there is no reference to when it actually takes place. This is 
the reason why Ayurveda is not concerned with when (the exact time) but how (the process) 
the soul unites with the fertilized ovum.2241 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the above study that the classical Hindu view 
saw man as a part of the universe in the natural order, and as part of the Ātman (Purusha) in the 
ontological order. Because of the theory of Karma and rebirth, the human being is taken beyond 
                                                 
2239 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 4.5. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 388. 
2240 Caraka Saṁhitā, Śārīrastāna 4.8. Agniveśa’s Caraka Saṁhitā, Vol. 2, op. cit., 390. 
2241 Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 371. 
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the sphere of one’s life. Therefore, the human individual does not begin and does not die 
definitively. There is a passage of birth and death, until one is finally liberated (jīvanmukta) 
from the earthly reality to be united with the Ultimate Ātman, namely, the Bráhman.  
Thus, irrespective of the stage of development, every human individual is a human person. The 
dignity of the human individual does not come from without; rather, from within by his/her 
very nature.2242 
Given the fact that the term “human dignity” has gained its importance in the Twentieth 
Century, the renowned philosophers of Hinduism like Śaṅkarā, Rāmānuja, or Madhva may not 
have used the term as it is meant today. Nevertheless, in their own way, while treating the 
subject of God and human being through their philosophical concepts, have ennobled and 
exalted the individual person as having a dignity beyond comparison. Taking this discussion 
further, from a medical-physiological-philosophical point of view, insofar as the soul so 
described by them is present from the beginning of life, essentially and integrally with 
consciousness as part of the soul, one can only conclude that inherent dignity is present from 
the beginning of life. The virtue of dharma, a concept similar to human rights in the Western 
tradition, exhorts the Hindus to refrain from causing harm to others but at the same time to 
uphold the right to life. This virtue of dharma can be developed by one’s own will. Similarly, 
the virtue of ahimsa promotes reverence for all life forms and also forbids the killing of another, 
especially the weaker forms of life, in our context, even embryos. This teaching is coupled with 
the question of rebirth for two reasons. First, the person who hinders an embryo by causing its 
death prevents its partaking in the cycle of rebirth. Second, consequent to this prevention, the 
embryo is not given a chance to strive towards its salvation. This is something evil in the eyes 
of the Hindus. The human being needs to overcome the bondage of a cycle of rebirth by living 
a purposive life as a moral agent and a spiritual being, finally achieving liberation. This whole 
purpose is defeated in cutting short the life of an embryo. Interestingly, the Western tradition, 
especially the Christian tradition is foreign to these virtues and concepts. 
The theme that runs through modern reformers, like Mohan Roy, Vivekānanda, Gandhi and 
Rādhākrishnan, stands out very clear. They held for the sacredness of life meaning that God 
dwells in the human and therefore he/she is also divine, having a “spark of the divine” so that 
the final culmination of the concept aham brahmāsmi (= I am God) or tat tvam asi (That thou 
art) could be realized in them. Thus, the Indian Renaissance thinking corresponds in some way 
to the image of God and likeness in the human being as envisaged in the Christian point of 
view. It is this fact that acknowledges the inherent dignity of the human person. All these 
reformers strived to bring equality and worth among all Indians, thereby sidelining the caste 
system. 
Ratzinger attests to the above fact with regard to the Christian concept of the person taken over 
by the Hindu reformers. Ratzinger brings out this aspect in a passage referring to Horst Bürkle 
regarding the actual practice in the life of Hindu society, in which the idea of a person is 
irreplaceable as an ultimate value. Bürkle says: 
                                                 
2242 Cf. ibid., 359. A comparison can be made here with regard to the comments of Reiter, namely, “Die Würde 
des Menschen ist mit seiner Existenz gegeben und Gegenstand nicht einer Zuerkenntnis, sondern Anerkenntnis. 
REITER, „Die Menschenwürde und ihre Relevanz…“, 135. “Human dignity pre-exists with existence of man and 
is not awarded (Zuerkenntnis), but acknowledged (Anerkenntnis).” Tr. by the author.  
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The development of modern Hinduism shows that for the idea of man in India today, also, 
this concept of personhood has become indispensable [...]. The experience of identity as 
found in the Upanishads, tat tvam asi, offers no adequate basis for the enduring validity and 
dignity of the uniqueness, as an individual, of every single person. This cannot be reconciled 
with the notion that this life is merely a transitory phase in the rhythm of changing levels of 
reincarnation. It is impossible to maintain the individual value and dignity of the person if 
this is merely a passing phase and subject to variation […]. The modern reforms of Hinduism 
are thus quite logically committed to asking about the dignity of man. The Christian concept 
of the person is taken over by them in the Hindu context as a whole, without its foundation 
in the concept of God.2243 
Based on the above passage of Bürkle, Ratzinger then concludes: 
It would not be difficult to show, however, that the concept of the individual as a person, and 
thus the defense of the individual value and dignity of each person, cannot in the end itself 
be maintained without its foundation in the idea of God.2244 
Ratzinger points out two important facts here that are verified in Hinduism. First, the idea of 
personhood cannot be maintained without its foundation in the idea of God. In the current 
research, it has been shown that not only in classical Hinduism, but also in the Hindu 
theologians like Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānuja and Madhva, as well as every modern Hindu 
Reformer, indeed always brought along the idea of God and the concept of the human person 
together, based on their indigenous understanding of personhood in Hinduism. Therefore, the 
fact that Ratzinger states is verified in Hinduism, which acclaims a person as tat tvam asi (That 
art thou), founding the idea of personhood on the idea of God. Although, the ideas of 
personhood in Catholicism and Hinduism is different (owing to its basis on different 
philosophies), yet it was noted that one can draw some similarities between the understanding 
of personhood, especially with regard to rationality, substance and individuality. 
Second, Ratzinger points out that the defense of the individual value and dignity of each person 
cannot be maintained without its foundation in the idea of God. Again, what Ratzinger is stating 
is verified in Hinduism and this has been pointed out in the research. The value and dignity of 
                                                 
2243 Bürkle writes: „Die Entwicklung im neuzeitlichen Hinduismus zeigt, dass auch für das heutige indische 
Menschenbild dieses Personverständnis unverzichtbar geworden ist… Die upanishadische Identitätserfahrung des 
tat tvam asi vermag die bleibende Gültigkeit und Würde der individuellen Einzigartigkeit jedes einzelnen 
Menschen nicht zu begründen. Sie lässt sich nicht mit der Vorstellung vereinen, dieses Leben sei nur eine 
Durchgangsphase im Rhythmus wechselnder Wiedergeburtsstufen. Der Eigenwert der Person und ihre Würde 
lassen sich nicht als Durchgangsstadium und unter den Bedingungen ihrer Variabilität festhalten […]. Die 
Reformen des Hinduismus in der Neuzeit setzen darum auch konsequent in der Frage nach der Menschenwürde 
ein. Das christliche Personverständnis wird bei ihnen ohne seine Grundlegung im Gottesverständnis in den 
hinduistischen Gesamtzusammenhang übernommen […].“ Horst BÜRKLE, Der Mensch auf der Suche nach Gott 
– die Frage der Religionen, AMATECA, Lehrbücher zur katholischen Theologie, Bd. 3, Bonifatius, Paderborn 
1996, 130-131. See Joseph RATZINGER, Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions, Ignatius Press, 
San Francisco 20043, 47. Original German Title: Joseph RATZINGER, Glaube-Wahrheit-Toleranz. Das Christentum 
und die Weltreligionen, Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau 20043, 39-40. 
2244 Cf. RATZINGER, Truth and Tolerance…, 47. Ratzinger writes here in German: „ Es wäre nicht schwierig 
zu zeigen, dass das Verständnis des einzelnen als Person und so die Verteidigung von Eigenwert und Würde jeder 
Person sich aber letztlich gerade nicht ohne die Grundlegung im Gottesgedanken selbst durchhalten lässt.“ IDEM, 
Glaube-Wahrheit-Toleranz…, 40. 
436 General Conclusion  
 
 
 
each person, in Hinduism is based on the fact that the human is made in the image of God 
(ātman = bráhman).2245 
However, having acknowledged these facts, yet it becomes difficult for Christian Theologians 
to reconcile with the fact of rebirth theory, with the question of individual, unique and enduring 
validity of each person beyond one’s death. For a classical Hindu believer – which stresses on 
the karma and the cycle of rebirth – individual historical existence is not significant. Therefore, 
there is no serious concern with regard to human dignity or personhood that is enduring even 
after death. The main and serious concern for a Hindu is that one’s ātman becomes united with 
bráhman.2246 Human life in the present world is significant insofar as it helps one to overcome 
the cycle of rebirth and achieve this purpose, namely, to re-join in the individuality of bráhman. 
Nevertheless, in claiming the transitory nature of human life, the Hindus do not mean that 
human beings have no dignity, worth, value, or be treated with disrespect, because their idea of 
dignity is based on the idea of God. This has been clarified in this research. 
From a legal point of view, one can make a comparison of Germany with India. Somewhat 
similar to the Grundgesetz of Germany, one can find affirmative assertions in the Constitution 
of India. Although India is a secular country, it assures through its Constitution and provides 
safeguard to the evil of violating the inalienable worth and dignity of the human person. Article 
21 of the Constitution encompasses human personality in its full blossom, to sustain the dignity 
of person assuring a life with dignity and equality. Nonetheless, as far as it is known, these laws 
enshrined in the Constitution have not been given sufficient importance in the field of Bioethics 
to draw any consequence on the human dignity with issues related to the beginning of life. 
However, in Germany, and for some Western traditions, the consequence of the laws enshrined 
in their Fundamental Constitution or Legal instruments bear a central significance in their 
bioethical debates as well as in German Moral Theology. This is found wanting in Indian Moral 
Theology. 
Taken together, these results suggest that from a philosophical, religious, medical and legal 
perspective there are some similarities between Catholic Theology and Hinduism, although 
their approaches are found to be different. The approaches, as such, are not contradictory but 
are complementary to the understanding of human dignity, especially from the beginning of 
life. It must be remembered that one cannot attempt for a univocal merger of the two, which 
would result in injustice to both. One needs to appreciate what is common, while respecting the 
differences2247 in an attempt towards a dialogue between them. This has been the project in this 
research. 
                                                 
2245 Gandhi had already affirmed the idea of man as image of God. According to him, it could mean that man 
has within himself the spirit (ātman) to a higher degree than all other living or non-living beings, and by virtue of 
this man is the spark par excellence of the divine. Cf. DOONGDOONG, “The Dignity of Man…”, 56 at fn.15. 
Doongdoong notes here that the uniqueness of man as image of God lies, not in the mere presence of the spirit, 
but in the fact that man possesses the highest degree of the spirit. See Chapter 17.4.4 at fn. 2009 & 2010 above. 
2246 RATZINGER, Truth and Tolerance…, 45. Ratzinger writes here: “[…] the final aim of man is to become 
one with, and dissolve in, the All-One”. The German version reads: „ […] und das Ziel des Menschen das 
Einswerden und Aufgehen im All-Einen ist.“ IDEM, Glaube-Wahrheit-Toleranz…, 38. Ratzinger is here basing 
himself on Bürkle with regard to the ātman-bráhman identity. See BÜRKLE, Der Mensch auf der Suche nach 
Gott…, 127. Cf. RATZINGER, Truth and Tolerance…, 45 at fn. 1. IDEM, Glaube-Wahrheit-Toleranz…, 40, fn.33. 
2247 Cf. GONSALVES, How did I begin?..., 358. 
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The findings of this study suggest that human dignity is to be recognized and acknowledged 
from the beginning of life irrespective of origin, caste, creed, religion, sex, culture, nationality, 
etc.2248 Insofar as human dignity is recognized and acknowledged as a fundamental principle of 
morality, the respect and protection worthy of the embryo be assured. The protection itself is 
ensured through the right to life of an embryo from its very beginning through instruments of 
human rights. 
Human beings are rational beings. They by virtue of their being human possess certain basic 
and inalienable rights, which are commonly known as human rights. These rights of human 
beings are not derived from being a national of certain State, but belong to them because of 
their very existence and are based upon the attributes of human personality. They are derived 
from the inherent dignity and worth of human being […]. The expression ‘dignity of the 
human person’ means nothing if it does not signify that the human person has the right to be 
respected, is the subject of rights, possesses rights. To have human rights, one need not do 
anything special than be born a human being.”2249 
This study has shown that religious arguments, whether they stem from Christian Theology or 
Hindu Theology, cannot, as stand-alone argument in a pluralistic multi-religious society, 
legitimize right to life in assuring human dignity to all, especially to those who are in their 
weakest form, namely, from the beginning of life. Right-to-life discourse demands that the 
reasons for its implementation be accessible to all, which means not only to people of all faiths, 
but also to those who do not believe in a personal God. This is possible through the outcome of 
the integrated effort of philosophical, anthropological, social, medical or legal sciences, as well 
as the contribution of other sciences in the understanding of right to life. Ultimately, the right-
to-life discourse must be related to the ethical principles of safeguarding life in its weakest 
form. One such fundamental ethical principle is human dignity. In other words, Srampickal 
sums up some basic and essential conclusions that can be drawn from the present study, which 
is necessary for: 
[...] an integral approach, enlightened by scientific findings, philosophical reflection and 
sufficiently based on a theological anthropology, which helps us to understand and appreciate 
the dignity and value of the human person/life and take a corresponding stand with regard to 
the embryo”.2250  
The most obvious result to emerge from this research, which enhances the understanding of 
human dignity from the beginning of life, can be summarized as follows: 
 That, each one of us is a human individual, is sacred, worthy of respect and 
value. In short, each one is intrinsically endowed with human dignity. This is 
acknowledged in both German and Indian Moral Theology, in a philosophical 
and theological sense. It is to be noted that there is an enduring continuance of 
the individuality and personality that begins at conception. In Hinduism too the 
sacredness, value and worth of every individual, which ultimately refers to the 
                                                 
2248 Cf. JOSHI, “The Right to Equality…”, 83 and DESHTA/DADWAL, “Genesis of Human Rights in India…”, 
35. 
2249 Ibid. Deshta and Dadwal are following here the theory of Jacques Maritain, who is invoking natural law in 
order to establish human rights. See Jacques MARITAIN, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, Geoffrey Bles, 
London 1958, 37. Cf. Maurice CRANSTON, What are Human Rights?, The Bodley Head, London/Sydney/Toronto 
1973, 7. 
2250 SRAMPICKAL, “The Catholic View of Human Life…”; 96. 
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inherent dignity, is claimed and acknowledged from the very moment of 
conception. However, the enduring continuance of the individuality and 
personality is short-lived, in the sense that after death the self or ātman re-enters 
into another individual and continues the cycle until its final salvation depending 
on karma. Because of its sacredness, the self or ātman, which continues through 
the cycle, insofar as it becomes the animating principle in a human being, the 
human individual has intrinsic dignity during one’s lifetime. At the final 
salvation, the self or ātman returns back to the individuality of the Bráhman. 
 That, everyone is worthy (being) because of one’s very being (Dasein) and not 
because of what one possesses (having) as characteristics which began at the 
beginning of life. The problem (as claimed by some Anglo-Saxon philosophers), 
namely, the absence of certain characteristics of an embryo based on which an 
embryo is disqualified to be a person, does not exist in Hinduism. For them, 
since the ātman possesses these characteristics, the human person exists right 
from the moment of conception, because the ātman is part of the definition of an 
embryo that animates it. 
 Therefore, each one of us from the beginning of our life as human individual – 
which is at the moment of fertilization/conception – have inherent human 
dignity. 
 Hence it follows: Independent of the sex, origin, country, society, class, caste, 
religion, culture or family every human individual, because of being human, 
from the beginning of life has an inviolable intrinsic dignity recognized 
throughout its life and respected but not granted; that cannot be lost, taken 
away, or damaged but can be disrespected and assaulted and is therefore subject 
to being defended and protected by human rights. 
In the last analysis, a variety of historical, philosophical, cultural, religious as well as medical 
resources have been drawn, from both Germany and India, in order to grapple with the threats 
that Science poses to the contemporary world. It was observed that an integrated contribution 
of these sciences is necessary to answer the human dignity from the beginning of life and to its 
right of life. This is attested by Schockenhoff’s deliberation, namely, that the human dignity 
that one owes to the human embryo from the moment of conception as an unconditional moral 
and legal respect (which is accorded to every human being in the physical and spiritual 
wholeness of existence), can rely on a remarkable convergence of developmental-biological, 
anthropological and philosophical arguments. These arguments can be regarded as well-
founded even without alluding to a religious coloring, especially in a pluralistic society.2251 
These findings have enhanced the understanding of the dignity of the human person from the 
beginning of life. Therefore, owing to the respect and protection due to the human embryo this 
research does not support any recommendations of experimentation on them that will eventually 
                                                 
2251 Cf. SCHOCKENHOFF, Ethik des Lebens…, 507-508. 
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destroy them, not even for the greater good of future generations.2252 One cannot sacrifice even 
one embryo for the good of others, because each of them has an inviolable and inherent dignity. 
Pope Benedict XVI had reiterated this. Speaking in the context of Stem Cell Research, he said:  
Those who advocate research on embryonic stem cells in the hope of achieving such a result 
make the grave mistake of denying the inalienable right to life of all human beings from the 
moment of conception to natural death. The destruction of even one human life can never be 
justified in terms of the benefit that it might conceivably bring to another.2253 
However, those experiments that will further the medical research in finding solutions to 
problems without bringing any harm to the embryos or those experiments that will eventually 
help in their survival as a therapeutic measure are strongly supported.2254 
In summary, as envisioned by Hilpert, it can be stated that the legal commitment to human 
dignity and its associated human rights heritage goes back to 2,000 years of Christian tradition. 
National law and government as well as international law today will continue and maintain that 
legacy for the sake of respect for religion and freedom of conscience of each individual. It is a 
manifestation of the human dignity and not so much as former premises of a largely self-evident 
and of shared religious beliefs. The society that has become pluralistic today would do well by 
engaging the religious traditions and interpretations in order to ascertain repeatedly by 
considering those resources to strengthen, secure and renew permanently the ethos of respect 
for those gifted with human dignity. At least this consideration needs to go beyond them while 
being sensitive and strengthening those who are in a precarious condition as something 
humane.2255 
Thus, this research, heeding to the humane point of view, has endeavored to claim that human 
dignity is inherent from the beginning of human life. 
                                                 
2252 See Ibid., 237. Here in the latest 2013 edition Schockenhoff explains: „Jeder Mensch ist um seiner selbst 
willen zu achten, und niemand darf ausschließlich als Mittel zu einem fremdem Zweck – auch nicht um einen 
hohen Gutes wie der Gesundheit künftiger Generationen willen – geopfert werden.“ “Every person is to be 
respected for his/her own sake, and no one may be willed exclusively outside its intended purpose to be sacrificed 
– not even for the sake of the higher level of good health of future generations.” Tr. by author. 
2253 BENEDICT XVI, Address of his Holiness Benedict XVI to Participants in an International Conference 
Promoted by the Pontifical Council for Culture on Saturday 12 November 2011 in Clementine Hall, Vatican, 
Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican 2011. 
2254 Cf. ibid. 
2255 Cf. HILPERT, „Die Idee der Menschenwürde…“, 53-54. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
1. General Abbreviations, Periodicals, Series, Source Works and Handbooks for German and 
some English works are taken from “Abkürzungsverzeichnis”, in LThK3 (Sonderausgabe) 11 
(2009) 692-733. 
2. Biblical Abbreviations from: Holy Bible: Revised Standard Version, op. cit. 
3. Other special Abbreviations used: 
Apte APTE, V. S., The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary, op. cit., 4 vols. 
BG Bhagavad-Gītā, The. With a commentary based on the original source, ed. by 
R. C. ZAEHNER, op. cit. 
BVerfG Bundesverfassungsgericht. Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 
BVerfGE  Bundesverfassungsgericht Entscheidung. Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany Decision 
CBCI Catholic Bishop’s Conference of India 
CCBI Conference of Catholic Bishops of India 
CCC Catechism of the Catholic Church 
Com. PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, Compendium of the Social 
Doctrine of the Church, op. cit. 
CSR  Child Sex Ratio 
CWG GANDHI, M. K., The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, op. cit., 93 vols. 
CWV VIVEKĀNANDA, S., The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, op. cit., 9 
vols. 
FABC Federation of Asian Bishop’s Conference 
FBMEC FIAMC Bio-Medical Ethics Centre (Mumbai) 
FIAMC Fédération Internationale des Associations Médical Catholique 
fn.  footnote 
ICMR  Indian Council of Medical Research 
MWM MONIER-WILLIAMS, M., Sanskrit-English Dictionary. op. cit. 
Nr./No. Nummer, number (s) 
Skt. Sanskrit 
Tr./tr. translator/translation/translated 
vs. versus 
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TRANSLITERATION AND PRONUNCIATION 
OF SANSKRIT LETTERS 
VOWELS: 
a short ‘a’, pronounced like ‘a’ as in America. 
ā long ‘a’, pronounced like ‘a’ as in father. 
e short ‘e’, pronounced like ‘e’ as in get. 
ē long ‘e’, pronounced like ‘ai’ as in aid. 
i short ‘i’, pronounced like ‘i’ as in pin. 
ī long ‘i’, pronounced like ‘ee’ as in bee. 
ai diphthong ‘ai’, pronounced like ‘y’ as in try. 
o short ‘o’, pronounced like ‘o’ as in home. 
ō long ‘o’, pronounced like ‘o’ as in cool. 
u short ‘u’, pronounced like ‘u’ as in put. 
ū long ‘u’, pronounced like ‘oo’ as in food. 
au diphthong ‘au’, pronounced like ‘ow’ in how. 
ṛ short ‘ri’, pronounced like ‘ri’ as in merrily. 
ṛi long ‘ri’, pronounced like ri’ as in marine. 
 
CONSONANTS: 
Generally as in English. 
ś ‘s’, pronounced like ‘sh’ as in sure. 
ṣ ‘sh’, pronounced like ‘s’ as in shun. 
s ‘s’, pronounced like ‘s’ as in hiss. 
ṁ  nasalization of the previous vowel, pronounced like ‘m’. 
n ‘n’ pronounced like ‘n’ as in nut. 
ṅ nasalization, pronounced like ‘n’ as in sing. 
ṇ  nasalization like ‘n’ in none. 
ñ palatal nasal, pronounced like ‘n’ as in binge. 
ṭ ‘t’, pronounced like ‘t’ as in true 
th ‘t’ as in pent-house. 
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acetana non-conscious. 
advaita  non-dualism. The system of philosophy that believes that ultimate reality 
is bráhman and all creation is merely a manifestation of bráhman in time 
and space. It refers to the identity between ātman and bráhman, that is, 
the self of a person is identical with the ground of all being, the bráhman. 
Advaitins follower of the advaita system of philosophy. 
adhyāsa superimposition, i.e., all human subject-object knowledge is distorted 
because of superimposition so that the subject is unable to find objective 
truth. 
agni fire. One of the five mahābhūtas. One of the important Vedic gods. 
aham ego, self. 
ahamkāra literally the “I-maker”. A reflection of the “I” or self, principle of 
individuation, egotism. 
aham brahmāsmi  ‘I am Brahma!’ 
ahiṁsā written also as áhiṇsā, i.e., not injuring anything, harmlessness, 
“nonviolence”. It is the opposite of himsa, which is killing, causing 
violence or injury. 
ākāśa ether, space. One of the five mahābhūtas. 
anādi beginning-less; without beginning, eternal. 
ānandá bliss, happiness, joy, enjoyment. ‘Pure happiness’ is one of the three 
attributes of Bráhman. The other two are cit and sat. 
aṇima minuteness, smallness, fineness, atomic nature. 
antarātman the inner self or the soul that resides within the being, conscience. 
antaryāmi the inner ruler, namely, the soul, bráhman in one’s heart. 
anubhava perception or experience of reality. 
Anugītā part of the epic of Mahābhārata and the second discourse of Kṛṣṇa to his 
disciple Arjuna. 
anuloma permissible intercaste marriage in which the man belonged to the higher 
caste. 
aparigraha without any possessions. 
araṇya forest. 
artha object, meaning, wealth. It is one of the puruṣārthas or goals of life. The 
others are kāma, dharma and mokṣa. 
Aryans A group of tribes that invaded India about two thousand years BCE. 
Āraṇyaka  are forest treaties of the Vedas. 
Arjuna Warrior and hero of Mahābhārata and Bhagavad-Gītā. Disciple of 
Kṛṣṇa. 
āśramas hermitage, stages of life. 
                                                 
Glossary compiled from the following sources: MONIER-WILLIAMS, Sanskrit-English Dictionary…, op. cit., 
WOOD, Vedanta Dictionary…, op. cit., KLOSTERMAIER, A Survey of Hinduism…, 587-610 and GONSALVES, How 
did I begin?..., xxi-xxxii. 
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asteya not stealing. 
āstika orthodox. Hindu Philosophical system that accepts the authority of the 
Veda. 
Atharva Veda Veda containing a collection of magical formulas. 
ātman  the essential Divinity, or light of consciousness that resides in each 
individual; self, soul, being The ultimate goal in Hinduism is to achieve 
mokṣa through the realization that one’s ātman  and bráhman is the same. 
ātmānaṃ viddhi know thyself. 
avatāra descent of a deity or incarnation of God. 
avyakta  unmanifest, unapparent, and indistinct. Refers also in masc. gender to the 
Universal Spirit, the Supreme Being, bráhman. 
avidyā  ignorance. 
āyuh literally means “life”. Ayurveda is the Veda of āyuh or life. Thus, 
Ayurveda is “the science or art of life”. 
bándhu  connection, relation or association. 
Bhagavad-Gītā  literally “the song of the sublime” or the song of Kṛṣṇa. It is part of the 
epic of Mahābhārata. 
bhakti devotion or love of God. 
bhāṣya commentary. 
bheda difference. 
Bráhmā personal God, the creator God. 
bráhman (neuter gender): the impersonal God, devoid of all qualities; the 
Omnipresent, All-pervading, Transcendent Reality. This supreme 
Reality is called bráhman when regarded as transcendent, and ātman 
when regarded as the Life Principle in the individual person, the power 
behind and within the cosmos that makes it function and live; the 
Ultimate Reality. In the early Vedic religion, this was the focus of 
worship by the Brahmins. 
Brāhmaṇas  sacrificial texts of the post-Vedic period consisting in theological 
treatises explaining the vedas. They expound the sacrificial ceremonial 
in minute detail. They probably belong to about the seventh century B.C. 
Refers also to an individual belonging to the highest varṇa; considered 
as custodians of the sacred texts and teachers (also written as Brahmin). 
bhrūṇahatyā  is the killing of an embryo in general. 
bhrūṇaghna  the proper word for one who procures abortion. 
bimba-pratibimba image, shadow, reflected or represented form. Pratibimba is a reflection, 
reflected image. The combination of bimba- pratibimba means object of 
comparison and that with which it is compared. 
brahmacarya first stage in life, celibate student-hood. 
buddhi or vijñāna is reasoning or intelligence. 
cāṇḍāla term used for lower class, outcast. Also used for a child of a Brahmin 
mother and a Śūdra father. 
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Caraka Saṁhitā the classical inner medicine or therapeutic text on Ayurveda medicine 
written by Caraka (ca. 2nd Century BCE), a physician. 
cit to perceive, to understand, comprehend, know, be conscious of and 
reflect upon. ‘Pure consciousness’ is one of the three attributes of 
bráhman. 
caturāśrama  four stages of life: the brahmacarya the gṛahstya, the vānaprasthya, life 
and saṃnyāsa. 
caturvarga  the four aims of life or the puruṣārthas 
caturvarṇa  the four principle varṇas or classes. 
cetana conscious. 
darśana philosophy. 
dharma variously translated as ethics, duty; conformity to the laws; justice, piety; 
equity; law; usage; etc. It is also the basis of human rights. 
Dharmaśāstra treatise of Dharma, law books. Any book recognized as having divine 
authority, but particularly the ancient books of Hindu law. 
dhātus or bhūtas elements. It refers to six elements that comprises a puruṣa, namely, the 
five mahābhūtas and the element of consciousness. 
doṣa  means a fault or error, an Ayurvedic term for biological humour. The 
three doṣas are vāta, pitta and kapha. These three are the biological 
humours that are the root forces of our physical life. 
dvaita  dualism. The system that considers bráhman as a personal God and 
creator of everything. 
garbha from the root grabh, meaning the womb. It refers to the inside, the 
middle, interior of anything. A foetus or embryo, child. 
garbhahatyā  killing of an embryo. 
garbhavadhá  killing or destruction of the embryo. 
gṛahstya second stage in the life, the life of a householder 
guṇa quality or properties. The chief quality of all existing beings (the three 
guṇas, namely, sattva, rajas and tamas). 
guru a venerable respectable person, spiritual preceptor who instructs the 
disciples in the śastras. 
Harijan Literally means ‘Children of God’ or ‘people of God’. Mahatma Gandhi 
gave this name to the category of the Untouchables. 
hatyā killing. 
hiṁsā  killing, violence or causing injury. 
indriyas organs. Ten in number; five sense or knowledge organs  (jñāna-indriyas) 
and five action organs (karma- indriyas). 
Īśvara personal God, manifestation of the creator bráhman. 
jāti  species as opposed to individuals, position assigned by birth, rank, caste 
jīva the principle of life, individual or personal soul imparting life to the 
human body, individual consciousness. 
jīvātman  animated soul or self. 
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jīvanmukta liberated soul. One who has reached liberation while still in body and 
will not be reborn again because of being devoid of karma. 
jñāna knowledge. 
jñāni a knower of the absolute. 
kāma desire, longing, pleasure, enjoyment, love, especially sexual love. 
kāraṇa cause, non-constituent cause, author, title for ātman. 
karma action, religious rite, results of immoral acts or the eternal law of 
retribution. 
kósa the five sheaths or coverings or the body. They are: the outermost “body 
made of food” (anna-maya-kósa), the “body made of vitality” (prāṇa-
maya-kósa), the “body made of mind” (mano-maya-kósa), the “body 
made of understanding” or wisdom or evaluation (vijñāna-maya-kósa) 
and the “body made of bliss” (ānanda-maya-kósa). 
Kṛṣṇa name of the most famous avatāra of  
Kṣatriyas  one of the four varṇas. Defenders and warriors who also ruled as kings 
and administrators. 
kṣetra field. 
kṣetrajña the knower,  i.e., the puruṣa or ātman, who knows the field or matter. 
mahā great. 
Mahābhārata  written perhaps in the 8th and 9th centuries B.C.E. It is one of the Sanskrit 
epics of ancient India attributed to Vyāsa. A principal part of 
Mahābhārata is the Bhagavad-Gītā. 
mahābhūtas  the great elements which are five in number in the their subtle form, i.e., 
earth (pṛthvī), water (jala), fire (tejas), air (vāyu), ether (ākāśa). 
mahātmā great soul, title of honour. 
manas or also buddhi is the intellect or mind, a synonym for cit. In Philosophy, 
it also means the internal organ of perception and cognition, the faculty 
or instrument through which thoughts enter or by which objects of sense 
affect the soul. In this sense, it is always regarded as distinct from ātman 
and puruṣa. 
māṇav dharma laws given by Manu, valid for all human kind, humanism. 
mantra Sacred word or formula to be chanted. It is called mantra, because it 
induces manana or reflection on the Supreme and because it provides 
trana or protection from the whirling of transmigratory life. 
Manu progenitor of humankind, the first ancestor of human race and the first 
sacrificer of fire. 
Manusmṛti Laws of Manu. A compilation of existing laws and creeds probably of 
about the third century BCE but based upon earlier works, attributed to 
Manu. 
mārga way, path of salvation through karma-, jñāna- and bhaktimārga. 
māyā extraordinary or supernatural power, illusion, unreality or deception. 
mīmāṁsā inquisition. One of the six orthodox system of Hindu philosophical 
system that defends and justifies the Vedic ritualism. 
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mokṣa liberation, release from worldly existence. 
mūḍhgarbha  “The Foetus Astray” or mal position of the embryo in the uterus. 
mukta liberated. 
mukti liberation 
nāstika heterodox. A system of Hindu Philosophy that does not accept the 
authority of the Veda. 
neti neti neti derived from a composite of two words na iti, “not so”. A denial, 
namely, “not this, not this”. A term used to describe the 
incomprehensible characteristics of the ātman. 
nirākāra without any form with reference to bráhman. 
nirguṇa without qualities or attributes. 
nirguṇa bráhman  bráhman as “impersonal”, having no qualities or the quality-less, 
implying that bráhman of itself is obviously beyond the limits of matter. 
Nirukta a technical treatise on etymology, philology and semantics. 
nīti  ethics, right moral behaviour, moral precept, rules of conduct. 
nitya eternal. 
niyama discipline, commandment. 
niyoga  the impregnation of a wife of an impotent or dead man in order to bear a 
child that will continue the progeny. 
nyāya rule, method, logic. One of the six orthodox system of Hindu philosophy. 
Traditionally it meant ‘formal reasoning’. It bases itself on four methods 
of arriving at the truth, namely, perception, inference, analogy and verbal 
testimony. 
Om  the primal sounds [namely a + u + m], the sound or vibration from which 
the whole universe emanates. In the Vedas, the most sacred of all words 
and has the meaning of bráhman. 
pāda section of a text. 
pañca the number five. used in compound with other substantives, e.g., pañca 
bheda (five differences). 
pañcamavarṇa the fifth varṇa; the category of out-caste-castes or non-caste-castes; the 
category of Untouchables, of Harijans or of the depressed castes. 
pañca mahā pātaka The five cardinal sins, namely, killing a Brāhmaṇa, drinking intoxicating 
liquors, stealing, destroying an embryo, committing adultery with the 
wife of a guru. 
param chief, primary, in the highest degree, supreme. 
paramārthika absolute reality or absolute truth which is bráhman itself. 
paramātman the Supreme soul. 
pātana  causing the fall of the foetus or abortion. Recourse to this procedure is 
used only in extreme circumstances. 
Prajāpati literally lord of creatures, creator. Same as puruṣa and sacrifice. 
prakṛti literally ‘making or placing before or at first’, primal matter, primary 
substance. It is an individual’s inherent nature influencing consciousness 
and activity. It consists of the three guṇas. 
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pramāna logical proof or means of cognition. 
prāṇa life; the life breath. 
pratiloma  intercaste marriage that was considered as reprehensible in which a man 
of lower caste marries a woman belonging to a higher caste. 
Purānas sources of folklore and popular religion. Purānas succeeded the famous 
epics, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata. 
pura township, fort. 
puruṣa is the same as Manu. Literally, it means ‘person’ or ‘Self’. The original, 
primaeval being, the sacrifice of which was believed to create from its 
body the phenomenal world, in particular the four castes. It is the pure 
consciousness, or the spirit which is also synonymous of bráhman and 
therefore of atman. 
puruṣārthas  the aims/goals of life required for human fulfilment, namely, wealth 
(artha), pleasure (kāma), duty (dharma) and liberation (mokṣa). 
puruṣotama supreme person. 
Rāma main hero of Rāmāyaṇa. General name of God. 
Rāmāyaṇa  a great epic written between 5th to the 4th centuries B.C.E, attributed to 
sage Valmiki. It describes the ‘goings’ (ayana) of Rāma and his wife 
Sītā. 
rajas one of the three guṇas or qualities, namely, passion, energy or 
turbulence. 
Ṛg Veda  verses recited during sacrifices. 
rasa a bodily fluid. In Ayurvedic embryology, it refers to the digestive 
product of the mother’s food. 
ṛṣi written also as rishi are patriarchal sages or saints, authors or seers of 
Vedic hymns. 
sadvṛtta the word used for ethics in Ayurveda. 
saguṇa with qualities or attributes 
saguṇa bráhman   bráhman  as “personal”, with qualities or the anthropomorphic qualified 
Godhead. 
śaivites followers of Śiva. 
sākṣī/sākṣitva  legal witness, evidence, testimony, bráhman present in humans. 
Sāma Veda  the Veda that comprises of chants or melodies 
saṁhitā a compendium, a compilation of hymns and formulas. The mantra part 
of the Vedas. 
sāṁkhya figure, number. One of the six orthodox system of Hindu philosophy. It 
means ‘enumeration’. It bases itself on perception, inference and verbal 
testimony. The universe is the outcome of union of spirit (puruṣa) and 
primal matter (prakṛti). 
saṃnyāsa fourth stage of life. A life of renunciation. 
saṃnyāsī An ascetic or devotee who lives a life of renunciation of all earthly 
concerns and devotes himself to meditation of the scriptures. 
sampradāya  a religious tradition or sect. 
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saṁsāra the world, secular life, cycle of death and rebirth. 
sanātana dharma another word for Hinduism. The eternal religion based on the eternal 
sustaining values of life. 
śarīra  corporeal human body, classified into three, namely, The dense or gross 
body (sthūla śarīra) made of food, subtle or fine body (sūkshma śarīra) 
made of vitality, mind and understanding and the causal body (kāraṇa 
śarīra) made of bliss. 
Śārīrastāna  Ayurvedic text that deals with anatomy and embryology. 
sárva  all in all; general. 
svarūpa real nature of the self. 
śastra instrument, sword, weapon. 
śāstra teaching, instruction, a manual or compendium of rules. 
sat-cit-ānandá absolute existence-pure consciousness-perfect bliss; a synonym for 
bráhman. 
sat  being, existence, truth, the self-existent or Universal Spirit, bráhman. 
‘Absolute existence’ is one of the three attributes of bráhman. 
satī a virtuous or faithful wife who burns herself (not always voluntary) on 
her husband’s funeral pyres. 
sātmya  wholesomeness, that which is agreeable to nature or natural constitution. 
In Caraka Saṁhitā it means wholesome or suitableness as a factor 
responsible for the production of an embryo. 
satsanga  a gathering of religious-minded people seeking the truth. 
sattva one of the three guṇas or basic qualities, namely, goodness or purity. 
satya truth. 
satyagraha  agraha = firmness. Hence, satyagraha means holding on steadfastly to 
Truth (Gandhi equated Truth to God). 
Sītā In the Rāmāyaṇa the proper name of the consort of Rāma. 
Śiva the destroyer God. 
smārta the two schools of orthodox theological ideas of Hinduism based on 
ṡruti, namely, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta. 
Smṛti the oral tradition and non-canonical scriptures, which derive their 
authority from ṡruti. 
soma juice of the Soma plant offered in libation. 
śoṇiṭa the female vital energy. 
śrāddha a rite performed in honour and for the benefit of dead relatives. It is not 
a funeral ceremony but a supplement to such a ceremony. 
Ṡruti what has been revealed and heard. The revealed canonical scriptures of 
the Hindus, comprising of the Veda. 
sthūla large, fat, strong, gross. In combination with śarīra, it means gross body. 
In Philosophy it refers to material or tangible as opposed to sūkṣma.  
Śūdras  one of the four varṇas. Individuals belonging to the lowest class. They 
were a class of servants and menials. 
śukra and śoṇiṭa the male and female sexual fluids and hormones, respectively. 
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sūkṣma subtle. 
sūkta Vedic hymn, the puruṣa-sūkta. 
Suśruta Saṁhitā surgical texts of Ayurveda written by Suśruta (ca. 6th Century BCE), a 
surgeon. 
sūtra a thread, sacred thread worn by the first three classes, a short sentence or 
aphoristic rules and a manual consisting of strings of such rules. 
sūtrastāna  Ayurvedic text that deals with general principles and philosophy of 
medicine. 
swaraj self-rule, personal integrity. 
tamas one of the three guṇas or qualities that signify darkness, dullness or 
ignorance. 
tat that; designation of the Supreme being, bráhman. 
tat tvam asi  “That art thou”. 
tattva principle, nature, reality. 
tri the number three. 
trimārga  or trivarga. Literally three ways or mārga to liberation, namely, karma, 
jñāna and bhaktimārga. 
Upaniṣad Literally, it means, “sitting down” of a disciple “near to” his guru. 
Theological treatises forming the concluding portions of the Veda, and 
therefore called the Vedanta on which is based much of the later Indian 
Philosophy. 
upāsanā  devotion (bhakti) or worship 
vaiśeṣika One of the six orthodox system of Hindu philosophy. It means 
‘difference’. It accepts only two sources of knowledge: perception and 
inference. 
vānaprasthya  third stage of life, life of a forest dweller. 
varṇa Literally means colour; generally used to designate the four traditional 
social and occupational classes; class and social division based on birth, 
namely, Brāhmaṇas, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas, and Śūdras. Each Varna can be 
divided into a number of jātis. Below these four varṇas are the 
Untouchables. 
varnāśramdharma Goals of life and the functions performed according to the system of the 
four varṇas. 
Vaiśyas  one of the four varṇas. Individuals comprised of farmers and merchants.  
vāyu wind, air (as one of the five mahābhūtas), another name for prāṇa or 
vital force, associated with the God of the wind, Indra, wind of the body. 
Vedas The oldest collection of Hindu sacred texts. The four principal books of 
sacred knowledge are Ṛg, Yajur, Sāma and Atharva. 
 
vedānta One of the six orthodox system of Hindu philosophy. Literally, it means 
the end of the Vedas and is concerned with knowledge and mokṣa 
(liberation). This system is further divided into dualism (dvaita), non-
dualism (advaita) and qualified non-dualism (viśiṣṭādvaita). 
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Vedic An adjective referring to the Vedas (as in “Vedic Scriptures”), the people 
who originally created and used the Vedas, the period from 1500 to 500 
BCE during which they were written, or any form of Hinduism or Hindu 
teachings that derive from the Vedas. 
vijñāna understanding, wisdom, evaluation. 
viśiṣṭā qualified, modified or complex. 
viśiṣṭādvaita  qualified non-Dualism. It considers bráhman to be impersonal, 
transcendent, indescribable, and the essence of pure consciousness. 
Viṣṇu the Sustainer or preserver God. 
vyakt manifest. 
vyakti  specific appearance, distinctness, individuality, an individual in 
opposition to jati or species. Used in modern times for both of the 
English terms ‘individual’ and ‘person’. 
vyaktitva,  a synonym for both ‘individuality’ and ‘personality’. 
Vyāsa or also known as Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana; author of Mahābhārata; one who 
arranged or compiled the Vedas, therefore known also as Veda-Vyāsa. 
yajña Vedic sacrifice. 
Yajur Veda  Veda comprising a collection of sacrificial formulas. 
yoga One of the six orthodox system of Hindu philosophy. It means “yoke”. 
It refers to an organized form of discipline that leads to a goal, namely, 
moksha, which is the release of the soul from cycle of death and rebirth 
(samsara). 
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